ORDER ON BOARD Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Since common question of fact and law is involved in all these writ petitions, they have been clubbed together, heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. This batch of writ petitions is directed against the order dated 20-2- 2024 passed separately by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appeals preferred under Section 13 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 (for short, ‘the Act of 2011’) as barred by limitation of 170 days. 3. Mr. Shobhit Koshta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that no notice was served to the petitioners by the Rent Controller and the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on 3-1-2022, and ultimately, on 28-2-2023, the Rent Controller has passed the order of eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent on the ground that the respondent landlord has proved his title and tenancy has been established. He would further submit that the petitioners have received notice of execution of order dated 28-2-2023 on 14-9-2023 and within seven days from the date of service of notice, on 21-9- 2023, the appeals were filed explaining the delay in filing the appeal, but the learned Tribunal dismissed the appeals as also the applications for condonation of delay, as such, the impugned orders are liable to be set-aside and the appeals be remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal for consideration on merits. 4. Mr. Vibhor Goverdhan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that the Rent Control Tribunal is absolutely justified in dismissing the appeals as the delay of 170 days in filing the appeals has not been satisfactorily explained and therefore the appeals have rightly been dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 6. True it is that the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on 3-1-2022 and on 28-2-2023, the Rent Control Authority has passed the order of eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent herein against which the petitioners herein had preferred appeals on 21-9-2023. 6. True it is that the petitioners were proceeded ex parte on 3-1-2022 and on 28-2-2023, the Rent Control Authority has passed the order of eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent against the petitioners and in favour of the respondent herein against which the petitioners herein had preferred appeals on 21-9-2023. The Rent Control Tribunal has recorded a finding that the petitioners have been served by registered post, but they have refused to accept the notice and as such, they have duly been served and therefore no sufficient cause has been shown and consequently, dismissed the applications for condonation of delay and also dismissed the appeals as barred by limitation. 7. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides as under: - “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.” 8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act confers the power on the court to entertain the appeal after the prescribed period if the appellate court is satisfied that the concerned appellant has shown sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the prescribed time. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. 9. 9.1) The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. 9. 9.1) The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. (See Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 .) (9.2) The expression “sufficient cause” necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fide and reasonableness. (See Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami, (1999) 6 SCC 396 .) (9.3) The Supreme Court in the matter of Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 held that sufficient cause means a cause for which a party could not be blamed for his absence. A party should not have acted with negligence or lack of bona fides. Degree of proof is less in case of good cause whereas it is higher in case of sufficient cause. (9.4) In the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that if the party who has applied for extension of period shows that the delay was due to any of the facts mentioned in the explanation that would be treated as sufficient cause, and after it is treated as sufficient cause, the question may then arise whether discretion should be exercised in favour of the party or not. (9.5) Likewise, in the matter of Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. 10. In the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. 10. In the matter of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 the Supreme Court has held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. In paragraph 3 of the report it has been held as under: - “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. ...” 11. Thereafter, in the matter of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Reiterating the principles of law laid down in Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 their Lordships observed as under: - “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (supra) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (supra). 13. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (supra) and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (supra). 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 12. Thereafter, in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. It has been observed as under: - “11. … The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. ...” 13. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. ...” 13. In the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines summarising the obligation of the court while dealing with application for condonation of delay and approach to be adopted while considering grounds for condonation, which are as under: - “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 14. Thereafter, in the matter of Manoharan v. Sivarajan and others, (2014) 4 SCC 163 the Supreme Court followed the principle of law laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra). 15. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly indicated that a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has to be adopted and appeal has to be decided on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. “Sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice especially when the delay is not deliberate and outcome of mala fide. 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, as sufficient cause has to be construed liberally and appeal has to be disposed of on merits, it is quite vivid that though the petitioners are said to have refused to accept the notice as per the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal, but that was not acted upon and thereafter, again the Rent Controller has directed for issuance of notice which, as per Postal Track Consignment, was served, but it is nowhere established that it was actually served on the petitioners. The petitioners being tenants would not be benefited by deliberately remaining absent inviting the order for eviction of the premises against them where they are residing. In that view of the matter, the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal that no sufficient cause has been shown, appears to be contrary to the facts and law available on record. Therefore, in our considered opinion, sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeals has been shown. In that view of the matter, the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal that no sufficient cause has been shown, appears to be contrary to the facts and law available on record. Therefore, in our considered opinion, sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeals has been shown. The orders impugned passed by the learned Tribunal are hereby set-aside and delay in filing the appeals is hereby condoned. Accordingly, the matters are remitted to the board of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal to consider and dispose of all the appeals of all the petitioners herein afresh strictly in accordance with law, expeditiously. 17. The writ petitions stand allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order to cost(s).