JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present petition has been filed for seeking the arrest of respondents no. 4 and 5 in F.I.R. No. 153 of 2021, registered at Police Station, P.S. Sadar, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 325, 509 and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC, after the addition of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. 2. The petitioner informant made a statement to the police that on 06.09.2021, Maya Devi and Kanta Devi want to throw the cow dung in their fields. At about 11:30 a.m., when they crossed the house of Deep Chand, all of a sudden Deep Chand and Rohit attacked them with a Darat and a stick, respectively. The informant and other persons sustained injuries. The police registered the F.I.R. Injured were medically examined. The Medical Officer opined that Meera Devi had sustained simple injury; whereas Sunita Devi, Maya Devi and Kanta Devi had sustained grievous injuries. The police conducted the investigation. The police wanted to get the statement of the informant recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., however, she did not appear in the Court to make her statement. An F.I.R. No. 152 of 2021 was also registered against the informant and other persons for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323, 324 read with Section 34 of IPC. The police arrested Deep Chand and Rohit and released them on bail. A charge sheet was filed against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 325, 509, and 201 read with Section 34 of IPC. The police obtained the opinion from the Medical Officer of Dr Rajendra Prasad Govt. Medical College & Hospital, Tanda, District Kangra, H.P. As per the Medical Officer, the injury was grievous and the possibility of endangering the life could not be ruled out. The police added Section 307 of IPC after the receipt of the report of the Medical Officer and filed a supplementary charge sheet against the accused. 3. The petitioner filed the present petition seeking the direction to arrest respondents no. 4 and 5. It was asserted that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is non-bailable. Respondents no. 4 and 5 misused their liberty. The police are also not taking steps for their arrest. Hence, it was prayed that directions be issued to arrest respondents no. The petitioner filed the present petition seeking the direction to arrest respondents no. 4 and 5. It was asserted that the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is non-bailable. Respondents no. 4 and 5 misused their liberty. The police are also not taking steps for their arrest. Hence, it was prayed that directions be issued to arrest respondents no. 4 and 5. 4. In the present case notice was confined to respondent No.1-State only. 5. I have heard Mr. Neeraj Sharma and Ms. Deepmala Sharma learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.P. Singh, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no.1-State. 6. Mr. Neeraj Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT Delhi and another (2001) 4 SCC 280 , Hamida vs. Rashid alias Rasheed & others (2008) 1 SCC 474 and Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar 2014 (8) SCC 273 to submit that the police needed to arrest respondents No. 4 and 5 after filing supplementary charge sheet for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. The police failed to do so. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and a direction be issued to the police to arrest respondents no. 4 and 5. 7. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no.1/State submitted that the charge sheet has been filed before the Court and the police do not have any power to arrest any person. The remedy of the petitioner lies in approaching the learned Trial Court for the arrest of respondents no. 4 and 5. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 9. The police have added Section 307 of IPC based on the opinion of the Medical Board that in the case of patient Kanta Devi, the possibility of injury endangering life could not be ruled out. 10. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Atma Singh vs. State of Punjab 1980 Crim. L.J. 1220 that IPC recognizes only four kinds of injuries — simple, grievous, injuries inflicted with intent to commit murder and injuries sufficient to cause death. There is no provision in the IPC which recognizes injury dangerous to life or which endangers life. L.J. 1220 that IPC recognizes only four kinds of injuries — simple, grievous, injuries inflicted with intent to commit murder and injuries sufficient to cause death. There is no provision in the IPC which recognizes injury dangerous to life or which endangers life. The injury endangering the life falls within Section 320(8) of IPC and such an injury is grievous. It was observed:- “10. When the doctor is required to carry out a medico-legal examination of the injury suffered in a criminal assault, he is required to examine the injury from two standpoints : (1) for the purpose of opining the kind of weapon used to inflict the injury in question and, (2ndly) to form an opinion regarding the degree of seriousness of the injury in order to enable to see as to what offence has the accused committed by inflicting the injury in question. The Indian Penal Code recognises from the standpoint of seriousness only four types of injuries, (1) simple injuries; (2) grievous (3) injuries of the kind inflicted with intent to commit murder described in clauses 'Firstly' and 2ndly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, (4) injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature envisaged by clause Thirdly' of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no provision in the Indian Penal Code, which envisages or refers to an injury described as 'dangerous to life'. The medico-legal examination of an injured person is intended to enable the Investigating Agency and the Court to find out the nature of the offence and, therefore, the doctor examining an injured person has to opine that the injury in question is one or the other of the type recognised in the Indian Penal Code for the purposes of a given offence. When a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life' one has to see what had the doctor intended to convey thereby. Is one to hold that since the injury has not been described by the doctor as one which 'endangered life', so the concerned injury cannot be held to be grievous on the specious ground that an injury described as 'dangerous to life' is not as serious an injury which 'endangers life'. 11. It appears that the doctors who had been conducting the medico-legal examinations have been using the term 'dangerous to life' as synonymous with an injury, which 'endangers life'. 11. It appears that the doctors who had been conducting the medico-legal examinations have been using the term 'dangerous to life' as synonymous with an injury, which 'endangers life'. Even the Courts at times have considered an injury described as dangerous to life as an injury envisaged in clause 'Eighthly of Sec. 320 of the Indian Penal Code. In this regard reference can be made to Mahamed Rafi v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 305 : (31 Cri LJ 77). In that case, the injury was on the right side of the neck about 2 1/2" x -" in dimension inflicted with a sharp-edged weapon. The doctor had, in fact in that case deposed that there was every possibility of the deceased surviving but for the wound becoming septic apparently as a result of it being pressed with hands and bandaged with dirty cloth in the initial stages before the deceased was taken to the hospital. The Court held that though a finding that the appellant knew that his act was likely to cause death, was not justified but at the same time, a wound on the neck must at least be considered to be 'dangerous to life' within the meaning of Clause (8), Section 320, Indian Penal Code, and therefore, grievous'. 12. Palekar, J., too in Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar, 1972 Cr App R 19 : (1972 Cri LJ 469) (SC), held, a penetrating wound 1 1/2 x 1/2 x chest wall deep on the right side of the chest caused with a bhala and described as 'dangerous to life', as grievous injury and in the latter part of paragraph 11 called this injury as one endangering life. 13. The expression 'dangerous' is an adjective and the expression 'endanger' is a verb. An injury, which can put life in immediate danger of death would be an injury which can be termed as 'dangerous to life' and, therefore, when a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life', he means an injury, which endangers life in terms of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code, for, it describes the injury 'dangerous to life' only for the purpose of the said clause. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as that the injury was 'dangerous to life', meaning both times the same thing. 14. He instead of using the expression that this was an injury which 'endangered life' described it as that the injury was 'dangerous to life', meaning both times the same thing. 14. K. S. Tiwana, J. in Crl. Appeal No. 1489 of 1974, (Sukhdev Singh v. The State of Punjab), decided on January 18, 1979, was concerned with the statement of a doctor who had merely externally examined the injury and had opined it to be dangerous to life. The doctor who had performed the operation had not preferred any opinion. The injury was a penetrating wound with clean-cut margins of the size of 1 1/4" x 1/2" on the left side of the chest, 5" below the nipple. The depth of the wound was not measured by the doctor who had given the opinion. In this case, the learned Judge did not accept the opinion of the doctor that the injury was dangerous to life on the ground that he was not qualified to say so merely by looking at the injury and the one who had performed the operation and had seen the damage had not given any such opinion. The learned Judge did not go into the question that an injury described as dangerous to life in no case could be considered a grievous injury. 15. S. S. Dewan, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 1007 of 1975 (Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab) decided on February 8, 1979, observed as did S.C. Mital, J., in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) that the term 'dangerous to life' is milder than the expression 'endangers life'. He merely followed his earlier decision holding that an injury described as dangerous to life cannot be considered grievous. 16. A. S. Bains, J., in Crl. Appeal No. 355 of 1976, (Surjit Singh v. The State of Punjab), merely followed the decision in Jagrup Singh's case (1973 Chand LR (Cri) 253) (Punj) and held that injury described as 'dangerous to life' would not satisfy the requirement of clause (8) of Section 320, Indian Penal Code and would not be a grievous injury. In all these decisions, with respect, there is no discussion in depth. 17. We are of the view that the Court is not absolved of the responsibility while deciding a criminal case to form its conclusion regarding the nature of the injury, the Expert's opinion notwithstanding. In all these decisions, with respect, there is no discussion in depth. 17. We are of the view that the Court is not absolved of the responsibility while deciding a criminal case to form its conclusion regarding the nature of the injury, the Expert's opinion notwithstanding. The Court has to see the nature and dimension of the injury, its location and the damage that it has caused. Even when an injury is described as to be one which endangers the life the court has to apply its mind and form its own opinion in regard to the nature of the injury, having regard to the factors that should weigh with the Court, already mentioned. We are also firmly of the view that wherever a doctor describes an injury as 'dangerous to life’ and the nature of the injuries is such which could merit such a conclusion then such an injury has to be treated as 'grievous hurt' of the description mentioned in the first portion of clause (8) of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Therefore, prima facie it was not permissible to add Section 307 of IPC merely because the Medical Officer has stated that there is a possibility of endangering life. 12. In the present case petitioners are seeking directions to arrest respondents No. 4 and 5. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 , that arrest should be justified and no arrest should be made because it is lawful to do so. It was observed:- 20. In India, the Third Report of the National Police Commission at p. 32 also suggested: “An arrest during the investigation of a cognizable case may be considered justified in one or other of the following circumstances: (i) The case involves a grave offence like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape etc., and it is necessary to arrest the accused and bring his movements under restraint to infuse confidence among the terror-stricken victims. (ii) The accused is likely to abscond and evade the processes of law. (iii) The accused is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offences unless his movements are brought under restraint. (iv) The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offences again. (ii) The accused is likely to abscond and evade the processes of law. (iii) The accused is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offences unless his movements are brought under restraint. (iv) The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offences again. It would be desirable to insist through departmental instructions that a police officer making an arrest should also record in the case diary the reasons for making the arrest, thereby clarifying his conformity to the specified guidelines ….” The above guidelines are merely the incidents of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India. No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police lock-up of a person can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of the commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person's complicity and even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter. The recommendations of the Police Commission merely reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to a person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do. 13. Similarly, it was held in Arnesh Kumar (supra) that arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to a person to attend the Station House and not to leave the Station without permission would do. 13. Similarly, it was held in Arnesh Kumar (supra) that arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever. Therefore, it should be resorted to when it is necessary. It was observed:- 5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police has not learnt its lesson: the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. It has not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of Independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of the public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasised time and again by the courts but has not yielded the desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool for police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motives. 6. Law Commissions, Police Commissions and this Court in a large number of judgments emphasised the need to maintain a balance between individual liberty and societal order while exercising the power of arrest. Police officers make arrests as they believe that they possess the power to do so. As the arrest curtails freedom, brings humiliation and casts scars forever, we feel differently. We believe that no arrest should be made only because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of the commission of an offence made against a person. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of the commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation. Despite this legal position, the legislature did not find any improvement. The number of arrests have not decreased. Ultimately, Parliament had to intervene and on the recommendation of the 177th Report of the Law Commission submitted in the year 2001, Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”), in the present form came to be enacted. It is interesting to note that such a recommendation was made by the Law Commission in its 152nd and 154th Report submitted as back in the year 1994. The value of proportionality permeates the amendment relating to arrest. 14. It was further held that the police officer must be satisfied that an arrest is necessary only then the arrest should be made. It was held:- 7.3. In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put a question to himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What object it will achieve? It is only after these questions are addressed and one or the other conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of arrest needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first, the police officers should have reason to believe on the basis of information and material that the accused has committed the offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to be satisfied further that the arrest is necessary for one or more purposes envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 CrPC. 15. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the preservation of liberty is essential and should be curtailed only when it is essential to do so. In the present case, no reason has been given as to why this power should be exercised. 15. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the preservation of liberty is essential and should be curtailed only when it is essential to do so. In the present case, no reason has been given as to why this power should be exercised. The only reason is the addition of 307 of IPC, which prima facie appears to be doubtful in view of the position of the law notice above. 16. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati(supra), where, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Magistrate should not ordinarily grant bail in a case triable by the Sessions Court. However, this judgment is not relevant to the facts of the case. 17. In Hamida’s case (supra), the High Court exercised the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the accused was permitted to be enlarged on bail although the offence converted into the one punishable under Section 304 of IPC and the charge sheet was filed for the commission of an offence under Section 302 of IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the accused did not remain in custody for even a single day and the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should not be exercised for this purpose. In the present case, a supplementary chargesheet has been filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, the invocation of which prima facie is doubtful. It has not been shown that respondents no. 4 and 5 have misused their liberty by influencing the investigation or intimidating the witnesses. Therefore, there is no reason for arresting the accused. 18. The police have submitted the chargesheet before the Court, therefore, there is a force in the submission of Mr R.P. Singh learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no.1-State that remedy of the petitioner was to approach the learned Trial Court seeking the arrest of respondents no.4 and 5, therefore, the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. without exhaustion of this remedy is not to be exercised. 19. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 20. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.