JUDGMENT : R Raghunandan Rao, J. The appellant is the unsuccessful plaintiff in the suit. 2. The appellant had filed O.S.No.321 of 2006 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati for specific performance of a registered agreement of sale dated 13.06.1984 for purchase of Ac.1.70 cents of land which is described in the scheduled attached to the plaint and referred to as the suit schedule property. 3. The case of the appellant, in this regard is as follows:- The appellant had entered into an agreement of sale dated 13.06.1984 with the 1st respondent (since passed away) for a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- and a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid as advance. Thereafter, the 1st respondent executed a fresh agreement on 25.03.1986 extending the time for completion of the sale three months later. On 25.06.1986, the 1st respondent approached the appellant for payment of Rs. 50,000/- and the same had been paid and a receipt was obtained in relation to such payment. In 1987, some of the documents of the appellant had been seized by the Income Tax Department and these were not returned till December-1995. Upon receipt of these documents, the appellant, having come to know that the 1st respondent had created various fictitious records, issued a registered notice dated 15.04.1996 calling upon the 1st respondent to execute a sale deed. The 1st respondent despite receipt of this legal notice did not reply to the said legal notice nor complied with the demands made in the said legal notice. After remaining silent to the legal notice, the 1st respondent issued a letter dated 25.06.2003 extending the agreement of sale. As the 1st respondent was continuing to make illegal and fraudulent alienation's, the appellant got issued a further notice dated 03.05.2006 which was not claimed by the 1st respondent. On the basis of these facts, the appellant filed O.S.No.321 of 2006 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. 4. The 1st respondent is said to have passed away during the pendency of the suit and the respondents 2 to 5 were impleaded as his legal representatives. Subsequently, the respondents 6 to 16 were also brought on record as defendants on the ground that they had obtained registered deeds of sale of property, which was part of the suit schedule property. 5. Subsequently, the respondents 6 to 16 were also brought on record as defendants on the ground that they had obtained registered deeds of sale of property, which was part of the suit schedule property. 5. The 1st respondent filed a written statement, in which he admitted execution of the agreement of sale and receipt of advance Rs. 2,50,000/- apart from the balance of Rs. 50,000/- on 25.06.1986. However, the 1st respondent contended that the plaintiff continued to postpone execution of the registered deed of sale and that while he approached the appellant to find out why legal notice dated 15.04.1996 had been issued, he had ignored the legal notice dated 03.05.2006. It was the stand of the 1st respondent that due to the passage of time the value of the property had increased to Rs. 10,00,000/- and he was willing to execute the necessary documents upon the appellant paying the differential amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- 6. The respondents 8 & 10 to 13 had filed separate written statements while, the respondents 2 to 7 and 9 & 14 to 16 remained ex-parte. The written statements of these respondents essentially stated that the plaint schedule property and adjacent properties to an extent of Ac.5.46 cents were actually the properties of deceased 1st respondent, Sri. G. Naidu and Sri. A. Bali Reddy who had made a layout of the said land and sold the plots in the layout to various persons including these respondents by way of registered deeds. These respondents contended that on account of the deeds of sale being executed much prior to the filing of the suit, it was not permissible for the appellant to claim the rights over the land, on account of the suit agreement of sale. 7. The respondents raised the ground of limitation in as much as the suit for specific performance was filed more than 10 years after the legal notice dated 15.04.1996 had been issued. It was also contended that the agreement of sale itself is a sham document as the appellant was in the business of money lending and was taking such agreements of sale as security for repayment of money advanced and the said document was not a genuine agreement of sale in relation on which a suit for specific performance can be filed. It is further contended that the reasons why there was such delay in seeking specific performance is also because the original transaction was never a transaction for sale of the property. 8. The appellant, in reply to these contentions took the stand that the extension of the agreements by the 1st respondent kept the agreement of sale alive and the appellant is entitled for such a specific performance of the agreement as the suit was within three years from the date of issuance of the legal notice dated 03.05.2006 apart from the extension of the agreement of sale given by the 1st respondent on 25.06.2003. 9. The Trial Court went into the aforesaid issues including the question of whether a transfer, without notice of original contract, cannot be affected by any direction for specific performance of an anterior agreement or contract. The Trial Court after going through all these said issues had held that the agreement of sale dated 13.06.1984 cannot be treated as a true and valid document which is supported by consideration and is not binding on the 1st respondent. The Trial Court also took the view that the suit is barred by limitation as it has been filed 20 years after payment of balance of sale consideration. On a question of the effect of the said agreement, on the remaining respondents who had purchased plots in the land, by registered documents, the Trial Court took the view that the relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief and as such, the appellant who had approached the Court after a lapse of 22 years, without any sufficient reason cannot insist upon specific performance of the agreement and that it would be open to the Trial Court to decline the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellant. 10. On the basis of these findings, the Trial Court dismissed the suit, by a Judgment dated 28.08.2017. Aggrieved by the said Judgment/Decree, the appellant moved the V Additional District Judge, Tirupati by way of A.S.No.165 of 2017. 10. On the basis of these findings, the Trial Court dismissed the suit, by a Judgment dated 28.08.2017. Aggrieved by the said Judgment/Decree, the appellant moved the V Additional District Judge, Tirupati by way of A.S.No.165 of 2017. The Appellate Court after considering the contentions raised by all these parties and after taking into account the various Judgments cited by all sides had come to conclusion that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as it was not filed within three years from 15.04.1996 where a legal notice calling upon the 1st respondent to execute the sale agreement had been issued and received by the 1st respondent. 11. Heard Sri. V. Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for the appellant. 12. The admitted case, (as admitted by the 1st respondent) is that there was an agreement of sale between the parties on 13.06.1984 under which the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- payable and the said sum had been paid in full, over the time. The said agreement is said to have been extended on 25.03.1986 and 25.06.2003. The suit is said to have been filed as there was no answer from the first respondent to the registered notice dated 03.05.2006. 13. The finding of the Trial Court was that the said agreement of sale was only a document of security for repayment of loans and not an agreement of sale entitling the appellant to obtain a specific performance of the said agreement of sale. The Trial Court also took the view, that the limitation commenced from 15.04.1996 where the 1st respondent was called upon to execute the sale deed, and had not executed such a sale deed. Lastly, the Trial Court also took the view that the specific performance of an agreement is an equitable relief which can be refused by the Court if it is not equitable to direct such specific performance. The Trial Court, on this principle, had held that directing the specific performance of the agreement of sale would result in the other respondents, who had subsequently purchased the plots, by way of the registered deeds of sale, to be affected and that such a exercise would not be equitable keeping in mind the passage of more than 20 years between the agreement of sale and the filing of the suit for specific performance. 14. The Appellate Court had taken the view that a suit was barred by the limitation. 14. The Appellate Court had taken the view that a suit was barred by the limitation. It is also to be noted that the Appellate Court did not any differ with any of the findings of the Trial Court. 15. In the present case, a notice was issued in the year 1996 calling upon the 1st respondent to execute necessary deeds of sale. No such deed of sale has been executed by the 1st respondent and consequently, the said inaction would have to be treated as a refusal. Limitation would have to be calculated as having commence from the year 1996 and the said limitation would expire by 1999. Viewed from this angle, the filing of the suit in the year 2006 is clearly barred by limitation as the period of limitation is three years from date of refusal under Article-54 of the schedule to the Limitation Act. 16. The appellant contended that the period of limitation would stand extended on account of extension of the agreement is said to have been given of the 1st respondent on 2003. This contention cannot be accepted as the period of limitation had ended in the year 1999 and the question of extension of time in a case where the limitation had expired cannot be accepted. 17. Apart from this, the Trial Court rightly pointed out that grant of specific performance of agreement is an equitable relief which can be refused by the Court after taking into account, all the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the purchase of the plots by the respondents 6 to 16, by way of registered deeds of sale, has created rights in these respondents which cannot be set aside by action of the appellant and the deceased 1st respondent. Any such grant of specific performance would be inequitable to the said respondents and the same has rightly been rejected by Trial Court. 18. In the circumstances, I do not find any reasons to interfere with the findings and the directions of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court nor is there any substantial question of law which has to be answered by this court. 19. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.