Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 32 (GUJ)

Nitin Umarshibhai Bhanushali v. State Of Gujarat

2024-01-04

SANDEEP N.BHATT

body2024
ORDER : 1. The present, application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is filed by the applicant – original accused No.1 for quashing and setting aside the impugned F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-8 of 2019 registered with Nirona Police Station, Kachchh for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 323, 294(B), 506(2) & 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “I.P.C.”) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 2. Brief facts of the case as per the case of the applicant in this application are as such that complainant took a loan of Rs. 5,73,758/- on 07.11.2007 and out of the said amount, a tractor was purchased, the tractor is as on date also running in the name of the complainant. Complainant sold the tractor to the applicant for consideration of Rs. 60,000/- and executed an agreement. The complainant and Babu Mura Maheshwari went to the House of the applicant and demanded Rs. 25,000/- and asking him to pay the instalments, however, the complainant and other person were attacked and abused, for which they had taken treatment. Thereafter the complainant made applications and therefore the applicant on 26.06.2019 executed an agreement and paid Rs. 25,000/-. Hence, the impugned F.I.R. being C.R. No. 1-8 of 2019 was lodged for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 323, 294B, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3(1)(r), (s), 3(2)(5)(a) of The Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Hence the present application. 3. Heard Mr. Darshan M. Varandani, the earned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Harshad K. Patel, the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 – complainant and Mr. Soaham Joshi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 – State. 4. Mr. Darshan M. Varandani, the learned counsel for the applicant has drawn my attention to the averments made in the impugned F.I.R., whereby it is evident that the dispute was occurred in the 2009, which pertains to some monetary transaction by way of selling of tractor Pursuant to that, some agreement is executed between the parties. 4. Mr. Darshan M. Varandani, the learned counsel for the applicant has drawn my attention to the averments made in the impugned F.I.R., whereby it is evident that the dispute was occurred in the 2009, which pertains to some monetary transaction by way of selling of tractor Pursuant to that, some agreement is executed between the parties. In the year 2019, the applicant has filed this complaint under Sections 406, 420, 323, 294B, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3(1)(r), (s), 3(2)(5)(a) of The Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989, leading to present application. Furthermore, he has submitted that on bare reading of the complaint, the ingredients of any of the sections are not made out. Additionally, he has submitted that the incident occurred at the applicant's residence, and therefore, it cannot be considered as taking place in "public view." Moreover, he has submitted that considering the fact that no specific averment is made in the complaint that what word is used on the some derogatory remarks or insulting words. Furthermore, he has submitted that in accordance with the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah versus State of Andra Pradesh reported in (2008) 12 SCC 531 , more particularly paras : 5 to 8 and 12 thereof, the necessary requirement that F.I.R. must disclose that the accused are not belonging from the S.C. & S.T. community, and this crucial averment is also missing. Moreover, considering the alleged Sections 406, 420, 323, 294(B), 506(2) & 114 of the I.P.C., it is prima facie evident that these provisions are not applicable in the facts of the and the present complaint is filed with an ulterior motive and to settle some personal score under the guise of criminal prosecution. Moreover, considering the alleged Sections 406, 420, 323, 294(B), 506(2) & 114 of the I.P.C., it is prima facie evident that these provisions are not applicable in the facts of the and the present complaint is filed with an ulterior motive and to settle some personal score under the guise of criminal prosecution. Hence, he has prayed that in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) State of Haryana V/s Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , (ii) Gorige Pentaiah (supra), (iii) Sri Gulam Mustafa versus State of Karnataka reported in 2023 (0) AIJEL – SC 71008, more particularly paras 36 to 39 thereof are relevant, and (iv) Hitesh Verma versus State of Uttarakhand and Another reported in 2020 SCC online (SC) 907, more particularly, paragraphs 11 to 15, 16 and 18 thereof are relevant, the present application may be allowed by exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash and set aside the impugned F.I.R. 5. On the contrary, Mr. Harshad K. Patel, the learned counsel for respondent No.2 – the complainant, has asserted that, on the date of the incident, the applicant had assaulted the complainant. Babu Mura Maheshwari also intervened during the incident, requesting the applicant not to beat the complainant. Moreover, he has contended that it appears an agreement was executed in favour of the complainant following the sale of the tractor. Subsequently, the cheque issued for tractor payment was bounced. Hence, prima facie, the alleged offence in the impugned F.I.R. is made out, and the ingredients of the sections mentioned in the F.I.R. are attracted, especially considering the complainant's affiliation with the S.C. & S.T. community. Therefore, he has contends that, with prima facie evidence on record, no case warrants the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The applicant should face the trial proceedings, utilizing available defences during the trial. 6. Mr. Therefore, he has contends that, with prima facie evidence on record, no case warrants the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The applicant should face the trial proceedings, utilizing available defences during the trial. 6. Mr. Soaham Joshi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No.1 – State has drawn my attention to the statement of Babu Mura Maheshwari record on 16.1.2023 by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nakhatrana, whereby at the last portion of the statement, said Babubhai Mura Maheshwari has categorically stated that no such incident has taken place in his presence as the complaint as narrated in the impugned F.I.R. Therefore, the say of the complainant is doubtful and considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court may pass appropriate order in the interest of justice. 7.1 I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar by the respective parties. I have also considered the fact that the present complaint is filed pursuant to the initial incident of the year 2009, and as per the impugned F.I.R. which is said to be extended till the year 2019, which is prima facie, found very unusual and very surprising. On bare reading of the contends of the impugned F.I.R., it transpires that as per the complaint, the alleged incident has taken place at the private place i.e. residence of the applicant. It also transpires that even assuming that there is some dispute regarding some monetary exchange, even then breach of contract cannot be considered for such criminal offence under I.P.C. 7.2 It is relevant to refer the offences, which are invoked in the impugned F.I.R. under Sections 406, 420, 323, 294B, 506(2) and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3(1)(r),(s), 3(2)(va) of The Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989, as under: “Section 406 in The Indian Penal Code:- 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Section 420 in The Indian Penal Code 420. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Section 420 in The Indian Penal Code 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 323 in The Indian Penal Code 323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Section 294(b) in The Indian Penal Code (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.] Section 506 in The Indian Penal Code 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. Section 114 in The Indian Penal Code 114. Section 114 in The Indian Penal Code 114. Abettor present when offence is committed.— Whenever any person, who is absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence. “3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view; 3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; 3(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe- [(va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to suchmember, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine;” 7.3 Furthermore, upon a bare reading of the alleged sections, it becomes apparent that Section 294(B) and Sections 3(1)(r),(s) of the Atrocities Act stipulate that the incident must have occurred in public view. In the present case, admittedly, it is evident that it has not taken place in public view. Moreover, the averments made in the F.I.R. do not inspire any confidence. Hence, no prudent person would expect to wait for the transaction from the year 2009 til 2019. Additionally, the F.I.R. lacks a specific assertion regarding the abusive words used by the applicant regarding the caste of the complainant. Taking into account the fact that the impugned F.I.R. does not disclose anything about the accused belonging to the S.C. & S.T. community, it further raises doubts about the validity and merit of the charges. Additionally, the F.I.R. lacks a specific assertion regarding the abusive words used by the applicant regarding the caste of the complainant. Taking into account the fact that the impugned F.I.R. does not disclose anything about the accused belonging to the S.C. & S.T. community, it further raises doubts about the validity and merit of the charges. 7.4.1 It is also fruitful to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma (supra), it is held in paragraphs 11 to 15, 16 and 18, as under: “11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as "1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view". 13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh and Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel and Ors. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the 13. The offence under Section 3(1) (r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private p13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.lace but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies." 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered "in any place within public view" is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” 16. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.” 7.4.2 It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sri Gulam Mustafa (supra), more particularly paras 36 to 39 thereof, which read as under : “36. What is evincible from the extant case-law is that this Court has been consistent in interfering in such matters where purely civil disputes, more often than not, relating to land and/or money are given the colour of criminality, only for the purposes of exerting extra-judicial pressure on the party concerned, which, we reiterate, is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, there is a huge, and quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating dispute with regard to the ownership of the land in question, and the criminal case has been lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits, coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/her family members. It is evident that resort was not being had to criminal proceedings which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is with ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is a clear case of vengeance. 37. The Court would also note that even if the allegations are taken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the appellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive. 38. This Court would indicate that the officers, who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a very stringent nature, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused. The officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand. We clarify that our remarks, in no manner, are to dilute the applicability of special/stringent statutes, but only to remind the police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position. 39. For the reasons aforesaid, the Court finds that the High Court fell in error in not invoking its wholesome power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR. Accordingly, the Impugned Judgment, being untenable in law, is set aside. Consequent thereupon, the FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to the appellant, are quashed and set aside.” 7.4.3 Further, it would also be fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gorige Pentaiah (supra), more particularly Paras : 5 to 8 and 12 thereof, which read as under : “5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that even if all the allegations incorporated in the complaint are taken as true, even then, no offence is made out under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and under Sections 447, 427, 506 of the Indian Penal Code. As far as Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is concerned, it reads as under : "3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe :- (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view." 6. In the instant case, the allegation of respondent No.3 in the entire complaint is that on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (respondent No.3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the accused-appellant was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law. 7. Similarly, we find that the ingredients of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code are totally absent in the complaint. In the complaint it is not even mentioned that the accused had intimidated or threatened the complainant or any one else. In absence of basic ingredients of the section in the complaint, no case under section 506 IPC can be sustained. Section 506 reads as under : "Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both". 8. In absence of basic ingredients of the section in the complaint, no case under section 506 IPC can be sustained. Section 506 reads as under : "Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both". 8. "Criminal intimidation" has been defined in Section 503 which reads as under : "Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation." 12. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised : (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.” 7.4.4 Further, it will also be fruitful to mention the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus – “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch.XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Art.226 or the inherent powers under sec.482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under sec.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of sec.155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under sec.156(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 7.4.5 It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Another (supra), more particularly para : 23 & 24 thereof, which read as under: “23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Sec. 482 CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Sec. 482 CrPC can be exercised: [(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;] [(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and] [(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.] 24. Inherent powers under Sec. 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself'. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. Inherent powers under Sec. 482 CrPC though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself'. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. Discussion of decided cases.” 7.4.6. It is fruitful to refer the order dated 9.6.2023 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.9188 of 2018, more specifically, paragraphs 8 and 9 are relevant, as under: “8. The provisions of Sections 294(b) and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code are as under: “294. Obscene acts and songs.—Whoever, to the annoyance of others, (a) xxx (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both. “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation – Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. - And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. Para I Punishment – Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both – Non-cognizable – Bailable – Triable by any Magistrate – Compoundable by the person intimidated. Para II – Punishment – Imprisonment for 7 years, or fine, or both – Non-cognizable Bailable – Triable by Magistrate of the first class – Compoundable by the person intimidated.” 9. On bare reading of the FIR, it transpires that the FIR is lodged under Sections 294(b) and 506(2) read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code. Para II – Punishment – Imprisonment for 7 years, or fine, or both – Non-cognizable Bailable – Triable by Magistrate of the first class – Compoundable by the person intimidated.” 9. On bare reading of the FIR, it transpires that the FIR is lodged under Sections 294(b) and 506(2) read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code. The entire incident has occurred in the private residential house, whereas, under the law, more particularly, as per the provision of Section 294(b) of Indian Penal Code, the incident should have occurred in the public place. As far as Section 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, general allegations are made in the FIR and, therefore, no case is made out.” 7.5 Additionally, considering the fact that the person, who allegedly was present at the time of the incident, during the course of the investigation, categorically stated before the police authority that he was not present at the time of the incident and has no knowledge about such an incident, this itself demonstrates the questionable conduct of the complainant. It suggests that the complaint has been filed with some mala fide intention to harass the present applicant. Therefore, in view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that this is a fit case where the Court should exercise its discretion in favor of the present applicant by exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with the aim of preventing the abuse of the process of law, in alignment with the above-mentioned judgments. 8. Resultantly, the present application is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 9. The impugned F.I.R. being C.R. No.I-8 of 2019 registered with Nirona Police Station, Kachchh for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 323, 294(B), 506(2) & 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “I.P.C.”) and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as well as consequential proceedings arising thereto, are quashed and set aside qua the present applicant only. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 10. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 10. Considering the conduct of the complainant, the Court has to take judicial notice that, time and again, in many matters, the Court has encountered cases where the provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are invoked merely on request of complainant, without verifying the actual facts of the incident. Merely because the complainant belongs to a particular community should not provide any undue advantage to such complainants. Due to this phenomenon, the provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are misused in many matters, as found by this Court. Hence, such a practice needs to be discouraged. Such dishonest litigation filed by the complainant with mala fide intentions needs to be curtailed. Otherwise, persons with genuine cases for invoking the stringent provisions of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act may be deprived of the benefits of such legislation due to repeated instances of misuse of the provisions by individuals like the present complainant and, therefore, such practice is required to be discouraged. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is not imposing any cost on the complainant. 11. The amount of compensation, if any, paid to the complainant, be refunded to the State, within four weeks from today. It would be open for the State to recover the same if not refunded by the complainant, in accordance with law.