JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (`CPC’ for short) being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 25.11.2023 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Gondal in Regular Civil Appeal No.12 of 2024 whereby the judgment and decree dated 30.7.2014 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gondal in Regular Civil Suit No.581 of 2002 is set aside, for the following substantial questions of law? “1. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is perverse and ex-facie illegal in view of the settled legal position that power of attorney can’t depose for the plaintiff in respect of the acts done by the plaintiff and not by him; and that too for the acts done before execution of POA? 2. Whether the appeal can be allowed in absence of deposition of the plaintiff himself who is the executor of the power of attorney; as in the POA at Mark 21/9 in favour of Pruthvish S Parmar, it is specifically mentioned that plaintiff-Jyotindrasinhji Vikramsinhji Jadeja is doing administration of the suit property and when another POA holder, who is examined, has no personal knowledge about the transaction between the plaintiff and the forefather of the defendants; and as such by way of said POA, no power was given for deposition in court proceedings? 3. Whether suit can be decreed without examination of plaintiff himself and without cross examination of POA – Pruthvish S Parmar, who has presented the plaint and who has issued pre-suit notice? 4. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is perverse and ex-facie illegal as it has not followed the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court mentioned in ground (M) of the present appeal memo? 5. Whether it is permissible for the lower appellate court to substitute his own findings, though the detailed findings and reasoning of the trial court are totally valid based on evidence on record? 6. Whether the lower appellate court is right in not believing the case of adverse possession, though possession of the defendants was uninterrupted, continuous and hostile to the original owner since more than 12 years and therefore suit is time barred? 7. 6. Whether the lower appellate court is right in not believing the case of adverse possession, though possession of the defendants was uninterrupted, continuous and hostile to the original owner since more than 12 years and therefore suit is time barred? 7. Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is perverse and ex-facie illegal as it had allowed the suit on the weakness of the defendants and totally ignored the settled legal position and that it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove his case? 8. Whether the lower appellate court is right in deciding the appeal, when it was brought to the notice of the lower appellate court that in another suit except quarter number, the subject matter, nature and place of the property, including one of the issue as to whether POA can depose the same, which has gone up to the Hon’ble High Court and Second Appeal is admitted and interim relief is granted? 9. Whether the finding of the lower appellate is totally perverse and contrary to the evidence on record?” 2. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 2.1 Learned advocate Mr.Sheth for the appellant has assailed the order of the learned lower appellate court by submitting that the learned lower appellate court has set aside the detailed and well reasoned order of the learned trial court which is illegal, perverse and contrary to the evidence on record; that the lower appellate court has failed to appreciate that initially the notice for vacating the suit property dated 13.9.1994 was issued by the power of attorney holder (POA)-Pruthvish Shirishbhai Parmar, on behalf of former ruler Jyotindrasinhji Vikramsinhji Jadeja and he filed the suit on 23.11.1994, but the said POA was not brought to cross-examination to prove the case of the plaintiff, but another POA-Khengarbhai H Rathod having POA dated 13.4.1992, who was aged 90 years was examined on the premise that earlier POA who has filed examination-in-chief at Exh.23 is retired and therefore the contents of the plaint are not proved in view of the non-examination of the POA who presented the plaint. 2.2 Learned advocate Mr.Sheth further submitted that the learned appellate court has erred in holding that the presuit notice is issued by the POA, who has deposed at Exh.41 but actually the pre-notice is issued by the earlier POAPruthvish Shirishbhai Parmar who is not brought forward for cross-examination; that the POA who was examined by the plaintiff has admitted that he has joined service in 1942 and not aware about the fact that what talks between Vikramsinh and Durgeshsinh was in 1937 and therefore the plaintiff has failed to prove his case pleaded in the suit by producing necessary evidence in support of his case; that as per the POA which is produced at Exh.40, no right of deposition before the court of law is given to the POA, who deposed in the suit at Exh.41; that the POA-Pruthvish S Parmar who has filed affidavit in examination-in-chief at Exh.23, is not brought for cross-examination on the pretext that he is retired. He has submitted that on the basis of deposition in other side where the said witness is mentioned as aged 40 years which is deposed in the year 2004 and in the year 2009, it is stated that the said POA has retired which is not believable, looking to the age of the POA; that the appellant is otherwise occupier in the premises since so many years and by way of continuous possession which has now become hostile to the plaintiff and therefore in view of adverse possession, right is created in favour of the appellant and that the learned lower appellate Court has not considered all these aspects. He submitted that the plaintiff himself was never examined and he is not considered as a permissible user or care taker of the property in the facts and circumstances of the present case and actually he was staying as an employee of the erstwhile Maharaj. 2.3 Learned advocate Mr.Sheth has relied on the decisions in the cases of T.Anjanappa (supra) and Others V/s Somalingappa and Another reported in 2006(7) SCC 570 , Man Kaur V/s Hartar Singh Sangha reported in (2010) 10 SCC 512 , Karnataka Bard of Wakf V/s Government of India and Others reported in 2004(10) SCC 779 and S.Kesari Hanuman Gaud (supra) V/s Anjum Jehan and 2013(12) SCC 64 , in support of his contentions raised in the suit. He, therefore, prayed to allow this appeal by considering the substantial questions of law, more particularly, when his possession is uninterrupted and hostile to the original owner which is continued for more than 12 years and also considering other grounds. 3. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Patel appearing for the respondents has drawn my attention to the various observations made by the learned lower appellate court in the impugned order and submitted that the learned lower appellate court has rightly come to the conclusion, after considering the cross-examination of the defendant-Balvantsinh Anupsinh at Exh.52A wherein the defendant has admitted that none of the three brothers are working with the plaintiff. 3.1 He submitted that the learned lower appellate court has considered the judgment in the case of S.Kesari Hanuman Gaud (supra), wherein it is held that the POA can depose on behalf of the acts done by him in his personal capacity and he cannot depose on behalf of the acts done by principal in his personal capacity; the noting of the learned trial court that the POA of the plaintiff was not present when the ancestor of the defendant came and so he might not be aware about what transpired between Vikramsinhji and ancestors of the defendants was negatived by the learned lower appellate court by holding that in the present case, looking to the evidence of both the sides, it is not established that the ancestor of the defendant were given the permission of the possession. He has further submitted that the ancestors of the defendants have died and the ancestors of the plaintiff to whom services were provided has also died and there is no contract between the plaintiff and defendant and therefore the facts are different and ratio would not be applicable to the defendants in the facts of the present case. In the facts of the present case, the lower appellate court has not believed that the said case about the factum that the defendant is in service of the plaintiff and is occupying the premises from the time of his forefather as a servant. He has further submitted that the lower appellate court has also dealt with the aspect about the adverse possession. He has further submitted that the lower appellate court has also dealt with the aspect about the adverse possession. The defendants are in possession since 55 years; however, the learned lower appellate court has observed that, from the record, it transpires that the forefather of defendant were in service of Royal state to which Yuvrani Nayankunvarba hailed, and upon her marriage with Maharaja of Gondal state, the grandfather of defendant came alongwith the Yuvrani; and in that background, the forefather of the defendant had possession of the servant quarter, as well as the contention of defendant that they came with the Yuvrani as per the order of the Royal state to which the Yuvrani belonged is clearly indicating of forefather of defendant being in service of the Royal State to which the Yuvrani belong and they accompanied the Yuvrani as personal attendants, therefore, it cannot be inferred that the defendants were in any manner the members of Royal family or in the service of royal family of the Gondal state; 3.2 He submitted that the learned lower appellate court has dealt with the judgment of Man Kaur (supra) regarding the personal knowledge of the POA and the court has come to the conclusion that POA has personal knowledge as he was in service of the state since long and the plaintiff is former Maharaja of Gondal and all his administration function are done by his POA and he was aware of the facts in respect of the present case. 3.3 He submitted that the learned lower appellate court has also considered the judgment in the case of T.Anjanappa (supra) regarding the plea of adverse possession and also to the judgment in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra) on the point of peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and concluded that in the present case, the starting point of adverse possession and other facts such as the manner in which the possession operationalized, nature of possession, whether open, continuous, uninterrupted or hostile possession, have not been proved and long possession may not be considered necessarily as adverse possession; 3.4 Learned advocate Mr.Patel submitted that considering all these aspects and also considering the judgment in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Others V/s Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs reported in AIR 2012 SC 1727 , the learned lower appellate court has rightly come to the conclusion that the learned trial court has committed error in dismissing the suit as the possession of the defendants over the suit property is on account of them being heirs of person who was given residential accommodation on account of being in service of erstwhile Gondal state, actually they are not in service of the Gondal state as attendants, therefore, the possession and occupation of the suit property is required to be handed over by the occupant after receipt of the notice as the defendants have no legal right to retain the same and therefore the appeal is allowed, which is just and proper. He relied on the judgment in the case of Ram Nagina Rai And Another V/s Deo Kumar Rai (Deceased) By Legal Representatives and Another, reported in (2019)13 SCC 324 . The present second appeal is not required to be considered any further as no substantial question of law as required under Section 100 of the CPC are borne out from the present appeal as neither the findings of the learned lower appellate court can be considered as perverse or illegal. On the contrary, it is based on the documentary as well as oral evidence and also in consonance with the provisions of the law and therefore, he prays to dismiss this appeal. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar and also perused the impugned judgment and material on record. 5. On the contrary, it is based on the documentary as well as oral evidence and also in consonance with the provisions of the law and therefore, he prays to dismiss this appeal. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar and also perused the impugned judgment and material on record. 5. It transpires from the record that the suit is filed by the plaintiff to get the possession of the suit premises which is situated in the campus of the palace of the present respondent who happens to be the king of Gondal state at the relevant point of time; that in the suit proceeding, the POA has issued the notice and thereafter the POA has filed the suit who happens to be the employee of the plaintiff; that the POA has also filed affidavit for examination-in-chief and that POA happens to be retired and thereafter another POA who also happens to be the employee of erstwhile Maharaja has deposed in the suit as he was aware about and having personal knowledge about the facts of the case as he was in the employment of Maharaja since so many years; that the parties have contested the suit by filing plaint and written statement respectively and by producing necessary documentary and oral evidence, which are as under: “Plaintiff’s evidence: Sr.No. Evidence Exh. 1. Power of Attorney in favour of Khengarbhai 40 2. Oral Evidence of Khengarbhai Hirjibhai 41 3. Notice given to the defendants 50 4. Reply of the notice 51 5. Cover of reply of notice 52 6. Acknowledgement 53 7. Hajoori Hukum 54 8. Sanad of City survey 55 9. Gazette 56 10. Order recognizing plaintiff as ruler 57 11. Withdrawal of Civil Suit 58 12. Withdrawal of Civil Suit 50-A Defendant’s evidence Sr.No. Exh. 1. Oral Evidence of Balvantsinh Anupsinh 52-A 2. Closing Purshish 69 6. The issues are framed, the witnesses are also examined and therefore, after considering the submissions made at the bar and after considering the material available on the record, the learned trial court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff by giving findings on the issues which was challenged by way of appeal by the present respondent who is the original plaintiff and the learned appellate court. The lower appellate Court has framed the points of determination and also discussed necessary evidence produced by the parties which are as under: “Evidence of the plaintiff: Sr.No. Descriptions Exh. 1. Power of attorney in favour of Khengarbhai 40 2. Oral Evidence of Khengarbhai Hirjibhai 41 3. Notice given to the defendants 50 4. Reply of the notice 51 5. Cover of reply of notice 52 6. Acknowlegement 53 7. Hajoori Hukum 54 8. Sanad of City Survey 55 9. Gazette 56 10. Order recognizing plaintiff as ruler 57 11. Withdrawal of Civil Suit 58 12. Closing pursis 50-A Evidence of defendants: Sr.No. Descriptions Exh. 1. Oral Evidence of Balvantsinh Anupsinh 52-A 2. Closing pursis 69 Thereafter, the learned lower appellate court has, after considering the submissions made at the bar and the findings of the learned trial court, has dealt with the contentions raised by the present appellant as well as respondent in the appeal. 7. The contentions raised by the learned advocate for the appellant is mainly on two grounds (i) that the POA who has filed the suit and issued pre-suit notice has not actually deposed and neither the plaintiff has deposed and therefore the requirement under the provisions of Order III of CPC is not complied with; (ii) the other plea is with regard to adverse possession by stating that the present appellant is occupying the premises since the time of his forefather and he has continuous possession of more than 55 years and therefore, now it should be considered as adverse possession. These aspects are properly dealt with by the learned lower appellate court in the impugned order and has specifically come to the conclusion that the present appellant is not having any valid or legal right to occupy the quarter in question which is situated in the premises of the palace and owned by the original plaintiff and that the aspect of adverse possession cannot be attracted as the plaintiff is owner of the property and the defendant is neither in the service of the plaintiff nor has any other legal and valid right to stay in the property. It is further observed that the said quarter, which is in fact was permitted to be used by his forefather who was attending the Yuvrani of the family. It is further observed that the said quarter, which is in fact was permitted to be used by his forefather who was attending the Yuvrani of the family. At the best, it can be considered as being used by the person who is permitted to use the same as caretaker and the plaintiff on his own, has no right except that his father was attending Yuvrani of Gondal state at the relevant point of time. After issuance of the notice, the plaintiff was asked to vacate the suit premises and after following due procedure, the suit is also instituted but the defendant has not vacated the premises. 8. The learned lower appellate court has discussed that on perusal of the deposition of POA holder of plaintiff at Exh.41, it reveals that the plaintiff is former Maharaja of Gondal and all his administration function are done through his power of attorney holder and that he was aware about the facts of the present case; that the POA deed produced at Exh.40 reveals that the plaintiff Jyotindrasinjji Vikramsinhji Jadeja landlord and ex-ruler of Gondal appointed Shri Himanshusinhji Jyotindrasinhji Jadeja (his son), Shri Kantilal Sanghajibhai Benani and Shri Khengar Hirjibhai Rathod (deponent at Exh.41) jointly and severally as his true and lawful attorney to manage his immovable property at Gondal, Jetalsar, Upleta and Rajkot in the Rajkot district. The said deed of POA is titled as General Power of Attorney. On page no.3, it is specifically authorizes the POA to file, conduct, prosecute, defend and contest any suit and also file appeal, application, application for review or revision from and of any judgment and decree or order, or any legal proceedings that may now or at any point of time herein after are be pending against the principal. On page no.4, it is specifically provided that POA holder shall be authorized to appear and take all steps in such proceedings and further it is also provided that the POA holder shall be authorized and entitled to in respect of them matters, properties mentioned in the said deed; the said POA is executed on 13.4.1992 and the authority cited in the deed was joint and several in favour of three attorney holders and since the deponent at Exh.41 is one of the POA mentioned in the deed at Exh.40, he would be empowers to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiff. 9. 9. Further, the learned lower appellate court has also examined in detail the document at Exh.54 which indicates vesting of ownership of Nana Bunglow palace and other properties situated therein in favour of ancestor of plaintiff and said document dates back to the year 1948 and since the POA of the plaintiff who has deposed at Exh.41 was in service of Gondal state since 1942; he obviously would have knowledge about the same; Further, the plaintiff Jyotindrasinhji Vikramsinhji was recognized as Maharaja of Gondal with effect from 2.8.1969 in succession of his father late Maharaja Vikramsinhji by virtue of order passed on 24.9.1969 and the publication of Gazette of India in this regard produced at Exh.56. Therefore, the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property and the requisite knowledge on the part of his POA is clearly made out. 10. The lower appellate court has also observed that all the taxes including water connection charges, electricity supply charges etc. in respect of the suit property are admittedly paid by the plaintiff and the defendants are also admittedly not in service of the plaintiff, hence the defendants cannot be said to be in full control of the suit property. Further, the very fact that forefather of the defendants came alongwith Yuvrani Nayankunvarba as her attendance and were permitted to occupy servant quarters in the Nana Bunglow is clear indicative of forefather of defendants being servants or caretakers of the Maharaja and his wife; hence, in absence of any cogent evidence to indicate that they were given possession of the suit property on ownership basis, it would not be appropriate to infer that they have right to continue occupation over the suit property to prejudice and against the wish of the plaintiff. 11. On the contention of adverse possession, the learned lower appellate court has observed that in order to establish the plea of adverse possession, the defendant ought to have adduced evidence indicating hostility of their possession; but in the matter of hand, it is evident that apart from word of mouth of defendants that their possession was adverse to the plaintiff and his father, there is nothing to indicate that the defendants or their forefather ever claimed ownership or title over the suit property. The learned lower appellate court has referred to the judgment in the case of T.Anjanappa and others (supra), more particularly, paragraphs 12 and 21 thereof. The learned lower appellate court has referred to the judgment in the case of T.Anjanappa and others (supra), more particularly, paragraphs 12 and 21 thereof. A reference is also made in paragraph 28 of the impugned judgment that a peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario is noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra). 12. It is observed by the learned lower appellate court that the possession of the defendants was permissible possession and therefore it was for the defendants to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of plaintiff, who is registered owner of the property. However, there is nothing on the record to indicate hostility on the part of the defendants, the defendants cannot seek title by adverse possession and therefore the defendants do not have right to continue with possession over the suit property. 13. The judgment relied on by the learned advocate Mr.Patel for the respondents in the case of Ram Navina Rai and Another (supra), wherein it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 22 as under: 17. Applying the test of nec vi, nec clam, nec precario i.e. “without force, without secrecy, without permission” as an established test for finding adverse possession, we find that the defendants have not proved their possession to be adverse to that of the real owner inasmuch as they entered into possession as licensees to begin with and there is nothing on record to show as to when the permissive possession became adverse to the interest of the real owner. “Animus possidendi” is one of the ingredients of adverse possession, and unless the person possessing the property has the requisite hostile animus, the period of prescription does not commence. Virtually, the defendants are required to prove the possession to be adequate in continuity, adequate in publicity and to adequately show that their possession is adverse to that of the true owner. It must start with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. 18. The physical fact of exclusion, possession and animus possidendi to hold as owner, in exclusion to the actual owner, are the most important factors to prove adverse possession. It must start with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. 18. The physical fact of exclusion, possession and animus possidendi to hold as owner, in exclusion to the actual owner, are the most important factors to prove adverse possession. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to take away the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 19. It is an established position of law that insofar as Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act are concerned, once a party proves its title, the onus of proof would be on the other party to prove the claim of title by adverse possession. In this case, it is an admitted fact that the ownership of the said suit property rests with the plaintiffs. In this given scenario, it is our considered view that the defendants have not proved the onus of adverse possession against the plaintiffs. 22. In light of the above observations of this Court, we find that there is no absolute requirement to deem the mere possession of the suit property by the defendants to amount to adverse possession over the suit property. This would be in clear violation of the basic rights of the actual owner of the property. There is nothing on record to show that the defendants' permissive possession over the property became adverse to the interest of the real owner, at any point of time. On the contrary, the records reveal that the permissive possession of the defendants continued till the filing of the suit.” 14. At this stage, a reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes & Others, (supra), will be fruitful, wherein it is held in paragraph 97 as under: “97. Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallised as under: (1) No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. (2) Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. (3) The courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. (4) The protection of the court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour. (5) The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal, He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession.” 15. The judgments relied on by learned advocate for the appellants are discussed in detail in the judgment of the lower appellate court and are not helpful in the facts of the present case. 16. Section 100 of CPC reads as under: “[100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 17. It is fruitful to refer the judgment in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875 paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 which are reproduced as under: “7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. In HeroVinoth v. Seshammal [HeroVinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means— of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ 28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognized that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs., had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity” the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.” 18. Considering the impugned judgment and observations made by the learned lower appellate court, as mentioned hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that the learned lower appellate Court has given cogent, convincing, just and proper reasons in passing the impugned order, which are in accordance with law and in consonance with the material available on the record and after properly appreciating the documentary as well as oral evidence produced on the record. 19. 19. In view of the above discussion and the judgments cited hereinabove, when the learned lower appellate court has not ignored the material evidence and not drawn wrong inferences from the material available on record, and has rightly come to the conclusion and properly appreciated the evidence by framing points of determination under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the same by framing substantial questions of law as suggested by the learned advocate for the appellants. 20. In view of the above, this appeal is required to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. As the appeal is dismissed, the civil application for stay does not survive and is disposed of accordingly.