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2024 DIGILAW 337 (CAL)

Usman Ali v. Champa Devi

2024-02-12

HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA

body2024
JUDGMENT : HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the common judgment and separate decrees dated January 10, 2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Andaman & Nicobar Islands Port Blair in Title Appeal No. 03 of 2013 heard analogously with Title Appeal No. 04 of 2013. By the said judgment and decree, Title Appeal No. 03 of 2013 was allowed on contest and the Title Appeal No. 04 of 2013 was dismissed on contest. 2. One Shiv Shankar Mishra i.e predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein filed a suit for declaration of title over schedule A property and for recovery of possession and damages in respect of B Schedule property against Sakina Bib i.e predecessor-in-interest of the appellants herein. The said suit which was originally registered as Title Suit No. 11 of 1989 was renumbered as Title Suit No. 37 of 2011. 3. The case of the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 is that the suit property originally belong to one Smt.Jaibasi who transferred the same in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra by dint of a registered deed of gift executed on 27th September, 1985. Smt. Jaibasi was permitted to live in one room of the wooden house till her death. One Sakina Bibi claiming herself to be a distant relative of Jaibasi came to see her at the suit property before the death of Jaibasi and continued to stay there in a portion of the suit house which has been described in schedule B of the plaint. After the death of Jaibasi, Sakina Bibi claimed herself to be the owner of the property left by Jaibasi. The plaintiff requested the defendant to vacate the B schedule property and also issued a notice calling upon her to quit and vacate the said property. Since the defendant failed to comply with the terms of the said notice, Shiv Shankar Mishra filed the suit. 4. Sakina Bibi filed a suit for declaration of title and for a further declaration that the registered WILL executed on of 9th November, 1989 by late Jaibasi is a valid WILL, for recovery of possession of the suit property and for cancellation of the gift deed allegedly executed by late Jaibasi in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra. The said suit which was originally registered as Title Suit No. 17 of 1996 was subsequently renumbered as Title Suit No. 21 of 2011. The said suit which was originally registered as Title Suit No. 17 of 1996 was subsequently renumbered as Title Suit No. 21 of 2011. 5. The case as made out in the plaint of Title Suit No. 21 of 2011 is that Jaibasi was a recorded tenant of the suit land along with the building standing thereon. Shiv Shankar Mishra was a tenant under Jaibasi in respect of a portion of the suit property. After the death of Shiv Shankar Mishra his heirs who are the defendant in the said suit continued to reside in the tenanted premises. It was stated that Jaibasi executed a WILL in respect of the suit property which was registered on 9th of November 1987 appointing Sakina Bibi and her son Usman Ali as joint executors and trustees of the said WILL. Sakina Bibi became the owner of the suit property by virtue of the said WILL. 6. The defendants of Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the allegations contained in the plaint. The specific defence case is more or less similar to the plaint case in Title Suit No. 21 of 2011. 7. The defendants of Title Suit No. 21 of 2011 contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations contained therein. The specific defence case is more or less similar to the plaint case in Title Suit No. 37 of 2011. 8. Both the suits were heard analogously and the learned Trial Judge by a common judgement and separate decrees dated February 21, 2013 dismissed both the suits. 9. The learned Trial Judge held that the plaintiffs of Title Suit No.37 of 2011 failed to prove that Jaibasi executed the deed of gift in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra in respect of the suit property. The learned Trial Judge further held that Sakina Bibi being the plaintiff of Title Suit no. 21 of 2011 failed to prove that she became the owner of the suit property by virtue of the alleged WILL executed by Jaibasi. 10. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree passed by the Trial Court in Title Suit No. 37 of 2011, the legal heirs of Shiv Sankar Mishra preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013. 11. 10. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree passed by the Trial Court in Title Suit No. 37 of 2011, the legal heirs of Shiv Sankar Mishra preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013. 11. The heirs of Sakina Bibi preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013 challenging the judgement and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge dismissing Title suit No. 21 of 2011. 12. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court by a judgment and decree dated 10th January, 2019 allowed Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 thereby setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. By the said judgment and decree, Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 was decreed and the respondents of Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 were directed to quit and vacate the “B” schedule property mentioned in the plaint of Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 and handover possession in favour of the appellant therein within the time limit specified in the said judgement. The respondents therein were held to be jointly liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 400 per month from the death of Jaibasi till the delivery of possession in favour of the appellant. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court, however, dismissed Title Suit No. 4 of 2013 upon holding that Sakina Bibi or her legal heirs has no residuary right over the suit property. 13. The legal heirs of Sakina Bibi excepting Smti. Sabrina Begum preferred a second appeal being SAT No. 001 of 2019 challenging the judgement and decree dated 10.01.2019 passed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013. The aforesaid legal heirs of Sakina Bibi filed SAT No. 002 of 2019 challenging the judgment and decree dated 10.01.2019 passed in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. Smti. Sabrina Begum was, however, impleaded as proforma respondent in the said appeals. 14. SAT No. 001 of 2019 and SAT No.002 of 2019 came up for admission on February 26, 2019 and the Hon’ble Division Bench admitted the appeals and framed the following substantial questions of law: “I Whether or not the First Appellate Court erred in discarding the evidence of the Handwriting Expert? 14. SAT No. 001 of 2019 and SAT No.002 of 2019 came up for admission on February 26, 2019 and the Hon’ble Division Bench admitted the appeals and framed the following substantial questions of law: “I Whether or not the First Appellate Court erred in discarding the evidence of the Handwriting Expert? II Whether or not the First Appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit without substituting the legal heirs of the respondent No. 6 who died during pendency of the appeal on 12th May, 2014?” III Whether or not the learned court below erred in not appreciating that the Will (registered) in question ought to have been accepted as any other document and could be relied upon? and; IV whether or not the learned court below erred in holding that the execution of the Will (registered) has not been proved in accordance with law?” 15. These appeals were taken up for analogous hearing as the appeals arise out of common judgments passed by the learned Courts below. 16. Mr. N.A. Khan, learned advocate appearing for the appellants in the aforesaid appeals contended that one of the legal heirs of Sakina Bibi namely Reshma Begum died on 12th of May, 2014 i.e. during the pendency of the Title Appeals before the learned First Appellate Court. He further submitted that the appellants in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 who are the respondents herein did not take any steps for substitution of the heirs and heiress of the said deceased and as a result Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 stood abated. He further submitted that the judgment and decree dated 10th January, 2019 in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 was passed against a dead person. He, therefore, submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is null and void and in support of such contention, Mr. Khan placed reliance upon a judgment and order date June 13, 2016 in SAT No. 004 of 2015 in the case of Smt. Kokila Devi vs. Shri. Bishan Prasad Tiwari. He further submitted that the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court failed to consider the opinion of the handwriting expert and the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 is liable to be set aside on that ground. He further submitted that the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court failed to consider the opinion of the handwriting expert and the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 is liable to be set aside on that ground. He further contended that DW 3 namely Shri Annadurai who was the attesting witness to the WILL executed by Jaibasi duly proved the execution of the WILL and the learned judges of both the courts below failed to appreciate the evidence of the said attesting witness in its proper perspective. 17. Smti. Sabrina Begum, one of the legal heirs of Sakina Bibi since deceased who has been impleaded as proforma respondents in these appeals appeared in-person and adopted the argument advanced by Mr. Khan, learned advocate. 18. Mr. Jayapal, learned advocate representing the respondents in these appeals seriously disputed the contentions raised by Mr. Khan. He contended that Title Appeal Nos. 3 of 2013 and 4 of 2013 were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment. He further contended that the heirs of Reshma Begum since deceased were duly substituted in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. He submitted that under such circumstances the Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 could not be said to have abated and in support of such contention he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case N. Jairam Reddy and another vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Kurnool reported at (1979) 3 SCC 578. He further submitted that the court should not rely upon the evidence of an expert and it is also unsafe to decide as to whether the gift deed was executed by Jaibasi merely relying upon the report of the handwriting expert and his testimony. Mr. Jayapal further submitted that Title Suit No.21 of 2011 is not maintainable as the plaintiff prayed for declaration of title on the basis of the WILL allegedly executed by Jaibasi since deceased. By placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam vs Yogendra reported at 2023 SCC OnLine SC 725. Mr. Jayapal contended that ownership right cannot be claimed on the basis of the WILL. 19. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed. 20. By placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyam vs Yogendra reported at 2023 SCC OnLine SC 725. Mr. Jayapal contended that ownership right cannot be claimed on the basis of the WILL. 19. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed. 20. The Substantial Question No. II is on the issue of jurisdiction of the First Appellate Court to pass a decree in T.A. No. 3 of 2013. 21. This court shall, therefore, first decide the said substantial question of law whether or not the First Appellate court erred in decreeing the suit without substituting the legal heirs of respondent No. 6 namely Reshma Begum who died during the pendency of the appeal on 12th of May, 2014. 22. Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 was filed by Shiv Shankar Mishra against Sakina Bibi. Title Suit No. 21 of 2011 was filed by Sakina Bibi against the heirs of Shiv Shankar Mishra. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of Title Suit No. 37 of 2011 Shiv Shankar Mishra died and upon his death his heirs and heiress were substituted the place and stead of the said deceased. Sakina Bibi also died during the pendency of the suit and upon her death her heirs and heiress were substituted in place and stead of the said deceased. The aforesaid Title Suits were heard analogously by the learned Trial Judge and were dismissed by a common judgment and separate decrees. 23. The heirs of Shiv Shankar Mishra preferred Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 and the heirs of Sakina Bibi preferred Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. It is not in dispute that Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 and 4 of 2013 were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment. It is also not in dispute that Reshma Begum died during the pendency of the appeals before the First Appellate Court and the heirs and heiress of the said Reshma Begum were duly substituted in place and stead of the deceased appellant no. 6 in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. However, the heirs of the said Reshma Begum, who was impleaded as respondent no. 6 in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013, were not substituted in place and stead of the said deceased in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013. 24. 6 in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. However, the heirs of the said Reshma Begum, who was impleaded as respondent no. 6 in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013, were not substituted in place and stead of the said deceased in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013. 24. The legal representatives of the said deceased Reshma Begum were, however, before the First Appellate Court as the heirs of the deceased appellant No. 6 in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013. 25. The question, therefore, arises whether failure to bring such legal representatives on record in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 would result in abatement of the action when such legal representatives were before the court in the same action though in another capacity. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.Jairam Reddy (supra) held that when legal representatives of a deceased appellant are substituted and those very legal representatives as legal representatives of the same deceased occupying the position of respondent in cross appeal are not substituted, the indisputable outcome would be that they were on record in the connected proceeding before the same Court hearing both the matter in one capacity though they were not described as such in their other capacity, namely, as legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that to ignore this obvious position would be giving undue importance to form rather than substance. It was further held that the anxiety of the court should be whether those likely affected by the decision in the proceeding were before the court having full opportunity to canvas their case and once that is satisfied it can safely be said that the provision contained in Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 are satisfied in given case. It was further observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that to take another view would be to give an opportunity to the legal representative of a deceased party in an appeal having had the fullest opportunity to canvas their case through the advocate of their choice appearing in cross appeals for them and having canvassed their case and lost, to turn around and contend that they were not before the court as legal representatives of the same person in other capacity namely respondent in the cross appeal. 27. The said reported decision squarely applies to the fact of this case. 27. The said reported decision squarely applies to the fact of this case. The object of Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 of the Code is to ensure that those likely to be affected were before the Court having full opportunity to canvas their case. The legal representatives of Reshma Begum since deceased were before the court as parties to the appeal and they had the full opportunity to put forth whatever contentions that were open to them in the appeals and to contest the contentions advanced against them by the other side. 28. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that if the legal representatives of Reshma Begum are allowed to raise a plea that Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 stood abated since they were not formally impleaded as legal representatives of the said deceased in the said appeal, it would be unjust. 29. In Kokila Devi (Supra), the learned First Appellate Court decided the appeal on merit in the absence of the defendant no.1, in ignorance of her death as the death of the said defendant was not brought to the notice of the learned First Appellate Court. The coordinate bench held that since no step was taken by any of the parties for bringing the legal representatives of the defendant no.1 on record in the said appeal within the period of limitation, the appeal stood abated. 30. In the said decision, those likely to be affected by the decision in the proceeding were not before the Court and, therefore, did not have the opportunity to canvas this case. The said decision being distinguishable on facts do not come to the aid of the appellants. 31. This issue can also be looked into from a different angle. Order 22 Rule 4 Sub Rule 3 of the Code states that where within the time limited by law no application is made under Order 22 Rule 4 Sub Rule 1, the suit shall abate as against the said defendant. Record reveals that an application under Order 22 Rule 4 was filed for substitution of the heirs of the deceased Reshma Begum in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013 through inadvertence. Record reveals that an application under Order 22 Rule 4 was filed for substitution of the heirs of the deceased Reshma Begum in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013 through inadvertence. Thereafter, on an application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the appellant in Title appeal No. 3 of 2013 the learned Additional District Judge by an order No. 16 dated 30th July, 2014 permitted the appellant of Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 to get back the said substitution application from the record of Title Appeal No. 4 of 2013 and to file the same in Title Appeal No .3 of 2013. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court in order No. 17 dated 30th of July, 2014 recorded that as per the earlier order an application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code has been filed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2014. Since the said Reshma Begum died on 12th of May, 2014 and an application for substitution of the heirs and heiress of the said deceased appears to have been filed in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 on 30th July, 2014 i.e. within the time limited by law for filing such application, the Title appeal No. 3 of 2013 cannot be said to have abated as against the respondent no. 6. 32. In view of all the reasons as aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 did not abate and the decree passed in the said appeal cannot be said to be a nullity. The substantial question of law No. III is thus answered against the appellants. 33. However, the fact remains that though the application for substitution was available in the records of Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 but the same was not disposed of. It is well settled that a litigant should not suffer due to such procedural lapse as this Court has already observed that such appeal did not abate. This Court therefore feels that a direction should be passed upon the learned Court of appeal below to correct/amend the decree in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 by incorporating the names of the heirs and heiress of the deceased Reshma Begum in her place and stead. 34. Admittedly, Jaibasi was the original owner of the suit property. This Court therefore feels that a direction should be passed upon the learned Court of appeal below to correct/amend the decree in Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 by incorporating the names of the heirs and heiress of the deceased Reshma Begum in her place and stead. 34. Admittedly, Jaibasi was the original owner of the suit property. The respondents herein are claiming title to the property by virtue of the gift deed executed by Jaibasi in favour of their predecessor-in-interest. The appellants are claiming title by virtue of the registered WILL allegedly executed by Jaibasi. The opinion of the handwriting expert was sought for as challenge was thrown to the execution of the deed of gift. In order to decide whether Jaibasi had any subsisting right in the suit property at the time of his death, this Court shall now proceed to decide the substantial question no. I, which is extracted hereinafter. 35. “Whether or not the First Appellate Court erred in discarding the evidence of the Handwriting expert?”. 36. The gift deed was executed by Jaibasi in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra on 27th of September, 1985. The appellants have challenged the execution of the said deed of gift. Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 states that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness atleast has been called for the purpose of proving its execution if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. Proviso to Section 68 do not have any manner of application to the case on hand as the execution of the deed of gift has been denied. 37. The gift deed was executed in the presence of two attesting witnesses namely A. John Kutty and P.D.Verghese. One of the attesting witnesses A. John Kutty deposed as PW 6. The said witness has specifically stated that deed was executed in his presence and he along with witness P.D.Verghese put their signatures on the said deed. He also stated that the donee put his signature on the deed in his presence. The evidence of the PW 6 could not be shaken in cross examination. 38. PW 7 was summoned by the Court who represented on behalf of the registration authority. He also stated that the donee put his signature on the deed in his presence. The evidence of the PW 6 could not be shaken in cross examination. 38. PW 7 was summoned by the Court who represented on behalf of the registration authority. PW 7 proved the registration of the gift which was marked as exhibit-6. 39. The learned Trial Judge after considering the evidence of PW 6 held that there is no ground to disbelieve the evidence of PW 6. The learned Trial Judge, however, concluded that Jaibasi never executed any gift deed in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra by relying upon the opinion of the Handwriting expert being DW 6 who opined that the person who wrote the signature in the passport did not write the signatures of the alleged deed of gift. 40. The Appellate Court, however, held that one of the attesting witnesses deposed before the Trial Court as PW 6 and has proved the execution of the said deed. The Appellate Court further held that PW 7 who represented on behalf of the registering authority has duly proved the factum of registration of the said deed. The Appellate Court found the opinion of the handwriting expert to be suspicious in view of exhibit 7, which is a communication made by another handwriting expert. The learned First Appellate Court further held that the opinion evidence can never take the place of substantive evidence. The Appellate Court concluded by observing that there is no reason to disbelieve the execution of the gift deed by Jaibasi. 41. Mr. Khan would strenuously contend that the Judgement and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court suffers from perversity as the evidence of the handwriting expert was discarded. 42. It is well settled that expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is after all, opinion evidence. Expert evidence as to handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. 43. The handwriting expert in cross examination admitted that the passage of time will affect the quality of handwriting of a person due to physical and muscular weaknesses. 43. The handwriting expert in cross examination admitted that the passage of time will affect the quality of handwriting of a person due to physical and muscular weaknesses. He also admitted that the variation of signature or handwriting of any person may occur in respect of any important document. The said witness voluntarily said that a person cannot write or sign twice alike in exact form. 44. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court rightly took note of the communication made in Exhibit 7 wherein another examiner of documents stated that he could not come to the just conclusion as the admitted signature that appears in the document was written during 1960 and the disputed signature in the year 1985. The said expert sought for few more admittedly genuine signature of Jaibasi written near about the period of disputed signature. 45. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court rightly noted that the report of an expert is not binding upon the Court and the Court after analysing such report and considering the same along with other evidence on record has to form its final opinion as to whether such report is worthy of reliance. 46. The learned court of appeal below after arriving at a finding that the execution of the gift deed was ratified by the attesting witnesses whose version could not be shaken during cross examination placed reliance upon such direct and substantive evidence. The learned First Appellate Court was right in not believing the opinion of the expert in view of the contrary opinion expressed by another document examiner in the communication being exhibit 7. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court applied the correct legal principle that evidence of handwriting expert cannot be conclusive and it can never take the place of substantive evidence. 47. In view of the direct substantive evidence in support of due execution and registration of the gift deed, this Court holds that the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court was right in discarding the opinion of the handwriting expert who deposed as DW 6. 48. The substantial question of law No. I is, therefore, answered against the appellants. 49. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court held the deed of gift was executed by Jaibasi and rightly concluded that the said gift deed gives absolute right over the suit property in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra. 48. The substantial question of law No. I is, therefore, answered against the appellants. 49. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court held the deed of gift was executed by Jaibasi and rightly concluded that the said gift deed gives absolute right over the suit property in favour of Shiv Shankar Mishra. 50. The substantial question Nos. III and IV relates to the WILL of Jaibasi. Now the question arises whether the learned Judge of Court of appeal below erred in law by holding that the execution of the registered WILL has not been proved in accordance with law and also whether the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court erred in not relying upon the said registered WILL in question. 51. The learned Trial Judge held that the plaintiffs of Title Suit No. 21 of 2011 has failed to prove the execution and registration of the alleged WILL dated 9th November, 1987. 52. It is not in dispute that the property which is the subject matter of the gift deed and the registered WILL are same. The gift deed was executed in the year 1985. The WILL was executed and registered in the year 1987. Jaibasi expired on 15.12.1987. The WILL comes into effect only after the death of the testator and not before it. Gift deed was executed long prior to the death of Jaibasi. This Court has already observed that the execution and registration of the gift deed has been proved in accordance with law and, therefore, Jaibasi was divested of all the right, title and interest in respect of the property in question upon execution and registration of the deed of gift. At the time of death, Jaibasi was left with no right, title and interest in respect of the property which would devolve upon Sakina Bibi or her legal heirs in terms of the registered WILL. In view of such factual scenario, the said substantial questions of law have become academic and, therefore, the same have not been answered in this appeal. 53. In Ghanashyam (supra) the plaintiff respondent instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant appellant claiming himself to have become the owner of the suit property by virtue of an agreement to sell, power of attorney as well as a WILL of the defendant appellant bequeathing the said property in favour of the plaintiff respondent. 53. In Ghanashyam (supra) the plaintiff respondent instituted a suit for eviction of the defendant appellant claiming himself to have become the owner of the suit property by virtue of an agreement to sell, power of attorney as well as a WILL of the defendant appellant bequeathing the said property in favour of the plaintiff respondent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the agreement to sell is not a document of title and as such the same may not confer absolute title upon the plaintiff respondent. It was further held therein that the power of attorney executed by the defendant appellant is of no consequence as on the strength of the said power of attorney neither any sale deed has been executed nor any action pursuant thereof has been taken by the power of attorney holder which may confer title upon the plaintiff respondent. It was further held that the WILL executed by the defendant appellant in favour of the plaintiff respondent is meaningless as the WILL, if any, comes into effect only after the death of the executants and not before it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the WILL has no force till the testator dies and the stage has not arrived in that case. In the backdrop of such facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the aforesaid WILL can no way confer any right upon the plaintiff respondent. The said decision is not an authority for the proposition that the legatee under the will cannot claim ownership right in respect of the property bequeathed after the death of the testator. 54. For all the reasons as aforesaid these appeals accordingly fail and the same stand dismissed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. 55. Let the records of Title Appeal No. 3 of 2013 be transmitted to the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Port Blair forthwith. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court is directed to carry out the necessary amendments in the decree only to the extent of incorporating the names of the heirs and heiress of the deceased respondent Reshma Begum in place and stead of the said deceased in the light of the observations and findings contained in the judgment expeditiously. 56. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of usual formalities.