JUDGMENT : PANKAJ PUROHIT, J. 1. This appeal is preferred by the State under Section 378 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.07.2002, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tehri Garhwal in Criminal Case No. 355 of 1994, State Vs. Kundan Singh, whereby the said court has acquitted the respondents accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 149, 153, 447, 448, 451, 427 and 506 IPC. 2. During pendency of appeal respondent nos. 1, 4 and 5 passed-away, hence the appeal stood abated against those respondents vide separate orders passed by the court. 3. In a nutshell case of the prosecution is that on a land a lease under The Government Grants Act, 1895 had been sanctioned to the informant, the informants have built up their houses on that land but on 15.04.1993 at about 01:30 PM all the accused persons/respondents caused an unlawful assembly and fully damaged the house built by the informants; they also looted the entire articles kept inside the house; the accused persons also severely damaged the tin shed and threw away stones and bricks which caused a loss of Rs. 80,000 to the informant. 4. This report was given to the District Magistrate, who passed order to the Police for registration of case and investigation ensued. After conclusion of investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against the accused persons. Charges were framed against the accused. As many as five witnesses were produced on behalf of the prosecution. Thereafter statement of accused under Section 313 CrPC was recorded. The accused persons denied commission of any such occurrence and one witness was produced in their defence. The trial court acquitted the respondents-accused as mentioned in para no. 1 of this judgment, hence this appeal has been filed by the State assailing the findings of acquittal. The trial court in its judgment has recorded the findings of acquittal by holding that the previous enmity between the parties i.e., informant and accused persons was duly proved by the prosecution witnesses. 5. A land had been sanctioned under The Government Grants Act, 1895 to PW5-Bijendra Singh. In the same land, the lease had been sanctioned in favour of Hukam Singh and both of them have possession of the land and built their separate houses. 6.
5. A land had been sanctioned under The Government Grants Act, 1895 to PW5-Bijendra Singh. In the same land, the lease had been sanctioned in favour of Hukam Singh and both of them have possession of the land and built their separate houses. 6. The trial court also disbelieved the prosecution story on the ground that the occurrence is stated to have taken place on 15.04.1993 whereas the report could be lodged on 17.04.1993; once there was no justification for the Police to go on the spot on 15th and 16th of April, it cannot be believed. 7. The trial court also noticed that there was delay in lodging the FIR which was fatal for the prosecution story. Moreover all eye witnesses are relatives of each other. Although the incident was stated to have been seen by independent witnesses, but none of them were examined. The trial court also doubted the presence of PW4-Prem Prasad Joshi on the spot. 8. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The respondents have been acquitted. In appeal against acquittal it is held by Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments that the Courts should be slow in interfering in the judgments of acquittal as the innocence of the accused is further re-inforced by his acquittal. Unless and until there is perversity in the judgment of acquittal, the same should not be interfered with. 9. It is trite law that that while hearing the appeal against acquittal, the power of reviewing evidence must be exercised with great care and caution. In order to ensure that the innocents are not punished, the appellate court should attach due weight to the lower court’s acquittal because the presumption of the innocence is further strengthened by the acquittal. The appellate court should reverse an acquittal only when it has “very substantial and compelling reasons.” I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ghurey Lal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450 . For the sake of convenience, paragraph no. 3 of the said judgment is quoted below: “3. We have endeavoured to set out the guidelines for the appellate courts in dealing with appeals against acquittal. An overriding theme emanates from the law on appeals against acquittals. The appellate court is given wide powers to review the evidence to come to its own conclusions.
3 of the said judgment is quoted below: “3. We have endeavoured to set out the guidelines for the appellate courts in dealing with appeals against acquittal. An overriding theme emanates from the law on appeals against acquittals. The appellate court is given wide powers to review the evidence to come to its own conclusions. But this power must be exercised with great care and caution. In order to ensure that the innocents are not punished, the appellate court should attach due weight to the lower court’s acquittal because the presumption of innocence is further strengthened by the acquittal. The appellate court should, therefore, reverse an acquittal only when it has “very substantial and compelling reasons.” 10. In view of aforesaid anomalies on part of prosecution the trial court came to this conclusion that the prosecution could not prove its case against the respondents/accused beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly it acquitted the respondents as mentioned hereinabove. 11. Learned AGA appearing for the State/appellant could not point out any ground far less reasonable and compelling to interfere with the well reasoned judgment, passed by the trial court. 12. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. 13. Let the L.C.R. be immediately sent back to the trial court for consignment.