ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition and seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 (for short, ‘the UGC Regulations of 2018’), on the ground that same is discriminatory and violative of his fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner has Masters Degree in Music and he has also cleared NET examination conducted by the University Grants Commission (UGC). He is an “A” Grade artist of All India Radio. On 16-5-2016, he was appointed as Assistant Professor in respondent No.3 University in the Department of Instrumental Music (Sarod) and after completion of one year probation, he became permanent with effect from 26-5-2017. It is the case of the petitioner that as per the UGC Regulations of 2018, under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) for University Teachers, for promotion on the post of Assistant Professor (Senior Scale) from the post of Assistant Professor (entry level), the eligibility criteria has been fixed that, those who have completed 4 years of service with Ph.D. or 5 years of service with M.Phil etc. or 6 years of service in case of those without Ph.D./M.Phil/P.G. degree in professional courses and also satisfy other conditions enshrined therein, would be entitled for promotion. Though the petitioner is having all the eligibility criteria to be promoted in the next level i.e. Level 11, but since he had not completed 6 years of service as Assistant Professor (Level 10), his case was not considered, whereas, those who possess Ph.D. have been given the benefit of CAS. Though the petitioner is having all the eligibility criteria to be promoted in the next level i.e. Level 11, but since he had not completed 6 years of service as Assistant Professor (Level 10), his case was not considered, whereas, those who possess Ph.D. have been given the benefit of CAS. It is the further case of the petitioner that at the time of recruitment, there was no requirement of having Ph.D. for the post of Assistant Professor under the category of “Music, Performing Arts, Visual Arts and other Traditional Indian Art Forms like Sculpture, etc.” for the candidates qualifying clause 4.4.2.1 (second part) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2010, then giving benefit of Ph.D. over the non-Ph.D. holder for promotions under the CAS is discriminatory and as such, it is violative of his right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 3. Return has been filed by the State/respondent No.1 and also by the University Grants Commission/respondent No.2 opposing the averments made in the writ petition stating inter alia that the UGC Regulations of 2018, which have been called in question, is strictly in accordance with law and challenge in this behalf is liable to be rejected. 4. Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the UGC Regulations of 2018 is discriminatory and violative of the petitioner’s right under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that the petitioner is having higher proficiency in the Instrument (Sarod) rather than academic qualification (Ph.D.) and his practical knowledge and experience will always have higher place as against Ph.D. He would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of State of J. and K. v. Triloki Nath Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 , Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of A.P., AIR 1993 SC 1947 and Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology and others, AIR 2023 SC 3723 to support his submission. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, learned counsel appearing for the UGC/respondent No.2, would support the impugned Regulation and submit that prescription of educational qualification for promotional post is the prerogative of the UGC and is a matter of recruitment policy and the UGC as employer is entitled to prescribe qualification as a condition of eligibility and scope of interference in the same is extremely limited and as such, the impugned Regulation is strictly in accordance with law and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Principles for Examining the Constitutional Validity of the provisions of an Act/Regulations: - 7. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption that the Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature, or that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, page 592.) 8. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 9. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and others), (2017) 9 SCC 1 held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary and manifest arbitrariness is the ground to negate legislation as well under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 10. Very recently, in the matter of Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 813, it has been held by three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court that judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive by observing as under: - “68. It could thus be seen that the role of the judiciary is to ensure that the aforesaid two organs of the State i.e. the Legislature and Executive function within the constitutional limits. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The role of this Court is limited to examine as to whether the Legislature or the Executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution. However, while doing so, the court must remain within its self-imposed limits.” 11. Thereafter, in Dr. Jaya Thakur (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon their earlier judgment in the matter of Binoy Viswam v. Union of India and others, (2017) 7 SCC 59 and reviewing their earlier decisions, speaking through B.R. Gavai, J., have held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly, and observed as under: - “70. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. To do so, the Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provision under challenge cannot stand. It has been held that unless there is flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions, the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be declared bad. 71. It has been the consistent view of this Court that legislative enactment can be struck down only on two grounds. Firstly, that the appropriate legislature does not have the competence to make the law; and secondly, that it takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provisions. It has been held that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or the other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. It has been held that Parliament and the legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. 72. It has been held by this Court that there is one and only one ground for declaring an Act of the legislature or a provision in the Act to be invalid, and that is if it clearly violates some provision of the Constitution in so evident a manner as to leave no manner of doubt. It has further been held that if two views are possible, one making the statute constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former view must always be preferred. It has been held that the Court must make every effort to uphold the constitutional validity of a statute, even if that requires giving a strained construction or narrowing down its scope. 73. It has consistently been held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. 73. It has consistently been held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. It has been held that if the law which is passed is within the scope of the power conferred on a legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a court may think of it. 74. It could thus be seen that the challenge to the legislative Act would be sustainable only if it is established that the legislature concerned had no legislative competence to enact on the subject it has enacted. The other ground on which the validity can be challenged is that such an enactment is in contravention of any of the fundamental rights stipulated in Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution. Another ground as could be culled out from the recent judgments of this Court is that the validity of the legislative act can be challenged on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. However, while doing so, it will have to be remembered that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.” 12. Furthermore, in the matter of Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti and another, (2022) 6 SCC 65 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. B.R. Gavai, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the report as under: - “27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28. It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.” 13. Similarly, in the matter of PGF Limited and others v. Union of India and another, (2015) 13 SCC 50 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down certain guidelines by taking note of certain precautions to be observed whenever the vires of any provision of law is raised before the Court and cautioned the Courts in paragraph 37 as under: - “37. The Court can, in the first instance, examine whether there is a prima facie strong ground made out in order to examine the vires of the provisions raised in the writ petition. The Court can also note whether such challenge is made at the earliest point of time when the statute came to be introduced or any provision was brought into the statute book or any long time-gap exists as between the date of the enactment and the date when the challenge is made. It should also be noted as to whether the grounds of challenge based on the facts pleaded and the implication of the provision really has any nexus apart from the grounds of challenge made. With reference to those relevant provisions, the Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation. With reference to those relevant provisions, the Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation. The Court should also examine the extent of financial implications by virtue of the operation of the provision vis-a-vis the State and alleged extent of sufferance by the person who seeks to challenge based on the alleged invalidity of the provision with particular reference to the vires made. Even if the writ court is of the view that the challenge raised requires to be considered, then again it will have to be examined, while entertaining the challenge raised for consideration, whether it calls for prevention of the operation of the provision in the larger interest of the public. We have only attempted to set out some of the basic considerations to be borne in mind by the writ court and the same is not exhaustive. In other words, the writ court should examine such other grounds on the above lines for consideration while considering a challenge on the ground of vires to a statute or the provision of law made before it for the purpose of entertaining the same as well as for granting any interim relief during the pendency of such writ petitions. For the abovestated reasons it is also imperative that when such writ petitions are entertained, the same should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and on a time-bound basis, so that the legal position is settled one way or the other.” 14. Clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the UGC Regulations of 2018, which has been impugned, states as under: - “6.4 STAGES OF PROMOTION UNDER THE CAREER ADVANCEMENT SCHEME OF INCUMBENT AND NEWLY-APPOINTED ASSISTANT PROFESSORS/ASSOCIATE PROFESSORS/PROFESSORS C. Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) for University teachers I. Assistant Professor (Academic Level 10) to Assistant Professor (Senior Scale/Academic Level 11) Eligibility: i) An Assistant Professor who has completed four years of service with a Ph.D. degree or five years of service with a M.Phil./PG Degree in Professional Courses, such as LLM, M.Tech, M.V.Sc. and M.D., or six years of service in case of those without a Ph.D./M.Phil./PG Degree in a Professional course and satisfies the following conditions: ii) Attended one Orientation course of 21 days duration on teaching methodology; iii) Any one of the following: Completed Refresher/Research Methodology Course/Workshop/Syllabus Upgradation Workshop/Training Teaching-Learning- Evaluation, Technology Programmes/Faculty Development Programmes of at least one week (5 days) duration, or taken one MOOCs course (with e-certification) or development of e-contents in four-quadrants/MOOC’s course during the assessment period; and iv) Published one research publication in the peer reviewed journals or UGC-listed journals during assessment period.” 15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid Regulation would show that it is a Career Advancement Scheme for University teachers i.e. Assistant Professor (Academic Level 10) to Assistant Professor (Senior Scale/Academic Level 11) and the Assistant Professor who has completed four years of service with Ph.D. degree or five years of service with M.Phil./PG Degree in Professional Courses such as LLM, M.Tech., M.V.Sc. and M.D. or six years of service in case of those without Ph.D./M.Phil./PG Degree in a Professional course and satisfies the other conditions i.e. conditions No.(ii), (iii) & (iv) therein. Since the petitioner herein has been appointed only on 16-5-2016, therefore, on the date of consideration, he was not eligible as he has not completed 6 years of service as Assistant Professor (Level 10) and moreover, he did not have Ph.D. degree or five years of service with M.Phil./PG Degree in Professional Courses, such as LLM, M.Tech, M.V.Sc. and M.D., then he decided to call in question Clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the UGC Regulations of 2018. In the matter of Triloki Nath Khosa (supra), it has been held by their Lordships that “The object to be achieved” should not be “a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification” should not be “characterized as arbitrary or absurd”. 16. In the matter of Triloki Nath Khosa (supra), it has been held by their Lordships that “The object to be achieved” should not be “a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification” should not be “characterized as arbitrary or absurd”. 16. In the matter of Puneet Sharma and others v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited and another, (2021) 16 SCC 340 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon their earlier judgments in the matters of P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala, (2003) 3 SCC 541 , Jyoti K.K. v. Kerala Public Service Commission, (2010) 15 SCC 596 and State of Punjab v. Anita, (2015) 2 SCC 170 held that the prescription of qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy and the State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of eligibility. It has been observed in paragraph 29 of the report in Puneet Sharma (supra) as under: - “29. Thereafter, the Court discussed the previous rulings in P.M. Latha, Jyoti K.K. and Anita, then concluded that the candidature of the diploma-holders was correctly rejected and held as follows: (Zahoor Ahmad Rather case,[Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad, (2019) 2 SCC 404 ] SCC pp. 414-15, paras 26-27) “26. We are in respectful agreement with the interpretation which has been placed on the judgment in Jyoti K.K. in the subsequent decision in Anita. The decision in Jyoti K.K. turned on the provisions of Rule 10(a)(ii). Absent such a rule, it would not be permissible to draw an inference that a higher qualification necessarily presupposes the acquisition of another, albeit lower, qualification. The prescription of qualifications for a post is a matter of recruitment policy. The State as the employer is entitled to prescribe the qualifications as a condition of eligibility. It is no part of the role or function of judicial review to expand upon the ambit of the prescribed qualifications. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K.12 turned on a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower qualification. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The decision in Jyoti K.K.12 turned on a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification could presuppose the acquisition of a lower qualification. The absence of such a rule in the present case makes a crucial difference to the ultimate outcome. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench[Imtiyaz Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment[Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. State of J&K, 2017 SCC OnLine J&K 936] of the learned Single Judge and in coming to the conclusion that the appellants did not meet the prescribed qualifications. We find no error in the decision[Imtiyaz Ahmad v. Zahoor Ahmad Rather, LPA (SW) No. 135 of 2017, decided on 12-10-2017 (J&K)] of the Division Bench. 27. While prescribing the qualifications for a post, the State, as employer, may legitimately bear in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification and the content of the course of studies which leads up to the acquisition of a qualification. The State is entrusted with the authority to assess the needs of its public services. Exigencies of administration, it is trite law, fall within the domain of administrative decision-making. The State as a public employer may well take into account social perspectives that require the creation of job opportunities across the societal structure. All these are essentially matters of policy. Judicial review must tread warily. That is why the decision in Jyoti K.K. must be understood in the context of a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the post. It was in the context of specific rule that the decision in Jyoti K.K. turned.” 17. That is why the decision in Jyoti K.K. must be understood in the context of a specific statutory rule under which the holding of a higher qualification which presupposes the acquisition of a lower qualification was considered to be sufficient for the post. It was in the context of specific rule that the decision in Jyoti K.K. turned.” 17. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the prescription of qualifications for a post is the prerogative of the employer/State bearing in mind several features including the nature of the job, the aptitudes requisite for the efficient discharge of duties, the functionality of a qualification, etc., as laid down by the Supreme Court in Puneet Sharma (supra) and it is not for the courts to interfere and hold which qualification is best suited for that particular post. Considering the Career Advancement Scheme for University teachers, the eligibility of 6 years of service in case of those without a Ph.D./M.Phil./PG Degree in a professional course has been prescribed, which the petitioner did not have and thus he was not held to be eligible. Six years of experience in service in case of not holding Ph.D. degree in a professional course is the essential qualification prescribed for the said post which the petitioner did not have at the relevant point of time, merely because he did not have requisite qualification promotional post, clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the UGC Regulations, 2018 cannot be held to be discriminatory, unconstitutional or violative of the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 &16 of the Constitution of India. The decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner are clearly distinguishable to the facts of the present case. In light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court and scope for challenge of the subordinate legislation, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. 18. Consequently, the writ petition questioning the constitutional validity of clause 6.4(C)(I)(i) of the UGC Regulations of 2018, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost(s).