ORDER ON BOARD : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, the appellant herein/writ petitioner has preferred this appeal calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 28-11-2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S)No.3262/2009 by which his writ petition filed questioning the order of the second appellate authority partly modifying the order of the disciplinary authority and sustaining the award of penalty to the extent from reduction of four stages on basic pay in the time scale of pay to reduction in basic pay by one stage in the time scale of pay, has been dismissed finding no merit and declined to interfere with the order of the disciplinary authority as modified by the appellate authority. Relevant facts in brief: - 2. The writ petitioner/appellant herein at relevant point of time on 7-7-1994 was working as Development Officer in the respondent Company i.e. the Oriental Insurance Company Limited (OICL) and posted at Manendragarh Branch Office (now District Korea) and he issued a motor vehicle cover note bearing No.665581 putting time as 11.30 a.m. on 7-7-1994 granting “Act Only Insurance cover” to a Tractor bearing registration No.CPL-7065 & Trolley No.CPL-6115 belonging to one Shri Kadeem Akhtar Khan for the period commencing from 7-7-1994 to 6-7-1995. Unfortunately, the said vehicle met with a vehicular accident on the same day i.e. 7-7-1994 at 4 p.m. making the Insurance Company liable for payment of compensation which was subject-matter of Motor Accident Claim Case No.13/1994 vide award dated 12-5-2000 passed by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Manendragarh fastening liability on the Insurance Company to pay an amount of Rs. 1,28,640/- along with interest which the Insurance Company OICL ultimately decided to satisfy and satisfied the said award without any protest or demur or without even questioning the award before this Court in a duly constituted appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 1,28,640/- along with interest which the Insurance Company OICL ultimately decided to satisfy and satisfied the said award without any protest or demur or without even questioning the award before this Court in a duly constituted appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Thereafter, the respondent OICL after lapse of 11 years from the date of issuance of cover note, on 12-7-2005, vide Annexure P-6 of the writ petition, instituted a departmental enquiry against the petitioner and issued Articles of Charge & Statement of Imputation accompanied with List of Documents & List of Witnesses proposing to hold departmental enquiry against him under Rule 25 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 and directed him to submit written submission of defence within 15 days to which the petitioner submitted detailed reply on 6-7-2006 denying the charges framed against him and also stated that the cover note was issued in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and no inspection was necessary to cover third party liability or Act Only Risk. However, on 12-12-2005, vide Annexure P-10 of the writ petition, the petitioner had requested the presenting officer to provide all the documents including copy of cover note allegedly issued by him which the Branch Manager of the respondent Insurance Company, on 11-10-2005 informed the petitioner vide Annexure P-11 of the writ petition, that the cover note is not available in the city office, therefore, same will not be provided and as such, the copy of relevant document i.e. cover note could not be provided to the petitioner and disciplinary proceeding proceeded without providing alleged cover note to the writ petitioner. 3. The Enquiry Officer after hearing the writ petitioner and the OICL concluded that the allegation of antedating and antetiming of the cover note could not be proved by the OICL and also it could not be proved by the investigation report of A.L. Chourasia – Investigating Officer, however, it was held that part of charges relating to issuance of cover note without pre-inspection of vehicle and without ascertaining previous insurance, was found proved also on the basis of admission made by the petitioner. 4. 4. The disciplinary authority accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer visited the petitioner with major penalty of reduction in basic pay by four stages in time scale of pay by its order dated 12-12-2006 (Annexure P-3) against which the petitioner has taken appeal before the first appellate authority which the first appellate authority affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority vide order dated 19-9-2007 (Annexure P-2) and the petitioner preferred second appeal before the second appellate authority who, in turn, modified the order of the disciplinary authority by partly granting the appeal and the penalty imposed was reduced to reduction in basic pay by one stage in time scale of pay vide order dated 30-5-2008 (Annexure P-1). The petitioner also questioned that order before the writ court unsuccessfully and by the impugned order, the learned Single Judge held as under: - “8. Had the petitioner inspected the vehicle and ascertained the previous insurance details, it might have come to the fore that the vehicle was not previously insured. Inspection and ascertainment might have prevented the financial liability which the Insurance Company incurred subsequently. … 12. Having examined the nature of charge, I do not find present to be such a case where the imputation was of a very trivial nature and yet the major punishment has been imposed. It is also to be seen that the Chairman has already reduced the punishment of deduction in Basic Pay by four stages in the Time Scale of Pay to one stage.” Submissions advanced on behalf of the parties: - 5. Mr. Anshul Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein / writ petitioner, would make two fold submissions, firstly, that though the scope of interference by the writ court in the findings of the disciplinary authority affirmed by the appellate authority is quite limited and extend only to seeing that whether the finding of the disciplinary authority is based on conjectures and surmises, but, in the instant case, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had already held that the OICL has failed to produce any evidence to prove its case and passed award of Rs. 1,28,640/- along with interest which has attained finality, and it was specifically held that the OICL has failed to prove that the owner of the vehicle has obtained cover note after the accident and even the finding of the Enquiry Officer that in the departmental enquiry also it could not be proved to be antedated and antetimed and thus the issue of cover note has already been concluded, was accepted by the disciplinary authority. The OICL has failed to prove the allegation of antedating and antetiming of cover note or the act of dishonesty. As such, concurrent finding has been recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) as also by the Enquiry Officer accepted by the disciplinary authority that the cover note was antedated and antetimed or the plea of dishonesty is not proved. Only the Enquiry Officer has found that no physical inspection of vehicle was made and previous insurance details were also not inquired into which the Insurance Company did not raise before the MACT. Therefore, that ground is not available at this stage and it amounts to overreaching the finding of the jurisdictional MACT. Secondly, the cover note was allegedly issued on 7-7-1994 and departmental enquiry was initiated with huge inordinate and unexplained delay of 11 years which has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and the Insurance Company was not serious about it, only to overreach the award of the MACT, which the OICL had already satisfied, such departmental enquiry has been initiated which is per se mala fide and runs contrary to the decision of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Mohinder Singh Kanwar v. State of M.P. and others, I.L.R. 2023 M.P. 1350. 6. Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/OICL, while opposing the submissions advanced by Mr. Anshul Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the scope of judicial review is limited and the power of judicial review conferred on constitutional court or tribunal is not that of an appellate authority but is confined only to decision making process for which he would rely upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of State of Karnataka and another v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 and Union of India and others v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617. He would further submit that since the charges of not inspecting the vehicle and not ascertaining the previous insurance details were found proved partly, the petitioner has been punished departmentally by the disciplinary authority which was partly modified by the second appellate authority. As such, the learned Single Judge is absolutely justified in declining to interfere with the finding recorded by the appellate authority and therefore the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned amicus curiae, has brought to the notice of this Court the scope of judicial review in departmental enquiry, as the finding of guilt can be interfered with where the finding of guilt is based on conjectures and surmises and he has brought out the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 and State Bank of India v. A.G.D. Reddy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1064 and would also submit that the principle for consideration in respect of delay in initiating departmental enquiry would be, if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it and it has to bee seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. Mr. Tamaskar, learned amicus, has brought to the notice of this Court the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 to bolster his plea that long delay in initiation and conclusion of departmental enquiry causes serious prejudice to the delinquent officer. Finally, he has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2006) 4 SCC 713 in support of his contention that the disciplinary authority is bound to consider relevant decisions of the courts particularly when it is of civil court and it is being inter partes which are relevant. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Scope of interference in Departmental Enquiry: - 9. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. Scope of interference in Departmental Enquiry: - 9. In Ajai Kumar Srivastava's case (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself, and observed in paragraphs 24 & 27 as under: - "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings." 10. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings." 10. Similarly, recently, in Subrata Nath's case (supra), relying upon the earlier decisions, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have summed up the legal position and held that in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons as enumerated in the matter of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 and observed as under: - "21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor." 11. In P. Gunasekaran’s case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently held as under: - “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. In P. Gunasekaran’s case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court pertinently held as under: - “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.” 12. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in A.G.D. Reddy's case (supra) in which it has been held by their Lordships as under: - “42. It is now well settled that the scope of judicial review against a departmental enquiry proceeding is very limited. It is not in the nature of an appeal and a review on merits of the decision is not permissible. The scope of the enquiry is to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and to ensure that the findings are not bereft of any evidence. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognized and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court.” 13. Keeping in mind the aforesaid parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we shall now proceed to examine whether the disciplinary authority was right in holding the petitioner guilty imposing the penalty which was ultimately modified by the appellate authority as affirmed by the learned Single Judge. 14. Admittedly, the petitioner issued cover note on 7-7-1994 putting time as 11.30 a.m. on 7-7-1994 (act only insurance policy) to cover the subject tractor-trolley belonging to one Shri Kadeem Akhtar Khan for the period from 7-7-1994 to 6-7-1995, but unfortunately, on the same day, the said tractor-trolley met with an accident fastening liability upon the Insurance Company for payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,28,640/- along with interest by the jurisdictional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by award dated 12-5-2000, in which the learned jurisdictional MACT has clearly recorded a finding that the Insurance Company/OICL has failed to establish that the cover note was issued after occurrence of the accident while fastening liability on the officers of the Insurance Company, which the respondent Insurance Company/OICL has admittedly satisfied without protest or demur. Similarly, antetiming and antedating of the cover note has also not been found established by the petitioner which was also not found established by the Enquiry Officer vide Annexure P-13 as accepted by the disciplinary authority clearly holding that the OICL has failed to prove antetiming or antedating or the act of dishonesty. Thus, the issue of antetiming and antedating of the cover note stands concluded finally against the OICL and in favour of the petitioner by the jurisdictional MACT as well as by the disciplinary authority. 15. Thus, the issue of antetiming and antedating of the cover note stands concluded finally against the OICL and in favour of the petitioner by the jurisdictional MACT as well as by the disciplinary authority. 15. The Enquiry Officer has only found the allegations pertaining to not physically inspecting the vehicle and not ascertaining the previous insurance details, proved and confirmed the charge of issue of cover note without pre-inspection of vehicle and without ascertaining previous insurance and only held that in this connection reference needs to be taken of the standing instructions regarding necessity of such inspection under certain specified circumstances and allowing exemption in third party liability or Act Only risks. Further, though the enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, but in the entire disciplinary proceedings or in the writ court, no standing instruction/circular/order has been produced to show that physical inspection of vehicle was actually required to be done while issuing cover note and expected from the petitioner to cover Act Only Risk, same was also suggested by the Enquiry Officer in his enquiry report (Annexure P-13 of the writ petition). The Enquiry Officer observed as under: - "The above documents therefore, confirm the charge of "issue of covernote without pre-inspection of vehicle and without ascertaining previous insurance." However, in this connection reference need to be taken of the standing instructions regarding necessity of such inspection under certain specified circumstances & allowing exemption in Third Party Liability or Act Only risks." 16. As such, from the aforesaid analysis, it is quite evident that, 1. antedating and antetiming of the cover note issued by the petitioner on 7-7-1994 is neither established before the jurisdictional MACT nor in the departmental enquiry; 2. the plea of pre-inspection of the vehicle and ascertaining of previous insurance policy, though available to the OICL, was not taken before the MACT, which was found proved in the departmental enquiry, which has been initiated on 12-6-2005 after a period of 11 years, as the subject cover note was issued on 7-7-1994; 3. the plea of pre-inspection of the vehicle and ascertaining of previous insurance policy, though available to the OICL, was not taken before the MACT, which was found proved in the departmental enquiry, which has been initiated on 12-6-2005 after a period of 11 years, as the subject cover note was issued on 7-7-1994; 3. the respondent Insurance Company having taken specific plea before the MACT that the cover note was antedated & antetimed without taking any plea of pre-inspection and ascertaining previous insurance details and the award having been satisfied by the Insurance Company without any challenge to the appellate forum by preferring an appeal, the disciplinary authority ought to have considered the finding of the MACT and delay of 11 years in initiating departmental enquiry; and 4. the Enquiry Officer has also opined that standing instruction has to be referred regarding necessity of such inspection for issuance of cover note for third party liability or “Act Only Risk”. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 has held that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. More particularly, it has also been held that it has to be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. 18. In M.V. Bijlani (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that long delay in initiation and conclusion of departmental enquiry should be considered by the disciplinary authority, and observed in paragraph 16 as under: - "16. ... The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer." Their Lordships also held that disciplinary proceedings being quasi- criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge, though the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt. However, the disciplinary authority cannot take into consideration the irrelevant facts and cannot shift the burden of proof and he cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. However, the disciplinary authority cannot take into consideration the irrelevant facts and cannot shift the burden of proof and he cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) while dealing with similar allegations of antedating the insurance cover note by an employee, discussed the scope of judicial review in departmental enquiry and weightage to be given by the authorities in departmental proceedings to inter partes decision of civil court based on same facts and same evidence, and held in paragraphs 32 & 46 as under: - "32. The Appellate Authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil court being inter partes was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably come to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did not apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts. He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same. 46. The matter may be considered from another angle. The order of the disciplinary authority, in view of the statutory provisions, merged with the order of the Appellate Authority as also that of the Chairman-cum- Managing Director as the appellate proceedings are in continuation of the original proceedings and, thus, the doctrine of merger shall apply. (See Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 .)" 20. The order of the disciplinary authority, in view of the statutory provisions, merged with the order of the Appellate Authority as also that of the Chairman-cum- Managing Director as the appellate proceedings are in continuation of the original proceedings and, thus, the doctrine of merger shall apply. (See Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 .)" 20. As such, in our considered opinion, though the scope of judicial review in departmental enquiry is limited to evaluation of the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself, but, in the instant case, the disciplinary authority did not traverse into the ground of inordinate delay in initiation of departmental enquiry against the petitioner, as the issuance of cover note is dated 7-7-1994 and the jurisdictional Claims Tribunal turned down the plea of the Insurance Company that the cover note was antedated and antetimed finding it failed to prove the charge and fastened the liability on 12-5-2000, which the Insurance Company had already satisfied the award without challenging it further and charge-sheet was issued after delay of 11 years from the date of issuance of cover note on 12-7-2005, which has even not been explained by the OICL. The issue of cover note antedated and antetimed stands settled by the decision of the jurisdictional Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on account of not having been challenged by the respondent Insurance Company/OICL itself. This act of the respondent OICL would show that it has not only caused serious prejudice to the petitioner/appellant herein, but the OICL was not serious in taking up the departmental enquiry as the allegation of misconduct is of 7-7-1994 and the Insurance Company had slept over its right for a considerable time of 11 years and all of a sudden, woke up from its deep slumber on 12-7-2005 and instituted departmental enquiry in which the Enquiry Officer had already concluded and found the main charge of antedating and antetiming of cover note not established. Furthermore, it is also evident on record that no standing instruction/circular/order has been brought on record to demonstrate that physical inspection of vehicle was actually required and expected from the petitioner while issuing cover note for “Act Only Risk”. Furthermore, it is also evident on record that no standing instruction/circular/order has been brought on record to demonstrate that physical inspection of vehicle was actually required and expected from the petitioner while issuing cover note for “Act Only Risk”. Moreover, it is admitted position on record that copy of cover note dated 7-7-1994 allegedly issued without pre-inspection of vehicle and without previous verification of the earlier policy, if any, was never served to the petitioner as per Annexure P-11 dated 11-10-2005 on the ground that it is not available in the city office and the Enquiry Officer has also opined that standing instruction has to be referred regarding necessity of inspection for issuance of cover note for third partly liability or “Act Only Risk”. 21. Thus, it is a case where the departmental proceeding has been initiated not only with a delay of 11 years which has caused serious prejudice to the appellant and would show complete lackadaisical approach/attitude on the part of officers of the OICL and also ignoring the finding of the jurisdictional Claims Tribunal in which it has already been held that the Insurance Company is liable to pay the amount of compensation, as it has failed to prove that the cover note was antedated and antetimed, which amounts to overreaching the order of the Claims Tribunal and which the appellate authority was bound to consider as relevant fact in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan Arya (supra). 11 years’ delay in initiating departmental enquiry is contrary to law as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ajai Kumar Srivastava’s case (supra) and N. Radhakishan’s case (supra), as unexplained delay has caused prejudice. Furthermore, unexplained delay in initiating departmental enquiry, even of 7 years, has been held to be inordinate delay by the Supreme Court in the matter of Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and others, (2013) 6 SCC 515 . The Supreme Court in N. Radhakishan’s case (supra) has deprecated the initiation of departmental enquiry after much delay that too without explaining the delay in initiating the same and held that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. The Supreme Court in N. Radhakishan’s case (supra) has deprecated the initiation of departmental enquiry after much delay that too without explaining the delay in initiating the same and held that if the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. In the matter of State of M.P. v. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738 inordinate delay of 12 years in issuing the charge memo and initiating the departmental proceedings was interfered with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it has been held that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. 22. Finally, coming to the facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered opinion that on the ground of delay in initiating departmental enquiry after 11 years from the date of alleged misconduct, the issue in question has already been concluded and attained finality by the award of the learned Claims Tribunal dated 12-5-2000 and the Insurance Company had also acted upon the said decision by which the said issue has come to finality and even thereafter, the report of the Enquiry Officer holding the charge of antedating and antetiming of the cover note has not been proved which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and only on the ground of non-inspection of the vehicle and not ascertaining the previous insurance policy details of the said vehicle, though available, was not taken by the Insurance Company before the Claims Tribunal and further, there is no standing instruction to show that physical inspection of vehicle was actually required to be done while issuing cover note and expected from the petitioner to cover Act Only Risk. It is a case where the OICL has approbated and reprobated the issue with regard to its liability as well as the OICL cannot be permitted to “blow hot blow cold” (see Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 ). 23. In that view of the matter, for the foregoing reasons, the order of guilt recorded against the appellant herein/writ petitioner by the disciplinary authority accepted by the appellate authority, though punishment has partly been reduced by the appellate authority as accepted by the impugned order by the learned Single Judge, is hereby set aside. 23. In that view of the matter, for the foregoing reasons, the order of guilt recorded against the appellant herein/writ petitioner by the disciplinary authority accepted by the appellate authority, though punishment has partly been reduced by the appellate authority as accepted by the impugned order by the learned Single Judge, is hereby set aside. Consequently, the appellant herein/writ petitioner is entitled for all consequential benefits on account of setting aside the order of the aforesaid authorities and that of the writ court also. 24. The writ appeal is allowed to the extent sketched herein-above leaving the parties to bearing their own cost(s). 25. This Court appreciates the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Advocate, who in short notice not only made submissions on the point in issue, but also submitted written synopsis along with citations relevant for the purpose of resolving the controversy. We place his assistance on record.