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2024 DIGILAW 329 (GAU)

On the Death of Hemanta Kumar Mandal his Sons and Legal Heirs Amar Chand Mandal v. Union of India, through Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways

2024-03-13

SUMAN SHYAM, VIJAY BISHNOI

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JUDGMENT : SUMAN SHYAM, J. 1. This intra-court appeal has been preferred by the appellants, who were the writ petitioners, being aggrieved by the judgement and order dated 13/06/2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP (C) No. 2904/2015, dismissing the writ petition primarily on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners, in approaching the Court. By filing the above mentioned writ petition, the petitioners had assailed the order dated 10/03/2015, by means of which, their prayer for payment of compensation for the alleged acquisition of land for construction of 31 No. National Highway at Barpeta Road was rejected by the authorities. 2. The facts and circumstances of the case, in a nutshell, are that the predecessor-in-interest of appellant nos. 1 (I), (II) and (III) viz. late Hemanta Kumar Mandal along with the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant No. 2 (iv) (a) & (b) i.e. Late Dhirendra Das and 4 others, had jointly instituted WP (C) No. 2904/2015 inter alia, contending that land measuring 7 Bighas 4 Kathas 17 Lechas forming part and parcel of land measuring 11 Bighas 04 Kathas 02 Lechas, belonging to them had been acquired by the State for construction of National Highway No. 31 without paying any compensation. The request made by the appellants/petitioners for payment of compensation was rejected by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, Revenue and Disaster Management Department, by the impugned order dated 10/03/2015, issued under Memo No. RLA-134/2003/Pt-I/282, which was put under challenge in the writ petition. Contending that the value of land in the Barpeta Road town area had been notified on 28/03/2014 to be Rs. 75 lakhs per bigha, the appellants had jointly prayed for a Writ of Mandamus for payment of a sum of Rs. 5,97,75,000/- to them as compensation for the land. 3. From a scrutiny of the case record, it appears that the claim of the writ appellants was based on few departmental communications including the communications dated 23/12/2010 and 08/08/2011 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) issued by the Circle Officer, Barnagar Revenue Circle, as well as the letter dated 26.08.2013 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Barpeta requesting the Project Director (PIU) NHAI to place the proposal for payment of compensation before the competent authority. 4. 4. The learned Single Judge was of the view that although National Highway No. 31 was constructed way back in the year 1962, the writ petitioners had admittedly remained silent until the year 2010. It was only in the year 2010 they had submitted a representation before the Minister of Revenue, Assam, praying for payment of compensation for acquisition of land. Hence, it was a case of un-explained delay of more than 50 years in raising the claim, thus extinguishing the rights, if any, of the writ petitioner for payment of compensation. While arriving at the above conclusion, the learned Single Judge had extensively dealt with the documents available on record as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Premchand and Others vs. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 551 , State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582 , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Another vs. Dolly Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450 , Commissioner of Central Excise vs. M.P.V. Engg. Industries, (2003) 5 SCC 333 , Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569 , Sukh Dutt Ratra and Another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (2022) 7 SCC 508 , State of Maharastra vs. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 and Tukaram Kanha Joshi vs. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 to hold that the writ petition was devoid of any merit. 5. Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously argued that depriving his clients of valuable immovable property without paying just compensation for the land is not only in violation of their right to property guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India but is also in violation of the basic human rights of the writ petitioners/appellants. The learned counsel has further argued that his clients had not only raised their grievance through a forum called “Barpeta District Four Lane Affected Coordination Committee” in the year 1990 by submitting a representation before the Deputy Commissioner of Barpeta but had also renewed their prayer for payment of compensation from time to time in various forms including submission of representation in the year 2010 before the Revenue Minster, Assam. Therefore, submits Mr. Mahmud, it is not a case of inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the Court. 6. Mr. Therefore, submits Mr. Mahmud, it is not a case of inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the Court. 6. Mr. Mahmud has further argued that the documents and letters exchanged by the departmental authorities clearly go to show that the authorities had admitted that the land of the petitioners/writ appellants had been utilized for construction of National Highway No. 31 and, therefore, the respondents are bound to pay compensation to his clients. By placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kazi Moinuddin Kazi Bashiroddin and Others vs. The Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation, through its Senior Regional Manager, Regional Office, MTDC, Aurangabad, Maharashtra and Another, Mr. Mahmud has argued that in the matter of payment of compensation on account of land acquisition, if two views are possible, the view that advances the cause of justice is always to be preferred. 7. By referring to and relying upon the decision in the case of Ramarao Shankar Tapase vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2022) 7 SCC 563 as well as in the case of Vidya Devi (Supra), the learned counsel for the writ appellants has further argued that if a proper case of violation of property rights is made out on the basis of documents available on record, there can be no justification for denying relief to the land owners who are seeking compensation. Mr. Mahmud has also relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay rendered in the case of Rajeev Kumar Damodarprasad Bhadani and Others vs. The Executive Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (MSEDCL) and Others [Writ Petition No. 1430 of 2022] to contend that by ignoring the delay of 40 years in approaching the Court, the Division Bench of Bombay High Court had granted relief to a similarly situated writ petitioner, who was not paid just compensation for acquisition of the land by the MSEDCL. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge was not correct in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay in approaching the Court. 8. Responding to the above arguments, Mr. D.K. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the respondent nos. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge was not correct in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay in approaching the Court. 8. Responding to the above arguments, Mr. D.K. Sarmah, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for the respondent nos. 5, 8 & 9, has submitted that the report of the Circle Officer, Barnagar Revenue Circle dated 08/08/2011, relied upon by the petitioners/appellants is not a official correspondence pertaining to any departmental file but a correspondence apparently issued in personal capacity of the Officer, the authenticity of which cannot be established due to non-availability of departmental records. It is also the submission of Mr. Sarmah that due to inordinate delay on the part of the appellants in raising their claim, the authorities are unable to respond to their claim since no departmental records are available pertaining to any such transaction. The learned Government Advocate has, however, emphatically denied the claim of the writ appellants that their land had been acquired by the State for construction of National Highway No. 31 without paying compensation by arguing that a 2 (two) lane Highway constructed by the State PWD was already in existence at that place and subsequently, the 2 lane Highway was handed over to the National Highway Authorities of India (NHAI) in the year 2005 wherein, expansion work had been carried out. Mr. Sarmah has further argued that no records are available in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta as regards acquisition of land or release of compensation in favour of the land owners for construction of National Highway No. 31 during the year 1962. He further submits that the land records pertaining to land involved in National Highway No. 31 was corrected and the land was made sarkari land in the year 1969. 9. Ms. N. Bordoloi, learned Standing Counsel, Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Assam, appearing for the respondent nos. 4 & 6 has adopted the arguments of the learned Government Advocate, Assam. 10. Mr. C. Baruah, learned Standing Counsel, NHAI, appearing for the respondent nos. 9. Ms. N. Bordoloi, learned Standing Counsel, Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Assam, appearing for the respondent nos. 4 & 6 has adopted the arguments of the learned Government Advocate, Assam. 10. Mr. C. Baruah, learned Standing Counsel, NHAI, appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 10 has submitted that since his clients were involved in the project only in the year 2005 and considering the fact that the claim of the appellants is pertaining to the year 1962, there is no record available with the NHAI authorities pertaining to acquisition of any land in the year 1962 and, therefore, his client is unable to take any stand in the matter. 11. We have considered the submissions made at the Bar and have carefully gone through the materials available on record. 12. As has been noted above, the claim of the writ appellants is to the effect that land measuring 7B-4K-17L belonging to them was acquired by the authorities in the year 1962-64 for the purpose of construction of 31 No. National Highway with an assurance that they would be paid compensation for the aforesaid land. However, when no compensation was paid the appellants had submitted a representation before the Revenue Minister, Assam, in the year 2010. On receipt of such representation, the matter was referred to the Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta, asking him to verify and release compensation as per eligibility. Pursuant to such instruction of the Revenue Minister made on 14/12/2010, the Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta, had issued letter dated 18/12/2010 addressed to the Circle Officer, Barnagar Revenue Circle, who had replied to the same on 23/12/2010 informing the Deputy Commissioner that the land in question was converted into Government land but the owners have not received any compensation against their land over which 31 No. National Highway was constructed. Thereafter, although several correspondences were exchanged in this matter, yet, from the letter dated 20/07/2011 issued by the Executive Engineer, PWD, Rangia (NH Division), it is apparent that there was no record available in the office of the Executive Engineer, PWD, regarding acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of 31 No. National Highway, during the year 1962. 13. By filing affidavit in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge, the respondent no. 13. By filing affidavit in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge, the respondent no. 8 i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta, has categorically stated that no records of LA case No. 18/68/70, as mentioned in the communication dated 08/08/2011 issued by the Circle Officer, Barnagar Revenue Circle and LA Case No. 10/60/70 as mentioned in the report of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 04/12/2013, could be found in the office. Moreover, as per report of the Circle Officer, land measuring 7 Bighas -4 Kathas -17 Lechas had been corrected in the name of National Highway No, 31 but the original copies of the said letters also could not be traced out in the office. The Deputy Commissioner has also categorically stated in his affidavit that due to non-availability of the original records, it has become difficult for the authorities to ascertain the claim of the petitioners as well as the veracity of the projection made in the communication dated 08/08/2011 of the Circle Officer and the report of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta-cum-competent authority, NHAI dated 04/12/2013. 14. It would be significant to note herein that in the communication dated 04/12/2013 Additional Deputy Commissioner, Barpeta-cum-competent authority, NHAI has mentioned that pursuant to an inquiry conducted by him it was found that some land was in fact acquired in the year 1962 in connection with construction of 31 No. National High Way. In the list of Pattadars/owners of land in respect of village Barpeta Road, mouza Gobardhana under Barnagar Revenue Circle, the names of Hemanta Kumar Mandal and Ananta Kumar Madal is also included. However, such projection in the communication dated 04/12/2013 appears to be entirely based on the report of the Circle Officer Baranagar Revenue Circle and the concerned Lat Mandal. There is no departmental record available so as to verify the authenticity of the report of the Circle Officer and the Lat Mandal. 15. It is to be noted herein that at the relevant point of time, acquisition of land for public purposes could have been made by the State only by following the process laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in which event, the authorities would be bound to issue notifications under section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894. It is to be noted herein that at the relevant point of time, acquisition of land for public purposes could have been made by the State only by following the process laid down in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in which event, the authorities would be bound to issue notifications under section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894. There is neither any such notification available on record nor is there any reference to such notification in any of the departmental communications relied upon by the appellants. Not only that, the impugned order dated 10/03/2015 clearly mentions that the records pertaining to 20 Bigha -1 Katha -17 Lechas of land at village Barpeta Road town, Mouza - Gobardhana, was acquired in the year 1962 and was converted into Government land by correcting the records in the year 1969. Had the land of the appellants been acquired in accordance with law, such a process, in the opinion of this Court, could not have been carried out without first taking over possession of the land, which would invariably be preceded by payment of compensation to the registered owners. There is no explanation as to how the State Government could have taken over land belonging to the appellants and corrected the records without their knowledge and without following the prescribed procedure as laid down under the Act of 1894. In other words, the appellants have failed to establish the fact that their private Patta land had in fact been acquired by the State for construction of the Highway. If that be so, question of payment of compensation for acquiring the land of the appellants cannot arise in the eyes of law. Taking note of such factors, the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam has rejected the claim of the appellants by the impugned order dated 10/03/2015. 16. As has been noted here-in-above, by the own showing of the writ appellants they had remained silent for nearly 50 years since the time the land owned by them was allegedly acquired for construction of 31 No. National Highway at Barpeta Road. However, there is no proper explanation as to why they had remained silent till 2010 with regard to their claim for payment of compensation. However, there is no proper explanation as to why they had remained silent till 2010 with regard to their claim for payment of compensation. That apart, we also find from the pleadings of the parties that the petitioners have not only failed to mention the particulars of the land claimed by them by furnishing proper Dag Nos/Patta Nos. boundaries etc. of the land but have also failed to mention in the writ petition as to on what basis and since which date, they claim title and /or ownership and possession over such land. There is also not even a shred of evidence available on record to substantiate the claim of the appellants that they/ or their predecessor-in-interest were ever the owners in possession in respect of land measuring 7 Bighas -4 Kathas -17 Lechas. In other words, we find that there is not even an iota of evidence brought on record to prima facie establish the claim of the writ appellants over such land. 17. The departmental communications relied upon by the appellants are without any file number and there is no departmental record available to verify the contents of those communications. The departmental communications, relied upon by the appellants, could at best suggest that the authorities might have acquired some land for construction of the National High Way in the year 1962 and it is possible that in that process, some part of the land belonging to private individuals might also had been taken over by the Government. However, the materials brought on record, in our view, are wholly insufficient for this court to arrive at a conclusion that land measuring 07 Bighas 4 Kathas 17 Lechas belonging to the appellants had infact been acquired by the State. As such, the claim of acquisition of the appellants’ land by the State is itself a disputed question of fact which cannot be adjudicated in this proceeding. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that it would be wholly impermissible for this Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to make payment of compensation to the appellants, as prayed for. 18. In so far as the decisions in the cases of Ramarao Shankar Tapase (supra) and Kazi Moinuddin Kazi Bashiroddin (Supra) relied upon by Mr. Mahmud is concerned we find that those decisions are distinguishable on facts. 18. In so far as the decisions in the cases of Ramarao Shankar Tapase (supra) and Kazi Moinuddin Kazi Bashiroddin (Supra) relied upon by Mr. Mahmud is concerned we find that those decisions are distinguishable on facts. In Ramarao Shankar Tapase (supra), there was no dispute about the acquisition of land of the petitioners and the corresponding duty of the Corporation to pay compensation to the land owners. In fact, the original claimants/land owners had also pursued a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking enhancement of compensation. 19. In the case of Kazi Moinuddin Kazi Bashiroddin (Supra), the order of the High Court permitting the applicant to withdraw the amount earlier deposited by it was the subject matter of challenge before the Supreme Court. In that case, there was a notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The question that arose for consideration was pertaining to the validity of the request for withdrawal of the amount deposited before the Court. The decision of the Apex Court was clearly rendered in the facts and circumstances of that case. 20. In the case of Vidya Devi (Supra), it is no doubt correct that the Supreme Court had directed compensation to be paid to the land owners by ignoring the delay. However, that was a case where the appellant was an illiterate widow coming from the rural background, who was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlements under the law and, therefore, did not file any proceeding for compensation of the land taken over by the State. By taking note of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had directed the State to pay compensation in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India. 21. In the case of Rajeev Kumar Damodarprasad Bhadani (Supra), relied upon by Mr. Mahmud, here also the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had granted relief to the land owner by ignoring the delay factor by relying upon the law laid down in the case of Sukhdutt (Supra) and Digambar (Supra). 21. In the case of Rajeev Kumar Damodarprasad Bhadani (Supra), relied upon by Mr. Mahmud, here also the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had granted relief to the land owner by ignoring the delay factor by relying upon the law laid down in the case of Sukhdutt (Supra) and Digambar (Supra). However, from a careful reading of the said decisions, we find that the principles of equity had been applied by the Division Bench by taking note of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, the fact that the petitioners had succeeded in establishing their right to receive compensation, which is not the case in hand. Unlike in the case of Rajeev Kumar Damodarprasad Bhadani (Supra), the appellants herein, as has been noted above, have completely failed to establish even a semblance of right over the land claimed by them nor have they succeeded in producing any material pertaining to land acquisition proceeding involving their land in the year 1962 for construction of National Highway. Such failure on the part of the appellants, when viewed in the light of the delay of more than 50 years in approaching the court, in our considered opinion, is bound to have a fatal bearing in the outcome of the proceeding instituted by them. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellants are not entitled to any relief in this proceeding. Consequently, we hold that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition. 22. For the reasons stated herein above, this appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. 23. Before parting with the case record, we deem it appropriate to clarify that in the present proceeding, we have merely examined the claim of the appellants for payment of compensation by taking note of their plea that the State had acquired their land for construction of National Highway and rejected such plea. This order would, therefore, not preclude the appellants from raising any claim in respect of their private patta land, if any, based on title and possession, in a proceeding instituted in accordance with law, if so advised. 24. There shall be no order as to costs.