ORDER Mishra, J:- 1. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 27.6.2023 whereby the claim of the petitioner for supply of liquor has been rejected. 2. It is his case that the petitioner is a licensee of a group liquor shop at C.S. Waterhouse, New Bus Stand Kudri Road, District Shahdol for a duration from 1st June 2021 to 31st March, 2022. Licenses were provided to him for a consideration of Rs.8 Crores 50 Lacs approximately. The petitioner entered into the contract on 1st June 2021 and operated the liquor shop till 31st May 2022, as two months extension was granted to the petitioner due to Covid pandemic lockdown across the country. 3. The petitioner has paid and fulfilled all obligations mentioned in the contract entered between the Government and petitioner and in case some duties are paid with some delay that was in pursuance to the time period which has been extended by the Authority themselves but the fact that the petitioner has paid all the duties in accordance with law could not be disputed. It is his case that despite all the payments being made to the authorities, the respondents/department had not supplied liquor to the petitioner which entitles the petitioner to receive a compensation from the department as per section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 to tune of Rs.2,56,91,193/-. The District Excise Officer has recommended the case of the petitioner but the aforesaid was not taken note of by the Excise Commissioner, in turn, causing huge financial loss to the petitioner, therefore, this petition is filed seeking the following reliefs :- "The Hon'ble High Court to pass writ of certiorari or any other writ and directions set aside the Order Annexure P/1 of respondent No.2 dated 27.6.2023. The Hon'ble Court provide compensation to the petitioner of Rs.2,56,91,193/- along with interest of 12% from the date 31 May, 2022. Any other directions and orders as the Hon'ble Court deemt fit as per the fact of the case." 4. On notice being issued, a detailed reply has been filed by the respondents in the matter. It is contended that Condition No.4 in Annexure P/3 clarifies that the payment of license fee shall be in accordance with rule 2 of the General License Condition. On notice being issued, a detailed reply has been filed by the respondents in the matter. It is contended that Condition No.4 in Annexure P/3 clarifies that the payment of license fee shall be in accordance with rule 2 of the General License Condition. Further Clauses 15 and 17 clarify that the M.P. Excise Act, 1915 as well as rules and notifications issued thereunder shall be equally applicable to him. These General License Conditions as well as excise policy are being framed by the State Government in exercise of powers under section 62 and 63 of the Act of 2015. It is contended that the petitioner has made the payments but with delay and is claiming supply of liquor on the delayed payment of license fee or refund of the said fee, even compensation. The default committed by the petitioner in depositing the fortnightly license fee before 15th or 30th/31st of each month has been brought on record as Annexure R-2. Clause 31.4 of the Excise Liquor Policy notified by the State Government in terms of Section 63 of the Act of 2015 clarifies that in case the licensee fails to deposit the fortnightly installment of annual auction amount/license fee before the end of each fortnight and fails to deposit the same within first three days of successive fortnight then he shall not be entitled to supply of liquor for the fortnight in default at all. It is not the case of the petitioner that falls under the category of deposition of annual auction or license fee before the end of each fortnight, rather it is a case where there is a delay in depositing of the installment of the annual license fee. The same could not be disputed by the petitioner. 5. Rejoinder has been filed and an attempt has been made to satisfy the Court that the letter of District Excise Officer, Shahdol mentions that the petitioner has deposited Rs.2,56,91,193/- for supply of liquor and that is accepted by the authorities. The aforesaid was also communicated to the Excise Commissioner but the fact remains that the Excise Policy provides for deposit of the annual auction/license fee by end of the fortnight. The same has not been done in the present case. The aforesaid was also communicated to the Excise Commissioner but the fact remains that the Excise Policy provides for deposit of the annual auction/license fee by end of the fortnight. The same has not been done in the present case. It is pointed out that similar issue also arose for consideration before this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Lalit Jaggi reported in (2008) 10 SCC 607 . Hence, he has prayed for dismissal of the petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 7. The record indicates that the petitioner being license holder of liquor for the period of June, 2021 to May 2022 has deposited all the license fee/annual auction amount but with certain delay. The question which comes up for consideration is that whether she is entitled for supply of liquor on delayed payments. The question was considered and answered in the case of Lalit Jaggi (supra) wherein the Court has held as under :- "7. The key question which arises for determination in these civil appeals is : What is the nature of payment which the auctionpurchaser makes to the State Government as and by way of licence fee for a given fortnight? 8. In our view, before we come to the relevant judgments on this aspect, it may be stated that the licence fee, payable in advance in twenty-four equal instalments, is in essence rent charged for parting with the State's privilege for manufacturing and vending liquor and it is not a consideration for sale of liquor. It is dif erent from issue price. However, it has been urged before the High Court on behalf of the auction-purchaser that the licence fee contains an element of excise duty and, consequently, the State had no authority under the Act to impose duty in advance on undrawn liquor. 9. It is dif erent from issue price. However, it has been urged before the High Court on behalf of the auction-purchaser that the licence fee contains an element of excise duty and, consequently, the State had no authority under the Act to impose duty in advance on undrawn liquor. 9. While striking down Clauses 13.3 and 13.4 of the policy, the Division Bench of the High Court relied upon two judgments of this Court, in State of M.P. v. Firm Gappulal [ (1976) 1 SCC 791 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 71] and in Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of M.P. [ (1970) 2 SCC 467 : AIR 1971 SC 517 ] Before we come to the relevant judgment, at the very outset, it may be stated that these two judgments have no application for the simple reason that there is a basic dif erence between excise duty and licence fee. Both the judgments dealt with levy of excise duty on undrawn liquor. As stated above, rental is the consideration for the privilege granted by the Government for manufacturing and vending liquor. There is no levy of excise duty in enforcing payment of a stipulated sum mentioned in the licence. 10. The concepts of advance licence fee and excise duty are entirely dif erent and this has been very succinctly brought out in two judgments of this Court which we shall presently refer to. In State of Orissa v. Narain Prasad [ (1996) 5 SCC 740 ] a Division Bench of this Court (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and K.S. Paripoornan, JJ.) in a language which has all the clarity at its command, has held : (SCC pp. 756-57, para 33) "33. A review of the decided cases of this Court on the subject indicates a clear shift in the way this matter has been looked at. Initially, the matter was looked at from the point of view of the levy of excise duty. On that basis, it was held that unless there is a sale, no duty can be collected (Bimal Chandra Banerjee [ (1970) 2 SCC 467 : AIR 1971 SC 517 ] , Gappulal [ (1976) 1 SCC 791 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 71] and Ram Kumar [Excise Commr. v. Ram Kumar, (1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360] ). v. Ram Kumar, (1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360] ). But then a dif erent viewpoint emerged with the Constitution Bench decision in Har Shankar [Har Shankar v. Excise & Taxation Commr., (1975) 1 SCC 737 ] which was carried forward in Panna Lal [Panna Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) 2 SCC 633 ] , Jage Ram [State of Haryana v. Jage Ram, (1980) 3 SCC 599 : 1982 SCC (Tax) 130] and Y. Prabhakara Reddy [State of A.P. v. Y. Prabhakara Reddy, (1987) 2 SCC 136 ] . These decisions look at the matter from the point of view of the several payments being, in truth and ef ect, consideration for the grant of privilege/licence. They point out that the excise duty is a duty on manufacture and production and not on sale. It was a case, they said, where the duty was being passed on to the licensee who in turn passed it on to the consumer. What all the licensee paid, they held, is nothing but onsideration for the grant of licence and the mere fact that the total consideration fixed comprises several elements (including excise duty), it cannot be said that excise duty is levied upon the licensee. In our opinion, the Orissa matters fall under the ratio of Panna Lal [Panna Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) 2 SCC 633 ] and Y. Prabhakara Reddy [State of A.P. v. Y. Prabhakara Reddy, (1987) 2 SCC 136 ] and not under the ratio of Bimal Chandra Banerjee [ (1970) 2 SCC 467 : AIR 1971 SC 517 ] , Gappulal [ (1976) 1 SCC 791 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 71] and Ram Kumar [Excise Commr. v. Ram Kumar, (1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360] . The amounts mentioned in rules 6 and 6-A, as also the undertakings contained therein, together constitute the consideration for grant of privilege/licence, determined by auction, as contemplated by section 29 of the Act. v. Ram Kumar, (1976) 3 SCC 540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360] . The amounts mentioned in rules 6 and 6-A, as also the undertakings contained therein, together constitute the consideration for grant of privilege/licence, determined by auction, as contemplated by section 29 of the Act. As explained hereinbefore, the obligation to remit the excise duty is independent of the sale/purchase of liquor; it is payable on or before the specified dates every month; it is an addition to the monthly instalment payable under rule 6; its remittance is not tied up to the purchase of M.G.Q. except to the extent that the licensee has to pay the prescribed instalment of excise duty prior to the lifting of the liquor. It, therefore, cannot be said that there is any levy of excise duty upon the licensee. The concept here is altogether dif erent. It is a case where the consideration payable by the licensee for grant of licence is made up of monthly rental plus excise duty besides the obligation to purchase the M.G.Q. The licensee pays the rental and excise duty as undertaken by him under the agreement/contract executed by him and as required by conditions of the licence under which he is doing business i.e. as and by way of consideration. Indeed, the rules could have provided that the entire amount provided under rules 6 and 6-A should be paid in advance before the issuance of licence in which event it could not have been contended that it is not in consideration of grant of licence. Merely because the rules provide a concession and provide for collection of the said amounts in convenient instalments spread over the year, the nature and character of the payments cannot change." The judgment of this Court in State of Orissa v. Narain Prasad [ (1996) 5 SCC 740 ] , which has considered the earlier two judgments of this Court, has not been considered by the High Court in its impugned judgment. 11. In Excise Commr. v. Issac Peter [ (1994) 4 SCC 104 ] a threeJudge Bench of this Court once again, speaking through Jeevan Reddy, J. has succinctly brought out the concept of the licence fee payable by the auction-purchaser vide para 26 which we quote in extenso hereinbelow : (SCC pp. 124-25) 2 6 . 11. In Excise Commr. v. Issac Peter [ (1994) 4 SCC 104 ] a threeJudge Bench of this Court once again, speaking through Jeevan Reddy, J. has succinctly brought out the concept of the licence fee payable by the auction-purchaser vide para 26 which we quote in extenso hereinbelow : (SCC pp. 124-25) 2 6 . Learned counsel for the respondents then submitted that doctrine of fairness and reasonableness must be read into contracts to which State is a party. It is submitted that the State cannot act unreasonably or unfairly even while acting under a contract involving State power. Now, let us see, what is the purpose for which this argument is addressed and what is the implication? The purpose, as we can see, is that though the contract says that supply of additional quota is discretionary, it must be read as obligatory—at least to the extent of previous year's supplies—by applying the said doctrine. It is submitted that if this is not done, the licensees would suf er monetarily. The other purpose is to say that if the State is not able to so supply, it would be unreasonable on its part to demand the full amount due to it under the contract. In short, the duty to act fairly is sought to be imported into the contract to modify and alter its terms and to create an obligation upon the State which is not there in the contract. We must confess, we are not aware of any such doctrine of fairness or reasonableness. Nor could the learned counsel bring to our notice any decision laying down such a proposition. Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasijudicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is administrative. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions i.e. where it is a statutory contract—or rather more so. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed by statutory provisions i.e. where it is a statutory contract—or rather more so. It is one thing to say that a contract—every contract—must be construed reasonably having regard to its language. But this is not what the licensees say. They seek to create an obligation on the other party to the contract, just because it happens to be the State. They are not prepared to apply the very same rule in converse case i.e. where the State has abundant supplies and wants the licensees to lift all the stocks. The licensees will undertake no obligation to lift all those stocks even if the State suf ers loss. This one-sided obligation, in modification of express terms of the contract, in the name of duty to act fairly, is what we are unable to appreciate. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the licensees do not support their proposition. In Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay [ (1989) 3 SCC 293 ] it was held that where a public authority is exempted from the operation of a statute like the Rent Control Act, it must be presumed that such exemption from the statute is coupled with the duty to act fairly and reasonably. The decision does not say that the terms and conditions of contract can be varied, added or altered by importing the said doctrine. It may be noted that though the said principle was af irmed, no relief was given to the appellant in that case. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. [ (1991) 1 SCC 212 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 742] was a case of mass termination of District Government Counsel in the State of U.P. It was a case of termination from a post involving public element. It was a case of non-government servant holding a public of ice, on account of which it was held to be a matter within the public law field. This decision too does not af irm the principle now canvassed by the learned counsel. It was a case of non-government servant holding a public of ice, on account of which it was held to be a matter within the public law field. This decision too does not af irm the principle now canvassed by the learned counsel. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in case of contracts freely entered into with the State, like the present ones, there is no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness against one party to the contract (State), for the purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of the contract, merely because it happens to be the State. In such cases, the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contracts (which may be statutory in some cases) and the laws relating to contracts. It must be remembered that these contracts are entered into pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. There is no compulsion on anyone to enter into these contracts. It is voluntary on both sides. There can be no question of the State power being involved in such contracts. It bears repetition to say that the State does not guarantee profit to the licensees in such contracts. There is no warranty against incurring losses. It is a business for the licensees. Whether they make profit or incur loss is no concern of the State. In law, it is entitled to its money under the contract. It is not as if the licensees are going to pay more to the State in case they make substantial profits. We reiterate that what we have said hereinabove is in the context of contracts entered into between the State and its citizens pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. It is not necessary to say more than this for the purpose of these cases. What would be the position in the case of contracts entered into otherwise than by public auction, floating of tenders or negotiation, we need not express any opinion herein." 8. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparently clear that licensee is not entitled for supply of liquor on delayed payment. Admittedly, the payments have been made with certain delay by the petitioner. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparently clear that licensee is not entitled for supply of liquor on delayed payment. Admittedly, the payments have been made with certain delay by the petitioner. The same could not be disputed by her, therefore, in terms of settled legal proposition of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalit Jaggi (supra), no relief can be extended to the petitioner. 9. The writ petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.