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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 342 (HP)

Santosh Kumar v. Piramal Capital and Housing

2024-07-23

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the order dated 25.04.2024 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Court No.2, Shimla, H.P., vide which the application filed by the respondent under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI Act) was allowed. 2. It has been asserted that the respondent/creditor filed an application seeking a direction to SHO to help the authorized ofÏcer to take possession of the secured asset. It was asserted that petitioners No.1 and 2 availed housing loan/non-housing loan credit facility of Rs.20,95,001/- against the security of the premises with an undertaking to repay the same as per the terms of the loan agreement. Petitioners created an equitable mortgage by deposit of the original title deed. The amount was declared a Non- Performing Asset (NPA) on 11.03.2021. The borrowers were liable to pay Rs.20,75,486/- to the respondent. The respondent issued a demand notice on 17.05.2021 under Section 13 (3-A) of the SARFAESI Act and asked the petitioners to clear the dues within 60 days. The petitioners failed to clear the dues within 60 days or to file any objection. The respondent wanted to take possession of the secured asset; hence, the application was filed to seek assistance from the Court. The Court allowed the application and issued a warrant of possession to the Collector for delivery of the possession. The order is bad. The order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as no notice was served upon the petitioners nor any opportunity of being heard was provided to them before passing the order. The petitioners were ready and willing to pay the entire amount if some time was granted to them. The petitioners were regularly paying the monthly instalment of Rs.19,728/-, however, the instalments were enhanced to Rs.22,737/-. Petitioners have paid almost half of the loan amount. The petitioners suffered huge losses due to Covid-19. Thereafter, no person approached the petitioners regarding the outstanding amount. The amount claimed by the respondent is quite high. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 3. Petitioners have paid almost half of the loan amount. The petitioners suffered huge losses due to Covid-19. Thereafter, no person approached the petitioners regarding the outstanding amount. The amount claimed by the respondent is quite high. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 3. The Court passed an order on 27.05.2024 that the petitioner ha d furnished an undertaking to remit the amount of Rs.23,52,117/- on or before 26.06.2024; hence further action in the matter be deferred. 4. The notice of the petition was issued to the respondent. No reply has been filed. 5. I have heard Ms Madhurika Sekhon, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms Ridhi Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent through video conferencing along with Mr Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 6. Ms. Madhurika Sekhon, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned ACJM erred in issuing the order without serving a notice upon the petitioners. This is a violation of the principles of natural justice. Learned ACJM did not have jurisdiction to pass the order, as the jurisdiction is vested with the District Magistrate or the CJM. The respondent has claimed an excessive amount; therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned ACJM be set aside. 7. Ms. Ridhi Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent through th e video conferencing (not completely audible) submitted that the present proceedings do not lie before this Court as the remedy of the petitioners is to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal against the order passed by learned ACJM. There is no requirement to serve the notice before taking action against the secured debtor; hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S. Phoenix Arc Private Limited versus V. Ganesh Murthy & Anr., 2023 STPL 9172 SC, that the remedy against the action taken under SARFAESI Act is only available under the Act itself and recourse cannot be had to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “3. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/S. Phoenix Arc Private Limited versus V. Ganesh Murthy & Anr., 2023 STPL 9172 SC, that the remedy against the action taken under SARFAESI Act is only available under the Act itself and recourse cannot be had to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the Order dated 15.06.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, whereby the High Court has quashed the Order passed under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘SARFAESI ACT’). The contention put forth in the instant petition is that a petition filed unCder Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) to quash an order passed under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act was not sustainable. We note that the said contention has sufÏcient force as any remedy against such order can be availed only under the SARFAESI ACT’, 2002.” 10. Similarly, it was held in K. Virupaksha v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 4 SCC 440 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 592: (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 43: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 272 that SARFAESI Act is a complete code and an aggrieved person has to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal for redressal of his grievances. It was observed: “15. The SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself which provides the procedure to be followed by the secured creditor and also the remedy to the aggrieved parties including the borrower. In such circumstances, as already taken note of by the High Court in writ proceedings, if there is any discrepancy in the manner of classifying the account of the appellants as NPA or in the manner in which the property was valued or was auctioned, DRT is vested with the power to set aside such auction at the stage after the secured creditor invokes the power under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. This view is fortified by the decision of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill [Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 403 ] wherein it is held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 375-76, paras 34-37) “34. This view is fortified by the decision of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill [Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 403 ] wherein it is held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 375-76, paras 34-37) “34. The provisions of Section 13 enable the secured creditors, such as banks and financial institutions, not only to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower but also to take over the management of the business of the borrower, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising secured assets, subject to the conditions indicated in the two provisos to clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 13. 35. In order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and to prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error on the part of the banks or financial institutions, certain checks and balances have been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person, including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor, to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken for the reliefs indicated in sub-section (3) thereof. 36. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the banks and financial institutions have been vested with stringent powers for the recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to the transferee. 37. The consequences of the authority vested in the DRT under sub-section (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the DRT is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transactions entered into by virtue of Section 13(4) of the Act. The legislature by including sub-section (3) in Section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. The legislature by including sub-section (3) in Section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. Resultantly, the submissions advanced by Mr Gopalan and Mr Altaf Ahmed that the DRT has no jurisdiction to deal with a post-Section 13(4) situation, cannot be accepted.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Therefore, it is apparent that the remedy of the petitioners was before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act and not before this Court. 12. It was submitted that only the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate has the jurisdiction under Section 14 and no jurisdiction is vested with Additional CJM. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.D. Jain & Co. v. Capital First Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 675: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 921 that the power conferred upon Chief Judicial Magistrate can be exercised by Additional CJM or Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. It was observed: “28. From the aforesaid provisions, it can be seen that any Metropolitan Magistrate can be appointed by the High Court to be the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court may appoint any Metropolitan Magistrate to be an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and such Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under CrPC or any other law for the time being in force as the High Court may direct. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and every Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge; and every other Metropolitan Magistrate shall, subject to the general control of the Sessions Judge, be subordinate to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Thus, the judicial powers and the powers, under the CrPC which may be exercised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, can be exercised by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate also. Thus, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate can be said to be on par with the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate insofar as the powers to be exercised under the CrPC are concerned. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in addition, may have administrative powers. However, for all other purposes and more particularly the powers to be exercised under the CrPC both are on a par. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in addition, may have administrative powers. However, for all other purposes and more particularly the powers to be exercised under the CrPC both are on a par. Therefore, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be said to be subordinate to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate insofar as the exercise of judicial powers is concerned. 29. In view of the above discussion and as observed hereinabove when the powers to be exercised by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are on a par with the powers to be exercised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate [Section 17(2)CrPC] and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge (Section 19 CrPC) and the steps to be taken by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act as observed hereinabove are ministerial in nature and does not involve any adjudicatory process and there is no element of any quasi-judicial function, we see no reason to take a different view than the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment [ Capital First Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9425 ]. We hold that the expression “Chief Metropolitan Magistrate” as appearing in Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act shall be deemed to mean and include Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. 30. Similarly, when the Additional District Magistrates are conferred with the powers to be exercised by the District Magistrates either by delegation and/or by special orders and the Additional District Magistrates are exercising the same powers which are being exerc ised by the District Magistrates, the same analogy can be applied, more particularly, when the powers exercisable under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, are ministerial steps. 31. The issue/question may also be considered from another angle. It cannot be disputed and even judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the CMMs and/or even the DMs are required to perform so many other duties under different statutes. They have to perform many administrative duties also. District Magistrates are in overall administrative control of their jurisdiction/district. Similarly, CMMs are also required to perform administrative duties and they have to deal with other cases/criminal trials and many trials under special statutes also. 33. They have to perform many administrative duties also. District Magistrates are in overall administrative control of their jurisdiction/district. Similarly, CMMs are also required to perform administrative duties and they have to deal with other cases/criminal trials and many trials under special statutes also. 33. Therefore, if the submission on behalf of the appellants that only the CMM/DM concerned alone would have jurisdiction to decide the applications under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is accepted, in that case, it will be practically impossible for the CMM/DM concerned to decide the application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act expeditiously and within the time stipulated under the second proviso to Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. If the interpretation which we propose that, the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act includes the Additional District Magistrate/Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the same can be said to be a purposive interpretation to achieve the object and purpose of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, more particularly when as observed hereinabove, the orders to be passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are ministerial steps and to assist the secured creditor in getting/obtaining the possession of the secured property. Thus, there is no element of exercise of adjudicatory powers under Section 14 of the SARFAESI A ct. All these aspects have been considered in detail by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order [ Capital First Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9425 ]. 34. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court that : (i) the Distri ct Magistrate, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is not a persona designata for the purposes of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; (ii) the expression “District Magistrate” and the “Chief Metropolitan Magistrate” as appearing in Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act shall deem to mean and include Additional District Magistrate and Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the purposes of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. 35. 35. The contrary view taken by the other High Courts, namely, Gujarat High Court in Pushpa Devi B. Jain v. Indian Overseas Bank [Pushpa Devi B. Jain v. Indian Overseas Bank, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2625 ], Calcutta High Court in Chellaperumal v. Authorised OfÏcer [Chellaperumal v. Authorised OfÏcer, 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 13981] and Kerala High Court in Aseena v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Palakkad [Aseena v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Palakkad, 2008 SCC OnLine Ker 174] , is not a good law and are specifically overruled. 36. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. We hold that the powers under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act can be exercised by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrates of the area concerned having jurisdiction and also by the Additional District Magistrates, who otherwise are exercising the powers on a par with the District Magistrates concerned either by delegation and/or special order. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 13. It was contended that the learned ACJM has not issued any notice to the petitioners and the order is bad. This is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balkrishna Rama Tarle v. Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 662 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1299 that the power has been conferred upon Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM)/District Magistrate (DM) to pass an order under Section 14 of the Act is ministerial and does not involve the adjudication of any dispute. The borrower cannot raise any objection and if the objection has to be raised, the same can be raised before the Authorities constituted under the Act. It was observed: “15. On a fair reading of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, it appears that for taking possession of the secured assets in terms of Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act, the secured creditor is obliged to approach the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by way of a written application requesting for taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and for being forwarded to it (secured creditor) for further action. 16. The statutory obligation enjoined upon the CMM/DM is to immediately move into action after receipt of a written application under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act from the secured creditor for that purpose. 16. The statutory obligation enjoined upon the CMM/DM is to immediately move into action after receipt of a written application under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act from the secured creditor for that purpose. As soon as such an application is received, the CMM/DM is expected to pass an order after verification of compliance with all formalities by the secured creditor referred to in the proviso in Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act and after being satisfied in that regard, to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor at the earliest opportunity. As observed and held by this Court in NKGSB Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty [NKGSB Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, (2022) 10 SCC 286 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 157] , the aforesaid act is a ministerial act. It cannot brook delay. Time is of the essence and this is the spirit of the special enactment. 17. In the recent decision in R.D. Jain & Co. v. Capital First Ltd. [R.D. Jain & Co. v. Capital First Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 675 ], this Court had an occasion to consider the powers exercisable by District Magistrate /Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. After considering the object and purpose of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and the scheme of the Act under Section 14, it is observed and held in paras 18 to 26 as under: “18. Now so far as the powers exercisable by DM and CMM under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are concerned, the Statement of Objects and Reasons for which the SARFAESI Act has been enacted reads as under: ‘ Statement of Objects and Reasons The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in India's efforts to achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. While the banking industry in India is progressively complying with the international prudential norms and accounting practices there are certain areas in which the banking and financial sector do not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. There is no legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. There is no legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This has resulted in the slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non- performing assets of banks and financial institutions. Narasimham Committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining banking sector reforms have considered the need for changes in the legal system in respect of these areas. These Committees, inter alia, have suggested the enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. Acting on these suggestions, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordin ance, 2002 was promulgated on 21-6-2002 to regulate the securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The provisions of the Ordinance would enable banks and financial institutions to realise long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, and asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction.’ 19. Thus, the underlying purpose of the SARFAESI Act is to empower the financial institutions in India to have similar powers as enjoyed by their counterparts, namely, international banks in other countries. One such feature is to empower financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them. The same has been translated into provisions falling under Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act. Section 13 deals with the enforcement of security interests. Sub-section (4) thereof envisages that in the event a default is committed by the borrower in discharging his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the measures provided in sub-section (4). One of the measures is to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset. One of the measures is to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset. That, they could do this through their “authorised ofÏcer” as defined in Rule 2(a) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 20. After taking over possession of the secured assets, further steps to lease, assign or sell the same could also be taken by the secured creditor. However, Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act predicates that if the secured creditor intends to take possession of the secured assets, it must approach the CMM/DM by way of an application in writing, and on receipt of such request, the CMM/DM must move into action in right earnest. After passing an order thereon, he/she (CMM/DM) must proceed to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto for being forwarded to the secured creditor in terms of Section 14(1) read with Section 14(2) of the SARFAESI Act. As noted earlier, Section 14(2) is an enabling provision and permits the CMM/DM to take such steps and use force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary. 21. At this stage, it is required to be noted that along with the insertion of sub-section (1-A), a proviso has also been inserted in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act whereby the secured creditor is now required to comply with certain conditions and to disclose that by way of an application accompanied by an afÏdavit duly afÏrmed by its authorised ofÏcer in that regard. Sub-section (1-A) is in the nature of an explanatory provision and it merely restates the implicit power of the CMM/DM in taking services of any ofÏcer subordinate to him. As observed and held by this Court in NKGSB Coop. Bank [NKGSB Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, (2022) 10 SCC 286 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 157], the insertion of sub-section (1-A) is not to invest a new power for the first time in the CMM/DM as such. 22. Thus, considering the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, it is explicit and crystal clear that possession of the secured assets can be taken by the secured creditor before confirmation of the sale of the secured assets as well as post-confirmation of the sale. 22. Thus, considering the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, it is explicit and crystal clear that possession of the secured assets can be taken by the secured creditor before confirmation of the sale of the secured assets as well as post-confirmation of the sale. For taking possession of the secured assets, it could be done by the “authorised ofÏcer” of the Bank as noted in Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. 23. However, for taking physical possession of the secured assets in terms of Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act, the secured creditor is obliged to approach the CMM/DM by way of a written application requesting for taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and for being forwarded to it (the secured creditor) for further action. The statutory obligation enjoined upon the CMM/DM is to immediately move into action after receipt of a written application under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act from the secured creditor for that purpose. As soon as such an application is received, the CMM/DM is expected to pass an order after verification of compliance with all formalities by the secured creditor referred to in the proviso in Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act and after being satisfied in that regard, to take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward the same to the secured creditor at the earliest opportunity. 24. As mandated by Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the CMM/DM has to act within the stipulated time limit and pass a suitable order for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets within a period of 30 days from the date of application which can be extended for such further period but not exceeding in the aggregate, sixty days. Thus, the powers exercised by the CMM/DM is a ministerial act. He cannot brook delay. Time is of the essence. This is the spirit of the special enactment. 25. As observed and held by this Court in NKGSB Coop. Bank [NKGSB Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, (2022) 10 SCC 286 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 157], the step taken by the CMM/DM while taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto is a ministerial step. This is the spirit of the special enactment. 25. As observed and held by this Court in NKGSB Coop. Bank [NKGSB Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Subir Chakravarty, (2022) 10 SCC 286 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 157], the step taken by the CMM/DM while taking possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto is a ministerial step. It could be taken by the CMM/DM himself/herself or through any ofÏcer subordinate to him/her, including the Advocate Commissioner who is considered as an ofÏcer of his/her couHrt. Section 14 does not oblige the CMM/DM to go personally and take possession of the secured assets and documents relating thereto. Thus, we reiterate that the step to be taken by the CMM/DM under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, is a ministerial step. While disposing of the application unde r Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, no element of quasi-judicial function or application of mind would be required. The Magistrate has to adjudicate and decide the correctness of the information given in the application and nothing more. Therefore, Section 14 does not involve an adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrower against the secured creditor taking possession of secured assets. 26. Thus, in view of the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, more particularly, Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act and the nature of the powers to be exercised by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/learned District Magistrate, the High Court in the impugned judgment and order [ Capital First Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9425 ] has rightly observed and held that the power vested in the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/learned District Magistrate is not by way of persona designata.” 18. Thus, the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are ministerial steps and Section 14 does not involve any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrowers against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. In that view of the matter once all the requirements under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are complied with/satisfied by the secured creditor, it is the duty cast upon the CMM/DM to assist the secured creditor in obtaining the possession as well as the documents related to the secured assets even with the help of any ofÏcer subordinate to him and/or with the help of an advocate appointed as Advocate Commissioner. At that stage, the CMM/DM is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured assets and the aggrieved party to be relegated to raise objections in the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, befo re the Debts Recovery Tribunal.” 14. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in CA. Manisha Mehta v. ICICI Bank, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1096 that since no rights are adjudicated by the CJM/DM; therefore, there is no requirement to issue any notice to the secured creditor. It was observed: “ 7. However, the contention of Mr Nedumpara has no substance having regard to the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, as explained in Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311, Transcore v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 2007 SC 712 , and V. Noble Kumar v. Standard Chartered Bank (2013) 9 SCC 620 , and other decisions. The SARFAESI Act is intended to facilitate quick recovery of secured debts without extending any opportunity of hearing to a borrower and without judicial/quasi-judicial intervention till such time possession of the secured asset is taken by the secured creditor after serving the requisite notices and responding to the objection/representation that may be lodged/preferred by the borrower under section 13(3A). That Mardia Chemical s (supra) and Transcore (supra) are pre-section 14 amendment decisions, makes no difference. There is no fundamental change in the object and purposes of the SARFAESI Act even after the amendments. Since the need for a borrower to draw legal assistance arises only after a demand notice under sub-section (2) is issued, it has been experienced in very many cases that sub-section (1) of section 13, which is the harbinger of the misfortune of recalcitrant borrowers, is completely overlooked by those representing them. It permits the enforcement of security interests without the intervention of a court/tribunal but in accordance with the statutory provisions. The present case is not too different. The decision by a quasi-judicial authority (see section 17) upon compliance with natural justice stands deferred till such time possession, either symbolic or physical, is taken. The SARFAESI Act does not remotely suggest compliance with natural justice at the stage when section 13(4) or 14 operates. The present case is not too different. The decision by a quasi-judicial authority (see section 17) upon compliance with natural justice stands deferred till such time possession, either symbolic or physical, is taken. The SARFAESI Act does not remotely suggest compliance with natural justice at the stage when section 13(4) or 14 operates. Paragraph 36 of V. Noble Kumar (supra) explains that there are 3 (three) methods for taking possession of a secured asset. In view thereof, section 14 cannot stand independently of section 13(4). If a borrower has no right of hearing when the secured creditor takes possession under section 13(4), a fortiori, no hearing can be demanded by a borrower when he succeeds in resisting possession being gained over by the authorized ofÏcer of the secured creditor or does not on his ow n surrender possession, and thus compels such ofÏcer to work out the remedy by seeking assistance of the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, under section 14. Only a post-possession right to approach the tribunal is conferred on a borrower in terms of section 17, nothing more and nothing less. 8. Pertinently, section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was amended twice, once in 2013 and then again in 2016. If it were the intention of the legislature to extend the opportunity of hearing to a borrower before the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, it was free to do so. Advisedly, the legislature did not do so, for, it would have militated against the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and more particularly section 13 thereof. It is implicit in the scheme of the SARFAESI Act that natural justice, only to a limited extent, is available and not beyond what is expressly provided. There seems to be little merit in the argument advanced by Mr. Nedumpara and we hold that the language of section 14 is too clear and unambiguous, and does not admit of any requirement of complying with natural justice by putting the borrower on notice while an application thereunder is under consideration. 9. Our view as aforesaid finds support from the. coordinate bench decision of this Court in the case of Trade Well v. Indian Bank . Although an off-the-cuff response of Mr. Nedumpara is heard that Trade Wel l (supra) does not lay down the correct law, we find no rfeason to accept such a response. 9. Our view as aforesaid finds support from the. coordinate bench decision of this Court in the case of Trade Well v. Indian Bank . Although an off-the-cuff response of Mr. Nedumpara is heard that Trade Wel l (supra) does not lay down the correct law, we find no rfeason to accept such a response. In our opinion, the coordinate Bench in Trade Well (supra) has laid down a proposition of law which is correct and we share the view expressed therein. 10. The decisions in Binapani Dei (supra), A.K. Kraipak (supra) and Maneka Gandhi (supra) were rendered in entirely different fact situations. The law laid down therein would, however, not be applicable in view of our own reading and understanding of the decisions in Mardia Chemicals (supra), Transcore (supra) and V. Noble Kumar (supra), rendered on consideration of the SARFAESI Act. We reiterate that natural justice for a borrower within the meaning of section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act has very limited application in actions taken for enforcement of security interest [only consideration of objection/representation under section 13(3-A) of the SARFAESI Act is mandated] and stands excluded till such time recourse is taken to section 17. 15. A similar view was taken by Allahabad High Court in Shipra Hotels Ltd. vs. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine All 801 , wherein it was held: “91. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the CMM/DM acting under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is not required to give notice to the borrower at the stage of the decision or passing order as no hearing can be demanded by the borrower at this stage. However, it is clarified that the order passed by such Magistrate has to be duly served upon the borrower before taking any steps for his forcible dispossession by such steps or use of force, as may be necessary for the opinion of the Magistrate, and the date fixed for such forcible action shall be duly intimated to such borrower in advance giving him sufÏcient time to remove his belongingsH, or to make alternative arrangement.” 16. Thus, the submission that the orde r passed by learned ACJM is bad for non-issuance of notice is not acceptable. 17. No other point was urged. 18. Thus, the submission that the orde r passed by learned ACJM is bad for non-issuance of notice is not acceptable. 17. No other point was urged. 18. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.