JUDGMENT : Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). If there is a case that calls upon this Court to apply the principle contained in the above maxim, this is it. 2. These writ petitions are intrinsically connected with each other and essentially relate to the same subject matter. Therefore, they can be conveniently disposed of by common judgment. W.P(C.) No.16718 of 2016 is filed praying inter alia for a direction to the State and Revenue officials, namely respondents 1, 2, 3 and 4 in that writ petition not to effect mutation with regard to 1.70 acres of land in Sy.Nos.848/1A/1/1, 848/1D, 847/6A and 847/6B in Mullackal Village and another 35.073 cents in Sy.Nos.515/7A/2 and 515/6B/2 of Alappuzha West Village in Ambalapuzha Taluk of Alappuzha District, in the name of respondents 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 (13th respondent has subsequently been deleted from the array of parties) or anybody claiming under them. W.P.(C.) No.6557 of 2017 has been filed challenging Ext.P16 order dated 07.10.2002 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam in O.A.No.115/2002 and also seeking to quash the sale proclamation in D.R.C No.1036/SBI/ALP in O.A.No.115/2002 and to set aside the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal on 18.03.2004 and 30.09.2004, in respect of the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 documents. The learned Counsel appearing for various parties agrees that W.P.(C.) No.6557 of 2017 may be taken as the lead case. Therefore, exhibits and the parties referred to in this judgment are as they are marked in W.P.(C.) No.6557 of 2017, unless specifically indicated to be otherwise. 3. The 1st petitioner is a partnership firm. The 2nd and 3rd petitioners are its present partners. Going by the pleadings in the writ petition, the firm was originally constituted through a deed of partnership dated 01.04.1992 by three persons together with the 3rd petitioner, who is the wife of the 2nd petitioner. It is stated that on 01.02.1997, the three other partners, except the 3rd petitioner, retired from the partnership and the 2nd petitioner was inducted into the partnership. The 2nd petitioner obtained 170 cents of land in Sy.Nos.848/1A/1/1, 848/1D, 847/6A and 847/6B in Mullackal Village of Ambalapuzha Taluk of Alappuzha District under a family partition deed, which is on record as Ext.P2 dated 17.02.1997. The 2nd petitioner obtained 170 cents of land in Sy.Nos.848/1A/1/1, 848/1D, 847/6A and 847/6B in Mullackal Village of Ambalapuzha Taluk of Alappuzha District under a family partition deed, which is on record as Ext.P2 dated 17.02.1997. The 2nd petitioner also purchased another item of property having an extent of 35.73 cents of land in Sy.Nos.515/7A/2 and 515/6B/2 of Alappuzha West Village in Ambalapuzha Taluk of Alappuzha District by Ext.P3 document dated 18.02.1997. The properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 documents were mortgaged with the State Bank of India, Main Branch, Beach Road, Alappuzha to avail credit facilities for the business of the partnership firm. On default being committed, the bank initiated proceedings under the Recovery of Debts And Bankruptcy Act, 1993, (earlier known as ‘the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993’) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam by filing O.A.No.115/2002. Through Ext.P16 order dated 07.10.2002, the Original Application was allowed and the State Bank of India was permitted to recover a total amount of Rs.1,36,73,307/- (Rupees one crore thirty six lakhs seventy three thousand three hundred seven only) together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of Original Application till realization. Following the issuance of a recovery certificate, the properties were notified for sale by the Recovery Officer in D.R.C. No.1036/SBI/ALP in O.A.No.115/2002. The property covered by Ext.P3 document was sold in an auction on 18.03.2004 and the property covered by Ext.P2 document was sold in an auction on 30.09.2004. Since there were no applications for setting aside the sale conducted in terms of the provisions contained in the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, the sale conducted in respect of both items of properties have been confirmed. The petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reliefs as aforesaid. 4. Sri. G. Hariharan, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the entire sale proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer are vitiated by fraud and material irregularities. It is submitted that the 4th respondent is a lawyer practicing in Alappuzha who was regularly engaged in respect of certain cases for the 2nd petitioner. 4. Sri. G. Hariharan, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the entire sale proceedings conducted by the Recovery Officer are vitiated by fraud and material irregularities. It is submitted that the 4th respondent is a lawyer practicing in Alappuzha who was regularly engaged in respect of certain cases for the 2nd petitioner. It is submitted that the legal opinion obtained by the bank, before the sanctioning of the credit facilities, will show that the legal opinion was furnished by the 4th respondent, who was also a lawyer on the panel of lawyers for the State Bank of India. It is submitted that the 2nd petitioner had contacted the 4th respondent to defend him and the other petitioners in proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and then the 4th respondent informed the petitioners that he could not represent them, as he was on the panel of lawyers for the State Bank of India. It is submitted that on the instructions of the 4th respondent, the matter was entrusted to the 13th respondent in W.P.(C.) No.16718 of 2016 (the 13th respondent has been subsequently deleted from the array of parties), and he appeared on behalf of the petitioners before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It is submitted that the petitioners do not intend to impugn the final order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in O.A.No.115/2002 and are confining their challenge to the proceedings before the Recovery Officer. It is submitted that there are substantial tax liabilities, liabilities to the ESI Corporation, Provident Fund Organization etc., in respect of the 1st petitioner firm and the sale of the properties by the bank in proceedings before the Recovery Officer for a throwaway price, has resulted in great prejudice to the petitioners. He states that the delay in challenging the sale is not fatal to the proceedings as the petitioners were bonafide prosecuting an insolvency petition, numbered as I.P. No.15/2003, before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Pollachi. It is submitted that the bank was also a party to the said proceedings. It is submitted that I.P.No.15/2003 was dismissed for default only on 22.10.2012 and the petitioners had approached the District Court, Coimbatore by filing C.M.A.No.1/2013. It is submitted that C.M.A.No.1/2013 was disposed of only on 25.04.2017 and immediately thereafter, the petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P. (C.)No.6557 of 2017, impugning the sale proceedings. It is submitted that I.P.No.15/2003 was dismissed for default only on 22.10.2012 and the petitioners had approached the District Court, Coimbatore by filing C.M.A.No.1/2013. It is submitted that C.M.A.No.1/2013 was disposed of only on 25.04.2017 and immediately thereafter, the petitioners approached this Court by filing W.P. (C.)No.6557 of 2017, impugning the sale proceedings. It is submitted that the property covered by Ext.P2 document was purchased by the sister and brother-in-law of the 4th respondent, viz., respondents No.2 and 3. It is submitted that the property covered by Ext.P3 document was also purchased by a benamidar of the 4th respondent, viz., the 5th respondent. It is submitted that the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 were found sufficient security for a loan, for the total amount of Rs.97 lakhs in the year 1999 has been sold at a throwaway price. It is submitted that the property covered by Ext.P2 (having an extent of 170 cents) was sold for a price of Rs.44 lakhs in the year 2004, while the property covered by Ext.P3 was sold for a sum of Rs.32.45 lakhs. It is submitted that this fact is sufficient to show that the properties were sold for a throwaway price with the active connivance and support of the 4th respondent. It is submitted that the period during which I.P.No.15/2003 was pending before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Pollachi, and the time during which the C.M.A.No.1/2013 was pending before the District Court, Coimbatore must be excluded to consider whether the petitioners had challenged the sale within time. Reference is made in this regard to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ‘the 1963 Act’). The learned Counsel also refers to the provisions of Section 17 of the same Act, to substantiate that where fraud is alleged, and such fraud could not be discovered in reasonable time, the petitioners are entitled to impugn the sale proceedings even at this distance of time. 5. The learned Counsel appearing for the State Bank of India would vehemently oppose the grant of any relief to the petitioners. It is submitted that W.P. (C.) No.6557 of 2017, which is the petition filed challenging the sale proceedings must be dismissed on the sole ground of delay even if were to be held that a writ petition is maintainable in the matter. It is submitted that the sale of both the items of properties, viz. It is submitted that W.P. (C.) No.6557 of 2017, which is the petition filed challenging the sale proceedings must be dismissed on the sole ground of delay even if were to be held that a writ petition is maintainable in the matter. It is submitted that the sale of both the items of properties, viz. the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 documents were in the year 2004 and the petitioners cannot, after about 13 years of the sale, file a writ petition impugning the sale. It is submitted that even if it were to be held that the writ petition filed impugning the sale, was filed within reasonable time, a writ petition is not the remedy available to the petitioners to challenge the sale proceedings. It is submitted that there is no question of application of Section 14 of the 1963 Act, as that provision will apply only if the plaintiff/petitioner was prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding before a Court without jurisdiction. It is submitted that, in the facts of the present case, the indigent petition was filed even before the date of sale, therefore, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be referred to as a petition filed challenging the sale before a Court without jurisdiction. In other words, it is submitted that when there were no proceedings pending before any Court, impugning the sale proceedings, there was no question of application of Section 14 of the 1963 Act. It is submitted that the question of applying the provisions of Section 17 of the 1963 Act, also does not arise for consideration, as the 2nd petitioner had himself filed an affidavit in the year 2005 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal where he had stated that the sale conducted in respect of the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 were vitiated for lack of publication and on the ground that they were sold at a throwaway price. In other words, it is submitted that this is not a case where the alleged fraud was discovered only later, for the provisions of Section 17 of the 1963 Act to apply. It is submitted that in such circumstances, that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 6. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3, instructed by Adv. It is submitted that in such circumstances, that these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 6. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3, instructed by Adv. Sabu George, would fully endorse the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent bank. In addition, he refers to the document produced as Ext.R2(a) along with the counter affidavit of respondents 2 and 3, to contend that the 2nd petitioner was fully aware of the sale proceedings and had even taken up a contention before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, in I.A.No.941/2005 in D.R.C. No.1036/SBI/ALP in O.A.No.115/2002 that the sale of the properties was illegal and unsustainable. It is submitted that having taken such a contention before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the petitioners cannot be now heard to contend that they are entitled to maintain a writ petition impugning the sale conducted in the year 2004 by filing a writ petition in the year 2017. He also states that respondents 2 and 3 vehemently deny that the 4th respondent had any role, whatsoever in their bid for the property covered by Ext.P2. It is submitted that, merely because the 4th respondent was a lawyer for the State Bank of India in its panel of lawyers for conducting cases in Alappuzha, the contention that his sister and brother-in-law, viz., respondents 2 and 3 could not participate in an auction conducted by the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, is far fetched. The proceedings before the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in D.R.C. No.1036/SBI/ALP are also referred to show that it was after several unsuccessful attempts to sell the properties, that the sale was conducted in favour of respondents 2 and 3. The learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the contention that there are substantial statutory liabilities, the recovery of which would be affected by the sale of the properties in the manner described above is also untenable for the reason that Exts.P2 and P3 properties belonged exclusively to the 2nd petitioner. It is submitted that the liabilities referred to are the liabilities which arose before the induction of the 2nd petitioner as a partner of the firm and therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the properties can be proceeded against for recovery of the statutory dues. It is submitted that the liabilities referred to are the liabilities which arose before the induction of the 2nd petitioner as a partner of the firm and therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the properties can be proceeded against for recovery of the statutory dues. It is also pointed out that, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend that the sale must be set aside, as there are statutory dues which had to be recovered by the sale of the properties in question. It is submitted that the sale was conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions contained to the second schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It is also pointed that there was proper publication and proclamation of sale at every stage and the reduction in the reserved price was permitted after following due procedure. 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent would submit that the 4th respondent had absolutely no role in the sale of the properties covered by Exts.P2 in favour of respondents 2 and 3. It is submitted that the 4th respondent was not, in any manner involved with the conduct of the case before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and was not even aware of the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It is submitted that unnecessary allegations have been raised against the 4th respondent, only to give colour to the baseless allegation that the sale of the property was a collusive affair and was vitiated by fraud. 8. The learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents would submit that the State has no contention to be raised at this point in time regarding the disputes between the petitioners and the other respondents. It is submitted that it may be clarified that the adjudication of the issues in these writ petitions will not prevent the State from proceeding against the properties in question, if such proceedings are authorized by the law. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State Bank of India, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents and the learned Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent, I am of the view that the petitioners cannot be granted any relief in these writ petitions. As already noted, W.P.(C.) No.16718 of 2016 is filed seeking a direction to the State of Kerala and the officials of the Revenue Department, not to effect mutation in respect of the properties sold in auction in proceedings before the Recovery Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Apart from the fact that the said prayer may not be maintainable, the ground upon which such prayer is raised is that there are statutory dues owed to the Government and other Departments and therefore, the sale could not have been held. I am clear in my mind that the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the mutation, following the sale conducted by the Recovery Officer, should be prohibited based on the contention that there are other statutory liabilities. Further it is settled that mutation is only for fiscal purposes and such mutation does not affect the right of the State to proceed against the properties, if such proceedings are authorized by the law. That apart, the writ petition in question has been filed only in the year 2016 and in respect of the sale of properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 as early as in the year 2004. Therefore, W.P.(C.) No.16718 of 2016 is only to be dismissed. 10. Coming to the prayers in W.P.(C.) No.6557 of 2017, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out any case for the grant of reliefs sought in that writ petition. The sale of the property covered by Ext.P2 document was on 30.09.2004. The properties covered by Ext.P3 document were sold on 18.03.2004. W.P(C.) No.6557 of 2017, impugning the sale is filed only on 27.02.2017. The contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of Section 14 of the 1963 Act, or the principles governing Section 14 of the 1963 Act, is only to be rejected. Section 14 of the 1963 Act applies, where the plaintiffs/petitioners were bonafide prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding before a Court without jurisdiction. A reading of Section 14 of the 1963 Act indicates that the proceeding which was instituted before a Court without jurisdiction must relate to the same subject matter or must claim the same reliefs as sought in the subsequent proceedings. A reading of Section 14 of the 1963 Act indicates that the proceeding which was instituted before a Court without jurisdiction must relate to the same subject matter or must claim the same reliefs as sought in the subsequent proceedings. I.P. No.15/2003 filed before the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Pollachi, which is stated to be the proceeding which was being bonafide prosecuted with due diligence, was filed even before the sale in respect of the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 were held. By no stretch of imagination, can it be held that the said proceeding is a proceeding referred to in Section 14 of the 1963 Act, to apply the principles behind the provisions of that Section to determine whether the period spent in prosecuting that litigation must be ignored or excluded to consider whether the subsequent proceeding has been initiated in time. No doubt, W.P. (C.) No.6557 of 2017 is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the 1963 Act do not apply to such proceedings. However, Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a public law remedy and therefore, the delay and latches is fatal to the grant of relief in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners ought to have approached this Court within a reasonable time. Even if this Court were to overlook the objections raised on behalf of the bank that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy, the petitioners cannot be granted any relief as they ought to have approached this Court within a reasonable time. There is culpable delay and latches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court for relief. It is seen from the document produced as Ext.R2(a) that, as early as 05.07.2005, the 2nd petitioner had filed an affidavit before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, stating that the sale was irregular and illegal. If the 2nd petitioner was aware that the sale was illegal and unsustainable in July 2005, there is no reason forthcoming as to why he did not initiate appropriate proceedings at that point in time to impugn the sale proceedings. Similarly, no ground has been made out to apply the provisions of Section 17 of the 1963 Act which deals with the ‘effect of fraud or mistake’. Similarly, no ground has been made out to apply the provisions of Section 17 of the 1963 Act which deals with the ‘effect of fraud or mistake’. There is nothing in the facts of this case to indicate that the petitioners were prevented by fraud or mistake from challenging or impugning the sale proceedings in time. As already noted above, Ext.R2(a) document shows that at least in July 2005, the 2nd petitioner was aware of the fact that the properties covered by Exts.P2 and P3 documents have been sold in auction by the Recovery Officer. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any principle flowing from Section 17 of the 1963 Act. In Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam, [ (2001) 7 SCC 573 ], it was held:- “14. Needless to record that engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper - this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the consistent legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine of prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal diligence and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour. Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity - the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity - the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. Wood, V.C. in Manby v. Bewicke [(1857) 3 K&J 342 : 69 ER 1140] (K&J at p. 352) stated: (ER p. 1144) “The legislature has in this, as in every civilized country that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe certain limitations of time after which persons may suppose themselves to be in peaceful possession of their property, and capable of transmitting the estates of which they are in possession, without any apprehension of the title being impugned by litigation in respect of transactions which occurred at a distant period, when evidence in support of their own title may be most difficult to obtain.” In the facts of the present case, even a suit for declaration, or to recover possession of mortgaged property or to recover possession on the strength of title would be barred on the date of filing of W.P.(C.) No.6557 of 2017 [See articles 58, 61(b) and 65 of the First Schedule to the 1963 Act]. 11. The fact that the sister and brother-in-law of the 4th respondent (who is a lawyer at the panel of the State Bank of India) had purchased the property covered by Ext.P2, initially raised an apprehension in the mind of this Court as to whether there was any merit in the contentions taken by the petitioners. On a perusal of the materials produced along with the writ petition, I am unable to find any materials which would suggest that the 4th respondent is in any manner connected with the purchase of the property covered by Ext.P2 by respondents 2 and 3. Moreover, for invoking Section 17 of the 1963 Act, two ingredients have to be pleaded and duly proved. One is existence of a fraud and the other is discovery of such fraud. In the present case, since the petitioner failed to establish both the ingredients, he cannot be extended the benefit under the said provision. The writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. One is existence of a fraud and the other is discovery of such fraud. In the present case, since the petitioner failed to establish both the ingredients, he cannot be extended the benefit under the said provision. The writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that this judgment shall not be treated as deciding any issue on account of any statutory liabilities and the legality or otherwise of any action that may be initiated by the State or any statutory authority, if so advised.