Rakesh Agrawal, S/o. Shri Raja Ram Agrawal v. Laljee, S/o. Shri Raja Ram Agrawal
2024-04-29
GOUTAM BHADURI, RADHAKISHAN AGRAWAL
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1. The instant appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 17th September, 2019 passed by the Court of IX Additional District Judge, Durg, District Chhattisgarh in Civil Suit No. 80-A/2016 whereby the suit bearing No. C.S.No.80-A/2016 filed by the plaintiff for declaration, execution of sale deed and permanent injunction regarding property of Survey Nos. 459, 460, 462 area 40000 sqft wherein the Petrol pump namely Gourav Filling Station established over 10,000 sqft and the office of the same with its operation existing over 30,000 sqft situated at village Kohka, Tehsil, Bhilai, District Durg was dismissed. 2. The brief facts as pleaded in the plaint are that plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal, son of Raja Ram Agrawal filed a suit against his brothers namely defendants Lalji, Shivram and Vivek Kumar for declaration and permanent injunction inter-alia stating that the plaintiff and the defendants are the real brothers and constituted a joint family but subsequently they got separated. It was stated that one Company namely M/s. Ganesh Olio Chemical Pvt. Ltd was being run and operated at Raipur and the brothers inter-se entered into a family arrangement and got separated their shares. According to the plaintiff, the partition agreement (Ex.P-1) akin to Ex.P-12 was executed in between the brothers and as per the terms of agreement, (i) the disputed property namely Gourav Filling Station situated at Vaishali Nagar, Industrial Estate Kohka was being run in the name of Shiv Ram Agrawal and after the partition, the said petrol pump was agreed to be run by the plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal and it was further decided that the transfer-deed would be executed in respect of the said petrol pump as per the partition; (ii) It was further agreed therein the joint property situated at District Bharuch Gujarat was in the name of Rakesh Agrawal and after the partition, the same was to be recorded in the name of brother Shiv Ram Agrawal; (iii) another joint property which was in the name of Sakti Roadways and was operating at Raipur wherein different tankers, luxury buses were also partitioned and 3 residential houses of the joint property was also subject of partition. It was further stated that a house situated at Alkapuri Society in the name of plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal which was mortgaged with the Bank would be discharged by him on payment of dues of the Bank. 3.
It was further stated that a house situated at Alkapuri Society in the name of plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal which was mortgaged with the Bank would be discharged by him on payment of dues of the Bank. 3. Reading of plaint averments would go to show that according to the family partition deed dated 12.7.2014, different properties were partitioned. The subject property in the suit is the petrol-pump which stands established over Kh. Nos. 459, 460 & 462 admeasuring 40000 sqft. The plaintiff claimed that it fell to the share of plaintiff and the defendant no.2 Shiv Ram Agrawal is not entitled to sell the same. By way of amendment, the plaintiff claimed that on the basis of partition deed, since the petrol pump situated over the aforesaid land bearing Khasra numbers area 40000 sqft (supra) has fallen to the share of the plaintiff, the decree be passed directing defendant no.2 to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff and further sought per permanent injunction in respect of the suit property. 4. Defendants 1 & 3 supported the case of plaintiffs and stated that as per the partition, both the movable and immovable properties on the basis of family partition Ex.P-12 fell to the share of plaintiff. One of the brothers defendant no.2 namely Shiv Ram Agrawal denied the claim. It was stated that he is the proprietor and is in possession of the disputed property i.e., petrol pump. It was further stated that the defendant was residing at Gujarat and was running business over there and the plaintiff has not provided the account of disputed property since 2004 to 2013 and in respect of management/running of the petrol pump on the basis of power of attorney, it was alleged that it has been forged for which different FIRs were also lodged against the plaintiff. It was stated that the plaintiff has altered the agreement of family partition Ex.P-1 (P-12) and has misused the property. It is further stated that defendant no.2 acquired the dealership of Indian Oil Corporation by agreement dated 27.10.2009 and the license to sell the petrol and diesel in the name of defendant no.2.
It was stated that the plaintiff has altered the agreement of family partition Ex.P-1 (P-12) and has misused the property. It is further stated that defendant no.2 acquired the dealership of Indian Oil Corporation by agreement dated 27.10.2009 and the license to sell the petrol and diesel in the name of defendant no.2. It was further stated that the CSIDC issued lease deed for 30 years from 05.03.2004 to 04.03.2034 in respect of the disputed property and also counter claim was prayed that the plaintiff be restrained from interfering with possession and management of petrol pump and the mandatory injunction was also sought regarding disputed property. 5. On the basis of pleading, the learned Additional District Judge framed 9 issues and it was held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that by mutual consent the registered partition deed was legally executed on 12.07.2014 and in respect of issue nos.2 & 3, the trial Court held that it has not been proved that defendant no.2 has given the power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff and further held that the plaintiff failed to prove that he is possessor/owner of the disputed property bearing Kh.Nos.459, 460 & 462 admeasuring 40000 sqft wherein the petrol pump is being run. The learned Additional District Judge also held that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the sale-deed executed in his favour from defendant no.2 in respect of the disputed property. About the permanent injunction sought by plaintiff, it was held that plaintiff is not entitled to get the same against the defendants. Whereas in respect of counter claim made by defendant no.2, the trial Court held that defendant no.2 failed to prove that he is entitled to possess, enjoy and use the suit land of 40000 sqft and with respect to permanent injunction, the Court held that defendant no.2 is not entitled to get the same against the plaintiff over the suit land and eventually the suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved by such order, the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that - (i) the agreement dated 12.07.2014 (Ex.P-1) equivalent to P-12 is an agreement of family partition whereby the different properties were settled as against each other brother. He would submit that the land of Petrol pump was given to defendant no.2 by CSIDC on lease. Thereafter, he entered into petroleum agreement with the Indian Oil Corporation.
He would submit that the land of Petrol pump was given to defendant no.2 by CSIDC on lease. Thereafter, he entered into petroleum agreement with the Indian Oil Corporation. It was further submitted that subsequent to that, one of the brothers Shiv Ram Agrawal, gave the management and control to the plaintiff from 2004 to 2013, which is admitted in counter claim and the suit property was included by Ex.P-1. (b) Learned counsel would further submit that though the lease of disputed land was in the name of Shiv Ram Agrawal yet it was in control and management of plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal and partition agreement (Ex.P-1) was equivalent to Ex.P-12, the conditions of agreement of partition postulates that he will pay certain loan amount to relieve property of Shiv Ram from mortgage and Ex.P-15 would show that Rakesh Agrawal has paid the entire bank dues of M/s. Ganesh Olio Chemical Pvt. Ltd and Ex.P-2 would show that pursuant to the agreement, the Power of Attorney was given to plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal by Shiv Ram (D-2). It is stated that the plaintiff was running the petrol pump which was in his control, however, Shiv Ram tried to sell the petrol pump on 10.07.2016, therefore, the notices were issued and cause of action arose. (c) He would submit that the suit was filed on 19.07.2016 and the counter claim by Shiv Ram was filed on 18.8.2017 to declare the ownership of Shivram but the same relief has not been granted. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court has completely misdirected itself to hold that the property was ancestral one whereas it was nobody’s case that the property is ancestral property but it was a joint property. Learned counsel submits that the trial Court dismissed the suit on wrong assumption that the property was ancestral and all the sharers have not joined therefore resulted into dismissal. (d) He would submit that family settlement Ex.P-1 (P-12) as also the pleading and defence nowhere states that the property was ancestral.
Learned counsel submits that the trial Court dismissed the suit on wrong assumption that the property was ancestral and all the sharers have not joined therefore resulted into dismissal. (d) He would submit that family settlement Ex.P-1 (P-12) as also the pleading and defence nowhere states that the property was ancestral. It was further submitted that the trial Court had held that the suit property i.e., petrol pump was leased out by CISDC vide Ex.D-4 and the lease was for a period of 30 years from 05.04.2004 to 04.04.2034 and the licence by the Indian Oil Corporation is Ex.D-5 and therefore, while dismissing the suit, the learned trial Court has completely mixed-up both the lease and license. He would submit that once the agreement has acted upon and the subject property in the agreement has been transferred pursuant to the agreement, it would show that the parties have ratified their action and as per Ex.P-12 all the facts made known to each other inasmuch as even the civil suit was filed by one of the brothers and deposition and the suit filed by Shiv Ram would show that the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property was admitted. He submits that the application filed under Order 42 Rule 27 CPC would further go to show that in respect of one property when the suit was filed by Shiv Ram at Gujarat, the existence of such partition has been admitted, which will lead to point out that the defendant would be barred on the ground of estoppel to challenge such partition. (e) Learned counsel placed reliance in K. Arumuga Velaiah Versus P.R. Ramaswamy and another on (2022) 3 SCC 757 to submit that non-registration of document would also not hit by section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and when one party relinquishes its share in the family arrangement, the title in favour of other is acknowledged. (f) He would submit that when the party has filed the plaint on the basis of some family settlement which stood compromised, as is evident from the application filed Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, no ambiguity exists about the family partition. Therefore, the finding of the learned trial Court is completely perverse and liable to be set aside. 7.
(f) He would submit that when the party has filed the plaint on the basis of some family settlement which stood compromised, as is evident from the application filed Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, no ambiguity exists about the family partition. Therefore, the finding of the learned trial Court is completely perverse and liable to be set aside. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the relief sought in the plaint would show that a prayer has been made for sale of the suit property and at Paras 12 & 13 of the plaint, the plaintiff claimed that it is a registered partition deed. Admittedly, the land is of CSIDC of which the sale deed is sought for and if the land was leased out by defendant no.2 by CSIDC, the ownership remains with CSIDC, for which, the execution of sale deed could not have been passed. The learned counsel refers to the plaint allegations and statement of P.W.1 to show that they admittedly took the petrol pump on lease, the dealership of it was granted to Shiv Ram by Indian Oil Corporation and how the prayer to execute a sale deed could have been entertained. He would further submit that though the CSIDC has been made a party, but the Indian Oil Corporation has not been arrayed as party and no evidence is on record to show that the mortgage of subject property was released by the plaintiff on payment of money. Therefore, practically, no evidence has been led before the learned trial Court. He would submit that the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court is well merited and we don’t call for any interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents, pleadings and evidence on record. In order to ascertain the status of the parties, it would be apt to show the family tree which is drawn hereinbelow : Rajaram Agrawal Rakesh Agrawal (Plaintiff) Lalji (Def. No.1) [at Gujarat] Shivram Agrawal (Def. No.2) Vivek Kumar (Def. No.3) [at Gujarat] 9. The plaint allegations only confine to dispute about possession of the petrol pump installed in the subject land bearing Kh. Nos. 459, 460 & 462 admeasuring 40000 sqft situated at village Kohka Distt. Durg.
No.1) [at Gujarat] Shivram Agrawal (Def. No.2) Vivek Kumar (Def. No.3) [at Gujarat] 9. The plaint allegations only confine to dispute about possession of the petrol pump installed in the subject land bearing Kh. Nos. 459, 460 & 462 admeasuring 40000 sqft situated at village Kohka Distt. Durg. A perusal of the plaint would show that at para l2 the plaintiff averred that on 12.07.2014 a registered partition deed was executed. A perusal of the record would show that the said partition deed is marked as Ex.P-1 which is equivalent to Ex.P-12. A perusal of either Ex.P-1 or Ex.P-12 which is a translated copy does not show that it is a registered partition-deed but it is a captioned as an agreement of family partition. In the statement of P.W.1, the plaintiff states that according to the said partition the disputed property of petrol pump fell to his share. At Para 29 of his statement he categorically admits that the land of Gaurav Filling Station has been given on lease by CSIDC to Shivram Agrawal for running a petrol pump. With respect to Batwaranama Ex.P-1, he states that he has acted upon such partition. With respect to relinquishment of property at Bharuch (Gujrat), he states that he has not filed any document for the same and has subsequently stated that he was running the petrol pump after execution of Power of Attorney Ex.P-2. Thereafter he volunteers that he was running petrol pump on the basis of agreement Ex.P-1. 10. Statement of defendant no.2 Shivram Agrawal shows that he used to run the M/s. Ganesh Olio Chemical Pvt. Ltd and Gourav Filling Station under the licence of Indian Oil Corporation and in the cross examination at para 23, on a suggestion being made to him he has categorically stated that the said land of 40000 sqft was taken on lease from CSIDC for installing a petrol pump. According to the statement of the plaintiff, the mortgage was released by him in respect of M/s Ganesh Olio Chemical Pvt. Ltd but there is nothing on record to prove the same. Ex.P-15 wherein the plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal relies is the “No Due Certificate” issued by the Bank which shows that he has repaid the amount under the compromise settlement scheme.
Ex.P-15 wherein the plaintiff Rakesh Agrawal relies is the “No Due Certificate” issued by the Bank which shows that he has repaid the amount under the compromise settlement scheme. There is no evidence on record to show that what was the nature of property; which property was mortgaged whether the said property, mortgage of which stated to be released, was in the name of Shiv Kumar Agrawal. 11. The language of Ex.P-1 & P-12 would show that it was not in respect of any past transaction but effectual partition was drawn. Admittedly the same is not registered. The original of it is also not brought on record. The plain language of Ex.P-1 (Ex.P-12) shows that it is not a memorandum of partition. 12. The Supreme Court in K. Arumuga Velaiah Versus P.R. Ramasamy (2022) 3 SCC 757 has reiterated the principle laid down in Kale v. Director of Consolidation (1976) 3 SCC 119 and held that the family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. Paras 31, 34 & 35 are relevant here and quoted below : 31. In Lachhman Dass v. Ram Lal (1989) 3 SCC 99 , the reliance was also placed on Ratan Lal Sharma v. Purushottam Harit (1974) 1 SCC 671 to hold that the arbitration award in the said case did not just seek to assign a share of the respondent to the appellant therein, but made an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant therein. Therefore, the award in express words purported to the appellant therein. It was accordingly held that it would mandatorily require registration under Section 17 of the Act. 34. In para 10 of the said Judgment in Kale v. Director of consolidation (1976) 3 SCC 119 , this Court has adumbrated on the essentials of a family settlement which could be usefully extracted as under : (Kale case, SCC pp. 126-127) 10.
It was accordingly held that it would mandatorily require registration under Section 17 of the Act. 34. In para 10 of the said Judgment in Kale v. Director of consolidation (1976) 3 SCC 119 , this Court has adumbrated on the essentials of a family settlement which could be usefully extracted as under : (Kale case, SCC pp. 126-127) 10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretized form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions : (1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17 (2) [sic Section 17(1)(b)/[ of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; 35.
After reviewing several judgments of this Court, the Privy Council and other High Courts, this Court in para 20 indicated the following propositions (Kale v. Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 , SCC p. 130) : “20. … We would, therefore return the reference with a statement of the following general propositions: * * * (1) A family arrangement can be made orally. (2) If made orally, there being no document, no question of registration arises. * * * (3) If though it could have been made orally, it was in fact reduced to the form of a “document” registration (when the value is Rs.100 and upwards) is necessary. (4) Whether the terms have been “reduced to the form of a document” is a question of fact in each case to be determined upon a consideration of the nature and phraseology of the writing and the circumstances in which and the purpose with which it was written. (5) If the terms were not “reduced to the form of a “document, registration was not necessary (even though the value is Rs.100 or upwards); and, while the writing cannot be used as a piece of evidence for what it may be worth, e.g., as corroborative of other evidence or as an admission of the transaction or as showing or explaining conduct. (6) If the terms were “reduced to the form of a document” and, though the value was Rs.100 or upwards, it was not registered, the absence of registration makes the document inadmissible in evidence and is fatal to proof of the arrangement embodied in the document.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Applying the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant case especially when the contents of agreement of family partition Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-12 are looked into, the legal position would be clear that where the family arrangement is made orally, in such a case, the registration is not necessary but where the terms of family arrangements are reduced into writing by a document, the registration would be necessary. The Supreme Court has further held that a distinction should be made between a document containing terms and recital of family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared for the past transaction.
The Supreme Court has further held that a distinction should be made between a document containing terms and recital of family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared for the past transaction. The Court held that the memorandum may not require registration as the same itself does not create any right or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore, the same will not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. Here in the instant case, the language of agreement of family partition Ex.P-1 or P-12 is not about the memorandum but it is a partition effected between the parties and the registration would be necessary when it is reduced into writing. Further reading of these documents would show that one Sudhir Gupta, who deliberated such partition as an arbitrator written down the document and partition in present was effected and not recorded as a past transaction. So the basis on which the plaintiff appellant proceeded for claiming relief was Ex.P-1 (P-12) which is not admissible in evidence and this document apparently shows the value of properties are more than Rs.100/- therefore registration is necessary. That apart, the fact remains that the partition purports that it was effected in the year 2014 as a present transaction. It being not registered, no relief can be claimed on a document which is not admissible in evidence. 14. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the Court below do not call for any interference. The appeal sans merit and is dismissed.