Judgment On Board : Arvind Singh Chandel, J. 1. The instant appeal has been moved against the judgment dated 25.1.2017 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No.11/2013, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000 each, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 year Under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years and fine of Rs.2,000 each, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 6 months Additional Conviction and Sentence of Appellants Ravindra @ Ravi Sonkar, Shiva Sonkar and Dayal Prakash Conviction Sentence Under Section 25 of the Arms Act Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 year and fine of Rs.1,000 each, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 1 month 2. In this case, name of deceased is Mustkim. According to the case of prosecution, on 9.9.2012, PW1 Abdul Kayum alias Raja went along with Mustkim to his house where Sonu, Arif and Bantu were present. At that time, appellant Dayal also came there. A short talk took place between Dayal and Mustkim. Thereafter, both of them went on a motorcycle towards Power House Railway Station. PW1 Abdul also went along with them. All the above 3 persons reached waiting room of the railway station. Thereafter, both Dayal and Mustkim left the company of PW1 Abdul and they sent PW1 Abdul for purchasing gutkha. After purchase of gutkha, when PW1 Abdul came back there, both Dayal and Mustkim were not present there. He search them. It was found by him that behind the highway canteen situated near railway track, appellants Dayal, Ravi Sonkar and Vicky alias Virendra Sonkar and other appellants were committing marpeet with Mustkim with the help of knives and other sharp edged weapon. He immediately reached Chataipara, i.e., the mohalla of Mustkim and there he informed the incident to Sonu, Yusuf and other persons. Thereafter, all of them reached the spot. It was found by them that Mustkim was lying dead on the railway track behind the highway canteen. First Information Report (Ex.P1) was lodged by PW1 Abdul on 9.9.2012 at 10:40 p.m. Inquest (Ex.P49) was conducted. Post mortem examination over the dead body of Mustkim was conducted by PW9 Dr. Sanjay Kumar. Thereafter, all of them reached the spot. It was found by them that Mustkim was lying dead on the railway track behind the highway canteen. First Information Report (Ex.P1) was lodged by PW1 Abdul on 9.9.2012 at 10:40 p.m. Inquest (Ex.P49) was conducted. Post mortem examination over the dead body of Mustkim was conducted by PW9 Dr. Sanjay Kumar. Post mortem report is Ex.P35 in which total 15 injuries were found. Cause of death is reported to be shock, extensive head injury and pulmonary injury. Mode of death is reported to be homicidal. During the course of investigation, disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act of appellants Ravindra @ Ravi, Santosh Giri @ Jogo, Virendra, Shiva @ Kallu Sonkar, Dayal, Imtiaz @ Kallu were recorded vide Exhibits P5, P7, P45, P8, P9 and P10, respectively. On the basis of their disclosure statements, knife and clothes were seized from appellant Ravindra vide Ex.P6, knife and clothes were seized from appellant Santosh vide Ex.P11, clothes were seized from appellant Virendra Sonkar vide Ex.P46, chapad and clothes were seized from appellant Shiva vide Ex.P12, motorcycle, foldable knife and clothes were seized from appellant Dayal vide Ex.P13 and clothes were seized from appellant Imtiaz vide Ex.P14. Plain and blood stained soil were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex.P2. All the seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination. FSL report is Ex.P51. According to the FSL report, on the cloth (Article B) seized from appellant Ravindra and on the cloth of deceased Mustkim (Article P2) human blood was found. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of investigation, a charge- sheet was filed. 3. The Trial Court framed charges. The prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 81 documents in support of its case. 2 witnesses were examined in defence. The appellants denied the guilt and pleaded innocence in their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned earlier. Hence, the instant appeal. 4. As regards the conviction of appellants Santosh Giri, Shiva Sonkar and Imtiaz, learned counsel appearing for them submits that they have been convicted only on the basis of suspicion. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned earlier. Hence, the instant appeal. 4. As regards the conviction of appellants Santosh Giri, Shiva Sonkar and Imtiaz, learned counsel appearing for them submits that they have been convicted only on the basis of suspicion. In the First Information Report, which was got registered immediately after the incident by PW1 Abdul, who is the sole eyewitness, these 3 appellants were not named along with other appellants. The statement of PW1 Abdul was recorded in Court after about 1½ years of the incident. Then only, for the first time, he named these 3 appellants. No test identification parade of these 3 appellants was conducted. Merely on the basis of dock identification of these 3 appellants in the Court, their conviction is not sustainable. So far as other appellants are concerned, it is argued by their respective learned counsel that the case of prosecution is based only on the testimony of sole eyewitness PW1 Abdul, but, his statement is suspicious. At the time of incident, he did not call anyone present around him for help nor did he inform GRP or RPF personnel present around there. Instead, he went 2 kilometres away from the place of occurrence and called his friends. The above conduct of PW1 Abdul is completely unnatural and, therefore, not reliable. It is further submitted that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of PW1 Abdul Kayum @ Raja, PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim @ Sonu which further creates a doubt on the testimony of PW1 Abdul Kayum. As regards recovery of the articles, it is argued that on the seized articles also, no human blood was found except on the cloth of appellant Ravindra. The prosecution has failed to establish that the blood group of the blood found on the cloth of appellant Ravindra and the blood group of the blood of the deceased was same. Therefore, only on the basis of recovery of blood stained cloth from appellant Ravindra the conviction is not sustainable. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State opposes the arguments raised on behalf of the appellants and submits that after appreciating the entire evidence available on record the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants. Therefore, only on the basis of recovery of blood stained cloth from appellant Ravindra the conviction is not sustainable. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State opposes the arguments raised on behalf of the appellants and submits that after appreciating the entire evidence available on record the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants. He further submits that the statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum is fully reliable and names of appellants Santosh Giri, Shiva Sonkar and Imtiaz are mentioned in the diary statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum. Therefore, only on the ground that their names are not mentioned in the FIR, they are not entitled to get any benefit. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the objector opposes the arguments raised on behalf of the appellants. He adopts the contentions made by learned counsel for the respondent/State. 7. We have heard the rival contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the entire evidence available on record with due care. 8. The Trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record and considering the post mortem report (Ex.P35) which has been proved by PW9 Dr. Sanjay Kumar in which cause of death is reported to be shock, extensive head injury and pulmonary injury and mode of death is reported to be homicidal, has rightly held that the nature of death of Mustkim was homicidal. The finding recorded by the Trial Court that the death of Mustkim was homicidal is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and, therefore, we hereby affirm the said finding. 9. Now, the next question for consideration is whether the appellants are the persons who are responsible for the homicidal death of Mustkim. 10. The case of the prosecution is based on the testimony of PW1 Abdul Kayum @ Raja, who is the sole eyewitness as well as on other circumstantial evidence, i.e., recovery of blood stained clothes and knives from the appellants. 11. It is settled law that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. In Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 SCC 465 , it is observed by the Supreme Court as under: “12. 11. It is settled law that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. In Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 SCC 465 , it is observed by the Supreme Court as under: “12. In a case of this nature when there is a sole witness to the incident his evidence has to be accepted with an amount of caution and after testing it on the touchstone of the evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence as recorded. What is urged before the Court is that FIR Exhibit P-1 contained signature of a doubtful character which PW 1 himself admitted as having been different from the one given by him on the acknowledgment of having received the summons. How far reliance can be placed upon his evidence when PW 1 stated that he had rushed to the junction to inform PWs 2 to 4 and thereafter rushed back to the place of the incident, while the deceased also ran to the western side of the place of incident though he was profusely bleeding and he got hold of his wound by his hand and ran. If that is so, there would have been blood all over the place and not at one particular point. The abrasion on the neck of PW 1 could have been caused by a nail scratch and not by a weapon and was not a bleeding injury will clearly belie the statement made by him that he was profusely bleeding. If really the witness (PW 1) was wearing bloodstained clothes the same would have been certainly seized by the police for appropriate investigation of the same. Particularly, when the trial court had given cogent reasons to acquit the accused, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same merely because another opinion is possible and not that the finding concluded by the trial court was impossible.” 12. In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, (2003) 2 SCC 401 , the Supreme Court observed thus: “10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 )” 13. In Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 165 , it is observed by the Supreme Court as under: “16. Thus, the finding of guilt of the two appellant-accused recorded by the two courts below is based on sole testimony of eyewitness PW 1. As a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise [see Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367].” 14. In the light of above observations made by the Supreme Court, we have to carefully examine the statement of the sole eyewitness PW1 Abdul Kayum. A perusal of his statement shows that in his Court statement he deposed that on the date of incident at about 7 p.m. he had gone to the house of Mustkim (deceased). At that time, appellants Dayal and Kallu came there. Thereafter, appellant Dayal and the deceased went away and talked with each other. A perusal of his statement shows that in his Court statement he deposed that on the date of incident at about 7 p.m. he had gone to the house of Mustkim (deceased). At that time, appellants Dayal and Kallu came there. Thereafter, appellant Dayal and the deceased went away and talked with each other. Thereafter, PW1 Abdul Kayum, appellant Kallu and Mustkim (deceased) went on a motorcycle to Power House Railway Station and appellant Dayal went on other motorcycle with them to the said railway station. PW1 Abdul Kayum further stated that in the waiting room of the railway station appellant Dayal gave him an amount of Rs.10 and asked him to bring gutkha. Thereafter, appellants Dayal and Kallu and deceased Mustkim went away. When PW1 Abdul Kayum returned with gutkha, none of the said 3 persons were present there. Searching them, he went behind the highway canteen situated near the railway platform. There he saw that all the appellants were assaulting Mustkim with the help of knives and chapad. He further stated that having seen him, appellants Jogo and Kallu made him run away. He ran towards the house of Mustkim and there he met with Sonu, Arif and Ishu. He told them about the incident. Running, all of them reached the spot. There they saw that dead body of Mustkim was lying on the railway track. 15. PW1 Abdul Kayum in paragraph 16 of his cross-examination admitted the fact that in platform No.1 of the railway station, ticket booking office, waiting room, GRP and RPF Chowki were situated. In paragraph 36, he further admitted that the distance between the highway canteen and platform No.1 was about 100 gaz. In paragraph 49 of his cross-examination, this witness further admitted that at the time of incident many persons were present on platform No.1, but, he did not inform the incident to anyone there nor did he inform the incident to GRP or RPF personnel. He also did not raise any shout. He further admitted that though he had one mobile phone, he did not inform anyone through his mobile phone. Instead, he walked towards the house of the deceased. In paragraph 56 of his cross-examination, this witness further admitted that at the time of lodging of the FIR, he did not tell about the presence of Kallu, Shiva and Santosh Giri. He further admitted that though he had one mobile phone, he did not inform anyone through his mobile phone. Instead, he walked towards the house of the deceased. In paragraph 56 of his cross-examination, this witness further admitted that at the time of lodging of the FIR, he did not tell about the presence of Kallu, Shiva and Santosh Giri. According to this witness, he did not know these 3 persons by their names. Again in paragraph 57 of his cross-examination, this witness stated that before making statement in the Court he did not know Kallu nor did he tell anything about him. 16. As per the statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum, he immediately reached the mohalla of the deceased and informed the incident to PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim @ Sonu, but, Sheikh Arif did not support the above statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum and contrary to that he stated that Sonu informed him on telephone that some persons were assaulting Mustkim. However, PW3 Abdul Karim @ Sonu did not support the above statement of PW2 Sheikh Arif that he informed the incident to PW2 Sheikh Arif on telephone. 17. PW2 Sheikh Arif in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his cross- examination stated that after receiving information of the incident from Sonu on telephone, he along with PW1 Abdul Kayum went towards the spot and there they searched Mustkim, but, he was not found there. 15 minutes later, his dead body was found there. 18. On a minute examination of the above statements of PW1 Abdul Kayum @ Raja, PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim @ Sonu, we find that there are material contradictions and omissions in their statements. As per the statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum, he informed the incident to PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim, but, PW2 Sheikh Arif in his Court statement deposed that the incident was informed to him by PW3 Abdul Karim on telephone. However, PW3 Abdul Karim does not support the above statement of PW2 Sheikh Arif. As per the statement of PW1 Abdul Kayum, he informed the incident to PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim, but, PW2 Sheikh Arif in his Court statement deposed that the incident was informed to him by PW3 Abdul Karim on telephone. However, PW3 Abdul Karim does not support the above statement of PW2 Sheikh Arif. From the admission made by PW1 Abdul Kayum, it is also established that the incident took place on the railway track behind the highway canteen, which was situated about 100 gaz away from platform No.1 of the railway station and at the time of incident in platform No.1 many persons and officials of GRP and RPF were present, but, he did not tell the incident to anyone there nor did he raise any shout. Even after having a mobile phone with him, he did not inform the incident to anyone through his phone and keeping mum he walked towards the mohalla of the deceased and returned the spot along with PW2 Sheikh Arif, PW3 Abdul Karim and other persons. The above conduct of PW1 Abdul Kayum appears to be unnatural. Further, as stated by PW2 Sheikh Arif, when they reached the spot, they made search of Mustkim. 15 minutes later, they found his dead body on the railway track. If PW1 Abdul Kayum had witnessed the initial assault on Mustkim, he would have known the spot and, therefore, he would have taken both PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim to the spot directly, but, he did not do so and the dead body was found after making a search for 15 minutes. This again raises a doubt whether PW1 Abdul Kayum had actually witnessed the initial assault on Mustkim or not. 19. Further, in the FIR (Ex.P1), only the names of appellants Ravindra, Virendra and Dayal were mentioned. Names of remaining 3 appellants were not informed by PW1 Abdul Kayum. His statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded on the date of incident itself, i.e., 9.9.2012. Final report was prepared by police on 4.12.2012. Till 4.12.2012, PW1 Abdul Kayum did not disclose the names of remaining 3 appellants nor did he inform police that he knew the remaining 3 assailants and will also be able to identify them. Final report was prepared by police on 4.12.2012. Till 4.12.2012, PW1 Abdul Kayum did not disclose the names of remaining 3 appellants nor did he inform police that he knew the remaining 3 assailants and will also be able to identify them. However, on 12.12.2014, i.e., after about 2 years and 3 months from the incident he identified the remaining 3 assailants, namely, Santosh Giri, Shiva Sonkar and Imtiaz before the Court, which again creates a suspicion whether he had actually witnessed the incident or not. If he already knew and acquainted with all the assailants, why did he not mention the names of all the assailants at the time of lodging of the FIR and later why did he not go to police for informing them the names of remaining 3 assailants. This witness has not explained these things. 20. On the above subject, in Noorahammad vs. State of Karnataka, (2016) 3 SCC 325 , it is observed by the Supreme Court as under: “25. This Court in Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2002) 7 SCC 295 has elaborated upon the importance of test identification parade in great details. The relevant paras 6, 7 and 8 read thus: (SCC pp. 302-04) “6. It is also well settled that failure to hold test identification parade, which should be held with reasonable dispatch, does not make the evidence of identification in court inadmissible, rather the same is very much admissible in law. Question is, what is its probative value? Ordinarily, identification of an accused for the first time in court by a witness should not be relied upon, the same being from its very nature, inherently of a weak character, unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence. The purpose of test identification parade is to test the observation, grasp, memory, capacity to recapitulate what a witness has seen earlier, strength or trustworthiness of the evidence of identification of an accused and to ascertain if it can be used as reliable corroborative evidence of the witness identifying the accused at his trial in court. If a witness identifies the accused in court for the first time, the probative value of such uncorroborated evidence becomes minimal so much so that it becomes, as a rule of prudence and not law, unsafe to rely on such a piece of evidence. If a witness identifies the accused in court for the first time, the probative value of such uncorroborated evidence becomes minimal so much so that it becomes, as a rule of prudence and not law, unsafe to rely on such a piece of evidence. We are fortified in our view by a catena of decisions of this Court in Kanta Prashad vs. Delhi Admn., AIR 1958 SC 350 , Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of A.P., AIR 1960 SC 1340 , Budhsen v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC 128 , Kanan v. State of Kerala, (1979) 3 SCC 319 , Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 , Bollavaram Pedda Narsi Reddy v. State of A.P., (1991) 3 SCC 434 , State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700 , Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 1 SCC 510 , Raju v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 1 SCC 169 , Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625 , George v. State of Kerala, (1998) 4 SCC 605 , Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 428 , State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC 247 and Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 1 SCC 358 . 7. Apart from the ordinary rule laid down in the aforesaid decisions, certain exceptions to the same have been carved out where identification of an accused for the first time in court without there being any corroboration whatsoever can form the sole basis for his conviction. In Budhsen it was observed: (SCC p. 132, para 7) ‘7. ...There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration.’ 8. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh it was laid down that if a witness had any particular reason to remember about the identity of an accused, in that event, the case can be brought under the exception and upon solitary evidence of identification of an accused in court for the first time, conviction can be based. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh it was laid down that if a witness had any particular reason to remember about the identity of an accused, in that event, the case can be brought under the exception and upon solitary evidence of identification of an accused in court for the first time, conviction can be based. In Ronny it has been laid down that where the witness had a chance to interact with the accused or that in a case where the witness had an opportunity to notice the distinctive features of the accused which lends assurance to his testimony in court, the evidence of identification in court for the first time by such a witness cannot be thrown away merely because no test identification parade was held. In that case, the accused concerned had a talk with the identifying witnesses for about 7/8 minutes. In these circumstances, the conviction of the accused, on the basis of sworn testimony of witnesses identifying for the first time in court without the same being corroborated either by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, was upheld by this Court. In Rajesh Govind Jagesha it was laid down that the absence of test identification parade may not be fatal if the accused is sufficiently described in the complaint leaving no doubt in the mind of the court regarding his involvement or is arrested on the spot immediately after the occurrence and in either eventuality, the evidence of witnesses identifying the accused for the first time in court can form the basis for conviction without the same being corroborated by any other evidence and, accordingly, conviction of the accused was upheld by this Court. In State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj it was observed (at SCC p. 253, para 3) that: ‘test identification is considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them. In State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj it was observed (at SCC p. 253, para 3) that: ‘test identification is considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration.’ In that case, laying down the aforesaid law, acquittal of one of the accused by the High Court was converted into conviction by this Court on the basis of identification by a witness for the first time in court without the same being corroborated by any other evidence. In Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel it was observed : (SCC p. 369, para 20) ‘20. ...It, therefore, cannot be held, as tried to be submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, that in the absence of a test identification parade, the evidence of an eyewitness identifying the accused would become inadmissible or totally useless; whether the evidence deserves any credence or not would always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.’ The court further observed: (SCC p. 369, para 20) ‘20. ...the fact remains that these eyewitnesses were seriously injured and they could have easily seen the faces of the persons assaulting them and their appearance and identity would well remain imprinted in their minds especially when they were assaulted in broad daylight.’ In these circumstances, conviction of the accused was upheld on the basis of solitary evidence of identification by a witness for the first time in court.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In the light of above observation of the Supreme Court, it is also quite vivid that the testimony of PW1 Abdul Kayum is doubtful and he is not a trustworthy witness. Further, considering the contradictory statements of PW1 Abdul Kayum, PW2 Sheikh Arif and PW3 Abdul Karim, we are unable to rely that PW1 Abdul Kayum had actually witnessed the incident. 22. The Trial Court also convicted the appellants on the basis of recovery of blood stained knives and clothes from them on the basis of their disclosure statements. A bare perusal of the FSL report (Ex.P51) shows that only on the cloth seized from appellant Ravindra human blood was found. 22. The Trial Court also convicted the appellants on the basis of recovery of blood stained knives and clothes from them on the basis of their disclosure statements. A bare perusal of the FSL report (Ex.P51) shows that only on the cloth seized from appellant Ravindra human blood was found. But, the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that the blood group of the blood found on the cloth seized from appellant Ravindra and the blood group of the blood of the deceased was same. Therefore, we are of the view that in the light of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 7 SCC 781 , the recovery of said cloth (Article B) does not bear any evidentiary value. 23. In view of the foregoing discussion, in our considered opinion, the conviction of the appellants for the alleged offences is not sustainable and all the appellants are entitled to get benefit of doubt. Hence, giving benefit of doubt, all the appellants are acquitted of the charges framed against them. Appellants Ravindra, Virendra and Dayal are reported to be in jail. They be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. Appellants Santosh Giri, Shiva Sonkar and Imtiaz are on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 6 months under Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside.