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2024 DIGILAW 341 (KER)

Nehru Trophy Boat Race Society, Represented by its Secretary v. Vismaya Ventures (India) Private Ltd.

2024-03-14

BECHU KURIAN THOMAS

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ORDER : The Nehru Trophy Boat Race is an annual event held in the backwaters at Punnamada in Alappuzha. The event has received international acclaim with thousands thronging every year to witness the boat race. The event transforms the otherwise idyllic lake into an arena of activities bordering on festivity. The euphoria surrounding a boat race is difficult to describe but is to be experienced. 2. Organising the Nehru Trophy Boat Race is a herculean task. A society by the name 'Nehru Trophy Boat Race Society' (for short ‘the Society’) has been constituted, with the District Collector of Alappuzha as its Chairman and the Revenue Divisional Officer as its Member Secretary. Two civil servants occupying the above positions in 2012 are facing indictment for the offences under sections 406, 418, 463, 471, 420 and 120(b) r/w section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with the Society. The allegations are in connection with the boat race event held on 11.08.2012. Cognizance was taken of the above-referred offences on the basis of a private complaint filed by the first respondent, disregarding the claim of the accused of the need for sanction to prosecute them. The proceedings against the petitioners are challenged in these petitions under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Petitioners in Crl. M.C. No.7268/2014 are the Society and the then Revenue Divisional Officer of Alappuzha while the petitioner in Crl. M.C. No.7267/2014 was the then District Collector of Alappuzha. In fact the District Collector was only holding the charge of the District for the period from 30.06.2012 to 18.09.2012. The Society consists of various representatives of people like MLAs, MPs, Sports Council, Bar Association, Press Club, Representatives from the Municipalities and Panchayats and other nominees from different walks of life apart from presidents of social organisations like the Rotary and the Lions Club. 4. As the event incurs huge expenditure, the Society invites sponsors every year. In 2011, a company named PACL sponsored the event, and the first respondent who brought in the sponsor was paid a service charge for arranging such a sponsor. 4. As the event incurs huge expenditure, the Society invites sponsors every year. In 2011, a company named PACL sponsored the event, and the first respondent who brought in the sponsor was paid a service charge for arranging such a sponsor. For the year 2012, offers were invited from sponsors and in a meeting of the executive committee of the Society, it was decided that the first respondent would be given a 10% commission if it brought sponsorship upto Rs.4 Crores and 25% of the amount which exceeds Rs.4 Crores brought in as sponsorship. 5. An agreement was executed between the Society and the first respondent on 24.07.2012, granting exclusive marketing rights for the boat race for that year. The agreement stipulated inter alia that the Society would also be at liberty to market the rights themselves. The terms of the agreement stipulated that sponsors procured by the first respondent must execute an agreement with it, and the revenue sharing model stipulated that the first respondent will raise an amount of Rs. 4 Crores and above, for which service charges will be paid as stipulated therein. 6. Subsequent to the execution of the agreement, PACL, the company which had sponsored the event in the preceding year, agreed to sponsor the event and transferred Rs.4 Crores in two parts. Alleging that the sponsorship obtained from PACL, the sponsor, was not at the behest of the first respondent, who had never executed any agreement with the sponsor, the society refused to pay the service charges as stipulated in the agreement. Due to the failure to pay the service charges as per the agreement, the first respondent lodged a private complaint on 01.01.2014, and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on 26.02.2014. 7. According to the complainant, the accused forged an agreement dated 10.07.2012 to make it believe that it was executed by the accused and PACL and accepted the sponsorship from PACL for an amount of Rs. 4 Crores for the Nehru Trophy Boat Race for the year 2012 with the dishonest intention to cheat the complainant with whom an agreement was executed on 24-07-2012 for payment of service charges for bringing in sponsors. The complainant alleged that the agreement allegedly executed on 10.07.2012, was forged as the stamp paper on which the agreement was executed was purchased only on 10-08-2012. The complainant alleged that the agreement allegedly executed on 10.07.2012, was forged as the stamp paper on which the agreement was executed was purchased only on 10-08-2012. The complainant also alleged that the false agreement was executed with the intention to cause it to be believed that it was made even prior to the agreement executed with the defacto complainant and caused wrongful loss to the complainant and wrongful gain to the accused. It was further alleged that the agreement was used as genuine to cheat the complainant, causing a loss of 10% of the commission amount due to it, and thereby, the accused committed the offences alleged. 8. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, stating that since the accused are alleged to have committed the offences, the protection under section 197 Cr.P.C is unavailable. Faced with the prosecution, the first and second accused have approached this Court in these petitions under section 482 of Cr.P.C. 9. I have heard Sri. K.K. Chandran Pillai, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Adv. S. Ambily for the petitioners, Smt. Aparna C. Menon, the learned counsel for the first respondent, apart from Sri. K.A. Noushad and Smt. Sreeja V., the learned Public Prosecutors. 10. Two main questions arise for consideration in these cases. They are : (i) Whether the offences alleged against the petitioners are made out from the complaint instituted by the first respondent? and (ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to protection under section 197 of Cr.P.C?. The above two questions are discussed below. Question No.(i) Whether the offences alleged against the petitioners are made out from the complaint instituted by the first respondent? 11. The complainant's case revolves around an agreement allegedly executed on 10.07.2012. Both sides admit the agreement. Petitioners allege that the date noted on the agreement as 10-07-2012 is a mistake for 10-08-2012, and the stamp paper for the agreement was purchased on the latter date. There is no dispute that in the recital portion of the agreement, there is a reference to a meeting held on 30.07.2012. Therefore, it is evident that the date 10.07.2012 is erroneous. Petitioners allege that the actual date was 10.08.2012. However, since this is a proceeding under section 482 Cr.P.C, the contentions of the accused cannot be relied upon to quash the proceeding. Therefore, it is evident that the date 10.07.2012 is erroneous. Petitioners allege that the actual date was 10.08.2012. However, since this is a proceeding under section 482 Cr.P.C, the contentions of the accused cannot be relied upon to quash the proceeding. Therefore, this Court proceeds to consider these cases as if the agreement was executed on 10.07.2012 itself. 12. The main accusation against the petitioners is that by incorporating a false date on the agreement, they had created a forged document committed forgery. The term ‘Forgery’ is defined in section 463 IPC as follows : “S.463. Forgery: Whoever makes any false document or false electronic record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.” (emphasis supplied) 13. The primary requirement for attracting the offence of forgery is the making of a false document, which is defined in section 464 IPC as follows : “S.464. The primary requirement for attracting the offence of forgery is the making of a false document, which is defined in section 464 IPC as follows : “S.464. Making of a false document.- A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First—Who dishonestly or fraudulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.” (emphasis supplied) 14. On a reading of the above two provisions, it is evident that for the offence of forgery to be attracted, the document in question must be made with the dishonest or fraudulent intention of causing it to be believed that such a document was made by a person, who had actually not made that document. The term ‘making of a false document’ includes affixing a mark denoting signing, sealing, executing or transmitting the document to make others believe that it was made by someone who had not made it. An alteration of a document can amount to forgery if the alteration was done after it was made. The term ‘making of a false document’ includes affixing a mark denoting signing, sealing, executing or transmitting the document to make others believe that it was made by someone who had not made it. An alteration of a document can amount to forgery if the alteration was done after it was made. Even in such circumstances, it must be made without lawful authority and fraudulently. Further, even if a document is made fraudulently or dishonestly, unless it was made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made by some other person, it will not become a false document. Unlike common perception, merely because a document contains false statements or recitals, it does not become a false document under law. A simple illustration would be the case of a false recital in an affidavit or a false averment in the pleadings of a case. Such false recitals will not convert the affidavit or pleading into a false document or the act, a forgery. 15. In the instant case, Annexure 9 agreement was admittedly executed between the Society and PACL. The dispute is with regard to the date 10.07.2012 found entered in the said agreement. The date is not altered. The significance of the said date is because on 24.07.2012, an agreement was entered into between the Society and the first respondent promising to give 10% commission as service charges for the amount of sponsorship brought in by the first respondent. In this context, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the agreement between the Society and the first respondent reserves to the Society marketing rights of the event along with the first respondent. Therefore, the Society is not prohibited from canvassing for sponsorships independently, notwithstanding the agreement with the first respondent. The conditions in the agreement between the Society and the first respondent further stipulate that service charges are required to be paid to the first respondent only when there is an agreement between the first respondent and the sponsorer on the basis of which the sponsorship amount is advanced. Concededly, there is no such agreement between PACL and the first respondent or any other sponsor. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the date 10.07.2012 has been incorporated falsely into the agreement, that cannot change the character of the agreement into a false document under law. Concededly, there is no such agreement between PACL and the first respondent or any other sponsor. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the date 10.07.2012 has been incorporated falsely into the agreement, that cannot change the character of the agreement into a false document under law. Though there is a reference in Annexure 14 letter, to the agreement dated 10-07-2012, the same letter refers to the absence of an agreement between the first respondent and the sponsor for becoming entitled to claim the service charge. Therefore, there is no making of a false document to attract the offences under sections 463 and 471 IPC in the instant case. 16. Section 406 IPC deals with criminal breach of trust. The provision postulates that when a person entrusted with or having dominion over a property dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use, in violation of any legal contract or any express or implied obligation, touching the discharge of such trust, commits the offence of criminal breach of trust. In the instant case, as conceded by both parties, it is evident that the first respondent and PACL had not entered into any agreement. As the first respondent was given marketing rights along with the Society, giving the first respondent a percentage as service charges for every sponsorship that came in is unnecessary. The Society thus cannot be said to have committed criminal breach of trust for not paying service charges for amounts that came in as sponsorship. Hence the offence under section 406 IPC is also not attracted. 17. Regarding the offence under sections 418 and 420 IPC, nothing indicates that the petitioners had acted with any fraudulent or dishonest intention in entering into an agreement conferring marketing rights to the first respondent. The terms of the agreement specifically stipulated that the sponsoror and the first respondent must enter into an agreement. As mentioned earlier, in the absence of any agreement between the first respondent and the sponsor, the Society cannot be assumed to have acted with any dishonest intention while refusing to give service charges to the first respondent. 18. It is relevant to mention at this juncture that the criminal proceedings cannot be a cloak or a facade for settling civil disputes. 18. It is relevant to mention at this juncture that the criminal proceedings cannot be a cloak or a facade for settling civil disputes. In cases where the disputes are of a civil nature, and the recourse to criminal proceedings is with an intent to settle the disputes, provisions of section 482 can be resorted to quash the proceedings. In the decision in G. Sagar Suri and Another v. State of U.P. and Others [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 ], the Court had observed that it has to be seen whether a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence as criminal proceedings are not a short cut for other remedies available in law. Similarly, in the decision in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India LTD and Others [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 ], the Court had observed that any attempt to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecutions should be deprecated and discouraged. Numerous decisions have upheld the above views of the Supreme Court. Reference to Govind Prasad Kejriwal v. State of Bihar and Another [ (2020) 16 SCC 714 ] and Vijay Kumar Ghai and Others v. State of West Bengal and Others [ (2022) 7 SCC 124 ] would suffice. 19. The agreement between the Society and the first respondent provides an arbitration clause. The first respondent had initially filed a suit as O.S. No. 44/2013 before the Sub Court, Alappuzha. In the said suit, the parties were referred to Arbitration on the basis of the arbitration clause in the agreement. However, it is admitted that arbitration proceedings were not proceeded with by the first respondent thereafter. Instead of resorting to the arbitration proceedings, the first respondent filed a criminal complaint. It is evident from an appreciation of the aforementioned circumstances that the intention of the first respondent is to compel the petitioners to settle the claim for service charges for which the criminal case has been initiated. 20. This Court is satisfied that the criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of the court. There is also no possibility of the petitioners being convicted for any of the offences. 20. This Court is satisfied that the criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of the court. There is also no possibility of the petitioners being convicted for any of the offences. Since this Court has held that the offences alleged against the petitioners are not made out at all, the proceedings against the petitioners are liable to be quashed. Question No. (ii). Whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection under section 197 of Cr.P.C?. 21. In the decision in B. Saha and Others v. M.S. Kochar [ (1979) 4 SCC 177 ], the Supreme Court has held that the question of sanction for prosecution under S.197 Cr.P.C can be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings. Since this Court has already held that the criminal proceeding against the petitioners is an abuse of the process of court, the question of sanction becomes academic in nature. Therefore, the said question is left open. 22. In view of the finding on Question No. (i) the complaint filed in C.C. No. 1646 of 2014 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court-I, Alappuzha, against the petitioners is quashed. Crl.M.Cs are allowed as above.