JUDGMENT : 1. Respondent no.1 Nandlal brought Civil Original Suit No.224/2009 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for recovery of possession against the petitioners and the proforma respondents. The suit was decreed by judgment and decree dated 09.02.2021. Since Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prohibits maintainability of appeal or review against any order/ decree passed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 this revision petition under Section 115 of CPC has been filed. 2. Case and claim of plaintiff-respondent was/is that Simbhulal and his two sons Madan Lal & Om Prakash Vyas had jointly acquired Patta No.259 in respect of Plot No.990 in the year 1946-1947. Madan Lal was father of respondent no.1 Nandlal Vyas. The petitioners herein Om Prakash Vyas is another son of Simbhulal and petitioner no.2 is son of Om Prakash Vyas. The plaintiff asserted that after the death of Simbhulal Ji, though, Plot No.990 and the house standing thereon was never partitioned by metes and bounds but the co-sharers were conveniently using different portions of the suit property. The portion of Plot No.990 shown within “ABCD” was occupied by plaintiff Nandlal Vyas and his two real brothers i.e. Chandra Prakash and Rajkumar. The portion “CDEF” was also in possession of the plaintiff and the defendants were in possession of the rest portion shown in the map with plaint including a shop. Plaintiff asserted that plaintiff and his brothers had taken electric connection in the name of Madan Lal Vyas, father of the plaintiff, 20 years back and was paying electric charges and was in possession of receipts of payment of electric charges. For sometime, the said portion was in occupation of tenants and they were paying rent to the plaintiff and were getting receipts. In the month of October, 2008 tenant Krishna Vyas (examined as plaintiff witness) vacated the house for personal use of the plaintiff and the plaintiff got the repairing work done. However, on 19.03.2009 the defendants forcefully dispossessed the plaintiff, hence, the plaintiff was compelled to lodge FIR No.109/2009 on 20.03.2009 with Pratap Nagar police station and on 08.7.2009 the present Civil Suit No.224/2009 was filed. The plaintiff simultaneously filed partition suit No.228/2009 for partition of Plot No.990, which is pending separately. 3. However, on 19.03.2009 the defendants forcefully dispossessed the plaintiff, hence, the plaintiff was compelled to lodge FIR No.109/2009 on 20.03.2009 with Pratap Nagar police station and on 08.7.2009 the present Civil Suit No.224/2009 was filed. The plaintiff simultaneously filed partition suit No.228/2009 for partition of Plot No.990, which is pending separately. 3. The respondents controverted claim of plaintiff by filing written statement and stated that in fact Plot No.990 was purchased by Simbhulal from his own earnings and it was self-acquired property of Simbhulal Ji. At the time of purchase son of Simbhulal Ji i.e. Madan Lal Ji was of 12 years and petitioner Om Prakash Vyas was of 06 years, hence, they had no source of income to purchase the property. Since the suit plot was the exclusive property of Simbhulal, Simbhulal Ji executed a registered Will in favour of his wife Dev Kaur (defendant no.6) in the year 1962 and thereafter Dev Kaur is the real owner of the property. In fact Dev Kaur allowed, for some time, to occupy that portion by real brothers of plaintiff Chandra Prakash and Rajkumar, as such, their possession was permissive possession. Plaintiff managed repairing work for which Dev Kaur had paid the repairing charges. 4. The learned trial Judge relied upon testimony of the plaintiff including a tenant of plaintiff that the plaintiff was in possession of portion “ABCD” and accordingly decreed the suit for recovery of possession. The learned trial Judge elaborately considered in para 5 & 6 of the judgment oral and documentary evidences produced by the plaintiff including copy of patta, rent receipts, receipts of payment charges of water and energy. The learned trial Judge noticed that besides oral statement of the defendant/ petitioners, no other evidence was there to support their claim, rather admission of petitioner no.1 regarding claim of the respondent was also noticed. 5. In Aarti Vs. Aruna Gautam & Ors., reported in 2015(1) Civil Court Cases 212 (S.C.), Hon’ble Supreme Court said that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction (against the judgment and decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act -Mine), the High Court would be primarily concerned with the legality/propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction and cannot and ought not to have appreciated the evidence adduced by the parties which is within the purview and domain of the learned trial Court or an appellate Court. In this regard, the provisions of Section 6(3) of the Act, which specifically bars an appeal from any order or decree passed under Section 6 has to be specifically noted. 6. In view of settled proposition on scope and limits on exercise of revisional jurisdiction against judgment and decree passed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, it is limited to took into the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciation of evidence to come to a contrary conclusion. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in the first submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned trial Judge has not correctly appreciated the material contradictions in the evidence of the plaintiff as well as plaintiff’s witness. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there is admission of the plaintiff that he never resided in the suit premises, therefore, a decree for recovery of possession is bad in law. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basant Singh Vs. Janki Singh & Ors., reported in Manu/SC/0284/1966 for the submission that the admission of the party would be binding and would be relied upon against the party admitting. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that in fact Simbhulal was real owner of the property and at the time of purchase through registered patta. Sons of Simbhulal Ji were; having no source of income, therefore, plaintiff’s suit was fit to be dismissed for this reason, also specially, when Simbhulal Ji had already executed a registered-deed of Will in favour of his wife in the year 1962. 9. Learned counsel contends that the Patta obtained by Simbhulal Ji was not a benami transaction as defined under Section 2(9) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 for the reason that Simbhulal Ji being head of the family had purchased the property for himself and if name of the children was included in that, that would not be treated as benami transaction. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment in Bhim Singh & Anr. Vs. Kan Singh (And Vice Versa) reported in 1980 SCR (2) 628. It is worthy to note that Bheem Singh’s case was decided prior to enforcement of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, therefore, the ratio decided in that case could not affect the provisions of the Act. 10. Vs. Kan Singh (And Vice Versa) reported in 1980 SCR (2) 628. It is worthy to note that Bheem Singh’s case was decided prior to enforcement of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, therefore, the ratio decided in that case could not affect the provisions of the Act. 10. Learned counsel contends that in the State of Rajasthan, a Will is not required to be probated. Hence title passed to the wife of Simbhulal Ji in the year 1962 itself, therefore, subsequent suit was not maintainable for recovery of possession. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of this Court in Sultan Singh Vs. Brijraj Singh (S.B. Civil Rev. Petition No.1220/95, decided on 05.12.1996) and Mukund Bihari Sharma Vs. Satya Narayan (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.1232/2006, decided on 02.04.2007). 11. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent contends that for grant of relief under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, it is not necessary that the person dispossessed of the property should be its legal owner. Though the record reveals that the plaintiff is co-owner of the suit property. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Aarti Vs. Aruna Gautam & Ors., reported in 2015(1) Civil Court Cases 212 (S.C.). 12. Learned counsel next contends that physical possession over the property from which the plaintiff was dispossessed is not necessary; even symbolic possession and constructive possession would be protected under the said Section. Reliance has been placed on the case of case of Kumar Kalyan Prasad & Anr. Vs. Kulanand Vaidik & Ors., reported in AIR 1985 Patna 374. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has next relied upon the judgment in Gautam Gazmer Vs. Uttam Gazmer reported in 2015(1) Civil Court Cases 613 (Calcutta) for his contention that a co-owner in possession, dispossessed illegally and forcefully by another co-owner can maintain a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 14. It is evident that the impugned judgment and decree passed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is not perverse or suffers from any judicial impropriety. Re-appreciation of evidence to come to a contrary conclusion is not permissible at this stage. Now the question arises whether the aforesaid grounds raised by the petitioner could have been decided in a summary proceedings under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The answer would certainly be in negative. Re-appreciation of evidence to come to a contrary conclusion is not permissible at this stage. Now the question arises whether the aforesaid grounds raised by the petitioner could have been decided in a summary proceedings under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The answer would certainly be in negative. The petitioner has remedy under Section 6(4) of the Specific Relief Act to bring a suit for recovery of possession based on title. Law is well settled that a person who is found in possession of the suit property within six months prior to the date of institution of the suit is entitled to get relief under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and for recovery of possession the plaintiff need not establish his title. Moreover, in the case on hand, there is bonafide claim of the plaintiff-respondent to have title over the suit property, as discussed above. 15. In Kumar Kalyan Prasad, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court was confronted with the issue whether a symbolic possession would suffice recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. In Kumar Kalyan Prasad’s case symbolic possession of the plaintiff was restored in execution of a decree and thereafter the plaintiff was again forcibly dispossessed by the defendants. In para-9 of the said judgment, the Court stated as follows :- “9. In the first instance, a mere reference to the plain language of the provision aforesaid would indicate that the word "dispossessed" has not been used in the narrowly constricted sense of the actual physical possession of immoveable property.. Indeed, it talks (sic) widely of dispossession of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law without the person's consent. If the Legislature intended to narrowly limit the word "dispossessed" there could have been no difficulty by specifying in terms the actuality of physical possession as its necessary and vital ingredient. The word employed is the ordinary word 'dispossess'. Plainly enough it would include within its sweep actual physical dispossession also but this is no warrant for holding that it necessarily excludes the violation of other forms of possession including a symbolical possession duly delivered by law and contumaciously violated by an aggressive trespasser. On principle I am not inclined to construe the word "dispossessed" in Section 6 in any hypertechnical sense and to push it into the procrustean bed of actual physical possession only. On principle I am not inclined to construe the word "dispossessed" in Section 6 in any hypertechnical sense and to push it into the procrustean bed of actual physical possession only. Indeed the intent of the Legislature in Section 6 to provide early and expeditious relief against the violation of possessor right, irrespective of title, would be equally, if not more, relevant where symbolical possession delivered by due process of law is sought to be set at naught forthwith. On a larger and liberal construction, therefore, it seems wholly unnecessary to limit or constrict the ordinary and plain meaning of the word "dispossessed", which is obviously wide enough to include both actual physical possession and equally a symbolical possession of immoveable property which is well recognised in the eye of law. The view that I am inclined to take would receive massive support from the observations in the Full Bench judgment in Jayagopal Mundra v. Gulab Chand Agarwalla, AIR 1974 Orissa 173. Therein after a close analysis of Rules 35 and 36 of Order 21 of the Civil P.C. and relying on Juggobundhu Mukherjee v. Ram Chunder Bysack (1880) ILR 5 Cal 584 (FB), which was affirmed in Sri Radha Krishan Chanderjee v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1917 PC 197 (2), and equally on a string of the judgment of this Court beginning with Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo v. Sunderbans Koer, AIR 1923 Pat 76 it has been concluded as under : "Thus, the legal position is well settled that symbolical delivery of possession against where even actual possession could have been delivered amounts to actual delivery of possession." Equally reference may also instructively be made to Ramamanemma v. Basavayya, AIR 1934 Mad 558 , whilst keeping in mind that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act are virtually in pari materia with the old Section 9 of the repealed Act of 1877. It was observed in the aforesaid case that if the remedy is clear under the Specific Relief Act the parties should not be driven to the onerous remedy of another suit. By way of analogy in Manikayala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 it was observed in para 12 that the delivery of symbolical possession under Order 21, Rule 35(2) would amount to an interruption of the respondent's adverse possession. By way of analogy in Manikayala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 it was observed in para 12 that the delivery of symbolical possession under Order 21, Rule 35(2) would amount to an interruption of the respondent's adverse possession. It seems to follow from the aforesaid precedents that the weight of authority seems to be a pointer to the view that symbolical possession is in no way out of the ambit of dispossession envisaged and sought to be remedied by Section 6 of the Act.” 16. From the legal position stated above, it is evident that physical possession immediately before dis-possession is not necessary to allow the relief of recovery of possession. Such possession may be a symbolic possession or constructive possession. Plaintiff has asserted that he was in possession through his tenants and sometime through his real brothers. One of the tenant has come to support the aforesaid fact that he was inducted in the suit premises by the plaintiff and after vacating the suit premises, he has handed-over key to the plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, this Court does not find any substance in the submission of the petitioner that since the plaintiff was not in physical possession of the suit premises ever the suit was not maintainable. 17. It would not be a subject matter in the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act whether Simbhulal Ji had paid consideration money out of his “known source of income” at the time of obtaining Patta to escape from the mischief of Section 2 (9)(b)(iii) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. Similarly, in a suit under Section 6 of the Act it can not be an issue whether a defence regarding benami transaction is available to the party so asserting contrary to the provisions of Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, which was held to be retrospective in operation in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Ganpati Dealcom Private Limited reported in (2023) 3 SCC 315 , Para-42. 18. Likewise, if a property is purchased for the benefit of minors, can such property be disposed off in any manner without permission of court would be a question to be decided in appropriate suit and not in a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 19. Consequently, this Court does not find any merit in this Civil Revision Petition. 19. Consequently, this Court does not find any merit in this Civil Revision Petition. Accordingly, it stands dismissed.