JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.06.2021 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmour at Nahan (learned Trial Court) vide which, the appellant (accused before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the prosecution filed a charge sheet against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It was asserted that the police received information on 28.5.2017, at about 6.40 AM, from Tanuj (PW-1) that one person was stabbed at Tokiyon, near the cowshed. The information was reduced to writing and an entry (Ex.PW8/A) was recorded in the Police Station. SI Beeru Ahmad (PW-20), HC Surender Singh and HHC Kamal Kant (PW-16) proceeded to verify the correctness of the information. Geeta Ram, the informant, made a statement to the police that he was employed in the Gokul Dhaam cowshed to take care of the cows. He had gone to his home on 28.5.2017 at around 6.30 AM to take a bath when he heard some noise from the road near the cowshed. Informant Geeta Ram went to the spot and saw the accused Surender Singh abusing his brother-in-law Balbir Singh (since deceased) and attacking him with a knife on his neck and belly. Geeta Ram asked the accused not to stab the deceased but he continued stabbing the deceased. The deceased fell on the road and succumbed to his injuries. Many people gathered on the spot. The statement (Ex.PW13/A) was reduced into writing and was sent to the Police Station where FIR (Ex.PW18/A) was registered. SI Beeru Ahmad (PW-20) conducted the investigation. He prepared the inquest report (Ex.PW 20/A) and sent the dead body to the hospital for postmortem examination. Dr Kamal Pasha (PW-14), Dr Sudhir Gupta and Dr Rajiv Chauhan (PW-17) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased and found stab injuries which would have been caused by a knife. SI Beeru Ahmad (PW-20) conducted the investigation. He prepared the inquest report (Ex.PW 20/A) and sent the dead body to the hospital for postmortem examination. Dr Kamal Pasha (PW-14), Dr Sudhir Gupta and Dr Rajiv Chauhan (PW-17) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased and found stab injuries which would have been caused by a knife. The postmortem report (Ex.PW14/B) was issued. SI Beeru Ahmad prepared the spot map (Ex.PW-20/C). He picked up a piece of brick stained with blood (Ex. P1), put it in a parcel and sealed the parcel with three impressions of seal ‘H’. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex.PW10/A). He picked a controlled brick piece (Ex.P-2), put it in a parcel and sealed the parcel with three impressions of seal ‘H’. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex.PW10/B). He lifted the blood-stained soil (Ex.P3) from the spot where the dead body was lying. It was wrapped in paper and sealed in a parcel with three impressions of seal ‘H’. The soil was seized vide memo (Ex.PW10/C). He picked up the controlled soil sample (Ex. P4), wrapped it in paper and sealed it in a parcel with three impressions of seal ‘H’. The parcel was taken into possession vide memo (Ex.PW10/D). He also seized a pair of slippers (Ex.P5) and a belt (Ex.P6) lying on th e spot. He put them in a parcel and sealed the parcel with three impressions of seal ‘H’. The parcel was seized vide me mo (Ex.PW10/E). He scraped the blood-stained concrete (Ex.P7) from the road and wrapped it in a newspaper. He sealed the newspaper in a parcel with three seal impressions of seal ‘H’ and seized the parcel vide memo (Ex.PW10/F). He obtained the sample seals ‘H’ on separate pieces of cloth (Ex.PW-10/G-1 to Ex.PW-10/G-6) and handed over the seal to witness Gurnam Singh after the use. HC Virender Singh (PW9) deposited the parcels in Malkhana. The photographs of the spot (Ex.PW15/A1 to Ex.PW15/A24) were taken by Rajnish Kumar (PW-15). The Medical Officer also handed over the parcels to HHC Kamal Kant, who deposited them with HC Virender Singh. The accused was arrested on 28.5.2017. The accused had sustained injury on his head hand and finger of his right hand. SI Beeru Ahmad filed an application (Ex.PW17/A) for conducting medical examination of the accused. The Medical Officer also handed over the parcels to HHC Kamal Kant, who deposited them with HC Virender Singh. The accused was arrested on 28.5.2017. The accused had sustained injury on his head hand and finger of his right hand. SI Beeru Ahmad filed an application (Ex.PW17/A) for conducting medical examination of the accused. Dr Rajeev Chauhan (PW17) conducted the medical examination of the accused and found that he had suffered simple injuries that could have been cau.sed by a blunt-edged weapon within 10-12 hours of examination. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW17/B). The accused made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW16/A) on 30.5.2017 in the presence of HHC Kamal Kant (PW16) and Constable Arun Kumar that he could get the knife recovered from his room. The accused led the police to his house at Village Tokiyon. Nettar Singh (PW11) and Malkiyat Singh were associated on the way. The accused got recovered a knife (Ex.P8) from the bottom of the cupboard. SI Beeru Ahmad prepared the sketch of knife (Ex.PW20/D) and sealed it in a parcel with three impressions of seal ‘T’. He seized the knife vide memo (Ex.PW11/C). He obtained the sample of seal (Ex.PW11/D) on a piece of cloth and handed it over to Nettar Singh after the use. The accused also produced one Pant (Ex. P9) and a Shirt (Ex. P10), which were put in a parcel and the parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal ‘D’. The clothes were seized vide memo (Ex.PW11/E). The spot map of the recovery (Ex.PW20/C) was prepared. The case property was deposited with HC Virender Singh, who sent it to FSL for analysis. The result of the analysis (Ex.PX1 to Ex.PX3) issued by FSL shows that the controlled brick piece lifted from the spot was consistent with a blood-stained piece of brick, the soil sample was consistent with the blood-stained piece of concrete, human blood was detected in the blood sample, Pants, T-shirt and underwear of the deceased, blood- stained brick pieces, blood-stained soil, blo od-stained stones lifted from the spot, belt and Chappal of the deceased, knife and shirt of Surender Kumar (accu sed) but the result was inconclusive regarding the blood group. Blood was detected on the pants of the accused but it was insufficient for Serological examination. No poison/alcohol was detected in the viscera. Blood was detected on the pants of the accused but it was insufficient for Serological examination. No poison/alcohol was detected in the viscera. The DNA profiling obtained from the pants, T-shirt, blood-stained stone, and dagger/knife was consistent with DNA profiling obtained from the blood of Balbir Singh. A partial and mixed DNA profiling was obtained from the Pants, and T-shirt of accused Surender Singh but nothing conclusive could be said about the same. The Medical Officer issued the final opinion that the deceased had died due to hypovolemic shock and asphyxia caused by the cutting of great vessels like common carotid and subclavian arteries and collapse of the right lung leading to cardio respiratory arrest. The injuries could have been caused by means of the knife recovered at the instance of the accused. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented in the Court of Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Paonta Sahib, who committed it to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour at Nahan for trial, from where it was assigned to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmour, at Nahan (learned Trial Co urt). 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 21 witnesses to prove its case. Tanuj (PW1) made a call to the police disclosing that one person was stabbed. Anwar Ali (PW2) and Dharam Singh (PW3) did not support the prosecution case. Raghubir Singh (PW4) is the brother of the deceased, who proved that earlier a quarrel had taken place between the accused and the deceased in which the accused had caused head injury to the deceased. Ram Lok (PW5) was told about the incident and he visited the spot. Paramjeet (PW6) prepared the spot map. HHC Ramesh Kumar (PW7) carried the parcels to FSL. Constable Mohd. Tosif (Pw8) proved the entry in the daily diary. HHC Virender Singh (PW9) was working as In-charge, Malkhana with whom the case property was deposited. Gurnam Singh (PW10) was told about the death of Balbir Singh. He visited the spot and witnessed the recovery of various articles from the spot. Constable Mohd. Tosif (Pw8) proved the entry in the daily diary. HHC Virender Singh (PW9) was working as In-charge, Malkhana with whom the case property was deposited. Gurnam Singh (PW10) was told about the death of Balbir Singh. He visited the spot and witnessed the recovery of various articles from the spot. Nettar Singh (PW11) proved the recovery of the knife, shirt and pants at the instance of the ac cused. Khan Mohd. (PW12) did not support the prosecution case. Geeta Ram (PW13) is the informant and eyewitness. Dr . Kamal Pasha (PW14) and Dr. Rajeev Chauhan (PW17) conducted the postmortem of the deceased. Rajnish Kumar (PW15) took the photographs of the spot. HHC Kamal Kant (PW16) carried rukka from the spot to the Police Station and also carried the articles from the Civil Hospital, Paonta Sahib to the Police Station, Paonta Sahib. He also witnessed the disclosure statement made by the accused. Dr. Rajeev Chauhan (PW17) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased and the medical examination of the accused. SI/SHO Sewa Singh (PW18) registered the FIR. He prepared the supplementary challan and presented it before the Court. Harmesh Kumar (PW19) prepared the challan. SI Beeru Ahmad (PW20) conducted the investigation. SI Mohar Singh (PW21) filed the supplementary charge sheet. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He stated that he was innocent and the deceased had quarrelled with one Ram Lok one day before the incident. Statements of Dr Sumit Khatri (DW1) and Shalender Bhandari (DW2 ) were recorded in defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimony of Geeta Ram, the informant, was credible. It was duly corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained knife at the instance of the accused. The knife was found to contain the blood of the deceased. The deceased suspected that the accused had illicit relations with his wife. The defence of the accused that he was suffering from a mental ailment was not established as no treatment was taken after the year 2014. The injury caused by the accused was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 7. The defence of the accused that he was suffering from a mental ailment was not established as no treatment was taken after the year 2014. The injury caused by the accused was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The evidence was not properly appreciated. The testimony of the informant was not sufficient to convict the accused. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. The informant stated that the accused had stabbed the deceased in his stomach and neck, which is not corroborated by the medical evidence. It was proved by the defence that the deceased was suffering from a mental ailmen t. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, it was prayed that the accused be acqu itted. 8. We have heard M/s Mohit Pal Singh, Mudit Johar and Abhimanyu Singh, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr Varun Chandel, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 9. M/s Mohit Pal Singh, Mudit Johar and Abhimanyu Singh, learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. There was a discrepancy in the testimonies of the informant Geeta Ram (PW13) and Ram Lok (PW5) regarding the time. The place of the incident was heavily populated; however, no person from the vicinity was examined to prove the incident. There was a delay of more than four hours in the registration of the FIR, which was not properly explained. The statement of the informant is not corroborated by the medical evidence and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The disclosure statement was not witnessed by the independent witnesses and the same is fatal to the prosecution case. Hence, they prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sent ence passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Varun Chandel, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, they prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sent ence passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Varun Chandel, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the testimony of the informant is consistent and there is nothing on record to doubt the testimony. There is no requirement to associate the independent witnesses at the time of recording the disclosure statement. The actual recovery was witnessed by an independent witness against whom nothing was suggested. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. We have given considerable thought to the submissions and have gone through the records carefully. 12. Dr Kamal Pasha (PW14), Dr. Sudhir Gupta and Dr. Rajeev Chauhan (PW17) conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased and found the following injuries on his person: - Injury No.1 Sharp cut of 1.5 cm x 0.3 cm on left lateral side of nose bridge averted, clean cut vertically placed below left eye reddish in colour. Injury No.2 Sharp stab wound of 4cm x 1.5 cm x 8 cm, deep wound vertically placed edges averted, clean cut on right side base of neck and on proximal and of right clavicle and apex of right chest. On dissection, hematoma blood clots involving platysma and strenoc lestiod muscle traced down to the apex of the right lung. Injury No.3 The sharp cut of 5 cm x 1.5 cm x 6 cm on left lateral side of the chest. Edges clean cut everted obliquely placed on dissection depth slipped between subcutaneous tissue and chest bone. Injury No.4 1 cm x 0.5 cm x 0.2 cm sharp cut on left hypochondrium vertically placed. Rigor Mortis present head to toe. Postmortem lividity present on back. Scalp brain matter is congested. Thorax: Common carotid and subclavian arteries were cut. Right pleural cavity filled with 1½ litre of clotted blood. The right lung is collapsed and a sharp cut of 1.8 cm x 0.3 cm x 1.5 cm on right apex of the lung. Left lung congested. Heart: right filled with blood, left empty. Abdomen: stomach, semi-digested food material. Intestines: fecal matter. Liver, Spleen and Kidney: congested. Bladder: Empty. Genital Organs: No abnormality detected. Musculo Skeleton System: No obvious injury. 13. Left lung congested. Heart: right filled with blood, left empty. Abdomen: stomach, semi-digested food material. Intestines: fecal matter. Liver, Spleen and Kidney: congested. Bladder: Empty. Genital Organs: No abnormality detected. Musculo Skeleton System: No obvious injury. 13. In the opinion of the Medical Officers, the most probable cause of death was hypovolemic shock and asphyxia due to cuts of great vessels like common carotid and subclavian arteries and collapse of the right lung leading to cardio respiratory arrest. Their testimonies regarding the injuries and the cause of death were not challenged in the cross-examination and they were cross-examined only about the nature of the injury and whether they could be caused by attack from the front or the rear. Therefore, the testimonies of the Medical Officers that the deceased Balbir Singh died due to the injuries caused to him have gone unrebutted and have to be accepted as correct. 14. Geeta Ram, informant, is an eyewitness to the incident. He stated that on 28.5.2017, at 6.30 AM, he came to his house from the cowshed. He heard the screams from the roadside. He immediately rushed to the spot and saw the accused Surender and deceased Balbir Singh quarrelling with each other. He saw the accused Surender Kumar giving knife blows on the belly and neck of the deceased. Balbir Singh was screaming to save his life. The informant asked the accused not to inflict knife blows on the deceased but the accused did not stop. The deceased fell to the ground. Blood was oozing from his body and he died after some time. The accused and the deceased were brothers- in-law. He deposed about various recoveri es effected by the police and identified the accused preosent in the Court. He admitted in his cross-examination that the office of PWD and many houses are located adjacent to the cowshed. His house is located at a distance of 10-15 ft. There are 3-4 houses of the people abutting the road. The houses of Lal Chand and Baldev are located adjacent to his house. A Chowkidar is employed in the PWD Office. Deceased Baldev was not related to him; however, he knew him. He (informant) was working in the cowshed round the clock. Accused Surender was working in a factory and his working time was 6.00 AM to 2.00 PM. Usually, the accused meets him while going to and coming from duty. A Chowkidar is employed in the PWD Office. Deceased Baldev was not related to him; however, he knew him. He (informant) was working in the cowshed round the clock. Accused Surender was working in a factory and his working time was 6.00 AM to 2.00 PM. Usually, the accused meets him while going to and coming from duty. He reached the spot within 1 ½ minutes of hearing the screams. He had seen the deceased while he (informant) was going to his home and he (the deceased) was sitting on the culvert. He had not seen the accused at that time. He had not seen any knife in the hands of the deceased. People from the houses were watching the incident but they did not visit the spot. Chowkidar from the PWD office and no one from the adjacent houses came to the spot. He admitted that screams could be heard by the people of the adjacent houses. He admitted that there is a dhaba near the cowshed which remains open round the clock. The house of the deceased was at a distance of about 2 kilometres from his house, whereas the house of the accused Surender is located at a distance of about 500 meters from his house. The occurrence continued for about 2-3 minutes. He did not know from where the knife was brought nor the name of the persons who had brought the knife. The motorcycle of the accused-Surender was parked on the spot. The house of Ram Lok is situated towards the cowshed at a distance of about 400 meters from the spot. He did not separate the accused and the deceased while they were fighting. He volunteered to say that the incident took place in the spur of the moment and the deceased fell on the road immediately. People informed Pradhan, who reported the matter to the police. The police reached the spot at 7.30 AM. The deceased was lying on the road. Witnesses Yad Ram and Gurnam belonged to Sainwala located at a distance of 2 kilometres from Tokiyon. He admitted that bricks and concrete are usually lying on the road. The sample of concrete was lifted at a distance of about 2 meters from the heap of the bricks. The police saw the spot, prepared the panchnama and took the body to the hospital for postmortem. Police recorded his statement at 9.30 AM. He admitted that bricks and concrete are usually lying on the road. The sample of concrete was lifted at a distance of about 2 meters from the heap of the bricks. The police saw the spot, prepared the panchnama and took the body to the hospital for postmortem. Police recorded his statement at 9.30 AM. The accused was not present at the time of the arrival of the police. He (accused) again arrived within ½ hour of the occurrence. He denied that the police had pressurized him to make a false statement against the accused. 15. This is the entire statement of the eyewitness. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness to suggest that he has any motive to depose falsely against the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Hari Singh, (1974) 4 SCC 552 that ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is a truthful witness especially when he is deposing in a grave charge of murder unless there is something unlikely or unnatural in his statement. It was observed: - “12. It is in dealing with the evidence of Zora Singh, PW 3, that the High Court seems to us to have adopted a patently erroneous approach and to have given grounds which do not appear to us to be reasonably sustainable. The High Court seems to have assumed that Zora Singh must have invented the story that he had got up to urinate so that he may pose as an eyewitness of the occurrence. The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them. The High Court had no doubt tried to show that this was the position with regard to the whole of the testimony of Zora Singh. But, we do not think that it was successful.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It was held in David Piper Vs. Mark Hales, 2013 EWHC B1 (QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: - 34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill approved by the courts is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues " published in " The Business of Judging ", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985 p 1-27 , he wrote: ". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified, but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full: ''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour' which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by over much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case: (1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred; (2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence; (3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions; (4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation; (5) the demeanour of the witness. The first three of these tests may in general be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable, and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . ." 35. It may only be unreliable, and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . ." 35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215-6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable; and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 , when he said at p. 57: - "Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added]. That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable; and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence." In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms. "Although like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important, and so infrequently done." 36. "Although like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important, and so infrequently done." 36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610 , in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14: 11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings. 12. There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge and he or she has to decide whose evidence, and how much evidence, to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary but it could be other oral evidence, for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant seeks or is given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present and the oral evidence can then be checked again st it. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present and the oral evidence can then be checked again st it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. 37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also distort the accurate picture even though they are meant to assist the court. 17. In the present case, the testimony of Geeta Ram is consistent with the initial version recorded in Ex.PW13/A, which contains the details of the incident in the same manner as were deposed by him on oath. 18. It was submitted that many houses and PWD office are located in the vicinity. The Investigating Officer did not associate any person from the vicinity, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. Geeta Ram specifically stated that people were watching the incident from their homes but no one including the Chowkidar of the PWD office came to the spot. Thus, no person had visited the place of incident. Even if the people had watched the incident from their homes, the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to their non- examination. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav Vs State of U.P. 2022 Cri. L.J. 2986 that non-examination of the witnesses will not vitiate the prosecution. It was observed: - “31. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav Vs State of U.P. 2022 Cri. L.J. 2986 that non-examination of the witnesses will not vitiate the prosecution. It was observed: - “31. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. The onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it. The aforesaid settled principle of law has been laid down in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369 : “13. Another circumstance which appears to have weighed heavily with the Additional Sessions Judge was that no independent witness of Salabatpura had been examined by the prosecution to prove the prosecution case of assault on the deceased, although the evidence shows that there were some persons living in that locality like the ‘pakodewalla’, hotel walls, shopkeeper and some of the passengers who had alighted at Salabatpura with the deceased. The Additional Sessions Judge has drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for its failure to examine any of those witnesses. Mr Hardy has adopted this argument. In our opinion, the comments of the Additional Sessions Judge are based on a serious misconception of the correct legal position. The onus of proving the prosecution case rests entirely on the prosecution and it follows as a logical corollary that the prosecution has complete liberty to choose its witnesses if it is to prove its case. The court cannot compel the prosecution to examine one witness or the other as its witness. At the most, if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. The court cannot compel the prosecution to examine one witness or the other as its witness. At the most, if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. But it is not the law that the omission to examine any and every witness even on minor points would undoubtedly lead to rejection of the prosecution case or drawing of an adverse inference against the prosecution. The law is well- settled that the prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as are essential for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. In other words, before an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses who had been withheld were eyewitnesses who had actually seen the occurrence and were therefore material to prove the case. It is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witness after witness on the same point; it is the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence that matters. In the instant case, the evidence of the eyewitnesses does not suffer from any infirmity or any manifest defect on its intrinsic merit. Secondly, there is nothing to show that at the time when the deceased was assaulted a large crowd had gathered and some of the members of the crowd had actually seen the occurrence and were cited as witnesses for the prosecution and then withheld. We must not forget that in our country there is a general tendency amongst the witnesses in mofussil to shun giving evidence in courts because of the cumbersome and dilatory procedure of our courts, the harassment to which they are subjected by the police and the searching cross-examination which they have to face before the courts. Therefore nobody wants to be a witness in a murder or any serious offence if he can avoid it. Although the evidence does show that four or five persons had alighted from the bus at the time when the deceased and his companions got down the bus, there is no suggestion that any of those persons stayed on to witness the occurrence. They may have proceeded to their village homes…” 32. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 : “19. They may have proceeded to their village homes…” 32. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 : “19. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time- honoured principle that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on the value provided by each witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity, which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even in probate cases, where the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it has been held that the production of more witnesses does not carry any weight. Thus, the conviction can even be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if the same inspires confidence. (Vide Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [ AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000], Kunju v. State of T.N. [ (2008) 2 SCC 151 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. [ (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150: AIR 2010 SC 3638 ], Mahesh v. State of M.P. [ (2011) 9 SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2012) 1 SCC 10 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 2 SCC 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807: JT (2013) 1 SC 222] .)” 19. In Appabhai and another Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696 , the incident had taken place at the bus stand. It was contended that independent witnesses were not examined and the prosecution case was doubtful. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent persons. It was observed: “11. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696 , the incident had taken place at the bus stand. It was contended that independent witnesses were not examined and the prosecution case was doubtful. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution case cannot be doubted due to the non-examination of the independent persons. It was observed: “11. In light of these principles, we may now consider the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. The contention relates to the failure of the prosecution to examine independent witnesses. The High Court has examined this contention but did not find any infirmity in the investigation. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has not been able to produce any independent witness to the incident that took place at the bus stand. There must have been several such witnesses. But the prosecution case cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. The experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that a crime like a civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether -in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the accused." 20. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Su preme Court, the prosecution cannot be doubted because of the non-examination of all the independent persons. 21. Ram Lok (PW5) stated that he was awaken by Ram Pal, who informed him that Balbir Singh and Surender were quarrelling with each other. He and Ram Lal went to the cowshed and found Balbir Singh lying near the heap of bricks in a pool of blood. The accused was breathing his last. Geeta Ram was already present on the spot. He and Ram Lal went to the cowshed and found Balbir Singh lying near the heap of bricks in a pool of blood. The accused was breathing his last. Geeta Ram was already present on the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that distance between his house and accused-Surender is about 50-60 mtrs. Two sisters-in-law of Balbir are married to Surender and his brother Ram Pal. The distance between the spot and his house is about 200 meters. Many people had gathered on the spot. Geeta Ram is a resident of Village Tokiyon and is not related to him. He denied that he had killed Balbir due to monetary transactions and he was deposing falsely due to the relationship. 22. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. He has deposed about the presence of Geeta Ram on the spot and corroborates his version that Geeta Ram was an eyewitness to the incident. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104 , that while assessing the evidence of an eye witness, the Court must adhere to two principles namely whether in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eye witness to be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scruti- nised the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is ir- resistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence more particularly the evidence re- lating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses the Court must adhere to two principles, namely whether in the circum- stances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inher- ently improbable or unreliable. The High Court in our opinion has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and in fact, had misappreciated the evidence which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court in our opinion has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and in fact, had misappreciated the evidence which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what im- pression is created by his evidence taken insofar as the context of the case and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3 we find they are consistent with one an- other so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of as- sault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evi- dence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to es- tablish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” 24. In the present case, the presence of Geeta Ram is established by the testimony of Ram Lok. There is nothing in the testimony of Geeta Ram that he is deposing falsely; hence, his testimony is to be accepted as correct. 25. It was submitted that as per the testimony of Ram Lok, he was informed about the quarrel at 6.00 AM, whereas Geeta Ram deposed that the incident took place at 6.30 PM. This is a major contradiction, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirji Bhai versus the State of Gujarat, 1983 (3) SCC 217 that ordinarily people make their estimate regarding the exact time of incident or duration of the incident and one cannot expect people to make a very precise or reliable estimate in such matters. It was observed: - “(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. It was observed: - “(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events, the witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. (3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (4) By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. (5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork impulsively at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the Court atmosphere and the piercing cross- examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts gets confused regarding the sequence of events or fills up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieve d though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him - perhaps it is a sort of psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.” (Emphasis supplied)” 26. This position was reiterated in Balu Sudam Khalde and another Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2023 SC 1736 , wherein it was observed:- “25. This position was reiterated in Balu Sudam Khalde and another Versus State of Maharashtra AIR 2023 SC 1736 , wherein it was observed:- “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straightjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which did not have this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for hi m to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large people canno t accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events, which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” (Emphasis supplied) [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 Cri LJ 1096: ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 ) ]. 27. Thus, the testimony of Geeta Ram cannot be doubted due to the discrepancy in time which is minor and can arise due to differences in the perception of time and failure to recall the facts identically. 28. Even otherwise, Geeta Ram stated that he heard the noise and came outside and saw the accused stabbing the deceased. It means that the incident had started sometime before 6.30 am and keeping in view the difference in time perception of different people, the variation in time in the statements of Ram Lok and Geeta Ram are not irreconcilable. Thus, the prosecution case cannot be discarded due to the difference in time. 29. It was submitted that there was a delay of four hours in reporting the matter to the police, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. The initial information was given to the police at 6.40 AM. Thus, the prosecution case cannot be discarded due to the difference in time. 29. It was submitted that there was a delay of four hours in reporting the matter to the police, which is fatal to the prosecution case. This submission is not acceptable. The initial information was given to the police at 6.40 AM. The information was reduced to writing and SI Beeru Ahmad and other police officials proceeded to verify the correctness of the information. He (SI Beeru Ahmad) explained in his cross-examination that he reached the spot at 7.25 AM. He sent the dead body to the hospital after filling the inquest report. He effected the recoveries and it took about two hours to do so. He started recording the statement of Geeta Ram at about 9.15 AM. Geeta Ram (PW13) stated that the police came to the spot at 7.30 am, lifted the dead body from the spot and recorded his statement at about 9.30 AM. These statements show that the Investigating Officer had forwarded the dead body to the hospital and thereafter effected the recovery before recording the statement of the informant. The anxiety of the Investigating Officer to send the dead body from the spot to the hospital for post-mortem examination can be very well understood. Thus, the delay in recording the statement of the informant has been properly explained. 30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Silak Ram Versus State (2007) 10 SCC 464 , that the delay in filing FIR is not fatal in every case. It was observed: 12. Coming to the stand that there was a delay in lodging the FIR and in the dispatch of the report to the Illaqua Magistrate, this also has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court. Delay in lodging FIR by itself would not be sufficient to discard the prosecution version unless it is unexplained and such delay coupled with the likelihood of concoction of evidence. There is no hard and fast rule that delay in filing FIR in each and every case is fatal and on account of such delay in prosecution version should be discarded. The factum of delay requires the court to scrutinize the evidence adduced with a greater degree of care and caution. 31. There is no hard and fast rule that delay in filing FIR in each and every case is fatal and on account of such delay in prosecution version should be discarded. The factum of delay requires the court to scrutinize the evidence adduced with a greater degree of care and caution. 31. This position was reiterated in Hariprasad v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 2 SCC 557 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1454 wherein it was observed: “9. It cannot be gainsaid that the first information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced during the course of the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence [ Thulia Kali v. State of T.N ., (1972) 3 SCC 393 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 543 ]. It is also an equally settled legal position that the receipt and recording of information report by the police is not a condition precedent to set into motion a criminal investigation [ King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 : (1943-44) 71 IA 203: AIR 1945 PC 18 ]. The first information report under Section 154CrPC, as such could not be treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or contradict the informant's evidence in court. As held by a three-judge Bench of this Court [ Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114: 1973 SCC (Cri) 195 ], FIR is very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish, or before the informant's memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, may give rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. 10. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, may give rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. 10. Of course, the delay in lodging an FIR by itself cannot be regarded as a sufficient ground to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution case, nor could it be treated as fatal to the case of the prosecution. The court has to ascertain the causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. If the causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay by itself would not be fatal to the case of prosecution. 11. In Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2001) 7 SCC 690 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1384 ], it has been held that : (SCC pp. 695-96, paras 13-15) “13. The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that the law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Of course, a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords the commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false version. Barring these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuineness of the version incorporated therein. 14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to the lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, that the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident. 15. We are not providing an exhaustive catalogue of instances which could cause a delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is a delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. (Vide Zahoor v. State of U.P. [Zahoor v. State of U.P., 1991 Supp (1) SCC 372: 1991 SCC (Cri) 678], Tara Singh v. State of Punjab [Tara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710] and Jamna v. State of U.P. [Jamna v. State of U.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 185: 1994 SCC (Cri) 348 ] ) In Tara Singh [Tara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710 ] the Court made the following observations : ( Tara Singh case [Tara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 536: 1991 SCC (Cri) 710], SCC p. 541 , para 4) ‘4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all, it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station to give the report.’” 32. In the present case, a proper explanation has been provided and the delay cannot be used for discarding the prosecution case. 33. It was submitted that Geeta Ram (PW13) stated that the accused gave blows with a knife on the belly and the neck of the deceased. This is contrary to the medical evidence. This submission is not acceptable because Dr Kamal Pasha (PW14) found a sharp stabbing wound on the right side base on the neck which corresponds to the statement of Geeta Ram that injury was caused on the neck of the deceased. The Medical Officer had also found an injury on the left lateral side of the chest and hypochondrium which is a part of the stomach. Thus there is no discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence and the submission that the testimony of Geeta Ram is liable to be rejected due to discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence is not acceptable. 34. Thus, there is sufficient material on record to show the presence of Geeta Ram on the spot. Nothing has been shown in his cross-examination that he had any motive to depose against the accused. His testimony is consistent with his initial version and the medical evidence. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the testimony of Geeta Ram. 35. The accused made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW16/A) that he had concealed the knife in a room near the kitchen in his house and the same could be got recovered by him. This statement was made in the presence of witnesses Kamal Kant (PW16) and Constable Arun Kumar. 35. The accused made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW16/A) that he had concealed the knife in a room near the kitchen in his house and the same could be got recovered by him. This statement was made in the presence of witnesses Kamal Kant (PW16) and Constable Arun Kumar. It was submitted that the statement is not witnessed by the independent witnessws and no reliance can be placed on the same. This submission is not acceptable. An identical submission was repelled by this Court in Sunil Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2024 HHC 1909 , wherein after the analysis of various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Rajasthan High Court, it was held that there is no necessity to associate independent persons while recording the statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 36. HHC Kamal Kant (PW16) stated that the accused made a disclosure statement on 30.5.2017 stating therein that he had concealed a knife in a room near the kitchen of his house and he could get the knife recovered. Statement (Ex.PW16/A) was signed by the accused and the witnesses. He stated in his cross- examination that the disclosure statement was made in Police Station Paonta Sahib, which is surrounded by the abadis. SI Beeru Ahmad recorded the statement in the Investigating Officer’s room. He denied that no statement was made by the accused. 37. It is apparent from the cross-examination of this witness that his testimony that the accused had recorded a disclosure statement was not shaken in the cross-examination. Nothing was suggested as to why he should be deposing falsely against the accused. The mere fact that he is a police official is not sufficient to discard his testimony. 38. The accused led the police to his home. The police associated Nettar Singh (PW11). He stated that he had gone to the house of the accused with the police. The accused got a knife recovered, which was concealed beneath the cupboard from the second rack. The police prepared a sketch of the knife. The police sealed the knife in a parcel with three impressions of seal ‘T’. The knife was seized vide memo (Ex.PW-11/C). The accused also got a shirt and trousers recovered, which were seized by the police after sealing them in a parcel. He duly identified the knife, shirt and trousers. 39. The police prepared a sketch of the knife. The police sealed the knife in a parcel with three impressions of seal ‘T’. The knife was seized vide memo (Ex.PW-11/C). The accused also got a shirt and trousers recovered, which were seized by the police after sealing them in a parcel. He duly identified the knife, shirt and trousers. 39. He stated in his cross-examination that he was called near Khera temple by Malkiyat Singh. His house is located at a distance of 3 kilometres from the house of the accused. The police came in a vehicle but he could not state the registration number, make or colour of the vehicle. The house of the accused is at a distance of 200 meters from the main road. There were 4- 5 houses of the people adjacent to the house of the accused. He had gone to the house of the accused on his bike and reached the spot with the police. The house of the accused is accessible by the room and appeared to be of a single storey having 4-5 rooms. He entered the room from where the knife and clothes were recovered. No photographs were taken. He denied that he was not associated with the police or that no recovery was effected in his presence. 40. His testimony that the accused had recovered a knife from his house has not been shaken in the cross-examination. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he has any motive to depose against the accused. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon his testimony. 41. The parcels were deposited with HC Virender Singh (PW9) whose testimony is corroborated by the entries made in the register of Malkhana (PW9/A). He stated that he sent the case property to FSL Junga through HHC Ramesh Kumar (PW7). 42. PW7 Ramesh Kumar stated that he carried 12 parcels to SFSL, Junga and deposited them in a safe condition. His testimony that he had carried the parcels to the SFSL, Junga was not challenged in the cross-examination and has to be accepted as correct. (Please see Sunil Kumar Vs. State 2024: HHC:1909, para 28 & 29). 43. The result of the analysis (Ex.PX1) shows that the parcels were received from HHC Ramesh Kumar. The seals on the parcels were intact and tallied with the specimen seal sent with the docket. (Please see Sunil Kumar Vs. State 2024: HHC:1909, para 28 & 29). 43. The result of the analysis (Ex.PX1) shows that the parcels were received from HHC Ramesh Kumar. The seals on the parcels were intact and tallied with the specimen seal sent with the docket. Once the laboratory report of the analysis mentions that the seals were found to be intact, an inference can be drawn that there was no tampering with the case property. (Please see Nonu Auli @ Ram Chander Vs. State of H.P. 2023:HHC:14498, para 45 to 50). 44. The result of analysis (Ex. PX) shows that the DNA profile obtained from the dagger was consistent with the DNA profile obtained from the blood of Balbir Singh. It clearly shows that the knife recovered at the instance of the accused was used to cause the death of Balbir Singh. This report also corroborates the statements of Dr. Kamal Pasha (PW14) and Dr. Rajiv Chauhan (PW17) that the injuries noticed by them could have been caused by means of a knife. 45. Thus, it was duly proved that the accused had got a knife recovered, which was stained with the blood of the deceased. This recovery provides valuable corroboration to the testimony of Geeta Ram that the accused had inflicted injuries upon the deceased. 46. The accused had also examined two defence witnesses to establish that he (deceased Balbir) was a drug addict and was suffering from psychotic disorders. The incident had taken place on 28.5.2017. Dr. Sumit Khattri (DW1) stated that he had examined the patient on 10.12.2014. Similarly, Shailesh Bhandari (DW2) stated that the patient was not treated after 12.5.2016. The statements of these witnesses show that the deceased was not treated after the year 2014 by Dr. Sumit Khattri (DW1) and after May, 2016 in the society. Further, Dr. Sumit Khattri (DW1) and Shalender Bhandari (DW2) stated in their cross examination that deceased Balbir was not aggresive with them. Dr. Sumit Khattri (DW1) also stated that no stafff member had reported about the aggresive nature of the deceased; hence this evidence does not show that the deceased was aggresive or of quarrelsome nature and no advantage can be derived from their testimonies. 47. Dr. Sumit Khattri (DW1) also stated that no stafff member had reported about the aggresive nature of the deceased; hence this evidence does not show that the deceased was aggresive or of quarrelsome nature and no advantage can be derived from their testimonies. 47. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that Anwar Ali (PW2) and Dharam Singh (PW3) have not supported the prosecution version, however, both the witnesses were permitted to be cross-examined and their credit has been impeached with reference to their previous testimonies under Section 155(4) of Cr.PC and no reliance can be placed upon their testimonies. (Please see Dilo Begum Vs. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:1559, paras 24 to 30) . 48. Raghuvir Singh is the brother of the deceased. He stated that the wives of accused Surender and deceased Balbir were real sisters. One year before the death of Balbir, a marriage of his brother-in-law was being performed. A quarrel took place between Balbir and Surender in the marriage. Surender caused a head injury to Balbir; however, no police case was registered and Balbir was treated in a private hospital. Balbir used to suspect that the accused had illicit relations with his (Balbir’s) wife and there was a grudge between the two. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not heard any other quarrel except the one which took place in the marriage. He denied that Balbir used to become aggressive and pick up quarrels with the villagers. He denied that Balbir sustained injuries by way of a fall. Balbir had visited Surender’s house 2-3 times after his marriage to attend function and Surender had visited the house during Katha. He denied that Balbir never used to sus pect Surender. 49. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he is making a false statement. Merely because he is related to the deceased is no reason to doubt his testimony. His testimony shows the reason for the quarrel between the deceased and the accused. 50. Ram Lok (PW5) also stated that Surender and Balbir were brothers-in-law. Balbir used to suspect that his wife was having illicit relations with the accused and this led to the quarrel between the accused and the deceased. He stated in his cross- examination that Balbir and Surender had the least frequency of visits to each other’s house. 50. Ram Lok (PW5) also stated that Surender and Balbir were brothers-in-law. Balbir used to suspect that his wife was having illicit relations with the accused and this led to the quarrel between the accused and the deceased. He stated in his cross- examination that Balbir and Surender had the least frequency of visits to each other’s house. He came to know of the suspicion from the parents of Balbir. He denied that Balbir never suspected Surender. 51. His testimony also corroborates the statement of Raghubir Singh that the deceased used to suspect that the accused had illicit relations with his wife. These testimonies duly proved the strained relations between the accused and the deceased. 52. The injuries were caused on the vital part of the body. The Medical Officers specifically stated that injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. The accused had used a knife (a sharp-edged weapon) to cause the injuries. Any person using a knife on the vital parts of the body can only lead to an inference that he intended to cause the death of the victim. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 that once the existence of the injury is proved, the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. It was observed: ‘16. … The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he in- tended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the cir- cumstances justifies such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. 17. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justifies an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then, of course, the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but one of fact; ….’” 53. Similarly, it was held in Singapagu Anjaiah vs. State of A.P., (2010) 9 SCC 799 that causing injury to the vital part of the body can lead to an inference that the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased. It was observed: “16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. It was observed: “16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which had caused multiple fractures of the skull. This clearly shows the force with which the ap- pellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all these factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclu- sion that the appellant intended to cause the death of the deceased.” 54. In the present case, the Medical Officer also stated that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 55. No other point was urged. 56. In view of the above, no ground for interference with the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court is made out. Consequently, the present appeal fails and is dismissed.