JUDGMENT : CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J. 1. This Special Criminal Application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and under Section-482 of the Cr.P.C. is filed to quash the FIR in Crime Register No.I-143 of 2010 registered with Anand Town Police Station, Anand and to set aside the order dated 06.01.2024, whereby the petition filed by the petitioner to discharge her from the Criminal Case No.1025 of 2014 on the file of 3 rd Additional Civil Judge, Anand, was dismissed. 2. Heard Mr. I.H. Syed, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Hardik Soni, learned APP for the respondent – State. 3. Facts of the prosecution case lie in a narrow compass and may be stated as follows:- 3.1 The deceased Sanjeev Patel is the husband of the petitioner herein by name Diptiben. On 08.08.2006, Sanjeev Patel met with a car accident. He succumbed to the injuries sustained by him in the said accident. However, no report was lodged with the police immediately after the accident. The de facto complainant is the friend of the deceased. He has attended the funeral ceremony of the deceased. As the factum of accident is not informed to the police, no case was registered in connection with the said accident immediately after the incident. 3.2 Subsequently, in the year 2009 i.e. on 22.02.2009, the de facto – complainant who is the friend of the deceased sent a report to the Superintendent of Police informing him about the factum of accident stating that the petitioner herein, who is the wife of the deceased dashed him with the car at their house and that the deceased sustained injuries in the said accident and succumbed to the same. The Superintendent of Police ordered for inquiry on the said report. After conducting preliminary inquiry, police registered the FIR against the petitioner herein on 28.04.2010 and investigated the crime. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed by the police on 24.03.2014 against the petitioner in the trial court. The trial court has taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioner on the next date i.e. 25.03.2014 for the offence punishable under Sections 304A, 279 and 176 of IPC and under Sections 177 and 184 of the MV Act. 3.3 The petitioner has filed a petition for discharge in the trial Court. The trial court has taken cognizance of the offence against the petitioner on the next date i.e. 25.03.2014 for the offence punishable under Sections 304A, 279 and 176 of IPC and under Sections 177 and 184 of the MV Act. 3.3 The petitioner has filed a petition for discharge in the trial Court. The trial Court dismissed the said petition on the ground that as the offence is triable as a summons case, as there is no requirement of framing a charge that the question of discharge does not arise. 3.4 The petitioner has filed the said discharge petition before the trial Court on the ground that taking cognizance of offence is barred by time under Section-465 of Cr.P.C. 3.5 Aggrieved thereby, and also questioning the order of the trial Court in taking cognizance of the offence, which was barred by time, the present application has been filed to quash the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the offence took place long back on 08.08.2006 and the FIR was registered 04 years thereafter on 28.04.2010 and the charge-sheet was filed after completion of investigation on 24.03.2014 after 04 years from the date of registration of FIR and the Court has taken cognizance of the offence on 25.04.2014 after lapse of 04 years period from the date of registration of the FIR and as such, the cognizance of the offence was taken against the petitioner by the trial Court after the expiry of period of limitation. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, section-468 of Cr.P.C. mandates that the Court shall not take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation and as the offences, for which, the charge-sheet was filed are punishable with 02 years and less than 02 years period of imprisonment that the cognizance of the said offence cannot be taken after expiry of period of 03 years. He would contend that as FIR was registered on 28.04.2010 and the charge-sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and the cognizance of the offence was taken by the Court on 25.03.2014, it is clearly barred by time. So on that ground, he would pray to quash the FIR and the criminal prosecution launched thereon. 5. He would contend that as FIR was registered on 28.04.2010 and the charge-sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and the cognizance of the offence was taken by the Court on 25.03.2014, it is clearly barred by time. So on that ground, he would pray to quash the FIR and the criminal prosecution launched thereon. 5. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that even though the offence took place on 08.08.2006, but no report was lodged with the police relating to the said accident immediately after the incident and it is only for the first time, report was lodged by the de facto complainant herein on 22.02.2009 and brought the said factum of the accident to the notice of the police on that day and after conducting preliminary inquiry that the FIR was registered on 28.04.2010. He would then contend that after completion of the investigation that the charge-sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and cognizance of the offence was taken by the Court on 25.03.2014. Even though the cognizance of the offence has to be taken within 03 years, he would contend that Clause-(b) of the Section-469 clearly envisages that the said period of limitation starts from the day when the offence was known to the aggrieved person or to the police officer and as the aggrieved person is not available as he died in the incident and as the police came to know about the said offence only on 22.09.2009 the period of limitation starts from that date. He also then vehemently contends that as the accused i.e. petitioner herein has been absconding and avoiding arrest that a non-bailable warrant was issued against her in the year 2010 itself and since then she is not available for her arrest and only in the year 2014, when she was arrested in connection with another crime by Gandhinagar Police that the same was intimated to the Anand Police and thereafter, they have secured her presence in this cases by obtaining P.T. warrant. So he contends that under Section- 470(4)(b) that while computing the period of limitation of three years, the time during which the offender i.e. the petitioner has avoided her arrest and absconding or concealing herself, shall be excluded and if that period is excluded that the order of taking cognizance of the offence against her by the trial Court is not barred by time. So, he prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. The fact that the offence took place on 08.08.2006 is not in dispute. The other material facts that the FIR was registered on 28.04.2010 and the charge-sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and the cognizance of the offence was taken on 25.03.2014 by the trial Court, all are absolutely not in dispute. These are all incontrovertible facts in this case. 7. Now, in order to ascertain whether the order of the trial Court taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner is barred by time or not, the relevant provisions to be examined in this context, are Sections-468, 469 and 470 of Cr.P.C. 8. Section-468 of Cr.P.C. deals with bar to take cognizance of the offence after the period of limitation, which reads thus:- 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.– (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be - (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. 3) [For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.][Inserted by Act of 1978, Section 33 (w.e.f. 18-12-1978).] 9. The above section mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period of limitation. At the very outset, it is relevant to note that the bar is on the court to take cognizance and the bar is not on the police to register a case and investigate the same and to file the charge-sheet. The section imposes a bar on the Court to take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period of limitation. Clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section-(2) of Section-468 are not relevant in the context. But Clause (c) thereof is relevant in the context to consider. The section imposes a bar on the Court to take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period of limitation. Clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section-(2) of Section-468 are not relevant in the context. But Clause (c) thereof is relevant in the context to consider. It envisages that when the offence is punishable for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation to take cognizance of the said offence is three years. The offences for which the charge-sheet is filed, are all punishable with less than two years of imprisonment. Therefore, the period of limitation as per Clause (c) Sub-section (2) of Section-468 is three years. 10. Now, it is significant to note that Section-469 deals with commencement of the period of limitation. It envisages that the period of limitation in relation to an offender, shall commence (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which, the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. Clause (2) further clarifies that in computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed, shall be excluded. 11. Invoking Clause (b) of Section-469, it is contended on behalf of the prosecution that as the aggrieved person is no more as he passed away in the accident, the second part of clause (b) applies to the facts of the present case and it is contended by learned APP that the day on which the police officer came to know or got knowledge of the said offence, shall be the date from which the said limitation period of three years is to be computed. 12. This Court finds considerable force in the said contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. There is nothing to indicate from the record that a report was lodged with the police immediately after the accident or that the said fact was brought to the notice of the police. 12. This Court finds considerable force in the said contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. There is nothing to indicate from the record that a report was lodged with the police immediately after the accident or that the said fact was brought to the notice of the police. The record indicates, as can be seen from the case diary, which is now produced before the Court, that the second respondent, who is the first informant, who is the friend of the deceased, has sent a report to the Superintendent of Police of Anand on 22.02.2009 relating to the said accident and he ordered for inquiry on the basis of the said report. After conducting an inquiry, the present FIR was registered on 28.04.2010. Therefore, the period of limitation as contemplated under Section-469(2)(b) is to be computed from 22.02.2009, the day on which, the police officer got knowledge about the said offence. There is no period of limitation prescribed for filing the charge-sheet after completion of investigation. Section-173(1) of Cr.P.C. only mandates that the investigation is to be completed without unnecessary delay. As noticed supra, the bar is on the Court to take cognizance of the offence and there is no bar imposed on the police to investigate a case or to file a charge-sheet beyond three years. Ultimately, the charge- sheet was filed on 24.03.2014. The Court has taken cognizance of the said offence immediately on the next date i.e. on 25.03.2014. Considering the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 (2)(b), cognizance has to be taken within three years from the date on which the police officer got knowledge about the said offence. Even as per Section-469(2)(c), period of limitation of three years commences from the date on which the identity of the offender is known to the police officer. 13. The Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. P.D.Pujari reported in 1979 Criminal Law Journal had an occasion to deal with the scope and ambit of Section 469 of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE , which deals with the commencement of the limitation. After analyzing the provision elaborately, ultimately, the Bombay High Court concluded in paragraph nos.16 and 17 of the judgment as follows:- “16. After analyzing the provision elaborately, ultimately, the Bombay High Court concluded in paragraph nos.16 and 17 of the judgment as follows:- “16. Bearing in mind all these factors and circumstances as also the scheme of Chapter XXXVI and its object, my conclusions on the question arising and framed for adjudication are as follows: (i) The period of limitation will commence, under Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 469, "on the date of the offence", if, on that date itself, there is knowledge also of the offence as also identity of the offender. Cl. (a) will not apply, if, on the date of the offence, there is no knowledge of the offence nor will it apply, if, on the date of the offence, there is knowledge of the offence but there is no identity of the offender. Cl. (a) presupposes knowledge of the offence as also identity of the offender. (ii) The period of limitation will commence, under Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 469", on the first day on which the offence comes to the knowledge" of the person aggrieved thereby or of any Police Officer, if on that date itself the identity of the offender is also known. Cl. (b) will not apply, if, on the date specified therein, though there is knowledge of the offence, there is no identity of the offender i.e. though the offence is known, the offender is not known. Cl. (b) presupposes identify of the offender. (iii) The period of limitation will commence, under Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 469. "On the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the Police Officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier." Cl. (c) presupposes knowledge of the offence. 17. Applying the tests formulated above to the undisputed dates in the present case, it is clear that the instant prosecution was not barred by limitation. The date of the offence was 5.09.1975. The offence was also known on that date but the offender was not known. His identity was first known only by virtue of letter dated 21.11.1975, by the B.E.S.T. Undertaking to the Traffic Police. The case was thus clearly governed by Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 469 of the Code. The date of the offence was 5.09.1975. The offence was also known on that date but the offender was not known. His identity was first known only by virtue of letter dated 21.11.1975, by the B.E.S.T. Undertaking to the Traffic Police. The case was thus clearly governed by Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 469 of the Code. The prosecution instituted on 18.03.1976 was thus much within the period of limitation of six months ( prescribed u/s. 468(2)(a) of the Code) from the date when the identity of the offender (the accused herein) was, on receipt of the letter dated 21.11.1975, first known to the Police Officer making investigation into the offence. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, wrong in holding that the complaint was not within limitation. His finding in that behalf is set aside.” 14. Now, it is significant to note here that the version of the prosecution is that from the time when the FIR was registered in the year 2010 that the petitioner, who is the sole accused in the said crime was absconding and she has been avoiding her arrest and concealing herself. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has produced the report of the investigating officer to that effect, which is already taken on record. It indicates that the petitioner was absconding and she was not available for arrest. Therefore, Section-470(4)(b) of Cr.P.C. is relevant in the context to consider. Section-470 deals with exclusion of time in certain cases. Clause (1) to (3) are not relevant in the context. Clause (4) of Section-470 is relevant in the context and reads thus:- “In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender -(a) has been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under the administration of the Central Government; or (b) has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.” Here Clause (a) is not relevant and Clause (b) is relevant to consider. It clearly ordains that when the offender has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, the said period shall be excluded from computing the said period of limitation. 15. The FIR was registered in the year 2010 and the charge- sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and cognizance of the offence was taken against the petitioner on 25.03.2014. It clearly ordains that when the offender has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, the said period shall be excluded from computing the said period of limitation. 15. The FIR was registered in the year 2010 and the charge- sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and cognizance of the offence was taken against the petitioner on 25.03.2014. Therefore, as the Court has to take cognizance within three years from the date when the police officer got knowledge of the said offence, if the said period is calculated, as police officer got knowledge of the offence on 22.02.2009, the cognizance has to be usually taken within three years from the said date. But the charge- sheet was filed on 24.03.2014 and cognizance of offence was taken on 25.03.2014. Though at the first blush, it appears that the cognizance is barred by time, if the period of limitation is computed and the time from which the petitioner has been absconding and avoided her arrest is taken into consideration and it is excluded as envisaged in Section-470(4)(b) of Cr.P.C., the order of taking cognizance is well within the period of limitation. As per prosecution version, she was arrested in connection with the present crime in the year 2014. So, the period of limitation of three years commences from the date of her arrest. 16. As per the submission made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, after she was absconding, warrant under Section-70(2) was obtained on 23.12.2010 and as it could not be executed that steps are taken under Section-82 Cr.P.C and ultimately, when she was arrested in the year 2014 by Gandhinagar Police in connection with another crime, she was produced in this crime on P.T. warrant in the year 2014. 17. Therefore, considering the mandate of Section-470(4) (b), which ordains that the period during which the offender is absconding shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation, it is to be held that the order of taking cognizance of offence against the petitioner is not barred by time as contended by the petitioner. The period of limitation of three years is to be computed from the date of her production after obtaining the P.T. warrant in the year 2014. So it cannot be said that the order of taking cognizance of offence against the petitioner is barred by time. 18. The period of limitation of three years is to be computed from the date of her production after obtaining the P.T. warrant in the year 2014. So it cannot be said that the order of taking cognizance of offence against the petitioner is barred by time. 18. Therefore, the FIR and the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner cannot be quashed on the ground that the order of taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Magistrate against the petitioner is barred by time. 19. Resultantly, the application is dismissed.