JUDGMENT : Krishna Rao, J. 1. The plaintiff has filed the present application being G.A No. 11 of 2022 seeking amendment by incorporating some averments and prayers in the plaint. The plaintiff has filed the suit against the State Authorities praying for the following reliefs: “a) Declaration that the orders imposing penalty under Clause 2(a) of the contract aggregating to Rs. 48,76,035.00 are wholly illegal, null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs. b) The said purported orders being imposing penalty under Clause 2(a) to be delivered up and cancelled; c) Declaration that the purported memo No. 1021/R-131 dated 29.05.2015 rescinding the contract is wholly illegal, null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs; d) The said purported memo No. 1021/R-131 dated 29.05.2015 be delivered up and cancelled; e) Declaration that the Memo No. 126-E-in-c/2016 dated 8th March, 2016 was issued by the Engineer-in-Chief & Ex-Officio Secretary, PWD, Nabanna is wholly illegal, null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs; f) The said purported Memo No. 126-E-in-c/2016 dated 8th March, 2016 was issued by the Engineer-in-Chief & Ex-Officio Secretary, PWD, Nabanna be delivered up and cancelled. g) Decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants their men and/or agents from giving effect to the memorandum issued from time to time imposing penalty aggregating to Rs. 48,76,035.00 and/or from the memo No. 1021/R-131 dated 29.05.2015 rescinding the contract illegally in any manner whatsoever; h) Decree for a sum of Rs. 2,21,61,296.00 as pleaded in paragraph 44 above; i) Decree for a sum of Rs. 55,76,035.00 as pleladed in paragraph 54 above; j) Interim interest and interest on judgment at the rate of 12% per annum on the decreetal sum till realization; k) Decree of an amount of Rs. 19,00,000.00 (Rupees nineteen lakhs) only as pleaded in paragraph 56 above; r) An inquiry be made into further loss and damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful act and conduct of the defendants as aforesaid and a decree be passed for such sum as may be found due and payable upon such inquiry.” 2. Before filing of the suit by the plaintiff, an order dated 7th July, 2015 was communicated to the plaintiffs by the defendant no. 2 barring to participate in any tender floated by the PWD for the next two years with effect from the date of the said order. Before filing of the suit by the plaintiff, an order dated 7th July, 2015 was communicated to the plaintiffs by the defendant no. 2 barring to participate in any tender floated by the PWD for the next two years with effect from the date of the said order. The said order was assailed in W.P. No. 1043 of 2015 before this Court on the premise that the decision to blacklisting the plaintiff without affording an opportunity of hearing is opposed to the principles of natural justice. The said order was set aside by this Court by an order dated 26th August, 2015 with categorical observations that the said order shall not preclude the concerned authority to proceed against the plaintiff afresh in accordance with law. 3. Subsequent to the order dated 26th August, 2015, the defendants have again issued a show cause notice on 18th September, 2015 to the plaintiff as to why punitive action should not be taken. On receipt of the show cause notice, the plaintiff has submitted a detailed reply. On receipt of reply, the defendants have not proceeded with the show cause notice but a memo was issued to the plaintiff on 8th March, 2016 by fixing a date of hearing on 29th March, 2016. Being aggrieved with the said memo, the plaintiff has filed the present suit as well as G.A No. 1339 of 2016 in C.S No. 102 of 2016. This Court by an order dated 11th May, 2016 had passed the following order in GA No. 1339 of 2016 : “Both the respondents and the petitioners are uniform in their submission that the committee has adjourned the date of hearing and, therefore, no decision has been taken as yet. In view of the categorical stand of the respondent that the memo is issued in furtherance to the show cause notice already issued, and since no decision has yet been taken, this Court does not find that this is a fit case where the Court should pass an ad interim order of injunction. It is open to the petitioner to take all the pleas and objections available to him, including the competence and jurisdiction and constitution of the said committee. Let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within two weeks after the reopening of the Court following the summer vacation; reply thereto, if any, within one week thereafter. It is open to the petitioner to take all the pleas and objections available to him, including the competence and jurisdiction and constitution of the said committee. Let affidavit-in-opposition be filed within two weeks after the reopening of the Court following the summer vacation; reply thereto, if any, within one week thereafter. The matter will appear as an ‘adjourned motion’ three weeks after the reopening of the Court following the summer vacation.” 4. Being aggrieved with the order dated 11th May, 2016, the plaintiff had preferred an appeal being APOT No.181 of 2016 along with an application being G.A No. 1640 of 2016. The Appellate Court has disposed of the said appeal on 21st June, 2016 by passing the following order : “Apparently, a show-cause notice once again was issued on 18.9.2015 indicating why punitive action as indicated in the show-cause notice should not be taken against the appellant. Apparently, a detailed reply said to have been issued on 28.9.2015 was sent to the said show-cause notice. Nothing seems to have happened till an intimation dated 8.3.2016, wherein the Engineer in Chief, PWD and Chairperson and Convenor, Debarment Committee directed the plaintiff/appellant to appear before the Debarment Committee constituted, as indicated in the notice of 8.3.2016, to hear the plaintiff/appellant on 29.3.2016. This became the subject matter of present suit wherein several grounds were taken and several reliefs sought against the respondents. The main contention of the appellant seems to be that there was no statutory provision for constitution of such Debarment Committee in any of the statues which are applicable to the proceedings now intended or there was no such contract between the parties when the plaintiff/appellant entered into the contract with regard to the tender in question. It was also brought to our notice that the authority who issued the show-cause notice on 18.9.2015 is entirely different from the Debarment Committee though the notice to appear on 29.3.2016 was issued by the very same person who issued the show-cause notice. Learned Advocate General brought to our notice that the Committee is now headed by the Chief Engineer, Head Quarter, PWD, the Chief Engineer, Head Quarters (RTD) and also the Financial Adviser, PWD. According to the Learned Advocate General, the Committee consists of high ranking officials who have knowledge in the subject matter. Therefore, there is no deviation or alien authority which would be conducting the enquiry. According to the Learned Advocate General, the Committee consists of high ranking officials who have knowledge in the subject matter. Therefore, there is no deviation or alien authority which would be conducting the enquiry. As a matter of fact, the Learned Judge has reserved liberty to take all possible defence available to the plaintiff including competence, jurisdiction and constitution of the Committee before the Committee when the appellant appears and places its defence in support of its stand. After the Committee takes a decision, he is always at liberty to challenge the said decision including the plea of competence, jurisdiction and constitution. It is possible that after hearing the appellant the Committee may agree with the defence of the appellant and drop the proceedings or they may further proceed with the matter and give a finding opining that the intention expressed in the show-cause notice has to be implemented. In such event it is always open to the appellant/plaintiff to knock at the doors of this Court. In the light of above observations and reasoning, we decline to intervene and we make it clear that no opinion is expressed either on the competence or jurisdiction or constitution of the Committee in question at this point of time. It is always open to the parties to seek early hearing of the matter. Both the appeal and application are dismissed.” 5. The application filed by the plaintiff being G.A. No. 1339 of 2016 was 3rd disposed of by this Court on November, 2016 by passing the following order: “GA No. 1339 of 2016 is disposed of by requiring the State through its relevant Debarment Committee to afford the plaintiff company a further date within four weeks from today to attend a hearing whereat. It will be open to the committee to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Till such time that the plaintiff company appears for the hearing, provided a date of hearing is disclosed as expeditiously as possible, it will be open to the State to not allow the plaintiff company to participate in any future tender. The plaintiffs will also pay costs of the present application assessed at Rs.50,000/-. The State will be entitled to such costs.” 6. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal against the order dated 3rd November, 2016 being APOT No. 404 of 2016 along with an application being G.A No. 3573 of 2016. The plaintiffs will also pay costs of the present application assessed at Rs.50,000/-. The State will be entitled to such costs.” 6. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal against the order dated 3rd November, 2016 being APOT No. 404 of 2016 along with an application being G.A No. 3573 of 2016. During the pendency of the appeal, the 1st defendants have issued an order dated December, 2016 by blacklisting the plaintiff. Being aggrieved with the said order, the plaintiff had again filed an application before this Court being G.A No. 84 of 2017 in C.S No. 102 of 2016 and this Court by an order dated 6th February, 2017 had set aside the impugned order dated 1st December, 2016 by directing the appropriate authority to consider the representation of the plaintiff in accordance with law and to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff within a period of three weeks from the date of communication of the order. In view of the order dated 6th February, 2017, the appeal preferred by the plaintiff was become infructuous. 7. The plaintiff had again filed an application being G.A. No. 877 of 2017 in C.S. No. 102 of 2016 against the order of blacklisting of the plaintiff without following the due process of law. This Court by an order dated 22nd March, 2017 had disposed of the said application by passing the following order: “The principal grievance of the petitioner appears to be that the petitioner was black listed for not following the procedure laid down in Clause 8 of the tender document. Moreover, the procedure prescribed under Clause 7.1 of the tender document has also not been adhered to. Although such objections were taken at the time of hearing which has culminated in the impugned order, it does not appear from the order that such point was adverted to and considered. It, prima facie, appears that Clauses 7.1 and 8 are condition precedent for exercising the power and only after following the said procedure and on consideration of the materials on records, the respondent if satisfied could pass an appropriate order for debarment of the petitioners in respect of future contracts. Only on these limited grounds, without going into the merits of the order, the said order is set aside. Only on these limited grounds, without going into the merits of the order, the said order is set aside. The representation of the petitioner shall be disposed of within a period of two weeks from date. The service of the notice upon the Advocate-on-Record of the petitioners shall be construed as service of notice upon the petitioners in this proceeding. The appropriate authority shall decide the matter impartially and uninfluenced by its earlier findings. The impugned order dated 6th March, 2017 is set aside. However, for a period of two weeks, the petitioners shall be debarred from participating any future tender. The respondent, however, shall not put the name of the petitioners in the category of black listed contractors in the website. The application is, accordingly, disposed of.” 8. In purported compliance of the order dated 6th February, 2017 passed by this Court, the Joint Secretary, Public Works Department has issued an order and against the said order, the plaintiff had again filed an application being 2416 of 2017 in C.S No. 102 of 2016 and the said application was disposed of on 2nd August, 2017 by passing the following order : “Since there are procedural lapses the instant application is disposed of by directing the Debarment Committee Members to dispose of the representation positively within a period of three weeks from date of communication of this order by either party after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and by passing a reasoned order. However, it is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the matter. It is made clear that in the event the decision is not taken by the Debarment Committee within the aforesaid period, the order of suspension shall automatically stand revoked on expiry of the aforesaid period and the petitioners shall be entitled to participate in the future tenders. The impugned order is set aside. It is needless to mention that the Debarment Committee shall consider the matter afresh and shall not be influenced by the earlier orders. The Debarment Committee shall decide the matters on the basis of the existing materials. In view of this order the petitioner shall not be shown as debarred contractor in the relevant website. GA No. 2416 of 2017, accordingly, stands disposed of.” 9. The Debarment Committee shall decide the matters on the basis of the existing materials. In view of this order the petitioner shall not be shown as debarred contractor in the relevant website. GA No. 2416 of 2017, accordingly, stands disposed of.” 9. The defendants have not complied with the order passed by this Court dated 2nd August, 2017, the plaintiff has filed a contempt application against the defendants being CC No. 82 of 2017. In the meantime, the defendants have also filed an application for extension of time to comply with the order dated 2nd August, 2017 and accordingly by an order dated 21st September, 2017, time to comply with the order is extended till 31st October, 2017 and both applications were disposed of. 10. By an order dated 31st October, 2017, the Joint Secretary, Public Works Department, Government of West Bengal issued an order of debarment of the plaintiff and being aggrieved with the said order, the plaintiff has filed an application being G.A No. 173 of 2018. During the pendency of the said application, the period of debarment had expired and the State removed the name of the plaintiff from the list of debarment and accordingly this Court by an order dated 24th January, 2020 disposed of the application holding that the issue as to whether or not the plaintiff was correctly debarred as sought to be done in the present case, is an issue which need not to be decided in this application and the said issue was kept open. 11. Now the plaintiff intents to bring all the above facts on record by way of amendment in the plaint as well as in the prayer portion of the plaint by claiming further reliefs in addition to the original reliefs. 12. Mr. Priyankar Saha, Learned Advocate submitted that the right from the 1st blacklisting order dated 7th July, 2015, till the debarment order dated 22nd May, 2017 have been set aside by this Court and due to the erroneous blacklisting orders, for about two years, the plaintiff has not been able to participate in any tender for which the plaintiff had suffered severe financial and business loss. 13. Mr. Saha submitted that by virtue of issuance of the blacklisting orders, the plaintiffs have faced defamation and loss of reputation. Mr. 13. Mr. Saha submitted that by virtue of issuance of the blacklisting orders, the plaintiffs have faced defamation and loss of reputation. Mr. Saha submitted that the order of debarment dated 31st October, 2017 is also illegal and not in accordance with law. He submits that the plaintiffs have challenged the said order of debarment in G.A No. 173 of 2018 but the said application was disposed of by keeping the issue open and thus the cause of action is still continuing. 14. Mr. Samrat Sen, Learned Senior Counsel representing the Sate submitted that the cause of action filing the suit has been described by the plaintiffs in paragraphs 44, 54 and 56 of the original plaint. The amendments as sought for by the plaintiffs introduce a new cause of action and new claims and the same would change the nature and character of the suit. He submits that the amendments are not necessary for the purpose of determining the real question as pleaded in the original plaint. 15. Mr. Sen submitted that the plaintiffs have filed the suit in the month of March’ 2016. The final debarment order was passed on 31st October, 2017. The plaintiffs have informed this Court that the plaintiffs intending to take out an application for amendment of the plaint on 24th June, 2019. The plaintiffs have filed an application for amendment in the plaint in the month of July’ 2019 being G.A. No. 1583 of 2019. The plaintiffs have not pressed the said application and accordingly by an order dated 13th January, 2021, the said application was dismissed as withdrawn. Mr. Sen submits that the plaintiffs have not prayed for leave to file afresh application. Now the plaintiffs have filed the present application in the month of December’ 2022 seeking amendment in the plaint. He submits that the contents of the earlier application which was dismissed as withdrawn without any liberty and the present application are same and thus the application filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed in limine on the grounds pari materia with Order XXIII, Rule 1 and 4 of the CPC, 1908 and the plaintiff has not obtained leave pari materia with Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC, 1908. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Sen submitted that the suit involved the notice calling upon the plaintiff for a meeting and recession of the contract but the proposed amendment based on new facts, new causes of action and rights arising out of the orders of blacklisting which did not exist at the time of filing of the suit. 17. Mr. Sen submitted that plaintiffs were granted leave under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 only with respect to the causes of action and the reliefs of the original suit but the proposed amendment relates to blacklisting orders passed by the defendants which were set aside by this Court and the final order dated 31st October, 2017 which arises subsequent to filing of the suit. No notice under Section 80 of the CPC is issued with respect to new claims and new cause of action and no leave is prayed for. He submits that as per the claim of the plaintiffs as per the proposed amendment fresh notice under Section 80 is required to be issued and thus the application is not maintainable. 18. The plaintiffs have filed the suit challenging the rescind of the contract by a memo dated 29th May, 2015 and the notice dated 8th March, 2016 by which the plaintiffs were asked to appear before the debarment committee on 29th March, 2016. The plaintiff has also prayed for monetary compensation. Before filing of the suit, the defendants have issued an order dated 7th July, 2015, baring the plaintiff to participate any tender floated by the Public Works Department for the next two years with effect from the date of issuance of the order. This Court in a writ jurisdiction has set aside the said order with observation that the said order shall not preclude the defendants to proceed against the plaintiff afresh in accordance with law. As per the liberty given by this Court, the defendants have again issued a show cause notice to the plaintiff on 18th September, 2015 and the plaintiff had submitted its reply to the defendants. On 8th March, 2016, the defendants issued memo to the plaintiffs intimating the date of hearing on 29th March, 2016 and the said memo is the subject matter of the instant suit. On 8th March, 2016, the defendants issued memo to the plaintiffs intimating the date of hearing on 29th March, 2016 and the said memo is the subject matter of the instant suit. The plaintiffs have also filed an application for grant of injunction with respect of the memo dated 8th March, 2016 in G.A No. 1339 of 2016 but this Court has not granted any injunction to the plaintiff and the plaintiffs have also not succeeded in appeal and lastly by an order dated 3rd November, 2016, this Court had disposed of the G.A No. 1339 of 2016 allowing the defendants to complete the hearing of the proceeding after giving an opportunity of hearing to the plaintiffs and this Court also imposed cost of Rs. 50,000/-upon the plaintiffs. The proceedings initiated by the defendants against the plaintiffs for debarment of the plaintiff was concluded on 31st October, 2017 by debarring the plaintiff to participate any tender process of the Public Works Department for two years. The said order of debarment dated 31st October, 2017 was challenged by filing an application being G.A. No. 173 of 2018 and by an order dated 24th January, 2020, this Court in G.A. No. 173 of 2018 had categorically held that “It is not for the Court at this stage to speculate on the effect of the debarment already suffered by the plaintiffs on a tender process which is yet to happen. The issue as to whether or not the petitioner was correctly debarred as sought to be done in the present case, is an issue which need not to be decided in this application. Such issue is kept open.” During the pendency of the application being G.A No. 173 of 2018, the plaintiffs have filed an application being G.A. No. 1583 of 2019 (renumbered as G.A. No. 7 of 2019) for amendment in the plaint. Having knowledge that this Court by an order dated 24th January, 2020 kept the issue open with regard to the validity of the debarment order dated 31st October, 2017 but the plaintiffs have not pressed the G.A No. 1583 of 2019 without any leave to file afresh, accordingly, this Court by an order dated 13th January, 2021 dismissed the said application as not pressed. Mr. Sen, Learned Senior Counsel in support of his contention relied upon the judgment reported in (2008) 14 SCC 364 (Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through LRS. Mr. Sen, Learned Senior Counsel in support of his contention relied upon the judgment reported in (2008) 14 SCC 364 (Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through LRS. –Vs-S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Another) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “18. Further, it is relevant to point out that in the original suit, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of his exclusive right to do mining operations and to use and sell the suit schedule property and in the petition filed during the course of the arguments, he prayed for recovery of possession and damages from the second defendant. It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be subject to certain conditions, namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The plaintiff not only failed to satisfy the conditions prescribed in proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 but even on merits his claim is liable to be rejected. All these relevant aspects have been duly considered by the High Court and rightly set aside the order dated 10-3-2004 of the Additional District Judge.” This Court finds that the defendants have initiated debarment proceeding against the plaintiff by issuing show-cause notice dated 18th September, 2015. The memo dated 8th March, 2016 which is the subject-matter of the instant suit is also continuation to the said show-cause notice. As per the directions of this Court, the defendants have concluded debarment proceeding against the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have challenged the orders of debarment in this suit by filing general applications and finally this Court by an order dated 24th January, 2020 had kept the issue open whether the plaintiffs have been correctly debarred or not by the defendants from the tender process. This Court considered the judgment relied by the defendants but considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the judgment is distinguishable. In view of the above, this holds that the amendment sought for by the plaintiffs is the continuous cause of action and will not change the nature and character of the suit. The entire circumstances are in continuation to the memo dated 8th March, 2016. In view of the above, this holds that the amendment sought for by the plaintiffs is the continuous cause of action and will not change the nature and character of the suit. The entire circumstances are in continuation to the memo dated 8th March, 2016. After dismissal of the said application as not pressed, the plaintiffs have filed the present application on 2nd December, 2022. As per the case of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have inadvertently withdrawn the said application without any leave to file afresh but the application filed by the plaintiff is within the period of limitation. The defendants have relied upon the following judgments in support of their case: a. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 17 (K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. and Anr. –vs-Alliance Ministries and Others). b. (2016) 1 SCC 332 (L.C. Hanumanthappa (Since Dead) Represented by His Legal Representatives – vs-H.B. Shivakumar). c. (2008) 15 SCC 610 (Ashutosh Chaturvedi –vs-Prano Devi Alias Parani Devi & Ors.). d. (2005) 12 SCC 1 : 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1305 (Union of India –vs-Pramod Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors.). e. (2008) 14 SCC 364 (Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through Lrs. –vs-S.K. Sarwagi & Company Private Limited & Anr.). f. (2001) 1 SCC 555 (Bishandayal & Sons –vs-State of Orissa & Ors.). g. 2017 SCC OnLine Ori 175 (Sabitri Satapathy & Ors. –vs-Notified Area Council). h. (2008) 3 SCC 717 (Usha Devi –vs-Rijwan Ahamd & Ors.). i. (2009) 10 SCC 626 (Surender Kumar Sharma –vs-Makhan Singh). j. (2009) 10 SCC 84 (Revajeetu Builders & Developers – vs-Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors.). Mr. Sen, Learned Senior Advocate relying upon the above judgments submitted that a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of filing of the present application. The claims which the plaintiffs intending to bring on record, if made in a fresh suit, would be barred by limitation due to lapse of time for such relief and thus the amended should not be allowed. The plaintiffs have relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 2022 in Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 in SUO MOTU Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 (In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation) dated 10th January, 2022 and submitted that the case of the plaintiffs for limitation is covered in the said judgment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case has extended the period of limitation for a further period of 90 days with effect from 1st March, 2022. In the present case, the plaintiffs intending to challenge the order of debarment dated 31st October, 2017 and accordingly the plaintiffs have filed an application being G.A No. 173 of 2018 and have also filed an application for amendment in the plaint being G.A No. 1583 of 2019. G.A No. 1583 of 2019 is dismissed as not pressed on 13th January, 2021 and G.A No. 173 of 2018 was disposed of on 24th January, 2020 by keeping the issue alive whether the order of debarment dated 31st October, 2017 is valid or not. This Court by an order dated 24th January, 2020 disposed of the G.A. No. 173 of 2018 only on the ground that the period of debarment having expired and the State removed the name of the plaintiffs from the debarment list of contractors. As regard the validity of the order of debarment was kept open. This Court passed an order on 24th January, 2020 and the plaintiffs have filed the present application on 2nd December, 2022, thus this Court finds that the application filed by the plaintiffs is not barred by limitation and it is continuation of challenging the impugned order dated 31st October, 2017 which arising out of memo dated 8th March, 2016. 19. Mr. Sen, Learned senior Counsel has raised the issue that the plaintiffs have not issued notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus the amendment should not be allowed. The plaintiff has filed the suit without issuance of notice under Section 80 of the CPC and has prayed for leave. This Court has not granted leave but in an appeal, the Appellate Court granted leave to the plaintiffs to proceed with the suit. Admittedly before filing of the amendment application no notice under Section 80 was served upon the defendants. Mr. Sen has relied upon the judgment reported in (2001) 1 SCC 555 (Bishandayal and Sons –vs- State of Orrisa & Ors.) and relied upon paragraph 16 of the said judgment which reads as follows : “16. There can be no dispute to the proposition that a notice under Section 80 can be waived. Mr. Sen has relied upon the judgment reported in (2001) 1 SCC 555 (Bishandayal and Sons –vs- State of Orrisa & Ors.) and relied upon paragraph 16 of the said judgment which reads as follows : “16. There can be no dispute to the proposition that a notice under Section 80 can be waived. But the question is whether merely because in the amended written statement such a plea is not taken it amounts to waiver. This contention was argued before the appellate court. Even otherwise, we find that in the suit itself Issue 4 had been raised as to whether or not there was a valid and appropriate notice under Section 80. Such a point having been taken in the original written statement and an issue having been raised, it was not necessary that in the amended written statement such a plea be again taken. On behalf of the respondents, reliance has been placed on the case of Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad v. Rachawwa [ (1970) 3 SCC 716 : AIR 1971 SC 442 ] wherein it has been held that where the plaintiffs' cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 was served, it would be the duty of the court to reject the plaint. In this case the original notice was only in respect of a claim under the plaint as it originally stood. That claim was on the basis that there was a concluded contract and that the appellants had already acquired rights in the mill and the lands. As has been fairly conceded those reliefs were not maintainable and were given up before the appellate court. The amended plaint was on an entirely new cause of action. It was based on facts and events which took place after the filing of the original plaint. It was a fresh case. Now the claim was for specific performance of the agreement alleged to have been entered into on 29-12-1978. Admittedly no notice under Section 80 CPC was given for this case. As there was an issue pertaining to notice under Section 80, the trial court should have dealt with this aspect. The trial court failed to do so. It was then pressed before the appellate court. Admittedly no notice under Section 80 CPC was given for this case. As there was an issue pertaining to notice under Section 80, the trial court should have dealt with this aspect. The trial court failed to do so. It was then pressed before the appellate court. In our view, the finding in the impugned judgment that the suit based on this claim was not maintainable is correct and requires no interference. If a new cause of action is being introduced a fresh notice under Section 80 CPC would be required to be given. The same not having been given, the suit on this cause of action was not maintainable.” In the present case, it is already held by this Court that the amendment sought for by the plaintiffs is the continuous cause of action and will not change the nature and character of the suit. The judgment relied by the defendants is distinguishable as in the said case the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the amended plaint was on entirely new cause of action. 20. In view of the above, this Court finds that the Appellate Court had already granted leave to the plaintiffs to proceed with the suit without issuance of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the amendment as sought for by the plaintiffs is continuous cause of action of the original suit filed by the plaintiffs as the impugned order dated 31st October, 2017 is the consequence of memo dated 8th March, 2016 and thus there is no necessity for issuance of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for incorporating the amendment and prayer by way of amendment in the original plaint. 21. G.A No. 11 of 2022 is thus allowed in terms of prayer (a), (b) and (c) of the Master’s Summons.