ORDER ON BOARD : 1. This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.02.2015 (Annexure-P/1) passed by respondent No.4, whereby, petitioner’s appointment on the post of Lab Technician vide appointment order dated 24.12.2013 (Annexure-P/4), has been cancelled. 2. Facts of the case are that an advertisement was published by respondent No.4 on 16.05.2012 (Annexure-P/3) inviting applications for the various posts including Lab Technician. The petitioner has applied for the post of Lab Technician and after completion of selection process an appointment order was issued in his favour on 24.12.2013 (Annexure-P/4). On 13.01.2015, a show cause notice (Annexure-P/5) was issued to him by the respondent/Authority for want of valid live registration with Employment Exchange. Thereafter, another show notice was issued to the petitioner on 12.02.2015 (Annexure-P/9) for want of valid domicile certificate stating that he is not resident of District Surguja and is resident of Manendragarh. The Tashildar, Manendragarh also responded on such issue by memo dated 03.09.2014 stating that the petitioner is not entitled for a Permanent Domicile Certificate of Tahsil Manendragarh. By the impugned order dated 25.02.2015, the respondent/Authority cancelled the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner is not having valid live registration with the Employment Exchange and he is also not having valid domicile certificate. Hence, this petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- (i) To quash the order dated 25.02.2015 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondent No.4, Division Joint Director, Division Surguja, Ambikapur (CG) (ii) To quash the order dated 03.09.2014 (Annexure-P/2) passed by respondent No.6, Tahsildar, Manendragrah, Koriya (CG). (iii) To direct the resp to reinstate the services of the petitioner on the post of “Lab Technician” with back wages, along-with interest. (iv) Cost of the petitioner may also be granted to the petitioner from respondents.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue relates to want of valid live registration with the employment exchange directly came before this Court in the matter Nitish Vachhani Vs. State of CG and Anr [WPS No.2221/2013 decided on 13.12.2013] wherein the object and provision contained in the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short the “Act 1959”) has been considered. Learned counsel submits that in the said case the reliance was placed in the matter of Union of India and Ors Vs. State of CG and Anr [WPS No.2221/2013 decided on 13.12.2013] wherein the object and provision contained in the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short the “Act 1959”) has been considered. Learned counsel submits that in the said case the reliance was placed in the matter of Union of India and Ors Vs. N. Hargopal and Ors, (1987) 3 SCC 308 whereby, it has been observed that the only purpose of such enactment is to notify the vacancies to the Employment Exchanges by the employer. Learned counsel also submits that the object of the Act is not to restrict but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and most efficient candidate and to provide an opportunity to the workers who have raised their claim for appointment. It is further submitted that it is clear that the Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Learned counsel also submits that the aforesaid judgment was also followed by this Court in the matter of Nagesh Dhruw Vs. State of CG and anr [WPS No.848/2014 decided on 18.02.2014], wherein, while allowing the petition this Court issued a direction to Authorities to consider the petitioner’s appointment, even without the live registration. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also refers to the notification issued the State dated 28.05.2019, wherein in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-para 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the Governor of Chhattisgarh, modified the provision regarding “eligibility for appointment” mentioned in Rule 5 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 made by the Sate Government under Article 309 of the Constitution of India vide Notification No. F I-1/2012/1-3, Dated 17th January, 2012, ordered that “Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or any other Act, Order, Direction, Rules of Law for the time being in force, only local residents of the districts falling under Baster and Sarguja Division, shall be eligible for recruitment to the vacancies arising in Class III and Class IV posts of the district cadre in various departments of the concerned districts, for a period of two years from the date of issue of the said Notification”. 5. 5. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid notification was challenged before the Division Bench of this Court in the bunch matters of Nandkumar Gupta and Ors Vs. State of CG and Ors [WPS No.1081/2020 and connected matters, decided on 12.05.2022], whereby, the Notification dated 17.01.2012 and the subsequent Notification extending the said notification including the notification dated 28.05.2019 were quashed. Learned counsel also refers to Para 49 of the aforesaid order whereby it has been observed that “it is impermissible for the Governor in exercise of power conferred under paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution to provide 100% reservation in respect of posts falling within the scheduled areas in favour of local residents of the scheduled areas only”. In view of the above, learned counsel submits that cancellation of appointment of petitioner is in the teeth of the aforesaid settled proposition of law and prays to allow the petition. 6. In the return, the State has submitted that the Authority has invited applications for the post of Lab Technician only for the candidates who are permanent and local resident of Surguja Division. Since the petitioner is not permanent resident of Surguja Division, he was not eligible for the said post. Even in the advertisement, there is specific condition for holding live registration and domicile certificate from the concerned office of Surguja. On both the grounds, the petitioner was not found suitable and appointment which has been wrongly issued in his favour was cancelled. 7. However, learned State counsel admits the fact that the issue related to live registration and reservation for the local resident has already been decided by this Court and the notification dated 28.05.2019 has already been quashed by this Court. Learned State counsel, however, submits that as the application of the petitioner was not in accordance with the conditions enumerated in the appointment order, his appointment was cancelled which is just and proper. 8. Heard rival submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused documents available in the petition. 9. The issue raised with regard to notification of the State dated 28.05.2019 giving recruitment opportunity only to local resident of Bastar and Surguja Division has been decided by the Division Bench of this Court in Nand Kumar Gupta (Supra) [WPS No.1081/2020]. 8. Heard rival submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused documents available in the petition. 9. The issue raised with regard to notification of the State dated 28.05.2019 giving recruitment opportunity only to local resident of Bastar and Surguja Division has been decided by the Division Bench of this Court in Nand Kumar Gupta (Supra) [WPS No.1081/2020]. In the said case, the Division Bench examined the legislative competence of the circular by following the law laid in the matter of Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 383 wherein it was categorically observed at Paragraph 54, that the question as to whether exercise of power conferred under Paragraph 5 can override the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III. For the sake of brevity, Para 54 of the aforesaid order is reproduced hereunder :- “54. With regard to the question as to whether exercise of power under paragraph 5 can override the fundamental rights under part III, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 84, held as follows: “84. The power is conferred on the Governor to deal with the scheduled areas. It is not meant to prevail over the Constitution. The power of the Governor is pari passu with the legislative power of Parliament and the State. The legislative power can be exercised by the Parliament or the State subject to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. In our considered opinion, the power of the Governor does not supersede the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. It has to be exercised subject to Part III and other provisions of the Constitution. When Para 5 of the Fifth Schedule confers power on the Governor, it is not meant to be conferral of arbitrary power. The Constitution can never aim to confer any arbitrary power on the constitutional authorities. They are to be exercised in a rational manner keeping in view the objectives of the Constitution. The powers are not in derogation but the furtherance of the constitutional aims and objectives.” 10. Thereby, the Division Bench, after due consideration, reached to the conclusion that notification dated 17.01.2012 and subsequent notification dated 28.05.2019 cannot be sustained in law and set-aside and quashed the same. 11. The powers are not in derogation but the furtherance of the constitutional aims and objectives.” 10. Thereby, the Division Bench, after due consideration, reached to the conclusion that notification dated 17.01.2012 and subsequent notification dated 28.05.2019 cannot be sustained in law and set-aside and quashed the same. 11. The next issue which relates to live registration with Employment Exchange also came for consideration before this Court in the matter of Nitish Vachhani (Supra), wherein following was observed in Paras 9 to 14 :- 9. The issue now remains to be considered is - whether a candidate, who was not having live certificate of registration with the District Employment Office on the last date of submission of application form can be considered for appointment? 10. In the matter of Union of India and others Vs. N. Hargopal and others, (1987) 3 SCC 308 while considering the scope and ambit of the provisions contained in the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras-4 & 6 thus:- “4. It is evident that there is no provision in the Act which obliges an employer to make appointments through the agency of -the Employment Exchanges. Far from it, Section 4(4) of the Act, on the other hand, makes it explicitly clear that the employer is under no obligation to recruit any person through the Employment Exchanges to fill in a vacancy merely because that vacancy has been notified under Section 4(1) or Section 4(2). In the face of Section 4(4), we consider it utterly futile for the learned Additional Solicitor General to argue that the Act imposes any obligation on the employers apart from notifying the vacancies to the Employment Exchanges. The learned Additional Solicitor General invited our attention to the speech of the Minister of Labour and Employment and Planning (Shri Nanda) made at the time of the introduction of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Bill. Far from being of any assistance to the learned Additional Solicitor General, the speech appears to be against his submission. In his speech, the Minister quoted from the report of the Training and Employment Services Organisation Committee and observed that the recommendation of the Committee offered a full explanation of the provisions of the Bill. Far from being of any assistance to the learned Additional Solicitor General, the speech appears to be against his submission. In his speech, the Minister quoted from the report of the Training and Employment Services Organisation Committee and observed that the recommendation of the Committee offered a full explanation of the provisions of the Bill. ‘The recommendation of the Committee which he quoted was: “Though we have not, for the present, recommended compulsion on private employers to recruit through the Employment Exchanges, we recommend that they be required on a compulsory basis to notify to the Exchanges all vacancies, other than vacancies for unskilled categories, vacancies of very temporary duration and vacancies proposed to be tilled through promotion." The Minister further said: “The main thing is that an obligation is being placed that after this legislation becomes operative, from that date, the employer in every establishment in the public sector shall, before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, notify that vacancy to such Employment Exchanges as may be prescribed. And so far as the private sector is concerned, there is this further\qualification that the government concerned may specify by notification that the employer in every establishment in private sector or every establishment pertaining to any class or category of establishments in private sectors shall, before filling up any vacancy in any employment in that establishment, notify that vacancy to ‘such Employment Exchanges as may be prescribed. This is the kernal of this provision. This is the main object, that is, an obligation placed on the employer to notify the vacancies that may occur in their establishment before filling those vacancies.” The Minister was conscious that there was a likelihood of the Bill being misunderstood as compelling the employers to make appointments through the Employment Exchanges only. He clarified the position saying: “The misunderstanding is as if this Bill gives power 'to the Government to compel the employers to recruit only such persons as are submitted by the Employment Exchanges. That is not so. This compulsion extends only to notification of vacancies. Naturally the employer has to consider the names which are submitted by the Employment Exchanges but there is no compulsion that they must restrict the choice only to the least (sic list) that is submitted to them. Of course, there is also the objection from ‘the other side that it may not go far enough. Naturally the employer has to consider the names which are submitted by the Employment Exchanges but there is no compulsion that they must restrict the choice only to the least (sic list) that is submitted to them. Of course, there is also the objection from ‘the other side that it may not go far enough. We believe that even this will make things very much better. In any case, when the Committee reported, they also suggested this much advance. At present, they said, we should have only compulsory notification, but not compel the employers to recruit only out of the list that is sent by the employment exchanges." 6. It is, therefore, clear that the object of the Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and the most efficient and to provide an opportunity to the worker to have his claim for appointment considered without the worker having to knock at every door for employment. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the Employment Exchanges." 11. Yet again, in the matter of Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam, Krishna District, A.P,L. Vs. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao and others, (1996) 6 SCC 216 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred its earlier decision in the matter of N. Hargopal (Supra) and held in para-6 thus:- “6. Having regard to the respective contentions, we are of the view that contention of the respondents is more acceptable which would be consistent with the principles of fair play, justice and equal opportunity. It is common knowledge that many a candidate is unable to have the names sponsored, though their names are either registered or are waiting to be registered in the employment exchange, with the result that the choice of selection is restricted to only such of the candidates whose names come to be sponsored by the employment exchange. Under these circumstances, many a deserving candidate is deprived of the right to be considered for appointment to a post under the State. Better view appears to be that it should be mandatory for the requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the employment exchange, and employment exchange should sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning departments for selection strictly according to seniority and reservation, as per requisition. Better view appears to be that it should be mandatory for the requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the employment exchange, and employment exchange should sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning departments for selection strictly according to seniority and reservation, as per requisition. In addition, the appropriate department or undertaking or establishment should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation and also display on their office notice boards or announce on radio, television and employment news bulletins; and then consider the cases of all the candidates who have applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter of employment would be available to all eligible candidates." 12. Thus, the law is well settled that an employer is not obliged to recruit only those who are sponsored by the employment exchanges. Impliedly, whether or not a person is registered with the employment exchange has no nexus with his suitability for the post. Although the advertisement makes it compulsory for a candidate to have live registration with one of the District Employment Exchange within the State, but yet the said registration has nothing to do with his qualification or suitability for the post. 13. Be that as it may, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and others v. Pritilata Nandaa, (2010) 11 SCC 674 has held in para-21 thus:- “21. We also agree with the High Court that once the candidature of the respondent was accepted by the authorities concerned and she was allowed to participate in the process of selection i.e. the written test and viva voce, it was not open to them to turn around and question her entitlement to be considered for appointment as per her placement in the merit list on the specious ground that her name had not been sponsored by the employment exchange. In our considered view, by denying appointment to the respondent despite her selection and placement in the merit list, the appellants violated her right to equality in the matter of employment guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution." 14. In the case in hand also, candidature of each of the petitioner was processed. In our considered view, by denying appointment to the respondent despite her selection and placement in the merit list, the appellants violated her right to equality in the matter of employment guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution." 14. In the case in hand also, candidature of each of the petitioner was processed. They were allowed to participate in the examination and their names have been included in the merit list/select list, however, at the time of counseling, their candidature has been rejected on the aforestated grounds. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pritilata Nanda (Supra) squarely apply in the facts of the present case. Therefore, once the petitioners have been allowed to participate and they have secured position in the select list, their candidature cannot be rejected at this stage.” 12. In view of the above, it is explicit that the reasons for cancellation of appointment of the petitioner is in conflict with the legal principles laid down in the afore-mentioned cases. Therefore, the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 (Annexure-P/1) is not sustainable in law and same is hereby set-aside. 13. The respondent Authority is directed to reinstate the service of the petitioner on the said post within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled for notional seniority from the date of cancellation of his appointment and said period shall also be counted for pensionary benefits. 14. This Court also observes that if the petitioner files an affidavit to the effect that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere, he shall be entitled for 25 % of total back-wages i.e. the period between date of cancellation of appointment till his joining. 15. Accordingly, the petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.