JUDGMENT : Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment/order dated 11.09.2015 passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division Ist, Hazaribagh (now Ramgarh) whereby and whereunder Title Suit No. 08 of 2015 instituted by the appellant has been dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) on the ground of barred by limitation. 2. The factual background of this case in nutshell is that the title suit was instituted by the appellant before the court below asking relief for mandatory injunction for direction to the defendant to submit C-Forms in respect of sale of 5 trippers from the appellant in the month of November, 2010 worth Rs. 3,16,20,000/-(Three Crores Sixteen Lacs and Twenty Thousand Only). A petition under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was also filed for condonation of delay of 214 days in filing the said title suit. The specific case of the appellant/plaintiff before the court below is as follows:- (a) Plaintiff i.e. V-E Commercial Vehicle Limited is a 50-50 joint venture between Volvo Group and Eicher Motors Limited. (b) The defendant M/s Chanani Transports is a partnership firm engaged in the business of transportation, finance, travel, etc and managing its business from Ramgarh, District, (Erstwhile District, Hazaribagh) Jharkhand. (c) The respondent/defendant contacted the appellant plaintiff to purchase the commercial vehicle from the plaintiff in pursuance of which appellant sent quotation to the respondent vide quotation no. QCL 10 SC 0020 dated 06.08.2010. (d) After receiving the quotation from the appellant and being satisfied with the same, the respondent placed order for 10 (Ten) commercial vehicles (10 Volvo) FM 400 8x4 tipper with 18.7 Cu.M. Rock Body with Hub Reduction fitted 12x24 Crossply Tyres (MRF) vide letter dated 26.10.2010. (e) The respondent requested to appellant to provide invoice of above vehicle at a concessional CST Rate of 2% for which the respondent had assured the appellant that they were registered with the Sales Tax Authorities in the State of Jharkhand and in connection of which respondent provided the appellant their TIN No. 20950406485. The said TIN No. was also mentioned in the invoices raised by the appellant. (f) The appellant quoted the price of the vehicle as Rs. The said TIN No. was also mentioned in the invoices raised by the appellant. (f) The appellant quoted the price of the vehicle as Rs. 63,24,000/-(Rupees Sixty Three Lacs Twenty Four Thousand) , each which was inclusively of CST @ 2% against Form C. (g) As per agreement between the parties that in case, the respondent fails to submit the Form-C, the defendant shall pay the appellant Value Added Tax (VAT) @13 % on the duty price. (h) The respondent had further agreed in unequivocal terms that respondent will forward the said Form-C to the appellant prior to the invoicing/delivery of the vehicles. (i) The respondent vide letter dated 26.10.2010 undertook to deliver the Form-C to the appellant by 31.12.2010 and if not delivered within stipulated time period, they shall pay the entire non-concessional CST of 13.5%. This letter was in accordance with terms and condition of the purchase order. (j) The appellant has invoiced 5 tippers to the respondent on 03.11.2010 based on Form-C billing. The details of which are as follows:- Vehicle No. Invoice No. Date of Invoice Price FM 400 8x4 Tipper 2201503 3.11.2010 Rs. 63,24,000/- FM 400 8x4 Tipper 2201504 3.11.2010 Rs. 63,24,000/- FM 400 8x4 Tipper 2201505 3.11.2010 Rs. 63,24,000/- FM 400 8x4 Tipper 2201506 3.11.2010 Rs. 63,24,000/- FM 400 8x4 Tipper 2201507 2201507 Rs.63,24,000/- Total cost of 5 tippers invoiced was Rs. 3,16,20,000/-which was issued on assurance given by the respondent that they will submit Form-C before 31.12.2020 to the appellant. (k) The respondent did not submit Form-C to the appellant as per contract for sale made between the parties and the appellant was expecting that the Form-C would be submitted within the same financial year 2010-11 if the same has not been done by 31.12.2020. As a result of which the appellant send reminder to the respondent through several letters dated 18.03.2011 (before the end of financial year 2010-11), 25.05.2011, 03.03.2012, 25.05.2012 and 27.06.2012 to do the needful but the respondent did not respond to any of the reminder letters sent by the appellant/plaintiff. (l) The appellant once again vide registered post and email dated 18.09.2012 requested the respondent to submit Form-C or pay the sum of Rs. 42,68,700/-(Rupees Forty Two Lacs Sixty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred) towards non-concessional tax amount. (m) The appellant vide demand notice dated 18.02.2013 issued to respondent, demanded a sum to pay Rs. (l) The appellant once again vide registered post and email dated 18.09.2012 requested the respondent to submit Form-C or pay the sum of Rs. 42,68,700/-(Rupees Forty Two Lacs Sixty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred) towards non-concessional tax amount. (m) The appellant vide demand notice dated 18.02.2013 issued to respondent, demanded a sum to pay Rs. 42,68,700/-with interest at the rate of 24 % per annum. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that due to non-responding to the letters issued by appellant and its reminder the appellant preferred the title suit no. 472 of 2013 before Sub-Judge, I, Ranchi. The said suit was withdrawn on 16.09.2013 due to jurisdictional issue by filing a petition under Order 23 Rule I CPC. Thereafter, suit was allowed to be withdrawn vide order dated 09.06.2014 with liberty to file fresh suit before the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the appellant filed a title suit no. 08 of 2015 before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Hazaribagh with a petition for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. But the learned court below held that the suit is time barred and rejected the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and also the suit vide impugned order/Judgment dated 11.09.2015. 4. It is further submitted that the learned court below has erroneously considered that the cause of action arose on 31.12.2010 within which period Form-C has to be submitted and arrived at absolutely erroneous conclusion and dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) C.P.C. Accordingly, impugned Judgment /order is liable to be set aside and the suit of the appellant is fit to be heard on merits. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon reported judgment in ShaktiBhog Industries Ltd. Versus Central Bank of India & Anr 2020) 17 SCC 260. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent has vehemently controverted the aforesaid points of argument raised on behalf of appellant and submitted that the learned trial court has gone through the entire averments contained in the plaint and at the very stage of admission of the suit found that it was barred by limitation about seven months. The period consumed in correspondence with the respondent cannot be taken as ground for extension of period of limitation for institution of a suit. The period consumed in correspondence with the respondent cannot be taken as ground for extension of period of limitation for institution of a suit. As such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order calling for any interference by way of this appeal which is devoid of merits and fit to be dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon Judgment rendered in CP. Kapoor Versus the Chairman and Ors. reported in 2012 SCC Online Delhi Court 5465. 7. I have gone through the record along with the impugned order. The concluding portion of the same reads as under:- “After going through the record filed by the plaintiff, it is evident that defendants have to submit Form-C till 31.12.2010 and from this period the limitation runs and there is limitation of three years within which the suit must be filed and as per plaintiff title suit no. 472/2013 filed on 16.09.2013 which was within limitation period and after withdrawal of the suit on 09.06.2014 this suit is filed before this Court on 12.01.2015 i.e after lapse of 214 days which is about seven months. As per Section 15 of the Limitation Act, duration of pendency of Civil Suit at Ranchi is not taken into account even then, it should be filed within three and half months but, it is filed after lapse of seven months. The reason assigned in the application is not appealing. Accordingly, the petition filed on 31.07.2015 is rejected and the suit is also not admitted and hence, it is dismissed.” 8. From perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the learned court below has exercised the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) which empowers the court to reject the plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law including the law of limitation and also in view of the provision of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides limitation period of three years from the date when right to sue accrues. This is a residuary provision for limitation period where no specific article with regard to time period is prescribed under the Act. 9. In the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited versus Central Bank of India and Anr. This is a residuary provision for limitation period where no specific article with regard to time period is prescribed under the Act. 9. In the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited versus Central Bank of India and Anr. (Supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “Order 7 Rule 11 CPC” gives ample power to the Court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. The relevant facts which needs to be looked into for deciding an application under Rule 11 are the averments of the plaint only. If on entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should reject the plaint. Order 7 Rule 11 (d) makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is the bounden duty of the court to examine the plaint as a whole and not selected averments therein. The question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised.” 10. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised.” 10. It is further observed that expression used in Article 113 of Limitation Act is “when the right to sue accrues” which is markedly distinct from the expression used in other Articles in First Division of the Schedule dealing with suits, which unambiguously referred to the happening of a specified event e.g. “Article 58 (when the right to sue “first” accrues), Article 59 (when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded “first” become known to him) and Article 104 (when the plaintiff is “first” refused the enjoyment of the right.) Parliament was conscious of the distinction between the provisions referred to above and had advisedly used generic expression “when the right to sue accrues” in Article 113 of the 1963 Act. Inasmuch as, it would also cover cases falling under Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit, continuing breaches and torts. Article 113 being a residuary clause and which has been invoked by all the three courts in this case, does not specify happening of particular event as such, but merely refers to the accrual of cause of action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue. “If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. In other words, the residuary article is applicable to every kind of suit not otherwise provided for in the Schedule.” 11. It was further observed that the cause of action for filing the suit would consist of bundle of facts. 12. Further factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents. 13. Keeping in mind the above legal aspects and the meticulous examination of plaint appears to be necessary. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents. 13. Keeping in mind the above legal aspects and the meticulous examination of plaint appears to be necessary. In the instant case the plaint discloses that the transaction for sell of five trippers were entered into with the defendant on 3.11.2010 with undertaking of the defendant to submit Form-C for the purposes of tax rebate. On the request of defendants the invoice was prepared at concession CST rate on 2 % and the defendant also provided his TIN No. It was specifically mentioned that the defendant has to provide Form C by 31.12.2010 with further undertaking that if the defendant fail to submit Form-C then they shall pay the plaintiff VAT at the rate of 13.5% on duty price. There is clear cut averment in the plaint that the defendant neither furnished the Form C by 31.12.2010 nor as per their undertaking paid the VAT at the rate of 13.5% in spite of several demand letters send to them. Ultimately, on 18.02.2013 the plaintiff/appellant send a demand notice claiming to pay Rs. 42, 68,700/-(Rs. Forty Two Lacs Sixty Eight Thousand and Seven Hundred) along with interest at the rate of 24 % per annum. It is also specifically pleaded that none of the letters were ever replied by the defendant which shows their dishonest intention to misappropriate the said amount without any legal justification. The date mentioned i.e. 31.12.2010 for submitting the Form-C by the defendant may be “first” day for accruing the cause of action in favour of plaintiff but it cannot be deemed to be the date of cause of action for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. It is also obvious that earlier the suit was filed by the plaintiff before the wrong court at Ranchi having no territorial jurisdiction which was allowed to be withdrawn under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC with permission to institute fresh suit on the same facts. It also appears that for the purpose of condoning the delay in institution of the suit due to choosing wrong forum, an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was filed. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as under:- Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. It also appears that for the purpose of condoning the delay in institution of the suit due to choosing wrong forum, an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was filed. Section 14 of the Limitation Act reads as under:- Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. — (i) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (ii) In computing the period of limitation for any applicant the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (iii) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,— (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. 14. 14. In the present case, the plaintiff under bonafide belief to settle the dispute with the defendant has waited from the stipulated time on 31.12.2010 till the end of financial year by sending a notice vide letter dated 18.03.2011 to defendant to submit Form-C and ultimately demand notice was send as per terms and conditions undertaken by the defendant on 18.02.2013. Therefore, within the meaning of Article 113 of the Limitation Act the right to sue also accrued and continued till the last date of demand notice i.e. 18.02.2013 and from that date computation of limitation period of three years shall be started and the period consumed during the pendency of the suit in a wrong forum before the Ranchi Court from the date of institution till its withdrawal shall also be excluded within the meaning of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If such course is adopted, the suit is well within time and is not barred by limitation. 15. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that the letters and correspondence entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant cannot be taken into account for the purposes of computation of limitation period, does not stand to reason in the factual background of this case which pertains to continuing breach of obligation on the part of defendant and the citation relied upon the learned counsel for the respondent CP. Kapoor (Supra) is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is also settled law that question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts which can’t be decided in a haste to declare the plaintiff non-suited on that ground alone rather it should be decided on merits after hearing both the parties. 16. In view of aforesaid discussion and reasons, I find that the learned court below has failed to property appreciate the whole intends and purpose of the suit, nature of breach of obligation as alleged and applying the law of limitation towards the facts averred in the plaint and arrived at erroneous conclusion in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/appellant. 17. Accordingly, the impugned Judgment and order dated 11.09.2015 passed in Title Suit No. 08 of 2015 is not legally sustainable which is hereby set aside and this appeal is allowed. 18. 17. Accordingly, the impugned Judgment and order dated 11.09.2015 passed in Title Suit No. 08 of 2015 is not legally sustainable which is hereby set aside and this appeal is allowed. 18. Let a copy of this order be sent to Court below to admit the suit of the plaintiff/appellant and proceed further in accordance with law.