JUDGMENT : S.N. Pathak, J. Heard the parties. Prayers made 2. Petitioner has assailed the order of punishment contained in Memo No. 698 dated 22.04.2015 (Annexure-16) issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur Range, Hazaribagh (respondent No. 2), in Departmental Proceeding no. 68/2011 as also the appellate order contained in Memo No. 417/D dated 16.11.2016, passed by respondent No. 1, by which the petitioner has been removed from service with a rider that pension and other retiral benefits would be decided in accordance with the Rules and upon Appeal the order of punishment has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Petitioner has also prayed that after quashment of the aforesaid orders, directions be issued to respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. Factual Matrix 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the respondent No. 2 instituted an FIR being Vishnugarh P.S. Case No. 114/2011 against the petitioner, who was the then A.S.I. of the said Police Station, alleging therein that on 17.11.2011, when the respondent No. 2 was at his residence, the petitioner came to his house and started abusing him. Upon hearing the noise, when the respondent No. 2 opened the door of house, the petitioner opened fire upon him however, somehow he could manage to save his life and hurriedly closed the door and informed about incident to his Superior Officers. Thereafter, upon hearing the sound of fire, the Munshi and other Police Officers came to the house of respondent No. 2. On the basis of aforesaid written statement, the present FIR was registered against the petitioner. 4. It is the case of petitioner that for the same set of charges, a Departmental Proceeding was initiated and petitioner was asked to submit his reply. In response to which the petitioner submitted his reply. However, being not satisfied with reply of the petitioner the Enquiry Officer started the departmental proceeding and after hearing the parties and perusing the evidences both oral as well as documentary came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner stand proved. Thereafter, petitioner was issued 2nd show-cause asking his reply to which the petitioner promptly replied denying the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, petitioner was issued 2nd show-cause asking his reply to which the petitioner promptly replied denying the charges levelled against him. However, the Disciplinary Authority not being satisfied with the reply of the petitioner, passed the order of punishment dated 22.04.2015 whereby he has been removed from services with a rider that pension and other retiral benefits would be paid to him in accordance with law. 5. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment before the Appellate Authority but during the pendency of instant writ petition, the same also stood dismissed as time barred. As such, petitioner challenged the Appellate Order dated 16.11.2016 by way of I.A. No. 8511 of 2016 and the said interlocutory application was allowed by this Court and petitioner was permitted to incorporate proposed amendment in the writ application. Since the Appellate Authority has also not considered the case of petitioner and affirmed the order of punishment hence, he has been constrained to knock the door of this Court. Submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner 6. Mr. Rajendra Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously urges that only issue involved in this writ petition which invites attention of the Court is as to whether the charge-sheet has been issued by the Competent Authority or not? 7. Learned counsel confines his argument to that extent and submits that impugned orders as well as the entire departmental proceeding vitiates on the ground that charge-sheet has not been issued by the Competent Authority. It has been argued that the petitioner, who was an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, his appointing authority as per the provisions of Jharkhand Police Manual is the Deputy Inspector General of Police and not the Superintendent of Police. It has been further argued that as per the law laid down it is the appointing authority who can draw the charge-sheet and not any Officer inferior to the appointing authority. In the instant case since the appointing authority was the Deputy Inspector General of Police, it was not open to the Superintendent of Police to draw the charge-sheet. It has been further argued that any charge-sheet drawn by the Officer inferior to the appointing authority is nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be termed to be a charge-sheet. In the instant case since the appointing authority was the Deputy Inspector General of Police, it was not open to the Superintendent of Police to draw the charge-sheet. It has been further argued that any charge-sheet drawn by the Officer inferior to the appointing authority is nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be termed to be a charge-sheet. It has also been argued that neither there was any approval of the appointing authority nor any document has been brought on record to show that power has been delegated to the Superintendent of Police by the Deputy Inspector General of Police to draw the charge-sheet. 8. Referring to the Rule-825 and Appendix-84 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, it has been argued that the entire proceedings vitiates in view of the fact that charge-sheet was not drawn by the competent authority. Placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. B.V. Gopinath, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 351 and also in case of Sunny Abraham v. Union of India, reported in (2021) 20 SCC 12 , it has been argued that in view of legal propositions and law laid down it can comfortably be inferred that the charge-sheet is nullity in the eyes of law and any proceeding drawn on the basis of said charge-sheet cannot be sustained and hence, the impugned orders based on the outcome of departmental proceeding is also not sustainable and fit to be quashed and set aside. Submissions of learned counsel for the Respondents 9. Per contra, counter-affidavit has been filed. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently opposing the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner argues that impugned orders are fully justified. There is no any illegality or infirmity in the eyes of law. The Superintendent of Police was competent enough to draw the charge-sheet. It has been argued that from perusal of Rule-825 as well as Appendix-84 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, it transpires that said provisions have wrongly been interpreted by learned counsel for the petitioner. Quoting Rule-825 and Appendix-84 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, learned counsel submits that nothing has been brought on record to show that there is any fallacy or illegality in the departmental proceeding. No procedural irregularities has been pointed-out. 11. Quoting Rule-825 and Appendix-84 of the Jharkhand Police Manual, learned counsel submits that nothing has been brought on record to show that there is any fallacy or illegality in the departmental proceeding. No procedural irregularities has been pointed-out. 11. Learned counsel further argues that since petitioner has been held guilty of the charges by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority following the procedures of law, i.e. after issuance of 2nd show-cause notice and upon perusal of reply of petitioner to the 2nd show-cause notice, has inflicted the punishment of removal from service, which does not suffer from any infirmity. Further, the said punishment order has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority also. Learned counsel further argues that cardinal principle of natural justice has been followed while passing the impugned orders inasmuch as ample opportunity has been provided to the petitioner to present his case before the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. 12. It has been further argued that charges against the petitioner are serious in nature and the act of petitioner is unbecoming of a Police Officer. In disciplined force such type of Officers cannot be allowed to continue in service. It is settled principle of law that deadwood should be weeded-out as early as possible. Justifying the impugned orders, learned counsel submits that no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition. 13. Heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the judgment of Hon’ble Patna High Court in case C.W.J.C. No. 8664 of 2017 (Ras Bihari Paswan Vs. the State of Bihar & Ors.) disposed of on 04.05.2023. Findings of the Court 14. Having heard rival submission of the parties across the bar, this Court is of the considered view that legal issues involved in this writ petition are as follows: (i) Whether the charge-sheet has been drawn by the competent authority or not ? (ii) Whether the departmental proceeding initiated on the basis of the said charge-sheet is sustainable in the eyes of law ? (iii) Whether the cardinal principle of natural justice has been adhered to and petitioner has been provided ample opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders ? (iv) Whether the punishment inflicted by the respondents is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him ? 15. (iii) Whether the cardinal principle of natural justice has been adhered to and petitioner has been provided ample opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders ? (iv) Whether the punishment inflicted by the respondents is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him ? 15. Before discussing the legal issues it would be proper to examine the relevant Rules of the Police Manual. Rule-825 of Jharkhand Police Manual reads as under: “825. Officers empowered to impose punishment.—(a) No police officer shall be dismissed or compulsorily retired by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him. (b) The Inspector-General may award to any police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any one or more of the punishments in Rule 824. (c) A Deputy Inspector-General may impose on any police officer subordinate to him and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any of the punishments in Rule 824 except dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal in the case of an Inspector. (d) A Superintendent may impose on any police officer subordinate to him and of and below the rank of Sub-Inspector any more of the punishments in Rule 824 except dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement in the case of Sub-Inspector or Assistant Sub-Inspector. It shall be kept in mind that if any enquiry has been initiated by the District Magistrate, a report of the result shall be sent to him for information. If required, the file of departmental proceeding shall also be sent with it [see Rule 16(a)]. (e) The punishments noted in Rules 824 (h) and (i) can be awarded by S. D. P. O. also but its record shall be kept in the office of Superintendent and it shall also, be seen that different yard sticks are not used in awarding punishments. (f) A list of officers competent to give punishments OI ordering of suspension according to Act V, 1861 is given in Appendix 84.” 16. A bare reading of Rule-825 (f) with Appendix-84 of the Police Manual would lead to a conclusion that the Superintendent of Police is competent to suspend and impose any other major punishment in case of a Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. 17. Now coming to the specific issues, Issue Nos. (i) and (ii) are the crucial issues which need to be addressed first. (i) Whether the charge-sheet has been drawn by the competent authority or not ? 17. Now coming to the specific issues, Issue Nos. (i) and (ii) are the crucial issues which need to be addressed first. (i) Whether the charge-sheet has been drawn by the competent authority or not ? (ii) Whether the departmental proceeding initiated on the basis of the said charge-sheet is sustainable in the eyes of law ? 18. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that charge-sheet has been issued under the signature of Superintendent of Police, who is not the appointing authority of petitioner. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is not in consonance with the Rules and the Guidelines of the Departmental Proceedings. There is no prayer for quashment of the charge-sheet. Nothing has been brought on record to show any guideline or rule of the disciplinary proceeding in case of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police that the Superintendent of Police under whom petitioner was working was not competent enough to draw charge-sheet and initiate departmental proceeding. Since there is no such specific prayer for quashment of the memo of charge, the disciplinary proceeding based on that cannot be questioned. 19. The reliance of petitioner in case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. B.V. Gopinath (supra) also does not come to his rescue. From Rule 825 of the Police Manual it would transpire that in consonance with Clause (1) of the Article 311 of the Constitution of India it says that no Police officer shall be dismissed or compulsorily retired by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him. In clause (c) of the Rule 825, a Deputy Inspector-General may impose on any police officer subordinate to him and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent any of the punishments prescribed in rule 824 except dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal in the case of an Inspector. Clause (d) of Rule 825 confers power upon the Superintendent of Police to impose on any police officer subordinate to him and of and below the rank of Sub-Inspector any or more of the punishments in Rule 824 except dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement in the case of Sub-Inspector or Assistant Sub-Inspector. A bare reading of Rule 825(f) with Appendix-84 of the Police Manual would lead a conclusion that the Superintendent of Police is competent to suspend and impose any other major punishment in case of a Sub-Inspector of Police 20. A bare reading of Rule 825(f) with Appendix-84 of the Police Manual would lead a conclusion that the Superintendent of Police is competent to suspend and impose any other major punishment in case of a Sub-Inspector of Police 20. Since from perusal of Rule-825 read with Appendix-84 of the Police Manual and that also Article-311 of the Constitution of India it can comfortably be inferred that the Superintendent of Police is competent enough and duly authorized to draw the charge-sheet and the same cannot be faulted with. 21. The Hon’ble Patna High Court in case of Ras Bihari Paswan Vs. the State of Jharkhand & Ors. (supra.) has held as under: “30. Before appreciating the facts of the case and application of law to those facts, this Court deems it just and proper to take a glance over Article 311 of the Constitution of India. For a ready reference Article 311 is extracted hereunder:- “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.- (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by a authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. [Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply]. [Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: Provided further that this clause shall not apply]. (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank ins satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.” 31. On perusal of the Article 311 of the Constitution of India, it is crystal clear that no person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 32. This Court further finds that in the case of Arun Kumar Jha (supra), the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court has considered a similar plea of the petitioner in the said case that the Bihar CCA Rules would apply in respect of the officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. After consideration what has been held by the learned co-ordinate Bench are recorded in paragraphs ‘13’, ‘14’ and ‘15’ are being reproduced hereunder:- “13. On bare perusal of the provisions contained in Clause 824(A) of the Bihar Police Manual, it would be apparent that the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, applies in respect of action against Deputy Superintendent of Police. On bare perusal of the provisions contained in Clause 824(A) of the Bihar Police Manual, it would be apparent that the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, applies in respect of action against Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Bihar Police Manual does not mandate the application of Bihar CCA Rules, to officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.” “14. Other than Rule 825 the petitioner cannot be permitted to place reliance on the provisions of the Bihar CCA Rules. In this connection it would be also relevant to notice Rule 3 of the Bihar CCA Rules which deals with application of the said Rules. The same is being reproduced herein below “3. Application of these Rules. - (1) These Rules shall apply to every Government Servant but shall not apply to- (a) any member of the All India Services, (b) any person in casual employment, (c) any person subject to discharge from service on less than one month's notice, (d) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matter covered by these Rules, by or under any law for the time being in force or by or under any agreement entered into with the previous approval of the Government before or after the commencement of these Rules, in regard to matter covered by such special provisions. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the Government of Bihar may, by order, exclude any class of Government Servants from the operation of all or any of these Rules against him. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), these Rules shall apply to every government servant temporarily transferred to a Service or post coming within (d) in sub-rule (1). (4) If any doubt arises with respect to the provisions of these Rules the matter shall be referred to the Government in the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms, whose decision shall be final.” “15. Bare perusal of Rule 3 more specifically sub rule (d) would show that the same read with the provisions contained in Rule 825 of the Bihar Police Manual which has been considered by the Division Bench makes it abundantly clear that the proceedings are to be guided by the provisions made in the Bihar Police Manual.” 33. In the case Kashi Nath Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. In the case Kashi Nath Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2019 (2) PLJR 293 (Full Bench), this Court has held that “….....the Bihar Police Manual is a compilation which has continued to be observed for the purpose, as presently involved, for appointments throughout the State in the Bihar Police Forces. It therefore has the mandate of the Government which in turn is entrusted with the obligation of governance including police administration being an exclusive State subject. The observance of the instructions contained in the Bihar Police Manual are binding on the State of Bihar and even it is argued that some of the provisions are directory in nature, then too even such provisions are not meant to be disobeyed or acted in breach thereof….…” 22. Further, from close analysis of Rules-7 and 12 of the Police Act, it can comfortably be said that Police Manual has the force of law and as such, the Rules are binding and procedures of the Police Manual has to be adhered to. Rules-7 and 12 the said Act reads as under: “7. Appointment, dismissal, etc. of inferior officers:- [Subject to the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution, and to such rules] as the State Government may, from time to time, make under this Act, the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police-officer of the subordinate ranks] whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same; [or may award anyone of the following punishments to any police-officer [of the subordinate ranks] who shall discharge his duty in a careless or negligent manner, or who by any act of his own, shall render himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely:- (a) fine of any amount not exceeding one month's pay; (b) confinement to quarters for a term not exceeding fifteen days with or without punishment-drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty; (c) deprivation of good-conduct pay; (d) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument. 12. 12. Power of Inspector-General to make rules:- The Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government, frame such orders and rules as he shall deem expedient relative to the organisation, classification and distribution of the police-force, the places at which the members of the force shall reside, and the particular services to be formed by them; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information, and all such other orders and rules relative to the police-force as the Inspector-General shall, from lime to lime, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duties.” 23. When the charge-sheet has been found to be issued by the competent authority the disciplinary proceeding based on that cannot be faulted with and warrants no interference. 24. Issue nos. (i) and (ii) are answered accordingly. 25. Now coming to issue Nos. (iii) and (iv) viz. (iii) Whether the cardinal principle of natural justice has been adhered to and petitioner has been provided ample opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders ? (iv) Whether the punishment inflicted by the respondents is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him ? 26. Since learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his arguments throwing challenge to the issuance of charge-sheet by the competent authority and the same has been answered in negative as the Superintendent of Police was fully empowered to draw the charge-sheet and petitioner has not assailed the impugned order on any other ground nothing remains to be decided now. 27. However, for the ends of justice, this Court on perusal of documents brought on record and delving deep into the procedures followed and ample opportunity provided to the petitioner, is of the considered view that since no foully has been pointed-out and the procedures have not been faulted with, no interference is warranted in the impugned orders as the same have been passed adhering to the cardinal principle of natural justice. The issue whether punishment inflicted to the petitioner shocks judicial conscience and is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner, the same is also answered in negative. The issue whether punishment inflicted to the petitioner shocks judicial conscience and is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner, the same is also answered in negative. From perusal of the charges it appears that petitioner was fully drunken while on duty and attempted to shoot his Senior Officer which clearly proves the indiscipline action of the petitioner. The police force is a disciplined force which shoulders a great responsibility of maintaining law and order in public at large and hence, such type of indiscipline persons cannot be allowed to continue in the Police Force. 28. Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any procedural laches in the proceedings rather a full-fledged enquiry was conducted following the provisions of natural justice by extending the petitioner ample opportunity of being heard. Admittedly, when the order of punishment was affirmed upto the Appellate Authority, this Court refrains itself from interfering with the same. 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held thus: “ The High Court does not act as appellant authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to the decision of a case on merit as an appellate authority.” (ii) Insufficiency of materials cannot be a ground to annul the findings of the Enquiry Officer neither can a substituted view be taken in place of Enquiry officer/disciplinary authority in cases of departmental proceeding. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 has held as under: 16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans observed: “The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.” 22. In the established facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold, at the outset, that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court fell into patent error in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and interfering with the quantum of punishment, as if the High Court was sitting in appellate jurisdiction. From the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is quite obvious that the findings with regard to an “unbecoming act” committed by the respondent, as found by the departmental authorities, were not found fault with even on reappreciation of evidence. The High Court did not find that the occurrence, as alleged by the complainant, had not taken place. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench found that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer or the departmental appellate authority were either arbitrary or even perverse. As a matter of fact, the High Court found no fault whatsoever with the conduct of enquiry. The direction of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the respondent was not entitled to back wages and was to be posted outside the city for at least two years, which was upheld by the Division Bench, itself demonstrates that the High Court believed the complainant’s case fully for otherwise, neither the withholding of back wages nor a direction to post the respondent outside the city for at least two years was necessary. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. To hold that since the respondent had not “actually molested” Miss X and that he had only “tried to molest” her and had “not managed” to make physical contact with her, the punishment of removal from service was not justified, was erroneous. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. But there is another aspect of the case which is fundamental and goes to the root of the case and concerns the approach of the Court while dealing with cases of sexual harassment at the place of work of female employees. 30. Further, in case of Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed that, “High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into appreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/ adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks conscience of court”. 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 has held as under: “6. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent was proved. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the respondent: 6.1. It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of “no evidence”. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge. 6.2. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal of the respondent by re-examining the evidence and taking a view different from that of the disciplinary authority which was based on the findings of the inquiry officer.” 32. From the discussions made above, it is crystal clear that the petitioner was provided ample opportunity to present his case and after perusing the reply of petitioner and being not satisfied with the same, the Disciplinary Authority has inflicted punishment upon the petitioner which was later on affirmed by the Appellate Authority. As such, it can comfortably be inferred that cardinal principle of natural justice has been adhered to and petitioner has been provided ample opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders. Further, since the charges levelled against the petitioner is serious in nature i.e. of abusing his senior officer and trying to kill him, it cannot be said that punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. Issue Nos. (iii) and (iv) are answered accordingly. 33. As a sequitur to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and legal propositions, the writ petition merits dismissal and the same is hereby dismissed. 34. No order as to costs.