Ashok Kumar Satnami, S/o Shivra v. State of M. P. (Now Chhattisgarh)
2024-04-16
SANJAY KUMAR JAISWAL
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
CAV JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25-09-2000, passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, Dist: Raipur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.429/1999, whereby the appellants have been convicted for offence under Section 304-B of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for 10 years to each of the appellants. 2. Facts of the case in brief is that Pushpa Bai, who was resident of village Bilari, had married to the appellant No.1- Ashok in the month of March-April, 1999. Father of Ashok is appellant No.2-Shivram and appellant No.3-Ratiram is brother-in-law of Ashok. In furtherance of common intention, they harassed Pushpa Bai by demanding dowry, as a result of which Pushpa Bai committed suicide by set her ablaze by pouring kerosene upon her. Thus, within one year of marriage, Pushpa Bai died under suspicious circumstances. 3. Further case of prosecution is that after the marriage, during bidai, after seeing the things kept in the tractor, given by the parents of Pushpa Bai, appellant No.3- Ratiram tumbled the things by stating that the things were not good. When Pushpa Bai came to her parents' home for the first time after marriage, she told her family members that she was being harassed on account of demand of dowry. After staying at her maternal home for 2 days, appellant Ashok Kumar Satnami took her back to her in-laws house. When the parents of Pushpa Bai called her after 02 months to come to her maternal home, then appellant refused to send Pushpa Bai to her maternal home and as a result of torture and harassment, Pushpa Bai committed suicide by setting her ablaze by pouring kerosene upon her on 17/07/1999, due to which she died. Appellant No.2-Shivram gave information about her death to village Kotwar-Mangturam (PW-1), then he informed the police, thereafter, merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P-1. Panchnama of dead body was conducted. Dr. Narayan Singh (PW-5) examined the dead body of deceased and submitted its report vide Ex.P-5, in which, he stated that there were no injury mark on the body, but there were burns to the depth of skin. Most of her hair on the forehead and ears were burnt.
Panchnama of dead body was conducted. Dr. Narayan Singh (PW-5) examined the dead body of deceased and submitted its report vide Ex.P-5, in which, he stated that there were no injury mark on the body, but there were burns to the depth of skin. Most of her hair on the forehead and ears were burnt. Carbon particles were also found in his throat and on that basis, doctor opined that cause of death was due to shock and suffocation by burns, which was of suicidal nature. Statements of witnesses have been recorded by the police. Spot map was prepared and it was found that Pushpa Bai was harassed on account of demand of dowry, due to which she died otherwise than under normal circumstance. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants. 4. During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 15 documents. Statements of the appellants were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied circumstances appearing against them in prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. In defence, the appellants examined Jabbar Khan (DW-1), Banshi Lal (DW-2) and Narayan Prasad (DW-3) by which, at the time of marriage of Pushpa Bai and Ashok Kumar Satnami, appellant No.3-Ratiram was not present. 5. After conclusion of the trial, the trial Court, by impugned judgment dated 25-09-2000, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, has convicted the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC and sentenced them as mentioned herein-above, against which, the present appeal has been filed by the appellants calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that no demand for dowry were made by the appellants. The prosecution witnesses have admitted the fact that nothing has been demanded as dowry at the time of engagement. The prosecution has not produced any evidence to the effect that just before the death of Pushpa Bai, she was harassed in any way on account of demand of dowry. The statements of the prosecution witnesses are in the form of uniform statements and the fact of dowry and harassment was not established. The report/complaint was not made regarding dowry and harassment from the maternal side of deceased.
The statements of the prosecution witnesses are in the form of uniform statements and the fact of dowry and harassment was not established. The report/complaint was not made regarding dowry and harassment from the maternal side of deceased. The offence was registered by the police after four days of merg investigation. Kotwar-Mangturam (PW-1) and Avadhram Patel (PW-2) have admitted in their evidence that Pushpa Bai had not made any statement against the appellants before her death, but she stated that she set her ablaze by own. Thus, offence against the appellants has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appellants may be acquitted of the charges leveled against them by setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance in the matters of Baijnath and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 1 SCC 101 and Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 454. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that the conclusion given by the trial Court regarding conviction and sentence of the appellant is based on sufficient and reliable evidence, which does not require any interference. Therefore, the contention made by the counsel for the appellants is not acceptable, hence, the appeal may be dismissed. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record including the impugned judgment. 9. The main witnesses examined on behalf of prosecution are Manjar Bai (PW-8), mother of deceased, Keshav Prasad (PW-3), brother and her maternal uncle- Reshamlal (PW-4). The fact has come in their evidence that marriage of deceased Pushpa Bai with appellant- Ashok was solemnized during Navratri in the month of April, 1999. In the case at hand, incident took place on 17/07/1999 and Pushpa Bai died within 3-4 months of her marriage and thus, it is established that Pushpa Bai died within 07 years of her marriage. 10. Dr. Narayan Singh (PW-5), while confirming the post- mortem report Ex.P.-5, has deposed that skin of deceased was burnt deeply. Most of her hair on forehead and ears were burnt. Both her eyebrows were burnt. External genitalia were normal. There were no external injury mark on her head. Carbon particles were found in her throat and trachea. He opined that nature of death was suicidal and death seems to be due to shock and suffocation by burning.
Most of her hair on forehead and ears were burnt. Both her eyebrows were burnt. External genitalia were normal. There were no external injury mark on her head. Carbon particles were found in her throat and trachea. He opined that nature of death was suicidal and death seems to be due to shock and suffocation by burning. On the basis of above evidence, trial Court has held that Pushpa Bai died within 07 years of marriage otherwise than under normal circumstances. 11. What is the legal position in the case of Dowry death, it would be appropriate to look at the relevant provisions and case laws. 12. In the matter of Baijnath and others V. State of M.P. (supra), it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court as under paragraph 24-32:- “24.The evidence on record and the competing arguments have received our required attention. As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections 304B and 498A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted hereunder: “304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are: (i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances and (ii) is within seven years of her marriage and (iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. The offence under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” as: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) or (ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 27.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences. 27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry to reiterate is the gravamen of the two offences. 28. Section 113-B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in the following terms: “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)” 29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith. 30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113B of the Act against the accused.
30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof. 31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty. 32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another Vs. State of Punjab – (2011) 11 SCC 517 and echoed in Rajeev Kumar Vs. State of Haryana – (2013) 16 SCC 640. In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao Vs.
It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao – (2003) 1 SCC 217 to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”. 13. If we consider the facts of the instant case in the light of the above judicial precedents, the fact clearly emerges in the statements of Manjar Bai (PW-8), mother of deceased, Keshav Prasad (PW-3), brother and her maternal uncle-Reshamlal (PW-4) that before the marriage, no communication was made with regard to any transaction/demand for dowry. In the testimonies of all these three witnesses, who are the nearest relatives of deceased, same thing has been stated at the point of torture that during the time of bidai after the marriage, appellant-Ratiram, brother-in- law of appellant-Ashok, had tumbled the items kept in the tractor because he was not satisfied with the said dowry items. When Pushpa Bai had come to her maternal home for the first time from her in-laws, she had stated that she was being tortured due to lack of dowry items and when her parents sent Anujram and Mohitram of village to bring Pushpa Bai to her maternal home after 02 months, appellants refused them to be sent to her maternal home. The same circumstance has been mentioned in the prosecution evidence regarding dowry and harassment. 14. It is not clear that what was the relationship between Anujram and Mohitram, who were sent to bring Pushpa Bai to her maternal home after her bidai. It is also not clear why Anujram and Mohitram were gone to bring Pushpa Bai alone, without any her family member. Anujram and Mohitram have even not been examined by the prosecution. In such a situation, it would not be appropriate to believe that appellants were giving any kind of torture to Pushpa Bai while not sending her with Anujram and Mohitram. 15. As far as the dowry items kept in the tractor, which were tumbled by the appellant-Ratiram at the time of bidai after marriage, in this regard, statement of Keshav Prasad (PW-3) was not recorded, but statements of Reshamlal (PW-4) and Manjar Bai (PW-8) were recorded.
15. As far as the dowry items kept in the tractor, which were tumbled by the appellant-Ratiram at the time of bidai after marriage, in this regard, statement of Keshav Prasad (PW-3) was not recorded, but statements of Reshamlal (PW-4) and Manjar Bai (PW-8) were recorded. It does not appear that appellant- Ratiram has acted in accordance with intentions of all the appellants. There was a interval of about 3-4 months between marriage and death of Pushpa Bai. Therefore, it cannot be said that due to the said act of appellant Ratiram, Pushpa Bai was tortured on account of demand of dowry soon before her death. 16. Looking to the fact that when Pushpa Bai went to her maternal home for the first time after marriage, she stated her parents that she was harassed on account of demand of dowry in her in-law’s house. There is no other independent evidence in this regard apart from the family members. No report/complaint was registered to the police by the maternal side of Pushpa Bai. Even after her death, no report was lodged by the maternal side, but only after merg investigation, police registered the case against the appellants. Village Kotwar-Mangturam (PW-1), who immediately reached the house of appellants on receiving the information, has deposed in his evidence that when he had talked to Pushpa Bai who was injured after being burnt and Sarpanch had asked why she had set her ablaze, she has only stated that she herself poured kerosene and set her ablaze by own. On being asked, if she was suffering from any pain or stress, she did not say anything and after that Pushpa Bai was taken to the hospital in a tractor and died. A similar statement has been made by Avadhram Patel (PW-2). Avadhram Patel has also stated that no family member of Pushpa Bai had made any complaint about being tortured. Thus, there is no independent evidence to show that Pushpa Bai was tortured by the appellants on account of demand of dowry. 17. After analyzing the above evidence, this court finds that in the light of above cited judgments, the prosecution should have established that Pushpa Bai was tortured for dowry soon before her death, which is not proved by the evidence produced by prosecution.
17. After analyzing the above evidence, this court finds that in the light of above cited judgments, the prosecution should have established that Pushpa Bai was tortured for dowry soon before her death, which is not proved by the evidence produced by prosecution. Therefore, the presumption of section 113-B does not arise and on the basis of above evidence, this court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence of dowry death against the appellants. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellants does not deserve to be sustained. 18. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellants under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is set aside and the appellants are acquitted of said offence. 19. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellants are stated to be on bail. Under Section-437/A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, their bail-bond will be effective for another 6 months. If there is no need to appear in the superior Court, their bail-bond will be considered free. 20. The record of the trial court along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately for necessary action and compliance.