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2024 DIGILAW 359 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Hans Raj

2024-09-30

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25.10.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Theog, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Sandeep Kumar (PW-2) was posted as HHG in Police Station Kotkhai in the year 2008. He was on a V.I.P. duty on 13.06.2008 on Jubbal-Kotkhai road. At about 1:20 PM, a vehicle bearing registration No. HP63-1318 pick-up Tempo Trax came on a high speed from Gumma and hit a child. His mother Amita Nanda ( PW-5) was walking with him. The child was crushed under the tyres of the vehicle. He was taken to Civil Hospital, Kotkhai but he succumbed to his injuries on the way to the hospital. The accused was driving the vehicle and the accident had occurred due to his high speed and negligence. Sandeep Kumar made a statement to HC Baldev Singh (PW11) who reduced it into writing (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the police station where FIR (Ext. PW-10/A) was registered. HC Baldev Singh (PW-11) conducted the investigation. He prepared a site plan (Ext. PW-11/A). He took the photographs with the help of an official camera but those photographs could not be developed and the negative (Ext. PW-11/B) were retained on record. Accused Hans Raj produced the vehicle bearing registration No. HP63-1318 along with the documents which were seized vide memo (Ext. PW-1/B). The inquest of the dead body was conducted and a report (Ext. PW-11/C) was prepared. An application (Ext. PW-7/B) was made for the post-mortem examination of the deceased child. Dr Pankaj Saki (PW-7) conducted the post- mortem examinationu of the deceased child and found that he had died due to a heaod injury. He issued the report (Ext. PW-7/A). The dead body was handed over to Mohit Nanda vide memo (Ext. PW-11/D). The articles being transported in the vehicle were handed over to Ramesh Chand (PW-3) vide memo (Ext. PW-1/C). The mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by HConstable Rajinder Singh (PW-13) who issued the report (Ext. He issued the report (Ext. PW-7/A). The dead body was handed over to Mohit Nanda vide memo (Ext. PW-11/D). The articles being transported in the vehicle were handed over to Ramesh Chand (PW-3) vide memo (Ext. PW-1/C). The mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by HConstable Rajinder Singh (PW-13) who issued the report (Ext. PW-13/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. The learned Trial Court put Notice of Accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Constable Sohan Singh (PW-1) carried rukka to the police station. Sandeep Kumar (PW-2) reported the matter to the police. Ramesh Chand (PW-3) was travelling in the vehicle with the accused. Nikhil Thakur (PW-4), Upesh (PW-14), and Amita Nanda (PW-5) are the eyewitnesses. Vishal Nanda (PW-6) is the father of the child, Dr. Pankaj Saki (PW-7) conducted the post- mortem examinationu of the child. Ravinder Mehta (PW-8) is the witness to the moemo. Tameshwar Thakur (PW-9) prepared the challan. HCC Mohan Singh (PW-10) signed the FIR. HC Baldev Singh (PW-11) conducted the investigation. Constable Pradeep Kumar (PW-12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Constable Rajinder Singh (PW-13) conducted the mechanical examination Hof the vehicle. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. admitted that the vehicle and documents were taken in possession. He admitted that he was driving the vehicle and the vehicle was carrying the articles of Ramesh Chand. He denied that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed. He stated that the child was going with his mother. The child left the hand of his mother and tried to cross the road. The accused had reported the matter to the police himself. He admitted that the child was taken to the hospital and he succumbed to his injuries on the way. He stated that he had stopped his vehicle to give a pass to another vehicle. The mother of the deceased child was negligent. He examined Pradeep Dopta (DW-1) in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the mother and uncle of the victim were not satisfactory. He stated that he had stopped his vehicle to give a pass to another vehicle. The mother of the deceased child was negligent. He examined Pradeep Dopta (DW-1) in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the mother and uncle of the victim were not satisfactory. The site plan shows that two vehicles could pass each other with difficulty. The defence version that the child had left the hand of his mother and suddenly tried to cross the road appeared to be highly p robable. In any case, when two versions appeared on the record, the version in favour of the accused was to be preferred. A driver cannot avoid an accident if a pedestrian suddenly comes in front of his vehicle. The negligence of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a superficial manner. The learned Trial Court failed to view the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective. It has set an unrealistic standard to evaluate the prosecution evidence. The testimonies of the witnesses were discarded without any reason. It was duly proved that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the accused. The child was crushed under the tyres of the vehicle. The road was quite wide. The place was busy and the accused should huave driven the vehicle carefully. Learned Trial Court faileod to appreciate all these facts. Hence, it was prayed thaCt the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Ms. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, Ms. Sheetal Vyas, Ms. Jai Prabha and Ms Tejasvi Thakur, learned counsel, for the respondent/accused. 9. Ms Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material on record. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, Ms. Sheetal Vyas, Ms. Jai Prabha and Ms Tejasvi Thakur, learned counsel, for the respondent/accused. 9. Ms Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material on record. It was duly proved by the testimonies of the mother and uncle of the deceased that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed and he had not stopped the vehicle after the accident which shows the negligence of the accused. The place of the accident was quite busy and the accused should have driven the vehicle slowly taking care of the pedestrian walking on the road. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms. Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent/accused supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial court and submitted that no interference is required with it. The mother and uncle of the deceased were interested witnesses. Other witnesses including the HHG Sandeep Kumar (PW-2) had supported the defence version that the child left the hand of his mother and suddenly ran in the middle of the road. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that two versions appeared on record and the version in favour of the defence was to be accepted as correct. Thus, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by thue Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been otaken based on the material on record. The Court will not ligChtly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: “25. The Court will not ligChtly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: “25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evHidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not m eant to be reversed on a mere difference of opiniotn. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The “two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the courts and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [ Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka , (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19] : (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acHquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus : (SCC p. 643, para 9) ‘9. … We are constorained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.’” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586 ] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807] ). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, thte appellate court must be extremely slow in rinterfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] ).” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Sandeep Kumar (PW-2) stated that the child was walking with his mother. He was hit by the vehicle and the child Hwas crushed under the tyre of the vehicle. He was taken to Hospital. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Sandeep Kumar (PW-2) stated that the child was walking with his mother. He was hit by the vehicle and the child Hwas crushed under the tyre of the vehicle. He was taken to Hospital. This witness was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted in his cross-examination by learned APP that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed and it hit the child walking on the side of the road. The accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle. He admitted in his cross-examination by learned defence counsel that the child left the hand of his mother and ran in the middle of the road. The vehicle was moving at a speed which is less than the normal speed. The driver could not have done anything to avoid the accident because the child suddenly ran in the middle of the road. 15. The testimony of this witness does not support the prosecution case. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that the child left the hand of his mother and suddenly ran in the middle of the road. He also admitted that the driver could not have avoided the accident. Hence, the prosecution cannot take any advantage from his testimony. 16. Ramesh Chand (PW-3) was the occupant of the vehicle. He stated that the child left the hand of his mother. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied in his cross- examination by learned APP that the child was walking on the road side and the vehicle had hit the child. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in the cross- examination by learned counsel for the defence that the shop of the child's father was towards the other side of the road. The child left the hand of his mother and ran towards the other side towards the shop. There was no negligence on the part of the accused. 17. It is apparent from the testimony of this witness that he has also not supported the prosecution version; rather he has supported the defence version that the child had left the hand of his mother and he suddenly crossed the road which caused the accident. 18. Upesh (PW-14) is another witness. 17. It is apparent from the testimony of this witness that he has also not supported the prosecution version; rather he has supported the defence version that the child had left the hand of his mother and he suddenly crossed the road which caused the accident. 18. Upesh (PW-14) is another witness. He stated that the vehicle came at a normal speed. A woman was standing on the roadside. A child was standing with her. The vehicle hit the child and the child sustained injuries. He stated in cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that the shop of the child's father is towards the other side of the road. The woman had one child on her left and the second child was standing on the road. He could not say that the child left the hand of his mother and suddenly ran towards the other side of the road. He volunteered to say that he was at a distance of 5-7 feet and could not see these things. He admitted that in case a child suddenly crosses the road the driver could not do anything. 19. The statement of this witness is also not satisfactory. He stated in the cross-examination that he was standing at a distance of 5-7 feet and could not say that the child had left the hand of his mother. This shows that he is not an eyewitness. 20. Nikhil Thakur (PW-4) stated thatH a vehicle came from Shimla which was going towards Rohru. The vehicle was being driven at a high speed. The vehicle hit the child and crushed the child under the tyre. The accused was driving the vehicle and the accident had taken place due to his negligence. He stated in his cross-examination that the child was the son of his sister. He admitted that the place of the accident was heavily populated. He denied that the place of the accident was not wide. He claimed that the road was widened at the place of the incident. He could not say that the vehicle of the accused was loaded. He denied that he was not present on the spot at the time of the incident. He denied that the vehicle was being driven slowly. 21. Amita Nanda (PW-5) stated that on 13.06.2008 at about 1:20 pm she was going to the shop with her minor son Viren. He could not say that the vehicle of the accused was loaded. He denied that he was not present on the spot at the time of the incident. He denied that the vehicle was being driven slowly. 21. Amita Nanda (PW-5) stated that on 13.06.2008 at about 1:20 pm she was going to the shop with her minor son Viren. A vehicle was going towards Jubbal at a high speed. She had caught the hand of the child. The vehicle hit her child at a high speed. The driver did not stop the vehicle. The accused was driving the vehicle. The child was taken to hospital but he succumbed to his injuries on the way. She stated in her cross- examination that the place is heavily populated near her residence. 4-5 shops are located at the place of the accident. She admitted that the vehicle was loaded but she claimed that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed and the driver appeared to be intoxicated. She denied that the child had left her hand and hit the rear tyre of the vehicle. 22. The statements of these witnesses show that they have attributed high speed as the cause of the accident. They have not given the approximate speed of the vehicle. Amita Nanda (PW-5) stated in her cross-examination that she could not say what was the speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal Saha v. State of West Bengal, 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term high-speed amounts to nothing unless the notion of the speed of the witness is to be ascertained from him. It was observed: “Prafulla Kumar Dey, no doubt, in court stated that the appellant's bus was coming at high speed; but this statement appears to be an improvement on his earlier evidence given during the investigation when he did not mention to the investigating officer that the bus was running at high speed. Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man a speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be reasonable speed. Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man a speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was dHriving the bus rashly and negligently.” 23. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1508 that the use of the term high speed is not sufficient to infer rashness or ne gligence. It was observed: 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a “high speed” does not bespeak either “negligence” or “rashness” by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately as to what they meant by “high speed”. “High speed” is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by “high speed” in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of “rashness” or “negligence” could be drawn by invoking the maxim “res ipsa loquitur”. There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure.” 24. This Court took a similar view in State of H.P. v. Amar Nath, Latest HLJ 2018 (HP) Suppl. There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure.” 24. This Court took a similar view in State of H.P. v. Amar Nath, Latest HLJ 2018 (HP) Suppl. 763 , and held as under: - “18 It would be noticed that the instant is a case where apart from the bare statement of PW-1 that the vehicle was being driven by the petitioner at a high speed, there was no attempt made to establish that there was any rash and negligent act on the part of theH driver of the vehicle. “High speed” is an expression which is relative and subjective. Therefore, merely because the vehicle was being driven at a high speed does not mean that the driver was driving rashly and negligently.” 25. A similar view was taken in Yash Pal Rana v. State of Himachal Pradesh Latest HLJ 2019 (HP) (Suppl.) 171 , wherein it was observed:- “9. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds no specific evidence led on record by the prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving by the petitioner-accused. As has been taken note of above, PW-1 in a very casual manner has only stated that the offending vehicle was being driven at high speed, but high speed cannot be a criteria to conclude rash and negligent driving, rather to prove guilt, if any, under Section 279 IPC, it is/was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove act of rashness and negligent so as to endanger the human life. But in the case at hand, the prosecution has not been able to place on record specific evidence, if any, with regard to rash and negligent acts, if any of the accused, which endangered human life. 26. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the use of the term high speed by the witnesses. 27. In any case, the prosecution's version that the accident was caused due to the high speed of the vehicle was not proved. It was admitted by the prosecution witnesses that the vehicle was loaded; therefore it could not have a very high speed. 27. In any case, the prosecution's version that the accident was caused due to the high speed of the vehicle was not proved. It was admitted by the prosecution witnesses that the vehicle was loaded; therefore it could not have a very high speed. The witnesses stated that the vehicle was being driven at a normal speed which appears to be probable keeping in view the fact that the vehicle was loaded and the articles loaded in the vehicle were handed over the Ramesh. 28. Amita Nanda (PW-5) stated that the accused was intoxicated which is not the case of the prosecution. It shows that she is trying to implicate the accused by going to any extent and this would make her testimony suspect. It was held by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1 990 ACJ 598: 1991 Cri LJ 771 : (1990) 2 TAC 261 that the witnesses are thoroughly prejudicial in accident cases and the Court has to be careful while evaluating their testimonies. It was observed at page 599: “12. While dealing with such type of cases, care has to be taken that evidence adduced is sometimes thoroughly prejudicial against the motorist Chances of exaggerating the events are not sometimes uncommon. Witnesses are also influenced by prejudices against the offender. Therefore, simply because a life has been cut short, the matter has not to be approached with jaundice style. The matter has to be scanned, assessed and appreciated in the right perspective.” 29. Pradeep Dopta (DW-1) was cited as a prosecution witness but was given up. He stated that a vehicle bearing registration No. HP63-1318 was being driven at a normal speed. A child was walking with his mother. He left the hand of his mother and was crushed under the tyre of the vehicle. He stated in his cross-examination that he knew the accused from the date of the accident. He had seen the vehicle from a distance of about 20 feet. 10-15 people weure present on the spot. The child and his mother were at oa distance of 5-7 feet. The vehicles crossed the spot wherCe he was standing. The child's mother was talking to some other women but he does not know her name. 30. The presence of this witness cannot be doubted because he was cited as an eyewitness by the prosecution. The child and his mother were at oa distance of 5-7 feet. The vehicles crossed the spot wherCe he was standing. The child's mother was talking to some other women but he does not know her name. 30. The presence of this witness cannot be doubted because he was cited as an eyewitness by the prosecution. He was given up by the prosecution as repetitive. Thus, his credibility was not doubted by the prosecution. There is nothing on record to doubt his testimony and learned Trial Court had rightly accepted his testimony. 31. Pradeep Dopta (DW-1), Sandeep Kumar (PW2) and Ramesh Chand (PW-3) have consistently stated that the child had left the hand of his mother and suddenly crossed the road which led to the accident. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 758 that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident and he cannot be held liable for negligence. It was observed at page 759: - “4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case Dayanand PW 1 that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the Cdriver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road the bus driver, however, slowly he may be driving, may not be in a hposition to save the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 32. This Court has also taken a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598: 1991 Cri LJ 771: (1990) 2 TAC 261. It was observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. It was observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggeHrated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz., the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high spee d. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn netar about the place of the curve which frightened the crhild, cannot be considered to be without substance. uThis can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child oon the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no Cevidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got frightened on the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contacHt with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the w itnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the atct of the driver. Their versions are, therefore, colourred by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the facut that the child had been finished.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against an acquittal. 34. Consequently, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 35. The record of the learned Courts below be returned forthwith. 36. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against an acquittal. 34. Consequently, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 35. The record of the learned Courts below be returned forthwith. 36. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.