JUDGMENT : This regular second appeal has been filed under order XLII Rule 1 read with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereinafter) challenging the decree and judgment in A.S. No.307 of 2004 dated 15.12.2017 on the files of the Court of the Additional District Judge-II, Mavelikkara arose from decree and judgment in O.S. No.479 of 2001 dated 30.07.2004 on the files of the Munsiff Court, Mavelikara. The appellants herein are defendants 1 to 5 and the respondents are legal representatives of the original plaintiff Bhanumathiamma and other defendants. Later, additional respondents 13 and 14 got impleaded as the legal heirs of the 4th respondent and additional respondents 15 to 16 got impleaded as the legal heirs of the 1st respondent. 2. Heard both sides in detail and perused lower court records. 3. As per order dated 22.03.2018, my learned predecessor admitted this appeal by formulating the following substantial questions of law : 1. Can additional documents produced in an appeal under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, CPC) which is disputed by the other party, be accepted in evidence without proof of those documents ? 2. When additional documents are produced in appeal under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, without satisfying any of the grounds enumerated under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, can such additional documents be accepted by the appellate court? 4. On hearing both sides, one more substantial question of law arose for consideration and the same is also formulated as under:- 3. Is it correct to hold that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Hemaji Waghaji jat v Bhilkhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan reported in 2008 KHC 4892, the law of adverse possession now exists is not recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India? 5. In this matter, the suit was originally filed by Bhanumathiamma claiming 1/3rd share in the plaint schedule property and also to declare that Gift Deed No. 54/1991, Sale Deed No.56/1991 and Sale Deed No.25/1994 are not binding on the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the property was originally held by Bhageerathiamma, the mother of the plaintiff and the plaint schedule property is succeeded by the plaintiff and her siblings, viz; Nandakumar and Vijayamma. The 1st defendant is Vijayamma and defendants 2 to 5 are her children. According to the plaintiff, the property was originally held by Bhageerathiamma, the mother of the plaintiff and the plaint schedule property is succeeded by the plaintiff and her siblings, viz; Nandakumar and Vijayamma. The 1st defendant is Vijayamma and defendants 2 to 5 are her children. Defendants 6 to 8 are the legal heirs of deceased Nandakumar, who is the brother of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. Defendants 9 and 10 are the subsequent purchasers of the plaint schedule property from defendants 1, 3 to 5. Other defendants are the children of the plaintiff. 6. Defendants 1 to 5 filed joint written statement and denied the partible nature of the property. The 1st defendant denied plaintiff as her sister and daughter of Bhageerathiamma. Accordingly, the 1st defendant raised contention that the plaintiff could not succeed in the matter of partition. 7. The 10th defendant, who purchased the property from defendants 1, 3 to 5 filed written statement admitting that the plaint scheduled property was originally owned by Bhagareethiamma and contending that the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and Nandakumar are the sharers to the property by birth. Similarly defendants 3 to 5 are also entitled to get a share. Right of defendants 11 to 15 was also admitted. 10th defendant, who purchased 6 cents of property form part of the plaint schedule property from defendants 1, 3 to 5, as per sale deed No.25/1994 dated 04.01.1994, raised plea of adverse possession over the same. 8. Earlier the suit was tried by the trial court and the matter reached upto this Court vide RSA No. 34/2011 and this Court remanded the matter to the first Appellate Court for considering appeal afresh, since it was reported that, at the time when the First Appellate Court delivered the judgment, Bhanumathiamma died, on 30.04.2010. The present judgment in A.S. No.307/2004 dated 15.12.2017, is the judgment delivered after remanding of this matter by this Court. 9. The trial court raised necessary issues and tried the matter. PWs 1 and 2 examined and Ext.A1 to A5 marked on the side of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 examined and Exts.B1 and B2 series marked on the side of the defendants. 9. The trial court raised necessary issues and tried the matter. PWs 1 and 2 examined and Ext.A1 to A5 marked on the side of the plaintiff. DWs 1 and 2 examined and Exts.B1 and B2 series marked on the side of the defendants. Finally, the trial court dismissed the suit holding that even though the plaintiff succeeded in proving that she is the daughter of deceased Bhageerathiamma and is entitled to get share in the property, her right has been extinguished by adverse possession and limitation, at the option of the 10th defendant. 10. The decree and judgment of the trial court was challenged before the Appellate Court vide A.S. No.307/2004. Before the first Appellate Court, the plaintiff produced additional documents marked as Ext.A6 to A10 with a petition to receive the same. Reception of the above documents led to raising of 1st and 2nd substantial questions of law in this appeal. While considering the appeal, cross objection at the instance of defendants 1 to 5 also was considered whereby defendants 1 to 5 challenged the findings entered by the Learned Munsiff regarding the entitlement of share by the plaintiff. The Appellate Court, on re appreciation of evidence found that the plaintiff, 1st defendant and deceased Nandakumar are children of Bhageerathiamma and they were entitled to get 1/3rd share each in the Item No. 1 property. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed by passing preliminary decree as under:- (a) The plaint schedule item No.1 property excluding the building in item No. 2 and 3 properties is allowed to be partitioned by metes and bounds into three equal shares. (b) The 2nd plaintiff/appellant and the defendants 12 to 15 being the legal heirs of the original plaintiff are jointly entitled to get 1/3rd share. The defendants 6 to 8 being the legal heirs of late Nandakumar are also jointly entitled to get 1/3rd share. The remaining 1/3rd share goes to the share of the first defendant. (c) The first defendant and deceased Nandakumar are entitled to get their share separated in final decree on payment of court fee. (d) If possible, the building in item No. 2 and 3 properties shall be included in the share of the first defendant. (e) Share of income claimed by the plaintiff is not allowed. (c) The first defendant and deceased Nandakumar are entitled to get their share separated in final decree on payment of court fee. (d) If possible, the building in item No. 2 and 3 properties shall be included in the share of the first defendant. (e) Share of income claimed by the plaintiff is not allowed. (f) the plaintiff is allowed to realise the cost of the suit as well as the cost in appeal from the defendants 1 to 5 and their assets. (g) The parties are allowed to apply for passing a final decree within three months.” 11. According to the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the trial court, in fact, found on evidence that the plaintiff is the daughter of late Bhageerathiamma. Defendants 1 to 5 raised cross objection challenging the said finding. Ext.A6 to A10 were marked by allowing IA No. 778/2017 filed by the plaintiff. Similarly IA No.2/2017 filed by the defendants 1 to 5 also was allowed and one document filed by them also was admitted in evidence as Ext.B3. 12. In this matter, as per the available evidence, the trial court found that the plaintiff is the daughter of Bhageerthiamma, while rejecting partition on the ground that the 10th defendant perfected title by adverse possession over the plaint schedule items, even though the 1st defendant did not raise any contention as to adverse possession, as pointed by the learned counsel for the defendant. 13. Much dispute raised in the matter of acceptance of Ext.A6 to A10 documents by the First Appellate Court and grant of decree based on the same. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that, when the appellants applied under the Right to Information Act, regarding the authenticity of Exts.A6 to A10 before the Mavelikkara Municipality and also before the Govt.H.S. for Girls, Mavelikkara, they replied that the records pertaining to the above certificates were not available and the reply so given are produced before this Court as Annexures.A3 and A4. He also submitted that I.A. No.5/2022 filed by the appellants to be allowed to receive documents produced as Annexures.A1 to A4. 14. In response to this argument, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent filed I.A. No.1/2023 and produced the certified copy of birth register extracts issued by the Municipality similar to that of Exts.A7 and A8, again when applied by the 1st respondent. 15. 14. In response to this argument, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent filed I.A. No.1/2023 and produced the certified copy of birth register extracts issued by the Municipality similar to that of Exts.A7 and A8, again when applied by the 1st respondent. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that, even though documents defined under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are admissible without formal proof thereof, the documents now produced before the Appellate Court as Exts.A6 to A10 could not be accepted without formal proof. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellants placed a decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in Khatalsaheb Wd. Khadir Saheb Inamdar (Dead by L.Rs) and Another v. Ameersaheb and Others [ 1995 (1) Kar.L.J. 663 ], where while dealing with births and deaths extracts, the Karnataka High Court observed as under : “13. The law in this regard can be summarised as follows:- Birth and death extracts can be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act to show that a particular person by that name mentioned in the document was either born or dead on that particular day. But, in order to establish that the said entry relates to a particular person, there must be some evidence led by the party contending that such an entry relates to a particular person. Further, it is very clear that the entry in that birth or death extract cannot be a document to prove the paternity of a person mentioned there, because it is not the duty of the person who makes those entries to make any entry as to the paternity of the person mentioned there. The entries are only regarding birth and death of the person concerned and the official concerned is required to make these entries only in the discharge of his official duties. The document cannot be used for any purpose other than to prove the date of birth or death of a particular person mentioned in the extract. On the basis of mere entries in the birth or death extract, the paternity of a person cannot be determined. For that purpose, a party concerned will have to lead some other evidence to prove that a particular person was born to a particular man when that point is in issue in the case.” 16. On the basis of mere entries in the birth or death extract, the paternity of a person cannot be determined. For that purpose, a party concerned will have to lead some other evidence to prove that a particular person was born to a particular man when that point is in issue in the case.” 16. Another decision of this Court reported in Govinda Pillai Sukumara Pillai v. Lakshmi Amma Kochappi Amma [1957 KHC 178], also placed to contend that it is not safe to accept a mere entry in the birth register as proof of the age of the child concerned without some evidence or admission of the parties about the identity of the parents and the child mentioned in the register. 17. The decision of the High Court of Nagpur reported in State Government, Madhya Pradesh v. Kamruddin Imamoddin [MANU/NA/087/1955] has been placed to contend that Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not mean that each and every entry made in the register is admissible in evidence. 18. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent has placed a decision of the Apex Court reported in [ (2009) 12 SCC 454 ] Sham Lal alias Kuldip v. Sanjeev Kumar and Others, wherein the Apex Court dealt with a secondary school leaving certificate and held after answering question No.3 as under : "Question 3 21. One of the documents relied upon by the learned District Judge in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the son of the deceased Balak Ram is Ext. P-2, the school leaving certificate. The learned District Judge, while dealing with this document has observed: "On the other hand, there is a public document in the shape of school leaving certificate, Ext. P-2 issued by Head Master, Government Primary School, Jabal Jamrot recording Kuldip Chand alias Sham Lal to be the son of Shri Balak Ram. In the said public document as such Kuldip Chand alias Sham Lal was recorded as son of Shri Balak Ram." The findings of the learned District Judge holding Ext. P-2 to be a public document and admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal since no objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence. 22. P-2 to be a public document and admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal since no objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence. 22. It has been held in Dasondha Singh v. Zalam Singh that an objection as to the admissibility and mode of proof of a document must be taken at the trial before it is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit. Even otherwise such a document falls within the ambit of section 74, Evidence Act, and is admissible per se without formal proof” 19. Another decision reported in [ILR Vol. L 716] Maharaj Bhanudas Narayanboa Gosai v. Krishnabai, wife of Chintaman Maharudra Deshpande and Another, also placed by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, wherein the Bombay High Court dealt with the authenticity of a Transfer Certificate granted by the Head Master of a School. In the said decision it was observed as under : “A “transfer certificate” granted by the Head Master of a school in a Native State and duly certified by the Resident, is admissible in evidence under sections 35 and 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court can also presume under section 114 of the Evidence Act that the certificate has the same character as the school leaving certificate in British India.” 20. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent also placed decisions reported in OIC Ltd v. Hira Devi [2021 SCC OnLine HP 9245], Wadi v. Amilal and Others [2015 KHC 1199 : 2015 (1) SCC 677 ] and Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and Another [1999 KHC 1091 : 1999 (3) SCC 573 : AIR 1999 SC 1441 ], to contend that entries in the birth register and death register are public documents and admissible under Section 37 of the Evidence Act and it is not necessary to prove, who made the entries and what was the source of information. 21. In this case, the main dispute is whether deceased Nandakumar and Bhanumathiamma are the children of Bhageerathiamma. According to the 1st respondent, Bhageerathiamma had three children viz. Nandakumar, Bhanumathiamma and Vijayamma. But, the appellants would contend that Nandakumar and Bhanumathiamma are the children of one Naniyamma and the one and only child born to Bhageerathiamma is Vijayamma. Therefore, the entire property left by Bhageerathiamma would devolve upon Vijayamma alone. 22. According to the 1st respondent, Bhageerathiamma had three children viz. Nandakumar, Bhanumathiamma and Vijayamma. But, the appellants would contend that Nandakumar and Bhanumathiamma are the children of one Naniyamma and the one and only child born to Bhageerathiamma is Vijayamma. Therefore, the entire property left by Bhageerathiamma would devolve upon Vijayamma alone. 22. Though, this contention was appraised by the trial court, the trial court relying on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, found that Nandakumar and Bhanumathiamma are also the children of Bhageerathiamma, while disallowing the prayer for partition on the finding of adverse possession raised by the 10th defendant, who subsequently purchased an item of plaint schedule property. 23. When the matter taken in appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the finding as to adverse possession and also concurred the finding of the trial court holding that Nandakumar, Bhanumathiamma and Vijayamma are the children of Bhageerathiamma for which reliance on Exts.A6 to A10 also given. Accordingly, preliminary decree for partition was passed. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that since Exts.A6 to A10 and its genuineness are in dispute, in view of Annexures.A3 and A4 produced before this Court, inclusive of documents placed by the 1st respondent along with I.A. No.1/2023, an opportunity shall be given to parties to adduce evidence to prove the said fact. 25. When the learned counsel for the appellants is asked to justify the evidence to support the contention raised by Vijayamma that, she is the only daughter of Bhageerathiamma, the learned counsel submitted that this fact is admitted by the plaintiff in the plaint and apart from that Exts.A4 and A5, the extract of voters list during the year 1964 and 1970 would substantiate the same. 26. The specific case put up by Bhanumathiamma is that Bhageerathiamma had three children viz. Nandakumar, Bhanumathiamma and Vijayamma. But, in the written statement filed by Vijayamma, she denied the said fact. On perusal of Ext.A4 voters list during 1964, persons’ names mentioned therein are, Madhavan Pillai Ammini Pillai, Bhageerathiamma Madhavan Pillai, Bhanumathiamma Raghavan Pillai, Vijayamma Bhageerathiamma. Ext.A5, is the extract of the voters list for the year 1970, persons’ names incorporated therein are Madhavan Pillai Ummini Pillai, Bhageerathiamma Madhavan Pillai, Bhanumathiamma Raghavan Pillai, Vijayamma Bhageerathiamma, Raveendran Nair Raghavan Pillai, Shakunthala Manisuvilal. 27. Ext.A5, is the extract of the voters list for the year 1970, persons’ names incorporated therein are Madhavan Pillai Ummini Pillai, Bhageerathiamma Madhavan Pillai, Bhanumathiamma Raghavan Pillai, Vijayamma Bhageerathiamma, Raveendran Nair Raghavan Pillai, Shakunthala Manisuvilal. 27. Though, Exts.A4 and A5 show the name of Bhanumathiamma also in the voters list, but her husband’s name is shown as Raghavan Pillai and the mother’s name did not depict in the above documents. But in Exts.A4 and A5, Bageerathiamma is shown as the mother of Vijayamma. 28. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent given heavy reliance on the evidence of PW2, one Indira Unnithan, to prove the relationship between the parties and to ascertain the fact that Bhageerathiamma had three children, viz. Nandakumar, Bhanumathiamma and Vijayamma. On reading the evidence of PW2, who deposed by filing chief affidavit that Bhageerathiamma had three children and during cross-examination she disclosed the details. 29. Ext.A9 is the school admission extract issued by the Headmistress of Govt. H.S. for Girls, Mavelikkara bearing date 09.08.2004. As per Ext.A9, the name of the student is shown as B. Bhanumathiyamma. In the column to show father’s or guardian’s name, the name shown is K.Bhageerathiamma, Kaleekkal Veedu, Kottarkavu, Mavelikkara. Ext.A6 is the first page of SSLC Book in the name of Nandakumaran Nair M, who is the predecessor of defendants 5 to 8. In Ext.A6 name of the guardian is shown as Madhavan Pillai, but the name of mother is not shown therein. Ext.A7, according to the plaintiff is the birth extract of Bhanumathiamma. On perusal of Ext.A7, name of person recorded as “not entered”. But name of mother is shown as Bhageerathiamma. The certificate was issued on 26.06.2004. Similarly, Ext.A8 is the birth extract as that of Nandakumar, placed to convince that Nandakumar is the son of Bhageerathiamma. Ext.A8 certificate also was issued on 28.06.2004 in the same fashion as of Ext.A7, without mentioning the name of the person. Ext.A10 is the certificate issued by the Principal, Govt. V.H.S. School, Mavelikkara on 17.12.2004 certifying that the date of birth of M. Nandkumaran Nair, S/o S. Madhavan Pillai, Kalikkal Veedu, Mavelikkara, is 03.05.1945 (as per school records). 30. Ext.A8 certificate also was issued on 28.06.2004 in the same fashion as of Ext.A7, without mentioning the name of the person. Ext.A10 is the certificate issued by the Principal, Govt. V.H.S. School, Mavelikkara on 17.12.2004 certifying that the date of birth of M. Nandkumaran Nair, S/o S. Madhavan Pillai, Kalikkal Veedu, Mavelikkara, is 03.05.1945 (as per school records). 30. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Ext.A9 school extract could not be believed, since during cross-examination, Bhanumathiamma admitted that she studied upto 4th class alone, though as per Ext.A9, it is stated that she joined in standard V-B and she leaved the school on standard VI for the reason for want of payment of fee. 31. Coming to the first and second substantial questions of law, Order 41 Rule 27 (aa) of CPC, introduced with effect from 01.02.1977, provides that the the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary in the Appellate Court. 32. At the same time, Order 41 Rule 27(a) provides that the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted. Similarly, Order 41 Rule 27(b) provides that the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined. So, acceptance of additional documents shall be subject to the three conditions laid down in Order 41 Rule 27 (a), (aa) and (b) of CPC and satisfaction of one of the conditions alone is sufficient to accept additional evidence. Thus, as provided as Order 41 Rule 27(b), it is within the power of the Appellate Court to accept documents to enable it to pronounce judgment. 33. In the case at hand, the First Appellate Court admitted documents produced by the appellants as well as the respondents. Thus, as provided as Order 41 Rule 27(b), it is within the power of the Appellate Court to accept documents to enable it to pronounce judgment. 33. In the case at hand, the First Appellate Court admitted documents produced by the appellants as well as the respondents. Therefore, the acceptance of additional documents by the Appellate Court could be held as one to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce judgment as provided under Order 41 Rule 27(b) of CPC. Accordingly, first and second substantial questions of law answered holding that the Appellate Court has the power to accept additional documents, which would not require proof even at the appellate stage. Further, it is held that the Appellate Court accepted the documents to deliver judgment in the matter in dispute. 34. Coming to the nature of documents marked as Exts.A6 to A10, the same are public documents dealt under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As per Section 74(1)(iii) of the Indian Evidence Act, documents forming part of the acts or records of the act of public offices, legislative, judicial and executive, [or any part of India or of the Commonwealth], or of a foreign country are public documents. Similarly, public records kept [in any state] of private documents are also public documents. Except the above documents, all are private documents as per Section 75 of the Indian Evidence Act. Sections 76 and 77 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides as under : 76. Certified copies of public documents.-Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written, at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies. Explanation- any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorised to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section. 77. Explanation- any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorised to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section. 77. Proof of documents by production of certified copies- Such certified copes may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies. 35. In the instant case, Exts.A6 to A10 are public documents and the same are admissible even without formal proof thereof. Therefore, it could not be held that, in view of Annexures.A3 and A4, issued by the concerned departments/offices later under the RTI Act, where again the Municipality issued birth certificates similar to that of documents covered by Exts.A6 to A10, could not be admitted without formal proof thereof. Therefore, the said challenge at the instance of the appellants stands repelled. 36. In this matter, as I have already discussed, apart from Exts.A6 to A10 documents, in Exts.A4 and A5 voters lists the name of Bhanumathiamma is available along with Vijayamma. PW2 deposed that Bhageerathiamma had three children and during cross-examination it was brought out that they are Bhanumathiamma, Nandakumar and Vijayamma. This fact is also admitted by the 10th defendant, who subsequently purchased an item of plaint schedule property from defendants 1, 3 to 5. Thus, it has to be held that the First Appellate Court rightly found that Bhageerathiamma had three children and therefore, the plaint schedule property is partible among them. 37. Coming to the third substantial question of law, the essentials to perfect title by adverse possession are well settled. When addressing the requirements of adverse possession, the classical requirements of adverse possession are; nec vi, nec clam and nec precario, that it should be peaceful, open and continuous. (1) nec vi means neither by force. If the rightful owner of the property is constantly visiting the property, trying to get back possession, but the adverse possessor is throwing him out and is maintaining his wrongful possession by force, then his adverse possession does not begin. (2) nec clam means neither secretly. If the possession of the wrongful occupier is a guarded secret, and the legal owner cannot be reasonably expected to know of the fact of the loss of possession to the wrongful occupier, then also adverse possession does not begin. (2) nec clam means neither secretly. If the possession of the wrongful occupier is a guarded secret, and the legal owner cannot be reasonably expected to know of the fact of the loss of possession to the wrongful occupier, then also adverse possession does not begin. (3) nec precario means neither licence or permission. Since the concept of adverse possession is nec vi nec clam nec precario, there must in the first instance be actual possession and secondly there must be open hostile animus; possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that his possession is adverse to the competitor. It is the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a cause of action which constitutes adverse possession. Consonant with this principle the commencement of adverse possession in favour of a person, implies that that person is in actual possession, at the time with a notorious hostile claim of exclusive title, to repal which, the true owner would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual possession with the requisite animus. The possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It must be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued for over the statutory period. The hostile character of the possession is gauged by the animus of the person setting up adverse possession. The question of animus is a question of personal equation of the prescriber and not that of the person whose title is sought to be acquired. Thus, where a person was found to be in possession on behalf of another, notwithstanding that the latter admitted the farmer's possession to be on his own account, it could be held that the former's possession was only on the latter's behalf and not adverse to him. The animus of the prescriber alone determines the nature and quantum of the estate that is being prescribed. The animus of the prescriber alone determines the nature and quantum of the estate that is being prescribed. Adverse possession depends on intention of the occupant to claim and hold the land in opposition to the whole world and also embodies the idea that the owner or persons interested in the property have knowledge of the assertion of ownership by the occupant. Adverse possession consists of actual possession with intent to hold solely by the possessor to the exclusion of all others. Ins held as under: 38. Since, claim of adverse possession/possessory title is available to a defendant to protect his adverse possession as a shield and to file suit by a person who claims possessory title, as a sword, the finding of the first Appellate Court holding the view that the decision reported in Hemaji Waghaji jat’s case (supra), the law of adverse possession is not recognized by the Apex Court is patently illegal and without properly understanding the position of law. In this decision, though the Apex Court opined that the law of adverse possession as exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person, who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner and thereby recommended the Union of India to seriously consider and make suitable changes in the law of adverse possession. Since no amendments brought into change the law of adverse possession so far and Article 65 of the Limitation Act is still in operation, the learned first Appellate Court misunderstood the ratio laid down in the decision and held so. Therefore, it is held that as per the ratio in Hemaji Waghaji jat’s case (supra), the Apex Court not recognized the law of adverse possession, in any manner. 39. Summing up, it is held that the First Appellate Court’s verdict, finding that Bhanumathiamma, Nandakumar and Vijayamma are the children of Bhageerathiamma and consequential partition granted, does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 40. Accordingly, this regular second appeal fails and the same stands dismissed, but no order as to costs. All interlocutory orders stand vacated and all interlocutory applications pending in this regular second appeal stand dismissed.