JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.PC, lays challenge to judgment dated 15.6.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), (Camp at Theog) Shimla, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No. 4-T/10 of 2020, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2019/1.2.2020, in Criminal Case No. 109-3 of 2014, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Theog, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 60,000/- to the complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the competent court of law, stating therein that accused with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque dated 20.9.2013, amounting to Rs. 79,000/- in favour of the complainant, however fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. Since accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period despite having received legal notice issued to him, complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 24.12.2019, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 15.6.2022. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set- aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set- aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 22.7.2022, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bonds within the stipulated period, but thereafter, he repeatedly got the matter adjourned, enabling him to deposit the remaining amount. Time and again, this Court came to be informed that petitioner-accused is ready and willing to pay the entire amount of compensation, but fact remains that despite sufficient opportunity, entire amount of compensation has not been deposited. 6. Today during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that petitioner is not coming forward to impart instructions and as such, this Court may proceed to pass appropriate orders. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference. 8. Factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon stands duly proved in accordance with law. Accused though was afforded due opportunity to lead the evidence in defence, but he failed to avail the same. Cross-examination conducted upon the complainant, if read in its entirety, clearly reveals that an attempt came to be made by the accused to set up a case that amount sought to be recovered by way of cheque actually stood received by the petitioner in cash, however such defence never came to be probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Though accused denied his signature upon the cheque but he was unable to explain that how and under what circumstances, cheque came in the hands of the complainant, who admittedly had business transactions with the accused. Though accused denied his signature upon the cheque but he was unable to explain that how and under what circumstances, cheque came in the hands of the complainant, who admittedly had business transactions with the accused. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the trial courts while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which clearly provide that there shall be a presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of some lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to raise probable defence. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat , 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to25 of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to ex amine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 10. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. With a view to rebut the presumption, accused tried to set up a case that cheque in question was issued as security but such defence of him never came to be probablized. 11. With a view to prove his case, complainant appeared in the witness box as CW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext.CA, wherein he reiterated the averments contained in the complaint. If the cross-examination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it cannot be said that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination, complainant stated that he knows Rajinder Singh since the date he sold apple boxes to him. While specifically denying that he had any prior acquaintance or relationship with the accused-Rajinder, this witness categorically stated that he had given apple cartons to the accused on 20.9.2013. He stated that entire cartons of apple were of royal variety and no amount was paid at the time of the selling of the apple. He admitted that accused had given cheque of Rs. 79,000/-, out of which, he has received Rs. 35,000/- outside the court. 12. Accused in his s tatement recorded under Section 313 CrPC though denied the case of the complainant in toto, but he was unable to dispute factum with regard to his business transaction with the complainant. By way of putting suggestion to the petitioner that he had received Rs. 35,000/- outside the court. 12. Accused in his s tatement recorded under Section 313 CrPC though denied the case of the complainant in toto, but he was unable to dispute factum with regard to his business transaction with the complainant. By way of putting suggestion to the petitioner that he had received Rs. 35,000/- in cash, complainant virtually admitted factum with regard to his having business transaction with the complainant. Though accused attempted to carve out a case that cheque allegedly issued by him does not bear his signature, but at no point of time, prayer, if any, ever came to be made on his behalf to get his signature verified from the handwriting expert. Though it came to be claimed by the accused that cheque does not bear his signatures but he was unable to dispute that Cheque Ext.C1 allegedly issued by him belongs to him. Moreover, endorsement given on the return memo and cheque, if perused, nowhere suggests that cheque was returned on account of difference, if any, in signatures, rather on account of insufficient funds. 13. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 14. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 15. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another , (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 16. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 17. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Needless to say, complainant shall always be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings for recovery of amount of compensation.