Brand Street v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited
2024-02-13
SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. In both the writ petitions, applications have been filed by the private respondent under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) alleging that certain forged documents have been annexed to the writ petitions and statements have been made in support thereof which are false and intended to practice fraud upon the court. 2. The first such document is a purported certificate of enlistment issued by the Madhyamgram Municipality to the writ petitioner for carrying on business of readymade garments (retail). Copies of the said document have been annexed by the applicant to the applications, where the endorsements “PROVISIONAL” and “2017-2018” appear. However, in the corresponding copies of the same document annexed to the writ petitions, the said endorsements were not there. 3. The writ petitioner seeks to explain away the same by contending that there was a flood in the region, which caused water-logging and apparently obliterated the said endorsements, which were stamped on the certificate of enlistment with soluble ink. Pleadings and materials in support of the flood has been sought to be produced. 4. A second document alleged to be forged is a leave and licence agreement dated September 13, 2018 annexed to the writ petitions. In internal page no. 3, second paragraph of the said document, there is a handwritten interpolation, apparently indicating that the period of licence was from July 3, 2020 to July 2, 2023. 5. Corresponding copies of the same document annexed to the present applications do not, however, contain such handwritten interpolation. 6. It is well-settled that the accused person is not required to be heard at length in connection with an application under Section 340 of the CrPC. For the purpose of the said Section, the court has to make a preliminary enquiry and if it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to sub-section (1)(b) of Section 195 of the CrPC which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court, a complaint is to be made. 7. We are to consider as to whether the allegations made in the applications under Section 340 of the CrPC come within the ambit of the said provision. Since Section 340(1) refers back to Section 195 of the CrPC, a reference to the same is necessary. 8.
7. We are to consider as to whether the allegations made in the applications under Section 340 of the CrPC come within the ambit of the said provision. Since Section 340(1) refers back to Section 195 of the CrPC, a reference to the same is necessary. 8. Section 195(1)(b) is to be considered in the present case. Clause (b) of Section 195(1) contains three sub-clauses. Sub-clause (iii) relates to criminal conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit or abatement of any offence specified in the previous two sub-clauses and need not be independently enquired into. 9. Sub-clause (i) of Section 195 (1) (b), CrPC refers to Sections 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205-211 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). On the other hand, sub-clause (ii) speaks about offences described in Section 463 or punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 of the IPC when alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. 10. Section 193, IPC speaks about punishment for false evidence. False evidence is provided for in Section 191 of the IPC, which says whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. 11. Section 193, IPC, while stipulating the punishment, speaks about intentionally giving false evidence at any stage of a judicial proceeding or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used at any stage of a judicial proceeding. Thus, the tendering of false evidence need not necessarily pertain to the stage of adducing evidence in a suit, but, as contemplated in Section 191, IPC, can also apply to false statements made on oath before a court of law. 12. Sections 194 to 196 of the IPC also speak about different shades of false evidence. Section 199, IPC is of a similar nature, dealing with false statements made in declaration receivable as evidence. However, strictly speaking, the same relates to the stage of adducing evidence. Again, Section 200, IPC speaks about corruptly using or attempting to use as true any declaration knowing the same to be false in any material point.
Section 199, IPC is of a similar nature, dealing with false statements made in declaration receivable as evidence. However, strictly speaking, the same relates to the stage of adducing evidence. Again, Section 200, IPC speaks about corruptly using or attempting to use as true any declaration knowing the same to be false in any material point. Sections 205 to 211 and 228 of the IPC do not pertain to the allegations made in the instant case and hence are not dealt with. 13. Moving on, Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC refers to Sections 463, 471, 475 and 475 of the IPC. Section 471 of the IPC speaks about using as genuine a forged document fraudulently or dishonestly, knowing or having reason to believe it to be forged. Section 463, IPC is the parent provision of forgery. Sections 475 and 476 of the IPC relate to counterfeiting devices or marks and are not attracted to the present case, since the endorsements alleged to have been omitted from the certificate of enlistment-in-question did not authenticate but merely referred to the nature and the period thereof. 14. Hence, what we see is that Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC, in the present case, comes only consequentially, pertaining to sentences made in support of the annexures to the writ petitions. The primary offences are those mentioned under sub-clause (ii) of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC, in particular, Section 463, IPC which defines forgery and colours Section 471 of the IPC. Hence, we are to look into the ingredients of Sections 463 and 471 of the IPC to assess whether, prima facie, the offences enumerated in Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC have been made out. 15. Section 463, IPC defines forgery. It provides that whoever makes any false statement or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, is said to commit “forgery?. 16.
16. The relevant ingredients which are to be established prima facie in the present case are that the two documents – being the deed of leave and licence and certificate of enlistment - are false and made with intent to support any claim or title. The questions of damage to public or to any person or parting with property, etc. do not arise here. 17. The writ petitioner has sought to support his claim of possession of the property for the purpose of getting electricity in the main writ petition and thus it is to be seen whether there is reason to believe prima facie that any forged document was made by the writ petitioner with intent to support such claim of possession. 18. Section 471 of the IPC factors in other ingredients to be satisfied. The forged document has to be fraudulently or dishonestly used, despite having reason to believe or actually knowing the same to be forged. 19. In the present case, if the other ingredients are satisfied, it can reasonably be deduced that the petitioner was aware as to whether the documents-in-question were forged, if they were actually forged. What has to be established is that the writ petitioner had intent to support any claim, for which he made the false documents. 20. Let us now consider the context of the use of the said two documents, that is, the purported deed of leave and licence and certificate of enlistment, in the original writ petition. The premise of the writ petitioner’s claims was that he is in settled possession of the property and is entitled to get electricity connection. The court decided ultimately, by looking into the said documents and other documents and averments in the writ petitions, that the writ petitioner was in occupation. 21. Thus, undoubtedly the writ petitioner used the documents with intent to support his claim. The germane question which arises is whether the alleged perpetration of fraud would have made any difference in the outcome of the writ petition to the knowledge of the petitioner for the petitioner to have any reason to deliberately resort to forgery. 22.
21. Thus, undoubtedly the writ petitioner used the documents with intent to support his claim. The germane question which arises is whether the alleged perpetration of fraud would have made any difference in the outcome of the writ petition to the knowledge of the petitioner for the petitioner to have any reason to deliberately resort to forgery. 22. Taking the certificate of enlistment first, even without going into the veracity of the defence of the writ petitioner, the use of the word “provisional” and the reference to a previous period of 2017-2018 would not be germane to the outcome of the writ petition. Even a provisional certificate of enlistment of a period some time prior to filing of the writ petition prima facie would have shown that the writ petitioner is in possession of the property, at least to the extent that a distribution licensee or a writ court taking up an electricity matter is supposed to examine. 23. Similarly, in the leave and licence agreement, even if the interpolated dates were ignored, the conclusion that there was a leave and licence agreement in favour of the writ petitioner commencing from September 13, 2018 and ending on September 13, 2021 that is before the filing of the writ petition, would have been prima facie established. It also has to be considered that the interpolations did not score through or erase the original dates but were merely added above the said dates. Arguably, it may very well be that a copy of the original leave and licence was in the custody of the present applicant who has annexed the same to the present applications under Section 340, CrPC whereas the original document or a copy where the said date was subsequently introduced was in the custody of the writ petitioner and not with the present applicant. Even taking the worst case against the writ petitioner, it would at best be arguable as to what would be the legal effect of a unilateral interpolation of dates by the writ petitioner in the leave and licence agreement. However, such interpolation ipso facto may not necessarily amount to “forgery?as contemplated in Section 463 of the IPC. 24.
Even taking the worst case against the writ petitioner, it would at best be arguable as to what would be the legal effect of a unilateral interpolation of dates by the writ petitioner in the leave and licence agreement. However, such interpolation ipso facto may not necessarily amount to “forgery?as contemplated in Section 463 of the IPC. 24. Hence, considering that the alleged acts of defacing/interpolation would not be germane for deciding the possession of the writ petitioner or to decide the writ petition, mens rea, which is a cardinal concept of criminal jurisprudence, is absent. 25. For applicability of Section 463 read with Section 471 of the IPC, one has to establish not only that the writ petitioner made the false document and intended the same to support any claim but also that the same was fraudulently or dishonestly used as genuine. There is no reason for the writ petitioner to have fraudulently or dishonestly used the documents to support his claim as genuine, since even without the alleged interpolation and omission in the two documents, the writ petitioner could very well have established his claim prima facie. 26. We are also to take into consideration the principles of Section 114 and Section 109 of the Evidence Act, which conjointly cast the burden of proof on a person challenging the continuity of a legal position/jural relationship as envisaged in Section 109 to prove that it ceased to exist. Hence, even if the leave and licence agreement ending in the previous year than the writ petition and the certificate of enlistment of a previous period were produced, the presumption would in any event be that the possession of the writ petitioner has been continuing. The word “provisional” in the certificate of enlistment does not make any difference whatsoever, since a provisional or a permanent certificate of enlistment would be of similar evidentiary value as regards the possession of the person concerned, even if they might make a difference with regard to the question as to whether the writ petitioner had a legal right to carry on the business at the present juncture, which was not in issue in the writ petition at all. 27. Hence, a careful reading of the relevant provisions of the IPC indicates that the ingredients of forgery are prima facie not established for the present purpose.
27. Hence, a careful reading of the relevant provisions of the IPC indicates that the ingredients of forgery are prima facie not established for the present purpose. As a consequence, the statements made in support of the allegedly forged documents do not also come within the purview of Section 195 (1) (b) (i) of CrPC. 28. Looking at the matter from another perspective, Section 340, CrPC itself requires that the court has to be of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that the course of action taken therein is to reported. 29. The expression “interests of justice” stands on a higher footing than an individual cause of action. Even if it may be argued that the writ petitioner had sought to mislead the court on certain aspects of the documents, the same is not on the higher category of offences which is required to be further inquired into for the interests of justice. Also, the alleged actions of the writ petition need not necessarily come within the purview of the commission of the predicate offences of the IPC and hence, the component of the writ petitioner having any impetus to mislead the court would be absent. 30. Since the commission of the alleged forgery (although prima facie absent here) would not and could not have made a difference in the outcome of the matter insofar as the possession of the writ petitioner is concerned, no deliberate intention to mislead the court can be automatically deduced or attributed to the writ petitioner. Thus, this Court does not find it expedient in the interests of justice to refer the matter for enquiry under Section 340 CrPC. 31. Accordingly, CAN 1 of 2023 in WPA No. 12911 of 2022 and CAN 1 of 2024 in WPA No. 16770 of 2022 are dismissed, without any order as to costs. 32. However, it is made clear that the above findings have been rendered in the limited context of dealing with the applicant’s applications under Section 340 of the CrPC and are confined to the allegations pertaining to whether the ingredients of the said provision are attracted in connection with the dealings before this Court.
32. However, it is made clear that the above findings have been rendered in the limited context of dealing with the applicant’s applications under Section 340 of the CrPC and are confined to the allegations pertaining to whether the ingredients of the said provision are attracted in connection with the dealings before this Court. Nothing in the above observations shall prejudice the outcome of the independent criminal cases or investigation, if any, otherwise going on against the writ petitioner on the complaint of the applicant in respect of the self-same documents. 33. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.