JUDGMENT : Dr. S.N. Pathak, J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has thrown challenge to the penalty order contained in Memo No. 80(S) dated 05.01.2012 passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand, whereby the petitioner has been slapped with the punishment of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect with a further direction to recover a sum of Rs.99,993.67/-. It has also been directed by this order that the petitioner would not be entitled for anything than what he has been paid under Rule 97 of the Jharkhand Service Code during the period of suspension. The appellate order contained in Memo No. 8125(S) dated 22.11.2012 Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi is also under challenge. 3. Bereft of unnecessary details what has been pleaded in the writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer in the erstwhile State of Bihar in the month of December, 1995. After rendering around 14 years of service, he was suspended by office order dated 4.9.2009. A departmental proceeding was initiated by framing memo of charge on 9.2.2010 (Annexure2). There are four charges leveled against the petitioner. One, relates to getting the sanction of estimates of 20 numbers each for a sum of Rs.25,000/- under the discretionary quota so as to bring the same within the jurisdiction of the Executive Engineer. Two relates to establish that on enquiry it was found that the work was shown to have been executed with respect to additional WBM Grade-III and the same was approved but the enquiry revealed that the work of WBM Grade-III was not at all executed. Three relates to financial year 2008-09. The charge against the petitioner is that under the discretional quota, the estimates were sanctioned for doing earth work in the flank and to lay the moorum and the work was also shown to have been executed. On enquiry it was found that in the maximum roads, works were not executed; and four is related to execution of the work at departmental level, but neither the materials were obtained nor the work was executed by the labourers. 4. The charges were, therefore, framed on these allegations against the petitioner. As directed, the petitioner submitted written statement of defence to the memo of charges on 24.3.2010. 4. The charges were, therefore, framed on these allegations against the petitioner. As directed, the petitioner submitted written statement of defence to the memo of charges on 24.3.2010. A supplementary written statement of defence was also filed by the petitioner on 15.09.2010. Finally, the inquiry officer conducted a thorough enquiry, but none of the charges were found to be proved against the petitioner. As per enquiry report dated 12.07.2011, the Deputy Secretary of the Government, Road Construction Department issued second show cause notice on 15.10.2011. The reply thereto was also filed by the petitioner on 11.11.2011. The impugned penalty order thereafter was passed on 05.01.2012 with the penalty as reflected above. The departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner on 25.4.2012, which also stood rejected on 22.11.2012. The writ petition has, therefore, been preferred challenging the penalty order as also the appellate order. Contentions of the Petitioner / Employee 5. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel, assisted by Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, learned counsel appears for the petitioner. Mr. Tandon contends that from bare perusal of the memo of charge at Annexure-2, it is evident that the charge was framed by the Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, who is neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. It is further contention of the petitioner that the enquiry report was submitted by the inquiry officer and none of the four charges were found to be proved as against the petitioner, which is evident from the conclusion arrived at by the inquiry officer at the foot of each of the charges. It is further contended that in a case where the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent employee, still the disciplinary authority has power and jurisdiction to differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and record a tentative reasoning of such difference by supplying the copy thereof to the delinquent employee and thereafter the disciplinary authority can differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and punish the delinquent employee. However, Mr. Tandon submits that strangely enough no reason of difference was ever supplied by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner. What has been done is that the Deputy Secretary, who is neither the disciplinary authority nor the appointing authority of the petitioner issued notice dated 15.10.2011 in the shape of second show cause notice. However, Mr. Tandon submits that strangely enough no reason of difference was ever supplied by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner. What has been done is that the Deputy Secretary, who is neither the disciplinary authority nor the appointing authority of the petitioner issued notice dated 15.10.2011 in the shape of second show cause notice. Moreover, he further submits that from perusal of this very second show cause notice dated 15.10.2011, it is evident that the Deputy Secretary has not only recorded a finding of charges being proved, but the Deputy Secretary has also recorded the proposed punishment to be awarded to the petitioner in the same very notice dated 15.10.2011 (Annexure-7). This according to Mr. Tandon is neither sustainable on facts nor on law. He cites the celebrated judgment on this point in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Bihari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 and in particular paragraph nos. 17, 18 and 19 thereof. It is further contended that a detailed reply to the said show cause notice was submitted by the petitioner contending inter alia that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer may not be differed with in the facts and circumstances of the case. But still the penalty order was slapped on the petitioner by order dated 05.01.2012 by the disciplinary authority i.e. the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand. It is the contention of the petitioner that from perusal of the penalty order dated 05.01.2012 and the second show cause notice dated 15.10.2011 it is as clear as day that though the penalty order was passed by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, but the fact is that the second show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Secretary, who was admittedly not the disciplinary authority. It is further argued that the appellate order dated 22.11.2012 was passed by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Road Construction Department. At this stage, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the second show cause notice dated 15.10.2011 was passed by one Anand Mohan Thakur, Deputy Secretary of the Road Construction Department and the appellate order dated 22.11.2022 was also passed by the same person, namely, Anand Mohan Thakur, Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand. Mr. of Jharkhand. Mr. Tandon highlights that the entire departmental proceeding was conducted dehors the rules as the appellate authority, as also the authority who issued the second show cause notice cannot be one and the same. Learned counsel submits that in the present case though not only the authority is the same but even the person, namely, Anand Mohan Thakur is one of the same. It is contended that this is totally impermissible in service jurisprudence. It is further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the departmental proceeding is governed by Rule, Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1935, as per which the procedure has to be followed before an order of such penalty is passed under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1930. Mr. Tandon also cites the judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 to buttress his argument to the effect that the disciplinary authority could not have recorded a finding of guilt and to prove the charge against the petitioner without any evidence as what is required under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1935. On this ground, the petitioner submits that the order passed by the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are fit to be quashed and set aside. Contentions of the Respondent-State 6. Mr. Sudhanshu Kumar Singh, learned Associate Counsel to Mr. Sreenu Garapati, learned Standing Counsel-III, appears for the respondent-State. It is the case of the respondent-State that the petitioner was suspended on 4.9.2009 as the charges against the petitioner were serious in nature. The report of the inquiry officer was thoroughly examined by the competent authority and thereafter differed with the findings recorded by the conducting officer and the same was communicated to the delinquent employee for submission of second show cause by letter no. 6834 dated 15.10.2011. The petitioner submitted a reply thereto. After differing with the finding recorded by the inquiry officer, the penalty was imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner preferred appeal against the penalty order which came to be dismissed on 22.11.2012. The contention of the State is that there is a concurrent finding of facts by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellant authority which may not be interfered with in a writ jurisdiction. The petitioner preferred appeal against the penalty order which came to be dismissed on 22.11.2012. The contention of the State is that there is a concurrent finding of facts by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellant authority which may not be interfered with in a writ jurisdiction. It is further argued that the Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution may not sit in appeal over the decision of the authority. It is highlighted that this Court may not re-appreciate the evidence on record, which have already been appreciated by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority in right perspective. Learned counsel submits that the writ petition lacks merit and the same is fit to be dismissed. 7. In addition to that, Mr. Singh, learned counsel representing the respondents submits that even if it is presumed that the second show cause notice has been issued without differing with the findings of the inquiry officer and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to represent his case on the difference of opinion, it is a fit case where the matter may be remanded back to the authority to start a fresh from the stage of issuance of a fresh show cause indicating his tentative disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer. To strengthen his argument, learned counsel places much reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lav Nigam Vs. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd and Anr., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 . Discussions 8. The materials on record revealed that the charges were framed by the Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department against the petitioner-employee whereas the penalty order has been passed by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department. In the given case, the Deputy Secretary is not the disciplinary authority / appointing of the petitioner. Admittedly, the appointing authority / disciplinary authority of the petitioner being the Junior Engineer is the Engineer-in-Chief and that is why, the Engineer-in-Chief has passed the order of penalty against the petitioner on 5.1.2012. The fact further revealed that the second show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Secretary, who is not the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. Admittedly, the appointing authority / disciplinary authority of the petitioner being the Junior Engineer is the Engineer-in-Chief and that is why, the Engineer-in-Chief has passed the order of penalty against the petitioner on 5.1.2012. The fact further revealed that the second show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Secretary, who is not the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. In service jurisprudence, particularly in the matter of departmental proceeding, it can safely be held that if the charges are not proved against the delinquent, it is only the disciplinary authority who has the power to differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and nonetheless. In the present case, it is totally absent. The Deputy Secretary had no jurisdiction to issue second show cause notice and differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. Moreover, from perusal of the second show cause notice, it is evident that the Deputy Secretary has recorded his finding to the effect that the charges are proved against the petitioner. Before that, no tentative reasons of difference of opinion was ever supplied to the petitioner. It appears that in the present case, unknown procedure of departmental proceeding was adopted by the authorities. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment in the case of Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Bihari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 . Paragraph nos. 17, 18 and 19 are relevant and the same are reproduced here in extenso : 17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case [ AIR 1963 SC 1612 : (1964) 2 SCR 1 : (1963) 1 LLJ 295 ] quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. 18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704]. 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. [emphasis supplied] 9. Further, this Court also in the case of Police 110-Pramendra Kumar Vs. [emphasis supplied] 9. Further, this Court also in the case of Police 110-Pramendra Kumar Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 841, while relying upon the judgment of Kunj Bihari Misra (supra) held that since before coming to the finding of guilt and differing with the enquiry report neither the disciplinary authority assigned the reasons for such difference nor opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, the impugned order was found to be not tenable in the eyes of law and hence, the same was quashed and set aside. 10. In the case at hand, it appears that the miscarriage of justice has been done. This Court comes to the conclusion for the simple reason that the authority who issued the second show cause notice namely, Anand Mohan Thakur has also passed the appellate order dated 22.11.2012. It is not only the same authority but even the same person who issued the second show cause notice and the appellate authority. This is not permissible under the service jurisprudence. 11. It is a case where Mr. Anand Mohan Thakur became the judge of his own cause. He found the charges proved against the petitioner while differing with the inquiry report and he projected himself after he became the disciplinary authority. Later on, he became the appellate authority also. This cannot be countenanced in a departmental proceeding. Though the enquiry report is in favour of the petitioner, but the Deputy Secretary has differed with the findings thereafter and recorded his proposed punishment also against the delinquent. After the due appeal came before him, he rejected the appeal also. These facts are glaring on the face of the record at Annexure-7 and Annexure11 respectively which are nothing but the second show cause issued by him and the appellate order signed by him. 12. The principle of “no one shall be a judge in his own cause” is a cornerstone of the rule of law, which ensures that justice is administered fairly and impartially by preventing individuals from being the judge in cases where they have a personal interest or stake in the outcome. Here, it would be useful to refer to the observations made in para-16 of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1985) 4 SCC 417 :- 16. ………….. Here, it would be useful to refer to the observations made in para-16 of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1985) 4 SCC 417 :- 16. ………….. one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is “in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done …………………….….”. 13. It is one thing to say that in departmental proceeding strict prove of evidence is not required, but at the same time, this Court will not shut its eyes when such a glaring manifest error is pointed out in the matter of departmental proceeding where the authority who issued the second show cause notice as also who passed the appellate order are one and the same person. A complete unknown procedure of law was adhered to in the present case. 14. Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1935 has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. From perusal of which, it is abundantly clear that to prove the charge, oral evidence has to be led and the delinquent has to be given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. From perusal of the record, it is evident that not a single witness was examined to prove the charge against the petitioner. Since the inquiry officer has found that none of the charges was proved, the petitioner could not be punished. It is well settled that mere production of a document would not be sufficient unless a witness comes and proves the same against the delinquent. Reference in this context may be made to the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Since the inquiry officer has found that none of the charges was proved, the petitioner could not be punished. It is well settled that mere production of a document would not be sufficient unless a witness comes and proves the same against the delinquent. Reference in this context may be made to the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that mere production of document would not be sufficient to prove the charge unless a witness comes and proves such document which is against the delinquent. 15. This Court has also gone through the inquiry report wherein the inquiry officer has given definite finding in respect of each of the charges to the effect that the charges are not proved. The only exception is charge no. 4 wherein the inquiry officer has opinioned that the delinquent may be exonerated for this charge also. Therefore, there is no evidence against the petitioner to prove the charge. In the present case, the authorities have ignored the relevant materials and have taking into consideration the irrelevant materials, the penalty order has been imposed. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlai Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 that such a procedure adopted by quasi-judicial authority is not permissible in the eyes of law. Even in a departmental proceeding some sort of evidence is required to be proved against the delinquent. Paragrpah-25 of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:- 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-judicial in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 16. Learned counsel for the State has cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lav Nigam Vs. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd & Anr., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 440 . In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that in case, the disciplinary authority differs with the view arrived at by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting his tentative conclusions to the charged employee and it is only after hearing the employee, the disciplinary authority can arrive at a final findings of guilt. However, in the present case, this procedure was not followed by the respondent authority to punish the petitioner. Lastly the respondent-State placing reliance on this judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has submitted that this case may be remanded to the authorities to start afresh from the stage of issuance of a fresh show cause notice by the disciplinary authority indicating his tentative disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer. 17. However, this Court is not inclined to accept such request of the learned counsel for the respondents for the simple reason that the writ petition was filed in the year 2012 and the same is being decided in the year 2023 and in this way, 12 years have passed. It is a case where charges against the petitioner could not be proved which is evident from the enquiry report itself and there is complete violation of the procedure of the departmental proceeding. Hence, no useful purpose would be served in remanding back the matter to the authority at this stage. Conclusion 18. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the penalty order dated 5.1.2012 (Annexure-10), as also the appellate order dated 22.11.2012 (Annexure-11) are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner is entitled for consequential benefits, which shall be extended by the respondents within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 19. The writ petition stands allowed.