JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 04.11.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 354, 323, 427 & 506 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code(for short “IPC”). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 354, 323, 427 & 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. It was asserted that the informant (the name being withheld to protect her identity), her sons and her husband were travelling in an Alto car bearing registration No. HP16-1982 being driven by the informant’s sons. The informant’s husband had undergone an operation in the Sanjeevni Nursing Home at Solan, H.P. for the removal of a Gallbladder stone and Hernia. When they reached at village Mashobra (Nohra) at about 9:00 p.m. an Indica Car was parked in the middle of the road. Its registration plate was covered with cloth. There was insufficient space to enable the other vehicle to cross. The informant thought that Indica car was defective; hence, they stopped their car behind the Indica car. Accused Ramesh and Satish came out of the Indica car. They were intoxicated. They went towards the informant’s car. Accused Ramesh dragged the informant’s son from the driving seat and pushed him towards the gorge. Accused Satish caught the informant’s breast and tried to drag her out of the vehicle. Her shirt was torn in the incident. They (accused) could not see the informant’s husband and son sitting in the rear seat of the vehicle but when they started shouting, the accused became aware of their presence. The informant’s husband came out of the vehicle and tried to intervene but the accused pushed him. They also gave beatings to the informant’s son. Lucky reached the spot after hearing the cries. A vehicle also reached on the spot in which Shyam Lal (PW-2) and Sushil Kumar (PW-3) were sitting. The informant’s husband came out of the vehicle and tried to intervene but the accused pushed him. They also gave beatings to the informant’s son. Lucky reached the spot after hearing the cries. A vehicle also reached on the spot in which Shyam Lal (PW-2) and Sushil Kumar (PW-3) were sitting. They tried to intervene but they were also beaten by the accused persons. The accused person damaged the windscreen of the Alto car with a stone. They threatened to kill the informant party and told that they were saved by other persons but they would not be saved on the next occasion. Informant’s husband started feeling pain and he was taken to the hospital. The matter could not be reported on the same day and it was reported on 29.09.2007. An F.I.R. (Ext.PW-1/A) was registered at the police station. ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) conducted the investigation. He asked the photographer to take photographs of the damaged windscreen. R.D. Prashhar (PW-5) took the photographs (Ext. PX-1 and PX-2). ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) went to the spot on 02.10.2007 and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-6/A). The informant produced her shirt (Ext.P-1) and Bra (Ext.P-2), which were put in a cloth parcel and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘D’. These were seized vide seizure memo (Ext.PW-1/B). The seal impression (Ext. PW-6/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth and the seal was handed over to witness Sham Lal after its use. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. The challan was prepared and it was presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 354, 323, 427 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Informant (PW-1) and her son Sandeep (PW-4) narrated the incident. Shyam Lal (PW-2) and Satish Kumar (PW-3) reached the spot in a vehicle. R.D. Prashar (PW-5) took the photographs. ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They stated that the witnesses deposed against them falsely due to the enmity between the parties. No defence was sought to be adduced by them. 6. R.D. Prashar (PW-5) took the photographs. ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They stated that the witnesses deposed against them falsely due to the enmity between the parties. No defence was sought to be adduced by them. 6. The learned Trial Court held that there were major contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The photographs were not proved as their negatives were not brought on record. There was a discrepancy regarding the date on which the clothes were taken and the place where they were taken. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, due to which the prosecution case became suspect. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused persons. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the appellant/State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence from proper perspective. Unrealistic standards were set to evaluate the prosecution evidence. The independent witnesses have supported the prosecution case and there was nothing to show that they were making false statements. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time. The photographs were taken with the help of a digital camera, which does not have any negative. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding the photographs on the ground that there was no negative. It was not necessary to conduct a medical examination and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC is not proved in the absence of the medical examination. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. O.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The independent witnesses had supported the prosecution case and there was nothing in their cross-examination to discard their testimonies. The learned Trial Court had set unrealistic standards for the evaluation of the prosecution evidence. The prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The independent witnesses had supported the prosecution case and there was nothing in their cross-examination to discard their testimonies. The learned Trial Court had set unrealistic standards for the evaluation of the prosecution evidence. The prosecution version was duly corroborated by the damage to the windscreen of the informant’s car. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside and the respondents/accused be convicted of the commission of charged offences. 10. Mr. O.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. He submitted that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police and the prosecution has not provided any satisfactory reason for the delay in lodging the F.I.R. The learned Trial Court was justified in evaluating the evidence produced before it with due care and caution. There was enmity between the parties and the possibility of false implication could not be ruled out. The independent witnesses were also related to the complainant/informant and their presence on the spot was highly suspicious. The medical examination of the informant party was not conducted and the prosecution version was inherently suspect. The learned Trial Court had rightly discarded the evidence led by the prosecution. He prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal is filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that an appeal against acquittal cannot be allowed merely on the difference of opinion. It was observed: “25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that th e possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The “two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19] : (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus : (SCC p. 643, para 9) ‘9. … We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on whi ch acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.’” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522], the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807 ]). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320]).” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The incident had taken place on 27.09.2007 at about 9:00 p.m. The matter was reported to the police on 29.09.2007 at 6:00 p.m. The informant stated that she had to take her husband to the Sanjeevni Hospital, Solan, due to which the matter could not be reported earlier. This explanation has not been established satisfactorily. She stated in cross-examination that Solan Police Station is located at Kotla Nala, which is before the Sanjeevni Hospital. She has not visited the police station. She volunteered to say that she was concerned about her husband’s health. They reached Sanjeevni Hospital after the incident at 10:45 p.m. on 27.09.2007. The doctor was not available in the hospital. An employee met them in the hospital and the doctor checked them at 7:00 a.m. on the next morning. They went to the informant’s brother's house on 27.09.2007 at 11:00 p.m. They did not visit the Government hospital because her husband was being treated in the Sanjeevni Hospital. She had not narrated anything to the Doctor about the incident. She had not informed the police on 27.09.2007 and 28.09.2007. She volunteered to say that her Police Station was located at Sarahan. 15. It is apparent from her cross-examination that the explanation provided by her that her husband was ill and her priority was to get him treated has not been established satisfactorily. They reached Sanjeevni Hospital at 10:45 p.m. but the Doctor was not available. They left at 11:00 pm and stayed at the house of the informant’s brother. 16. The fact that the condition of the informant’s husband was critical is not corroborated by her conduct. She had not taken her husband to the Government hospital on the pretext that he was being treated in the Sanjeevni Hospital. If the condition of the informant’s husband was critical and the doctor was not available at Sanjeevni Hospital, she would have taken him to the next available doctor but no such act was done. No effort was made by them to report the matter to the police on the same night or the next date even though the Police Station was located at Kotla Nala. Therefore, the explanation furnished by the informant regarding the delay in reporting the matter to the police has not been established satisfactorily. No effort was made by them to report the matter to the police on the same night or the next date even though the Police Station was located at Kotla Nala. Therefore, the explanation furnished by the informant regarding the delay in reporting the matter to the police has not been established satisfactorily. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. The prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 17. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 18. Therefore, the prosecution case is to be seen with due care and caution keeping in view the delay in reporting the matter. 19. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that she knew the accused before the incident. They are related to her as her brothers. She denied that she had filed the present case at the instance of her brother-in-law. Therefore, the prosecution case is to be seen with due care and caution keeping in view the delay in reporting the matter. 19. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that she knew the accused before the incident. They are related to her as her brothers. She denied that she had filed the present case at the instance of her brother-in-law. She denied that her brother- in-law had encroached upon the land of accused Satish Kumar and that he was not permitting the accused to cultivate the land. 20. Her statement shows that the incident had taken place without any reason. She claimed that the accused were related to her as her brothers but she has not given any reason as to why they would attempt to outrage her modesty and push her family members into a gorge. This shows that she was not disclosing the complete truth before the Court and was withholding some material information from the Court, which would make her testimony suspect. 21. The informant stated in her cross-examination that the name of the place of incident was Narti or Mashobra. There were 3-5 houses at the place of the incident. Her son stated in his cross-examination that Mashobra has 4-5 houses located in different places. Sushil Kumar (PW-3) stated that there were 1-3 houses at the place of the incident ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) on the other hand stated that there was no house at the place of the incident and the place of the incident was Nohra. It shows that the witnesses are giving different descriptions of the place of the incident and the place of the incident has not been established satisfactorily. 22. Shyam Lal (PW-2) in his cross-examination has stated that he was working as a driver with the younger brother of Satish Kumar and he had left the vehicle after a quarrel. He did not quarrel with Ashwani Kumar. 23. Sushil Kumar (PW-3) stated in his cross-examination that the informant is related to him and he belongs to her village. These statements show that the independent witnesses are not truly independent witnesses. 24. Sushil Kumar (PW-3) is related to the informant and Shyam Lal quarrelled with the younger brother of the accused Satish Kumar due to which he had to leave the job. Their presence on the spot is not natural. They are chance witnesses. These statements show that the independent witnesses are not truly independent witnesses. 24. Sushil Kumar (PW-3) is related to the informant and Shyam Lal quarrelled with the younger brother of the accused Satish Kumar due to which he had to leave the job. Their presence on the spot is not natural. They are chance witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with due care and caution. It was observed: Chance witness 29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13) “12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9 who are independent witnesses by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained as to how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same. 13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses” it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter explaining their presence.” 30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras21-23) “21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: If the offence is committed in a street only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanati on for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country like India where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of e xplaining their presence. 22. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country like India where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of e xplaining their presence. 22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ). 23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident may also be taken into consideration particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.” 25. It was specifically asserted that Lucky reached on the spot and rescued the informant from the accused. However, the prosecution has not examined Lucky in the present case. Hence, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding him. 26. It was specifically asserted that Lucky reached on the spot and rescued the informant from the accused. However, the prosecution has not examined Lucky in the present case. Hence, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding him. 26. The medical examination of the informant’s husband or any other person was not conducted to corroborate the prosecution version that the accused persons had beaten them.As per the informant, the accused had caught the informant from her breast and her clothes were torn in the incident. However, she had not stated that any injury was caused to her in the incident. She was not even subjected to a medical examination to show that she had suffered any injury. It is highly unbelievable that an incident in which the informant’s clothes were torn would not have resulted in any injury to the informant. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for not conducting the medical examination. 27. A heavy reliance was placed on the photographs of the vehicle. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that there was a discrepancy in the place of taking photographs. R.D. Prashar (PW-5) stated in his cross-examination that he had taken photographs outside his shop. ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) on the other hand stated in his cross-examination that photographs were taken at the Police Station. 28. Similarly, there was a discrepancy regarding the place where the clothes were seized. ASI Shiv Ram (PW-6) stated that the clothes were produced by the informant on the spot but the informant on the other hand stated that the clothes were produced by her in her home. 29. These discrepancies assume significance because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. The testimony of the informant is not satisfactory and she has withheld material information from the Court. The presence of chance witnesses was not established on the spot and Lucky was not examined. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution version was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with the same while deciding the appeal against the acquittal. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution version was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with the same while deciding the appeal against the acquittal. 30 In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 31. A copy of this judgment along with the record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.