JUDGMENT : Dhiraj Singh Thakur, C.J. 1. This is a petition filed purportedly in public interest in which the petitioner seeks a Mandamus to the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, to take necessary steps to make laws for extending the tenure of Greater Hyderabad City as a common capital for the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for a further period of 10 years i.e. till 2034, till the process of apportionment is completed under Sections 47, 53 and 68 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (in short, 'the Act, 2014'). 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Parliament of India had enacted the Act of 2014, Section 3 whereof envisaged that, on and from the 'appointed date', there would be formed a new State known as State of Telangana comprising the territories of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh as mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, 2014. It is not out of place to mention that by virtue of notification dated 04.03.2024 issued by the Government of India which was published in the Gazette of India on the same date, the Second of June, 2014, was notified as 'the appointed day' for purposes of the Act, 2014. 3. Section 4 of the said Act envisaged that, on and from the appointed day, the State of Andhra Pradesh shall comprise the territories of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh other than those specified in Section 3 the Act, 2014. 4. Section 5 of the Act, 2014, envisaged as under: "Hyderabad to be common capital for States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh: (1) On and from the appointed day, Hyderabad in the existing State of Andhra Pradesh, shall be the common capital of the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh for such period not exceeding ten years. (2) After expiry of the period referred to in sub-section (1), Hyderabad shall be the capital of the State of Telangana and there shall be a new capital for the State of Andhra Pradesh." 5. Section 47 of the Act, 2014, inter-alia envisaged the apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh immediately before the appointed day to secure just, reasonable and equitable apportionment of the assets and liabilities amongst the successor States. Section 47 of the Act, 2014, inter-alia envisaged the apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh immediately before the appointed day to secure just, reasonable and equitable apportionment of the assets and liabilities amongst the successor States. According to Section 2(j) of the Act, 2014, 'Successor State' is defined as under: "successor State", in relation to the existing State of Andhra Pradesh, means the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana, as the case may be." 6. Section 47(4) of the Act, 2014, further envisaged that, in case of any dispute regarding the amount of financial assets and liabilities, the same would be settled through mutual agreement, failing which it would be settled by the order of the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. 7. Section 53 of the Act, 2014, envisaged the apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the State undertakings, whereas Section 68(1) of the Act, 2014, envisaged that those companies and corporations specified in the Ninth Schedule constituted for the existing State of Andhra Pradesh shall, on and from the appointed day, continue to function in those areas in respect of which they were functioning immediately before that day, subject to the provisions of Section 68 of the Act, 2014, whereas Section 68(2) envisages the apportionment of the assets, rights and liabilities of the companies and corporations referred to Section 68(1) in the manner provided under Section 53 of the Act, 2014. 8. Section 71 of the Act, 2014, further envisages that the Central Government may issue directions for each of the companies specified in the Ninth Schedule regarding the interests and shares of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh in the Company between the successor States as also regarding the reconstitution of the Board of Directors of the Company so as to give adequate representation to the successor States. 9. 9. The entire case of the petitioner is that since the entire process of apportionment of assets and liabilities as envisaged in the Sections mentioned hereinabove has not been completed in terms of the mutual agreement as envisaged between the States and further that since the Union of India has failed to discharge its obligation to decide the said issue, Greater Hyderabad City, which was to remain as a common capital for a period of 10 years which period coming to an end on the Second of June, 2024, should be continued as a common capital for the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for a further period of 10 years till 2034 inasmuch as if it were not so declared as a common capital for a further period of 10 years, the interest of the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh would get effected by law. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner in fact requires this Court to issue a Mandamus to respondent No. 1 i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, for extending the tenure, to take necessary steps to make laws so that Greater Hyderabad City shall remain as a common capital for a further period of 10 years. 11. This clearly is impermissible inasmuch as all the three organs of the State i.e. the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary have their sphere within which they are expected to operate. While the power of Judicial Review is vested, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the High Courts and under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, in the Supreme Court, through which it can test the legality of an order passed by the Executive to see as to whether it is in accordance with the legislative intent or can even test the enactment of the Legislature to see as to whether it is ultra-vires or intra-vires of the Constitution, it is the adjudicatory function which alone is vested in the Courts and not the legislative function which is vested in the Legislature, much less can the Court frame policies which otherwise are within the domain of the Executive. 12. It is only if all these three organs of the State function within the limits prescribed under the Constitution can a constitutional democracy not only be sustained but can thrive. 12. It is only if all these three organs of the State function within the limits prescribed under the Constitution can a constitutional democracy not only be sustained but can thrive. Any encroachment by one organ over the powers vested in the other would create an imbalance and thus severely affect the constitutional democracy. Therefore, while the Courts may act as a 'Sentinel on the Qui Vive' for the other two organs yet a Mandamus can never be issued either to the Executive to frame the policy in a particular fashion or to issue a direction to take steps so that a particular legislation is brought about in tune with the claim of the petitioner. 13. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and others 1985:INSC:85 : (1985) 3 SCC 169 , the Apex Court held: "4. ....................... But at the same time the Court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the Executive and the Legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the Executive to introduce a particular legislation or the Legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law-making activities of the Executive and the Legislature." 14. In Asif Hameed and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others 1989:INSC:176 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364, the Supreme Court held: "............... 17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look on the inter-se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognized under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and Executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. Legislature and Executive, the two facets of people's will, they have all the powers including that of finance. Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self imposed discipline of judicial restraint." 15. In State of Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Satpal Saini (2017) 11 SCC 42 , the Apex Court held: "................... 12. The judiciary is one amongst the three branches of the State; the other two being the executive and the legislature. Each of the three branches is co-equal. Each has specified and enumerated constitutional powers. The judiciary is assigned with the function of ensuring that executive actions accord with the law and that laws and executive decisions accord with the Constitution. The courts do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy should be followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The peril of adopting an incorrect policy lies in democratic accountability to the people. This is the basis and rationale for holding that the court does not have the power or function to direct the executive to adopt a particular policy or the legislature to convert it into enacted law. It is wise to remind us of these limits and wiser still to enforce them without exception." 16. Considering the prayer made in the present petition on the touchstone of the fundamental principles of law discussed hereinabove, in our opinion, no such direction can be issued directing the Executive to take steps for ensuring that the Parliament takes steps to declare Greater Hyderabad City as a common capital for a period beyond what was envisaged in terms of Section 5 of the Act, 2014. 17. We do not find any merit in the present petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.