ORDER : 1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ mandamus to quashing/set-aside the order impugned dated 07.12.2021 passed by the respondent No.4 (Annexure P/1) and remand back the instant case before the respondent No.4. 10.2. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ mandamus to issue direction to respondent no.4 to grant the award with interest, entitled by the present petitioner as per the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. 10.3. Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2) The facts of the present case in brief are that the petitioner moved an application under Section 3(G)(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short, the Act, 1956) before the Arbitrator/Commissioner, Bilaspur Division and the same was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2021 and the petitioner was advised to approach the Civil Court. 3) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that earlier an award was passed pertaining to the land bearing survey Nos. 884 and 891 in favour of one Deepak Kumar whereas, the acquired land was purchased by the petitioner through the registered sale deed on 16.06.2000. He would further submit that the error that occurred in the award has already been rectified by the State and now the award has been passed in favour of the petitioner. He would also submit that the land of the petitioner acquired by the National Highways Authority of India (for short, the NHAI) was diverted land, whereas, the compensation has been determined taking into consideration the land as agricultural land and this fact was brought to the notice of the Arbitrator/Commissioner in the application moved by the petitioner under Section 3(G)(5) of the Act, 1956. It is further argued that the respondent authority while deciding the representation/application moved by the petitioner rejected the same on the ground that the application is not maintainable and directed the petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court according to the provisions of Section 3(H) of the Act, 1956. It is further argued that the petitioner is claiming the enhancement of compensation and determination of solatium etc. It is further argued that the petitioner is claiming the enhancement of compensation and determination of solatium etc. In support of submissions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 428 of 2020 [Saupatram and others v. Diwanchand and others] delivered on 08.02.2023, wherein it is held that while exercising the power under Section 3(G)(5), the authority cannot remit back the matter to the Sub-Ordinate Authorities. 4) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose. 5) Mr. Das, learned Dy. A.G. would submit that earlier there was some error on the part of the State as the award was passed in favour of one Deepak Kumar and later on, the same was rectified. He would further submit that the amount of the compensation has already been deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer. He would also submit that the petitioner was intimated with regard to the correction and he was asked to collect the amount of compensation. 6) Mr. Wankhede, learned counsel appearing for NHAI would submit that the Writ Petition against the order passed by the authority while deciding an application filed under Section 3(G)(5) is not maintainable. He would further submit that the petitioner ought to have approached the District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, the Act, 1996). In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and another [ (2022) 1 SCC 75 ]; para -12, 13, 18 & 19. 7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on the file. 8) Admittedly, the petitioner is the registered owner of the land bearing survey Nos. 884 891, and 801/2 situated at NH 149-B, Village Urga, Tehsil- Kartala, District- Korba. The petitioner got possession of the property pursuant to the sale deed executed earlier on 16.06.2000. The petitioner moved an application for diversion pertaining to land survey Nos. 884, and 891, ad-measuring 0.14 & 0.27 acres, a total of 0.41 acres. A specific order was passed by the authority for diversion on 06.08.2011. The land was acquired for the construction of NH- 149 B and an award was passed in favour of the earlier owner namely, Deepak Kumar. 884, and 891, ad-measuring 0.14 & 0.27 acres, a total of 0.41 acres. A specific order was passed by the authority for diversion on 06.08.2011. The land was acquired for the construction of NH- 149 B and an award was passed in favour of the earlier owner namely, Deepak Kumar. The petitioner raised an objection and the defect was rectified and an award was passed in favour of the petitioner. An application was moved by the petitioner before the Arbitrator/Commissioner, Bilaspur Division and vide order dated 07.12.2021, the same was rejected on the ground that the application is not maintainable, however, the petitioner was granted liberty to approach Civil Court according to Section 3(H) of the Act, 1956. 9) In the matter of Saupatram (supra), this Court while dealing with the scope of Section 3(G) of the Act, 1956, held that if there was any infirmity in the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), the Divisional Commissioner ought to have decided the case on the basis of the material placed before it. There was no dispute with regard to the title of the property; therefore, there was no reason or occasion for the Divisional Commissioner to remit back the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer when there is no provision under Section 3(G) of the Act, 1956. The relevant paras-11 & 12 are reproduced hereinbelow:- 11. From the record, it appears that the notification was published in the daily newspaper under Section 3A of the Act of 1956 on 20.09.2017, objections were invited, according to Section 3 D of the Act of 1956 notification was issued on 29.12.2017, thereafter, the notification was also issued under Section 3G of the Act of 1956 and award was passed in favour of the appellants and respondent No.1 by the Land Acquisition Officer on 01.07.2018. Respondent No. 1 being unsatisfied with the award, preferred an application under the provisions of Act of 1996 and the Act of 1956 before the Divisional Commissioner, Bilaspur seeking relief to enhance the compensation as his case has not been considered properly. The learned Divisional Commissioner after taking note of the ground raised by respondent No.1, remitted back the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer to decide the case afresh after affording proper opportunity to the parties. Present is not a case where any dispute regarding title or ownership is involved. The learned Divisional Commissioner after taking note of the ground raised by respondent No.1, remitted back the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer to decide the case afresh after affording proper opportunity to the parties. Present is not a case where any dispute regarding title or ownership is involved. After passing of the award, respondent No.1 has moved application before Divisional Commissioner only for enhancement of the compensation as the same was not determined in accordance with law. If there was any infirmity in the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer-Cum-Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaspur, the Divisional Commissioner ought to have decided the case on the basis of the material placed before it. The learned Single Judge has also not noticed the prayer made by respondent No.1 in his application. No dispute was raised by the respondent No. 1 regarding the share or title of the property and relief is confined only with regard to enhancement of compensation, particularly, for house situated over Survey No. 396/1, owned by respondent No.1. Therefore, there was no reason or occasion for the Divisional Commissioner to remit back the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer-Cum-Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilaspur, particularly, when there is no such provision in the Section 3G of the Act of 1956. 12. In the light of the above discussion, the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 1255/2020 dated 22.06.2020 and the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner dated 06.05.2020 are hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Divisional Commissioner, Bilaspur to restore the matter to its original number and to decide the same afresh after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties, strictly in accordance with law, within a period of two months from receipt of a copy of this order.” 10) In the matter of Bhaven Construction (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of Section 5 of the Act, 1996, which deals with judicial intervention. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the interference is not permissible by the High Court and discretion cannot be exercised to allow the judicial interference beyond procedure established under the Act, 1996. Para-12, 13, 18 and 19 are reproduced hereinbelow:- 12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal consequences. Para-12, 13, 18 and 19 are reproduced hereinbelow:- 12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal consequences. One such consequence is spelled out under : “5. Extent of judicial intervention.-- “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.” (emphasis supplied) The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act. 13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures and forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. The framework clearly portrays an intention to address most of the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide just and fair solutions. 18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a Constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court referred to several judgments and held: “11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 . However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/ instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi- judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (emphasis supplied) It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the procedure established under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the statute or a clear ‘bad faith’ shown by one of the parties. This high standard set by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and efficient. 19. In this context we may observe M/s. Deep Industries Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, (2019) SCC Online SC 1602, wherein interplay of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act and Article 227 of the Constitution was analyzed as under (para-16 & 17): “16. Most significant of all is the non- obstante clause contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act) . 17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied) 11) In the present case, an application was moved by the petitioner to consider the factum of diversion only pertaining to survey Nos. 881, and 889. Admittedly, the Arbitrator failed to consider the submissions made by the petitioner in his application filed under Section 3(G)(5) of the Act, 1956. The Arbitrator while rejecting the application directed the petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court. It is not res-integra that a Writ Court while exercising power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India should not interfere with the matter of Arbitration, but sight cannot be lost of the findings recorded by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the petitioner to approach the Civil Court. 12) In the matter of Saupatram (supra), the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that there is no provision in Section 3(G)(5) of the Act, 1996, empowering the Arbitrator to remit back the matter or issue direction, therefore, the direction issued by the Arbitrator/Divisional Commissioner dated 07.12.2021 is hereby quashed. 13) As far as the decision taken by the Arbitrator whereby the claim of the petitioner has been rejected is concerned, a decision has been taken by the Arbitrator; findings recorded by the Arbitrator may be correct or may be wrong, but taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaven Construction (supra), the Writ Court should not interfere with findings recorded by the arbitrator, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the petition with regard to challenge to the order passed by the arbitrator dated 07.12.2021 would not be maintainable and is hereby dismissed. 14) However, the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge the order passed by the Arbitrator according to the provisions of the Act, 1996.