JUDGMENT Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J. Heard Sri. Ram Pratap Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Aqeel Ahmad, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In the present case dispute arose during consolidation proceedings in regard to Khata Nos.333 and 254 which were recorded in the basic year in the name of original petitioner (Nokhai). 3. An objection was filed by Raghubar, (original respondent no.4). 4. Case of objectors was that land in dispute belonged to one Pheru and after his death it was inherited by Smt. Sumari being his widow who died later on in the year 1953. It was further contended by them that Smt. Sumari left behind two daughters namely Smt. Jagdei and Smt. Hardei who inherited the holding. 5. Raghubar claimed his right as heir of Smt. Hardei as her husband. Smt. Jagdei claimed her rights as daughter of Pheru and Smt. Sumari. 6. A counter objection was filed by original petitioner Nokhai claiming that land in dispute was a joint family property. He was a co-tenant with Smt. Sumari who relinquished her share in his favour in the year 1953 by an agreement. On basis of said agreement, mutation was also recorded and his name was alone recorded till the commencement of consolidation proceedings. Original petitioner has denied claim of original respondent no.4 (Smt. Jagdei and Smt. Hardei) that they were not daughters of aforesaid Pheru, but daughters of another Pheru a resident of same village. 7. Earlier same dispute was raised between parties which came up to High Court also at interim stage, however since consolidation commenced, therefore, abated. 8. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 21.2.1975 dismissed objections filed by Raghubar and original respondent no.4. 7. Earlier same dispute was raised between parties which came up to High Court also at interim stage, however since consolidation commenced, therefore, abated. 8. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 21.2.1975 dismissed objections filed by Raghubar and original respondent no.4. Relevant part of said order is extracted below: ^^iSekb'k fnukad 12] 11] 14 o 20] 8] 17 ds voyksdu ls Li"V Kkr gksrk gS fd Qs: pekj ckx cgkj dh nks yMfd;kWa iSnk gqbZ Fkh txnsbZ dh voLFkk 60 o"kZ crk;h x;h gS vkSj og bl izdkj 1914 dh iSnk gqbZ izrhr gksrh gS ysfdu dksbZ Hkh dkxtkr [kkrk 254 ds lEcU/k esa ugh fn;k x;k gS fd Kkr gks lds fd fookfnr Hkwfe ds Hkh QS: ds uke vafdr Fkk vr% Qs: ds LFkku ij ojklru dk izJ ugha mBrk gS ;g [kkrk rugk uks[kbZ ds uke gS vkSj mldk rugk dCtk Hkh xokg ds c;ku o ekyxqtkjh dh jlhnksa ls Kkr gS vr% oknhx.k j?kqoj o txnsbZ dk lR; izekf.kr ugha gksrk gS nhokuh ds U;k;ky;ksa ds fu.kZ; dk oS/kkfud egRo ugha gS D;ksafd og vcsV gks x;s gSA oknhx.k ds xokg fclbZ iq= dju dk c;ku Hkh nq'euh dks izekf.kr djrk gS vr% mls fudky nsus ds ckn Jherh gjnsbZ dh 'kgknrLorU= jg tkrh gSA vr% rudhg dk fu.kZ; fo:) j?kqoj Jherh txnsbZ fn;k x;kA rudhg ua0 5 o 6%& bl [kkrk dh Hkwfe ds lEcU/k esa oknhx.k dk dksbZ nkok ugha gSA vr% fcuk fookn ds mudk gd fu.kZ; ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS rlnhd [krkSuh ds le; Jherh lksekjh dk mRrjkf/kdkjh uks[kbZ fy[kk x;k gS mlh dk dCtk Hkh xkVk la0 2110@&330 ij fy[kk x;k gSA nksuks rudhg dk fu.kZ; cgd uks[kbZ fn;k x;k gSA** 9. As referred above, Consolidation Officer has held that there was no document which could suggest that the land in dispute (Khata No.254) was in name of Pheru, therefore, there was no right of inheritance of Pheru and land in dispute was recorded in name of original petitioner (Nokhai). It was also noted that since other civil proceedings were abated, therefore, orders passed therein have no legal consequence. 10. Above referred order was challenged by Raghubar and Smt. Jagdei jointly. Other objectors have not challenged the said order. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that appeal was belatedly filed. 12. It was also noted that since other civil proceedings were abated, therefore, orders passed therein have no legal consequence. 10. Above referred order was challenged by Raghubar and Smt. Jagdei jointly. Other objectors have not challenged the said order. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that appeal was belatedly filed. 12. Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation vide order dated 15.12.1975 allowed the appeal of respondent in part and modified order of Consolidation Officer to extent that only Arazi Nos.2011, 2925, 2127, 1891, 2010, 3863, 3864, 3865, 3866, 3889, 3890 and 2175 of Khata No.254 be recorded in the name of sole appellant and name of original petitioner was expunged. However, in regard to other numbers, name of contesting respondents along with Nokhai was recorded to the extent of 1/2 as co-tenant and half share each in the name of sole appellant. However, in regard to other numbers, name of contesting respondents along with Nokhai was recorded to the extent of 1/2 as co-tenant and half share each in the name of sole appellant. Relevant part of the order is mentioned hereinafter: ^^lu~ 1360 yxk;r 1369 Q0 dh udy [krkSuh izLrqr gS mlesa [kkrk la0 254 lksekjh ds uke rugk ntZ gS [kkrk la0 333 uks[kbZ lksekjh ds uke ntZ gSA mRrjoknh ds /kkjk 9 ds vkifRr esa ;g ugha gS fd nksuksa yMfd;ka Qs: dh gS [kkrk la0 254 dh vkjkth;kr rugk lksekjh ds uke ntZ Fkh blfy;s bu vkjkth;kr us rugk ekfyd vkifRr vFkok vihy drkZ lkfcr gq,A fo}ku pdcUnh vf/kdkjh us vius Qslys esa txnsbZ dks Qs: o lksekjh dh yMdh ekuk gS fdUrq dksbZ izek.k blds leFkZu esa Fkk fd ;s vkjkth;kr lksekjh dh jgh gS blfy;s fo}ku pdcUnh vf/kdkjh us vihydrkZ dk uke vafdr ugha fd;k gS fdUrq 1360&1361 Q0 dh tks [krkSuh gS mlls Li"V gS gqvk fd [kkrk la0 254 dh vkjkth;kr lksekjh dh rugk jgh gS rFkkbl vkjkth;kr ij Hkh uks[kbZ dk uke xyr <+ax ls vafdr gqvk gS budk uke rugk ekfy;r vihydrkZ lkfcr gq, [kkrk la[;k 333 esa uks[kbZ] lksekjh lg[kkrsnkj Fks blfy;s bu [kkrksa ds uEcjksa esa uks[kbZ] lksekjh ds lkFk 1@2 fgLlk ikus ds vf/kdkjh gSA vkns'k vLrq vihy va'kr% Lohdkj dh x;h fo}ku pdcUnh vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k esa la'kks/ku fd;k x;k fd [kkrk la0 254 dh vkjkth la0 2011] 2925] 2127] 1891] 2010] 3863] 3864] 3865] 3866] 3889] 3890] 2175 rugk vihy drkZ ds uke lhjnkj ntZ fd;k x;k rFkk uks[kbZ dk uke [kkfjt fd;k x;k rFkk 'ks"k uEcjksa esa vihy drkZ dk uke uks[kbZ ds lkFk 1@2 Hkk ij crkSj lg[kkrsnkj ntZ fd;k x;k rFkk @2 Hkkx uks[kbZ o 1@2 Hkkx vihy drkZ dk fgLlk 'ks"k uEcjksa esa foHkkftr fd;k x;kA ckn vey njken fefly nkf[ky nQrj gks Qjhdsu lwfpr gksA** 13. It would be relevant to mention here that Consolidation Officer has rejected the right of respondents on Khata No.254 since no documentary evidence was brought on record. However, appellants (respondents herein) have placed a photo copy of Khatauni of the year 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli, before the Appellate Authority wherein Khata No.254 was recorded in the name of Smt. Sumari, therefore, respondents were granted right on this Khata also. 14. However, appellants (respondents herein) have placed a photo copy of Khatauni of the year 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli, before the Appellate Authority wherein Khata No.254 was recorded in the name of Smt. Sumari, therefore, respondents were granted right on this Khata also. 14. Original petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed a revision petition before Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh which was allowed in part vide order dated 25.1.1977 whereby the order passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation was modified to the extent that name of Smt. Jagdei alone be recorded at Arazi Nos.2011, 2125, 2127, 1891, 2010, 3863, 3864, 3865, 3866, 3889, 3890 and 2175. On remaining numbers, name of Nokhai was directed to be recorded along with Smt. Jagdei being half share. On remaining numbers, name of Nokhai was directed to be recorded along with Smt. Jagdei being half share. Relevant part of the order dated 25.1.1977 is mentioned hereinafter: ^^i{kksa dh vksj ls fo}ku vfHkHkk"kdksa ds rdksZ ,oa vfHkys[kh; lk{;ksa ls ;g Li"V gS fd j?kqoj us tks vkifRr eq0 gjnsbZ ds lksgj dh gSfl;r ls fd;k Fkk og fdlh Hkh izdkj ls Qs: ds vFkok eq0 lksekjh ds okfjl ugha gks ldrsA vxj ;g ekuk tkrk gS fd eq0 txnsbZ muh iq=h gS rks fufoZokn gS fd rc ogh mldk rugk okfjl gksxk vr,o bl laca/k esa lgk;d cUnkscLr vf/kdkjh pdcUnh dk vkns'k lgh ugha gSA i{kksa esa 1956 ls eqdnesckth py jgh gSA fuxjkuhdrkZ ds vuqlkj eq0 gjnsbZ txnsbZ lqujk dh iqf=;ka crkbZ x;h ysfdu bl lacaU/k esa dksbZ lk{; ugha gS blds izfrdwy foi{kh dh vksj ls ;g lk{; fn;k x;k gS fd Qs: dh nks yMfd;kWa 1917] 1914 esas iSnk gqbZA ;g lgh gS fd ekStk futkbZ esa nks Qs: Fks ysfdu nwljs Qs: dh ;s yMfd;ka gS ,slk dksbZ lk{; fuxjkuhdrkZ dh vksj ls ugha fn;k x;k gS vkSj u ,slk dksbZ okn gh gSA ;g lgh gS fd nhokuh ds U;k;ky; ds U;k;ky; esa py jgs okn ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns'k fnukad 18-5-73 ls Lfkfxr gks x;k vr,o bu leLr vkns'kksa dk dksbZ egRo ugha jg tkrk ysfdu mu vkns'kksa dks ns[kus ls ;g fofnr gksrk gS fd ogkWa Hkh fuxjkuhdrkZ Li"V okn ugha ys ldk Fkk vkSj vkt Hkh Li"V :i ls lkfcr djus esa vlQy jgk gSA foi{kh eqgjk dh iq=h gSA fuxjkuhdrkZ ds nksuksa gh xokg mldh dsl dh lefFkZr djus esa vlQy jgs gS D;ksafd mudk ,d xokg fo'kqu dh mez 33 o"kZ gS ftlus iqf=;ksa ds lEca/k esa dqN ugha dgk gSA Qs: dks mUgksaus ns[kuk crk;k gS tks mudh mez ds vuqlj xyr fl) gks tkrk gSA lqfeju us Lo;a c;ku esa dgk gS fd crkSj lk{kh uks[kbZ c;ku nsus vk;k gSA vr,o mlds lk{; ls dksbZ ykHk fuxjkuhdrkZ dks ugh fey ldrkA vr,o mijksDr leLr ds vk/kkj ij eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igqapk gwWa fd lgk;d cUnkscLr vf/kdkjh pdcUnh dk vkns'k eq0 txnsbZ ds laca/k esa lgh gS ysfdu j?kqoj dks tks mUgksaus [kkrk futkbZ esa lkg[kkrsnkj ekuk gS og xyr gSA** 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that at appellate stage an additional evidence in form of a copy of Khatauni from 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli of Khata No.254 was filed. The Appellate Authority has placed complete reliance on said document and appeal was allowed on basis of such additional evidence which was further modified by Revisional Authority, however, no opportunity was granted to original petitioner to rebut the said additional evidence. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C. as well as Rule 176 of Chapter 8 (Rules relating to appeals, reference and revision) of U.P. Revenue Code Manual. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that provisions of above referred rules of U.P. Revenue Code Manual provides that Order XLI Rule 27 of C.P.C. was applicable to the Appells, therefore, it was mandatory for the Appellate Authority to comply with provisions of aforesaid rules. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Appellate Authority has to record reasons for admission of additional evidence. No opportunity was granted to the petitioner to rebut it, therefore, orders passed by Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority are liable to be set-aside. 19. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents urged that evidence brought on record before Appellate Authority was a public document, therefore, there was a presumption that it was a genuine document. Original petitioner has not tried to rebut it even at the stage of Revisional Authority or before this Court. No contrary document was placed which could dispute documents relied on by Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority i.e. Khatauni of 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli which clearly indicates that Khata No.254 was recorded solely in the name of Smt. Sumari. 20. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records. 21. As referred above, only dispute before this Court for consideration is as to whether the Appellate Authority has not committed any error by accepting revenue records as an additional evidence which was a basis to return a finding that Smt. Sumari was recorded as a sole tenant of Khata No.254? 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner by referring aforesaid submissions has submitted that above referred provisions were not followed and no opportunity to rebut it was granted to the petitioner. 23. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner by referring aforesaid submissions has submitted that above referred provisions were not followed and no opportunity to rebut it was granted to the petitioner. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Rule 176 of U.P. Revenue Code Manual which is extracted below: "Rule. 176 Application of certain provision of the Civil Procedure Code. The provisions of Rules 2 to 4, 6 to 10, 15 to 29, 31 to 37 of Order XLI, Order XLII and sections 99 and 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals from decree shall apply to appeals from orders under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act. Provided that the decree passed by the Board of Revenue may be dated and signed by the Registrar of the Board." 24. It is not under dispute that no specific ground was either taken before Revisional Court or before this Court in writ petition in support of above submission. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on following judgments to state that provisions of C.P.C. though not strictly applicable would serve as a guideline to be followed during proceedings. Cited judgments alongwith relevant paragraphs are mentioned hereinafter: (i) Raghunath Sahai v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria & Ors, 1982 ALL L.J.1427. Relevant paragraph 35 is mentioned hereinafter: "35. However, even if it be held that the provisions of O. XLI R.4. Civil, P. C. would not apply in terms to the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act but in my opinion the salutary principles enunciated therein and the judicial dicta lucidly expounded in aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court and other High Courts on the matter relating to granting appropriate relief to aggrieved party, can best serve as a guideline to be followed while granting approprite relief to aggrieved party in appeal and revision arising in proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. especially when there is no express provision to the contrary in the said Act and Rules framed thereunder." (ii) Anand Narain and 3 Others v. D.D.C. & 2 Ors, decided on 19.8.2013. Relevant Paragraph 10 is mentioned hereinafter: "10. Civil Courts are constituted under Chapter II of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887. Section 3 of the Act categorizes the civil court as (i) District Judge, (ii) Additional District Judge, (iii) Civil Judge (Sr. Relevant Paragraph 10 is mentioned hereinafter: "10. Civil Courts are constituted under Chapter II of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1887. Section 3 of the Act categorizes the civil court as (i) District Judge, (ii) Additional District Judge, (iii) Civil Judge (Sr. Division), and (iv) Civil Judge (Jr. Division) (as amended in U.P.). Thus, the consolidation authorities are not coming in any of the aforesaid categories. Similar matter has been considered by the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Arjun Tautara v. Krishna Chand AIR 1942 Patna 1 (FB), in which it has been held that the Deputy Collector and Collector while trying cases or hearing appeals under Orissa Tenancy Act are Revenue Courts and not Civil Courts, although they may be trying suits or proceedings of civil nature. This issue again came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Bijai Narain Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others AIR 1970 Allahabad 241 (FB). Paragraphs 32 and 35 of the judgment are relevant, which are quoted below: "32. It may now be seen as to whether the various authorities constituted under the Act are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. On an examination of the various provisions of the Act it would appear that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Some limited powers have been specifically given under Section 38 and enlarged by Rule 26, which have been again supplemented by Section 41, which says that the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act. On a perusal of the provisions of Section 38 and Rule 26 it would appear that they make a mention of the application of only some provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the same way the provisions in Chapter IX and X of the Land Revenue Act show that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings under that Act also. As such, it could not be held that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. As such, it could not be held that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Had the intention of the legislature been to make all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings under the Act, it could have said so just in one sentence. 35. It would thus appear that the various authorities constituted under the Act can neither be held to be Courts of civil jurisdiction nor governed by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. It follows, therefore, that the petitioners cannot verify the affidavits to be filed before the various authorities constituted under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act." Thus, it has been authoritatively held by this Court that the various authorities constituted under the Act can neither be held as courts of civil jurisdiction nor governed by CPC. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench, the contrary view taken by the Single Judge without taking any notice to the Full Bench decision is per incuriam and is not binding. Supreme Court in Shah Babudal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786 (paragraph-21), held that section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, the provisions of the Code does not limit or affect any special or local law. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have not been applied and in case principles of Order 22, Rule 3 (2) and Order 22, Rule 4 (3) are imported to the proceedings before the consolidation authorities, then it will certainly limit and affect the provision of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953." 26. Before further considering rival submissions, it would be relevant to extract few paragraphs of recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2022) 7 SCC 247 . Relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 are as under: "7. It is true that the general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41, Rule 27C PC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. Relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 are as under: "7. It is true that the general principle is that the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order 41, Rule 27C PC enables the appellate court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. It may also be true that the appellate court may permit additional evidence if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. However, at the same time, where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be allowed. Even, one of the circumstances in which the production of additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27C PC by the appellate court is to be considered is, whether or not the appellate court requires the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. 8. As observed and held by this Court in A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A. Subburaj Chettiar [A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A. Subburaj Chettiar, (2015) 17 SCC 713 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 514], the admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It is further observed that the true test, therefore is, whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced umar singh" (Emphasis Supplied) 27. It is not in dispute that copy of Khatauni of 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli in regard to Khata No.254 was brought on record by appellants, (contesting respondents herein) which became sole basis to hold that Khata No.254 was solely recorded in the name of Smt. Sumari. 28. It is not in dispute that copy of Khatauni of 1360 Fasli to 1369 Fasli in regard to Khata No.254 was brought on record by appellants, (contesting respondents herein) which became sole basis to hold that Khata No.254 was solely recorded in the name of Smt. Sumari. 28. It is well settled that presumption attached to revenue records can be rebutted only on basis of evidence of impeccable integrity and reliability. In this regard, few paragraphs of a judgement passed by Supreme Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 242 would be relevant which are as under: "23. In Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P. [Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P., (1986) 2 SCC 486 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 410], this Court was considering Section 28-B of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 which raises a presumption of sale of goods in a manner prescribed therein. This Court considered Section 4 of the Evidence Act and also the previous judgments and held as under: (SCC p. 496, para 14) "14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a prima facie case for party in whose favour it exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom the burden of proof lies. When presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is rebuttable it only points out the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed, and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed the purpose of presumption is over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts, and circumstances." 24. In another judgment in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823], this Court examined the presumption of fact in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In another judgment in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823], this Court examined the presumption of fact in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was held that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. It was held as under: (SCC p. 521, para 21) "21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue." 25. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted if such entry was made fraudulently or surreptitiously (Vishwa Vijay Bharati case [Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642 ] ) or where such entry has not been made by following the prescribed procedure (Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda [Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda, (2012) 13 SCC 759 : (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 419] ). Even in Guru Amarjit Singh [Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349 : AIR 1994 SC 227 ], where thirty years' old lease deed was produced, this Court had not accepted the proof of the relationship between landowner and tenant in absence of receipt of payment of rent. 26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth attached to the record-of-rights can be rebutted only if there is a fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made or that prescribed procedure was not followed. 26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth attached to the record-of-rights can be rebutted only if there is a fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made or that prescribed procedure was not followed. It will not be proper to rely on the oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption as the credibility of oral evidence vis-a-vis documentary evidence is at a much weaker level." (Emphasis Supplied) 29. As referred above, additional evidence in the form of revenue records was taken on record by Appellate Authority. 30. In revision petition filed by petitioner, no reference has been made that whether or not an opportunity was sought by the petitioner to rebut the presumption of truth attached to the said document. Even during revision petition, no such averment was taken. Argument in this regard was raised for the first time before this Court. Even in pleadings of this writ petition, no document or averment was made which could rebut the presumption of truth attributed to revenue records. 31. Objections raised by the petitioner that no opportunity was granted to rebut the additional evidence could not be justified only on basis of a bare averment. Requirement of such contra evidence should be of impeccable integrity and reliability which is not present in present case. 32. No document which could rebut the presumption of truth attached to revenue records was placed either before Appellate Authority, Revisional Authority or before this Court. 33. At this stage, it would be relevant to mention paragraph 19 of Pratap Singh (supra) which is mentioned hereinafter: 19. This Court in Vishwa Vijai Bharti v. Fakhrul Hasan & Ors. held that the entries in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of 4 (1976) 3 SCC 642 correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. This Court held as under: "14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was Made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title." 34. As discussed above, it is not the case of petitioner that revenue records were not genuine or forged or that fraudulent entries were made. Presumption of correctness of revenue revenue record could not be rebutted 35. In the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order whereby the Appellate Authority has taken note of an additional evidence i.e. revenue record and returned a finding that Khata No.254 was solely recorded in the name of Smt. Sumari as well as that there was no illegality or irregularity committed by Revisional Authority whereby a finding returned by Appellate Authority was confirmed. 36. In the aforesaid circumstances, impugned orders do not warrant any interference. 37. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.