Sruthi, D/o. Viswanathan v. District Collector, Thrissur
2024-03-12
ANU SIVARAMAN, C.JAYACHANDRAN, C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : C.Pratheep Kumar, J. 1. The appellant participated in the auction conducted by the 3rd respondent on 9.4.2007 and purchased the property comprised in Sy.No.258/1 of Pallippuram Village for a total sum of Rs.15,20,000/-. He had remitted the entire sale consideration and applied for confirmation of the sale. However, no sale certificate was issued in his favour, in spite of the fact that nobody applied for setting aside the sale. As per Ext.A1 order, the Collector set aside the sale by invoking the power under Section 54 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (in short the R.R.Act), on the grounds that the solvency certificate given to the said land was Rs.32,00,000/- while the sale proceeds was only Rs.15,20,000/-, which is not a justifiable amount and also that the auction bidder is the close relative of the defaulter. The revision filed by him before the 4th respondent was dismissed as per Ext.P6 order. Writ Petition No.5641/2011 filed against Ext.P6 order has also ended in dismissal. It was in the above context that he preferred this appeal raising various grounds. The main ground raised by the appellant is that inadequacy of sale price is not a ground for setting aside the sale under the proviso to Section 54 of the R.R.Act. 2. When this appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant brought to the notice of the Division Bench two conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court in Subaida Sulaiman v. Hamsa, 1991 KHC 365, and Reetha Wilson v. State of Kerala and Others, 2020 (4) KHC 411 , with regard to the powers of District Collector under Section 54 of the R.R. Act. The Division Bench also found some conflict in the above decisions and decided to refer the matter to a larger Bench. Accordingly, the matter was placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice who in turn constituted this Full Bench to resolve the issue involved in the matter. Now the points that arise for consideration before us are the following : (i) What are the powers of the District Collector under Section 54 of the R.R. Act ? (ii) Whether the power under section 54 of R.R.Act is limited to the grounds enumerated in section 53 alone?
Now the points that arise for consideration before us are the following : (i) What are the powers of the District Collector under Section 54 of the R.R. Act ? (ii) Whether the power under section 54 of R.R.Act is limited to the grounds enumerated in section 53 alone? (iii) Whether inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale is a sufficient ground to set aside the sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act? (iv) Whether there is automatic confirmation of sale on the expiry of 30 days ? (v) Whether notice is to be given to the purchaser before setting aside the sale under Section 54 ? (vi) Whether sale can be set aside under Section 54 after the confirmation of sale ? 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Special Government Pleader. 4. Considering the complexity and importance of the issue involved, we have sought the assistance of Adv.Syamkumar V.M., who was appointed as Amicus Curiae. He had also argued in detail the provisions of the R.R.Act, and especially the scope and ambit of Section 54 therein. 5. In order to properly evaluate the scope and ambit of Section 54 of the R.R. Act it is worthwhile to read Section 52, 53 and 54 of the R.R. Act, which are extracted hereunder :- “52. Application to set aside sale of immovable property on deposit.- (1) Any person owning or claiming an interest in immovable property sold under this Act may, at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, deposit in the treasury of the taluk in which the immovable property is situate or if there be no treasury in the taluk, in the nearest treasury – (a) a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money ; and (b) a sum equal to the arrears of public revenue due on land for which the immovable property was sold together with interest thereon and cost of process; and may apply to the Collector to set aside the sale.
(2) If such deposit and application are made within thirty days from the date of the sale, the Collector shall pass an order setting aside the sale, and shall repay to the purchaser the purchase money so far as it has been deposited, together with the five per cent deposited by the applicant : Provided that if more persons than one have made deposit and application under this section, the application of the first depositor shall be accepted. (3) If a person applies under section 53 to set aside the sale of immovable property, he shall not, unless he withdrawn such application, be entitled to make an application under this section. 53. Application to set aside sale on ground of material irregularity, mistake, etc - (1) At any time within thirty days from the date of the sale of immovable property, application may be made to the Collector to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting it ; but, except as otherwise hereinafter provided, no sale shall be set aside on the ground of any such irregularity or mistake, unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Collector that he has sustained substantial injury by reason thereof. (2) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall set aside the sale and may direct a fresh sale. 54. Order confirming or setting aside sale. - On the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale, if no application to have the sale set aside is made under section 52 or section 53 or if any such application has been made and rejected, the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale: Provided that if the Collector has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside notwithstanding that no such application has been made or on grounds other than those alleged in any application which has been made and rejected, he may, after recording his reasons in writing, set aside the sale.” 6. On a perusal of the above provisions, it can be seen that an application under Section 52 of the R.R.Act can be made by a person owning or claiming any interest in the property sold, within 30 days from the date of sale, on deposit of money for setting aside the sale.
On a perusal of the above provisions, it can be seen that an application under Section 52 of the R.R.Act can be made by a person owning or claiming any interest in the property sold, within 30 days from the date of sale, on deposit of money for setting aside the sale. An application to set aside the sale under Section 53 can be made if there is some material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting sale. In that case, the applicant also has to prove that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of the material irregularity, mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting sale. 7. One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Collector can invoke the power under the proviso to Section 54 only on the grounds enumerated in Section 53 of R.R.Act. On the other hand, the learned Spl. Government Pleader submits that the grounds other than those mentioned in Section 53 also can be invoked by the Collector to set aside a sale under Section 54. The learned Amicus Curiae would also submit that the scope of the proviso to Section 54 is wide enough to include grounds other than those mentioned in Section 53 as well. 8. In the decision in Joseph v. Tahsildar, South Wynad Taluk & Anr., 1980 (2) ILR (Ker) 650, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that gross inadequacy of the price fetched at the auction can certainly be a valid ground for setting aside the sale in the following words :- “......In practice, it is only when the question of confirmation is taken up by the Collector that the occasion for him to scrutinize the relevant records concerned with the proceedings arises; and if, in that process, the Collector finds reason for setting aside the sale, he has both the right and the duty to do so after recording the reasons in writing. Gross inadequacy of the price fetched at the auction, compared to the market price for similar lands, in the locality during the material time, can certainly be a valid ground for setting aside the sale. So also, if there were irregularities in the procedure adopted for conducting the sale, that also would afford a reasonable ground for setting aside the sale......” 9.
So also, if there were irregularities in the procedure adopted for conducting the sale, that also would afford a reasonable ground for setting aside the sale......” 9. However, in the decision in Subaida Sulaiman v. Hamsa, 1991 KHC 365, a Division Bench of this Court held that, the Collector can set aside the sale under Section 54 only on the grounds mentioned in Section 53 and not on any other grounds. On the basis of that reasoning, the Division Bench further held that mere inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale is not a ground coming within the sweep of Section 53 and therefore, it was further held that the sale is not liable to be set aside on the ground of mere inadequacy of the price fetched at the sale. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Division Bench held that :- “..........The proviso to S.54 does not indicate for what reasons or on what ground or under what circumstances the Collector can set aside the sale. It cannot be said that the Legislature intended that the Collector can set aside the sale for no reason, or for any irrelevant reason. It is difficult to accept that the Legislature did not intend to prescribe any guidelines in the matter of exercise of power conferred on the Collector under the proviso to S.54. Reading S.53 and 54 together, and it appears to us that the provision being a part of the scheme in the matter of setting aside the sale, they have to be read together, the picture becomes clear and the Collector can set aside the sale under the proviso to S.54, only if he has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside for the reasons mentioned in S.53. De hors the reasons mentioned in S.53, the Collector has no jurisdiction either under S.53 or under the proviso to S.54. The observations, we have quoted from the decision in Joseph's case, with respect, do not lay down the correct law.” 10. In the decision in Reetha Wilson v. State of Kerala and Others, 2020 (4) KHC 411 another Division Bench of this Court has held that inadequate price in sale is sufficient enough to set aside a sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act.
In the decision in Reetha Wilson v. State of Kerala and Others, 2020 (4) KHC 411 another Division Bench of this Court has held that inadequate price in sale is sufficient enough to set aside a sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act. In paragraph 15, the Division Bench held that :- “...........Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the setting aside of the sale by the Revenue Divisional Officer was by virtue of the powers conferred on him under S.54 of the Act, 1968, since the authority was satisfied that the price fetched by the property in the auction was inadequate, which thus, also means irrespective of any kind of material irregularity or mistake, the revenue authority was vested with powers to record his reasons and set aside the sale by virtue of the proviso to S.54 of the Act, 1963, which is a factual finding. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the authority was justified in doing so having realised that the sale if confirmed would seriously prejudice a farmer, also leading to any irreparable injury and loses.” 11. With regard to the requirement of notice to the auction purchaser the Division Bench in Reetha Wilson (supra) held that :- “.........So much so, on a deeper analysis of S.52 and S.53 of the Act it is unequivocal that there is no statutory requirement for providing any hearing to a person whose bid was not confirmed, and further independent of the applications under the said provisions, the authority is vested with powers under S.54 of the Act 1968 to set aside any sale.” 12.In the decision in Captain v. District Collector, 1996 KHC 421, a Single Bench of this Court, while dealing with the powers of the Collector under Section 54 of the R.R.Act, held that adequacy or inadequacy of price is one of the relevant criteria to be taken note of by the Revenue authorities. In paragraph 8 of the above decision it was held thus :- “...........Therefore, in a case where sale has not been confirmed, as held by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case, it is always open to the Collector to look into the question whether the price fetched is inadequate or not. If the District Collector is satisfied that the price fetched is inadequate, he can set aside the sale.
If the District Collector is satisfied that the price fetched is inadequate, he can set aside the sale. In the instant case, since the Collector never confirmed the sale, I am of the view that going by the Supreme Court decision adequacy of the sale price is one of the relevant criteria to be taken note of by the District Collector.” 13. The purpose of conducting open auction was also highlighted by the Single Bench in paragraph 5 of the above decision in the following words :- “........Therefore, question of adequacy, or inadequacy, of price is one of the relevant criteria to be taken note of by the revenue authorities when a property is brought to sale. The purpose of an open auction is to get the most remunerative price. It is the duty of the court to keep the auction open so that intending bidders would be free to participate and offer higher prices. If that path were to be closed, the possibility of fraud or underbidding would loom large. Therefore, contention of counsel for the petitioner that whatever might be the sale price, after the expiry of 30 days from the date of sale, sale has automatically become confirmed cannot be sustained.” 14. In the above decision, the Single Bench further held that in case auction was not confirmed, there is no necessity to give any notice to the auction purchaser to show cause why a re-auction be not conducted. 15. However, a Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Captain v. District Collector, 1999 KHC 375, held that before setting aside the sale under section 54 of the R.R.Act, notice is to be issued to the auction purchaser. In the above decision, the Division Bench reversed the order of the Collector setting aside the sale under Section 54, on the sole ground that before setting aside the sale no notice was issued to the auction purchaser. 16. In Abdul Basheer K. v. District Collector, Kannur and Others, 2012 (3) KHC 858 , another Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether the power under Section 54 of the R.R.Act could be invoked to set aside a sale once it was confirmed. In the above decision, the sale was confirmed after the requisition given by the KSHB was withdrawn as per the direction of the Government.
In the above decision, the sale was confirmed after the requisition given by the KSHB was withdrawn as per the direction of the Government. After observing that confirmation of sale is not automatic and the power under section 54 is very wide, in paragraph 16 the Single Bench observed that :- “The 'proviso' adds that, even if any application has been preferred either under S.52 or 53 and the same stands rejected, still it is open for the first respondent to invoke the power under S.54 and set aside the sale on grounds other than those alleged in any application which has been preferred and rejected. This clearly shows that, the power vested with the first respondent by virtue of the 'proviso' to S.54 is very wide. In other words, the power conferred under S.54 to confirm a sale is always subject to the power of the first respondent/District Collector to interfere in appropriate cases; even after rejecting an application to set aside the sale – of course on grounds other than those already dealt with in such application to set aside the sale, which stands rejected.” 17. With regard to the power of the Collector under Section 54 of the R.R.Act to set aside a sale after confirmation, in paragraph 17 the learned Single Judge further held that: “Going by the scheme of the Statute, enabling a party to make an application to set aside the sale under S.52 or 53, such application has to be filed in the manner specified therein and of course within 30 days. Once the application preferred is considered and rejected, the sale has necessarily to be confirmed in favour of the bidder, though the bidder does not get any vested right, till confirmation order is passed; more so, when confirmation of sale is 'not automatic'. But, when the 'proviso' to S.54 says that the power to set aside the sale can be invoked by the District Collector, even after the rejection of an application under S.52 or 53, on grounds other than those contained in such application already rejected, it necessarily indicates that confirmation of sale immediately after the rejection of the application preferred under S.52 or 53 is no bar for considering the matter on 'other grounds' (other than those contained in the applications already rejected).
To put it more clear, whether any such circumstances to cause for interference exist or not, is a matter to be considered with proper application of mind, which is a stage after the rejection of the application under S.52 or 53 and this situation is consciously taken care of by the law makers with a intent to do justice in deserving cases. The power that is being exercised by the first respondent, is of course that of a quasi-judicial authority. Necessarily, the affected parties have to be heard and that's all. This is more so, when there is no time limit for exercising such power under S.54 and the above power can be invoked by the first respondent, who can set aside the sale on grounds other than those which are contemplated under S.52 or 53 of the Revenue Recovery Act. This Court finds support in this regard from the decisions rendered by this Court, reported in ILR 1980 (2) Ker. 650, 1980 KHC 347 : 1980 KLT SN 78 : 1980 KLN SN 29 : 1979- 85 KUC 270 (cited supra) and 1990 (2) KLT 289 , 1990 KHC 376 Asha v. District Collector. Viewed in the above circumstance, it has to be declared that the District Collector is competent to set aside the sale invoking the power under the 'proviso' to S.54 of the Revenue Recovery Act, notwithstanding the confirmation of sale passed already, subject to satisfaction of the ingredients as mentioned herein before. As it stands so, Ext.P5 order passed by the first respondent is perfectly within the four walls of law and is not assailable under any circumstance.” 18.In Mohan Wahi v. Commissioner, Income Tax, Varanasi and Others, 2001, KHC 1799, the sale was held on 11.1.1980 for realising the income tax arrears due from the petitioner. But before confirming the sale on 25.3.1998, the demand against the assessee, stood reduced to nil. In the above factual background, the Apex Court held in paragraph 10 thus :- “...............The fact that sale was being held for an assumed demand which is found to be fictitious or held to have not existed at all, in fact or in the eye of law, is one such event which would oblige the Tax Recovery Officer not to pass an order confirming the sale and rather annul the same.
The High Court in our opinion, clearly fell in error in not allowing relief to the petitioner appellant by setting aside the sale.” 19.In Vijayakumar G.P. v. District Collector, Tvm and Others, 2013 (2) KHC 402 , another Single Bench of this Court relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mohan Wahi (supra), held that once a liability has been settled and the requisition which led to the revenue recovery action has been withdrawn, the District Collector had no jurisdiction to confirm the sale. 20. In paragraph 13 of the judgment in Vijayakumar (supra) the learned Single Judge further observed that Rule 56, 60 and 63 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act being similar to the provisions contained in S.49, 53, 54, 55 and 56 of the R.R.Act, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Mohan Wahi, in all respects, apply to the sale conducted under the R.R.Act also. 21.In P.Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala and Others, 2006 KHC 366, another Division Bench of this Court highlighted the duty cast upon the officials to safeguard the interests of the revenue as well as the defaulters to fetch the maximum amount in auction sale, in paragraph 7, in the following words :- “Revenue sale is conducted not only to wipe off the revenue dues but also to see that maximum price is fetched to the defaulter since in a revenue sale the interests of the intending purchaser, the defaulter and the mortgagee have to be safeguarded. Duty is cast on the officials to safeguard not only the interests of the Revenue but also the defaulter so as to fetch the maximum amount. Discretion conferred under S.75(2) has to be exercised by the authorities depending upon the facts of each case and the case has to be dealt with in a just and equitable manner. Revenue authorities should know that the defaulter is in distress and between devil and deep sea. Defaulter in a given case would not be in a position to repay the amount due to to various reasons; such as labour unrest, lack of raw materials, unfavourable market conditions and host of other reasons. Defaulter in all situations may not be a cheat or swindler.
Defaulter in a given case would not be in a position to repay the amount due to to various reasons; such as labour unrest, lack of raw materials, unfavourable market conditions and host of other reasons. Defaulter in all situations may not be a cheat or swindler. Since revenue authorities are dealing with the properties of somebody else it is highly necessary that an attempt should be made by them to get maximum price for the property.” 22. In the decision in Gopalakrishnan (supra) the sale was confirmed by the Collector during the pendency of the application preferred under Section 53 of the R.R.Act. In the above circumstances, the Division Bench set aside the order of confirmation of sale holding that the order of confirmation passed during the pendency of application under Section 53 is non-est in law. 23.The principles which should govern confirmation of sales were narrated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in Navalkha and Sons v. Ramunuju Das, MANU/SC/0614/1969, in the following words : “.......Where the acceptance of the offer by the commissioner is subject to confirmation of the court, the offeror does not by mere acceptance get any vested right in the property so that he may take automatic confirmation of this offer. The condition of confirmation by the Court operates as safeguard against the property being sold at an inadequate price whether or not it is a consequence of any irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion.” 24.In the very same decision, the Apex Court further held that :- “......The court is the custodian of the interests of the company and it's creditors and the sanction of the court required under the Companies Act has to be exercised with judicial discretion regard being had to the interests of the company and it's creditors as well. 25.The above proposition was quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its subsequent decision in LICA (P) Ltd. (No.1) v. Official Liquidator and Ors., MANU/SC/0803/1993. 26.It was argued by the learned Spl.
25.The above proposition was quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its subsequent decision in LICA (P) Ltd. (No.1) v. Official Liquidator and Ors., MANU/SC/0803/1993. 26.It was argued by the learned Spl. Government Pleader that though in Sections 52 and 53 of the R.R.Act specific grounds were mentioned for setting aside a sale, no such grounds were specified in Section 54 and hence, according to him, Section 54 can be invoked on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 53 also. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant would argue that an interpretation giving wider powers to the District Collector may lead to misuse of the provision and according to him, the grounds mentioned in Section 53 alone can be invoked by the Collector under Section 54 also. 27. We notice that, while Section 53 speaks of specific grounds to set aside the sale, the Proviso to Section 54 does not contemplate any specific ground. Instead, the language employed in the Proviso is “if the Collector has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside”. Such power of the Collector to set aside the sale can be exercised, notwithstanding the fact that no application under Section 52 or 53 has been made. In a case where an application has been made under Section 53 and the same has been rejected, the power under the Proviso can be exercised only on grounds, other than those alleged in such application. It is therefore clear that, if one among the grounds stipulated in Section 53 is alleged and rejected, it is quite open for the Collector to set aside the sale on other grounds stipulated in Section 53. In case, all the grounds in Section 53 has been urged and rejected, then the Collector can only set aside the sale on some ground other than the grounds envisaged in Section 53. This appears to be the true purport of the Proviso to Section 54. The power to set aside the sale is available to the Collector even in a case where no application is filed under Section 53 provided the Collector has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside.
This appears to be the true purport of the Proviso to Section 54. The power to set aside the sale is available to the Collector even in a case where no application is filed under Section 53 provided the Collector has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside. As regards the broad conspectus of “reason to think”, we are of the opinion that such reasons/grounds should be serious, valid, and material, as distinguished from a mere irregularity or even an illegality, which is not material and consequential. In other words, such reason should impact one among the parties with a material consequence, which requirement we read from the pre-requisite to record reasons in writing, while setting aside a sale invoking the Proviso to Section 54. 28. As pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae, the precaution against misuse of the power under the proviso to Section 54 has been inbuilt in the proviso itself. As per the above proviso, while setting aside the sale by invoking the above power, the Collector has to record his reasons in writing, before passing an order setting aside the sale. Therefore, it is implied that there should be sound and valid reasons for the Collector to invoke the power under the proviso to Section 54 of the R.R.Act. There is a further remedy by way of judicial review in case anybody is aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector under the above provision. 29. The decision of the Apex Court in Navalkha (supra) relates to open market sale of land of a Company under liquidation and as such it does not apply with the same vigour to a sale under the R.R.Act. Even then, the principles of the above decision can be applied in this case also, as in both cases the properties are being put to sale in auction to realize the amounts due from the defaulters. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Navalkha (supra) that the condition of confirmation by the Court operates as safeguard against the property being sold at an inadequate price, whether or not it is a consequence of any irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale can be applied in a sale conducted under the provisions of the R.R.Act also. 30.
30. However, as observed by the Apex Court in the judgment in Lica (supra), the Court has to bear in mind that a Court sale is a forced sale in which the best price is not often forthcoming. Moreover, if the revenue sale is interfered with on flimsy and trivial grounds, nobody will come forward and participate in such auction sales. Therefore, the Judge must make a certain margin for this factor. When the problem before us is evaluated in the light of the above observations and ground realities, it is to be held that a slight or mere inadequacy in the sale price cannot be taken as a ground sufficient enough to set aside a sale, which is otherwise validly conducted. To put it in other words, gross inadequacy of the sale price can definitely be taken as one of the grounds by the Collector to set aside a sale, by invoking the power under the proviso to Section 54 of the R.R.Act. 31.In the above circumstance, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Division Bench in Subaida Sulaiman's case (supra) to the effect that the District Collector can set aside a sale under Section 54 only on the grounds mentioned in Section 53 of the R.R.Act. 32. As we have already noted above, in the decisions in Reetha Wilson (supra) and Captain v. District Collector, 1996 KHC 421, this Court held that before invoking the power under the proviso to Section 54 of the R.R.Act, notice is not necessary to the auction purchaser in case the sale was not confirmed. However, in Captain v. District Collector, 1999 KHC 375, it was held that notice is necessary before setting aside a revenue sale. 33. It is true that only on confirmation of sale, the auction purchaser will get title over the property purchased by him. However, a decision passed by the Collector under section 54 of the R.R.Act would definitely affect the right of the auction purchaser. 34. The principle audi alteram partem is one of the basic principles of natural justice recognised by all civilised states. The importance of rules of natural justice including the application of the principle of audi alteram partem in judicial and quasi-judicial processes was discussed by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Manager, SN Trust, Kollam v. Dr.N.Unnikrishnan and Another, 2021(3)KHC 253.
The importance of rules of natural justice including the application of the principle of audi alteram partem in judicial and quasi-judicial processes was discussed by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Manager, SN Trust, Kollam v. Dr.N.Unnikrishnan and Another, 2021(3)KHC 253. In paragraph 15 the Division Bench held that:- “The rules of natural justice including the application of the principle audi alteram partem, are inherent in administrative proceedings, which affect rights of individuals. These safety valves are integral components of Art.14 and Art.16 of the Constitution. It is a well settled principle of administrative law that except in cases where the principles of natural justice are expressly excluded by legislative process, it shall be treated as inherent and inseparably woven into the judicial or quasijudicial processes. It applies also to administrative functions when individual rights are decided touching matters that could be contentious. It has necessarily to be ensured that principles of natural justice are adhered to.” 35. We are of the opinion that proceedings under section 54 of the R.R.Act is a collateral and independent one and is of quasi-judicial nature. The proviso to the above provision also mandates that the Collector has to give his reasons in writing, if he decides to set aside the sale. The principles of natural justice are not expressly excluded by the provisions of the R.R.Act. In the above circumstance, we are of the considered view that it is necessary to issue notice to the auction purchaser and hear him before invoking the power under the proviso to Section 54 of the R.R.Act, even if the sale is not confirmed, since it impacts him with serious civil consequences. Therefore, the observation of the Division Bench in the decision in Reetha Wilson (supra) and learned Single Judge in the decision in Captain,1996 (supra) that notice is not necessary before setting aside the sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act, cannot be held as a correct proposition of law. 36. Sections 52 and 53 of the R.R.Act stipulates a time limit of 30 days for filing an application to set aside the sale. Sub-sections (2) of Sections 52 and 53 provides that if applications under sub-section (1) of Sections 52 and 53 are filed, the Collector shall, if the other conditions in the provision are satisfied, set aside the sale.
Sections 52 and 53 of the R.R.Act stipulates a time limit of 30 days for filing an application to set aside the sale. Sub-sections (2) of Sections 52 and 53 provides that if applications under sub-section (1) of Sections 52 and 53 are filed, the Collector shall, if the other conditions in the provision are satisfied, set aside the sale. As per Section 54, on the expiry of 30 days from the date of sale and if no application is filed either under Sections 52 or 53 or if any such application has been made and rejected, the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale. On a conjoint reading of the above provisions, it can be seen that a period of 30 days is given to the aggrieved persons to file an application under Section 52(1) and 53(1) to the Collector and the Collector need to confirm the sale only after the expiry of 30 days. The provision does not stipulate any time limit for the Collector to dispose of an application filed under Section 52 or 53. Therefore, as held by the Division Bench in Abdul Basheer (supra) and Single Judge in Captain v. District Collector, 1996 (supra), confirmation of sale is not automatic on expiry of 30 days from the date of sale. There is also no necessity for the Collector to pass orders on applications filed under Sections 52 and 53 within a period of 30 days. In other words, an order of confirmation of sale or setting aside the sale after the expiry of 30 days is also perfectly in order. 37. In the decisions in Abdul Basheer (supra), Vijayakumar (supra) and Mohan Wahi (supra), sale was set aside under Section 54 even after the confirmation of the sale. In that case, at the time when the sale was confirmed there was no liability for the defaulter and without noticing the above material fact, the sale was confirmed. In Abdul Basheer (supra) the requisition was withdrawn before the sale was confirmed. In Gopalakrishnan (supra) sale was confirmed before the disposal of the application under section 53 was disposed of. In the above referred 3 cases, it was in the light of the peculiar and special circumstances involved that sale was set aside, after it was confirmed. The power to set aside a sale is contemplated in the proviso to Section 54.
In Gopalakrishnan (supra) sale was confirmed before the disposal of the application under section 53 was disposed of. In the above referred 3 cases, it was in the light of the peculiar and special circumstances involved that sale was set aside, after it was confirmed. The power to set aside a sale is contemplated in the proviso to Section 54. A proviso is liable to be read with reference to and in the light of the main provision, which, in the instant case, is Section 54, providing for confirmation of sale. It is at that time that the District Collector applies his mind to all aspects of sale and arrives at a conclusion that the sale is eligible/liable to be confirmed. Therefore, the power to set aside a sale invoking the power conferred by the proviso to Section 54 shall ordinarily be exercised at the time of confirmation of sale and not afterwords, except in exceptional circumstances, as culled out in Mohan Wahi, Abdul Baheer and Vijayakumar (supra). The points formulated are answered accordingly. 38. In the result, the reference is answered as follows :- (i) Power of the Collector for setting aside the sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act is not limited to the grounds set forth in section 53, The power can be exercised for any serious, valid and material reasons, as distinguished from a mere irregularity or even an illegality, which is not material and consequential. (ii) Gross inadequacy of sale price is a ground for setting aside the sale under Section 54 of the R.R.Act. (iii) There will be no automatic confirmation of sale on the expiry of 30 days. (iv) Natural justice requires notice and opportunity of hearing to the auction purchaser before setting aside the sale under the proviso to Section 54. (v) The power under the proviso to Section 54 cannot be exercised after confirmation of the sale, except in exceptional circumstances, like withdrawal of requisition, absence of any liability or pendency of any application under Section 52 or 53 of the R.R. Act etc, as recognised in Mohan Wahi, Abdul Basheer and Vijayakumar (supra). The reference is answered accordingly and the Writ Appeal shall be posted according to roster for consideration. Before parting with the reference, we place on record our deep appreciation to Sri. Syamkumar V.M., learned Amicus Curiae, as also, to the counsel for the respective parties.