ORDER : 1. This Petition has been filed under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. for grant of Special Leave to Appeal being aggrieved by the judgment dated 05.12.2016 passed by the Special Judge (Electricity Act, 2003), District Janjgir-champa in Electricity Criminal Case No. 493/2015, whereby, the accused/Respondent has been acquitted of the charge under Section 135 (1)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short ‘the Act of 2003’) for commission of theft of electricity. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 28.09.2015, when R.K. Acharya (CW-3), Executive Engineer, CSPDCL, Jangjir headed to village Nagpura with Assistant Lineman Ramji Pandit (CW-2) and Assistant Engineer Basant Som for inspection of electricity therein, they found that the accused/Respondent has committed theft of electricity by directly hooking the LT line in his agricultural premises. Hence, an inspection team has been constituted vide Ex.P-3 by R.K. Acharya (CW-3) and at the time of inspection of the said premises, his representative Fagu Singh Gond (not examined) was present and R.K. Acharya (CW-3) has given notice (Ex.P-7) for inspection and found that a 5 hp pump was used for directly hooking the LT line in an unauthorized and illegal manner for the agricultural purposes. 3. During investigation, panchnama (Ex.P-4) and the wire which has been used was seized (Ex.P-5) and spot map was also prepared (Ex.P-6). After receipt of such information at the Office, Assistant Engineer HS Shukla (CW-1) made an assessment (Ex.P-1) and in the calculations, as it was found that there is a loss of Rs.99.748/- therefore, temporary fine fixation order/bill (Ex.P-2) was passed in proforma-5. Nitesh Das Mahant (CW-4), Line Attendant has served the temporary fine/bill calculated by the Department (Ex.P-2) on the accused/Respondent and thereafter, HS Shukla, Assistant Engineer (CW-1), in the capacity of Nodal Officer, has filed a complaint under Section 135(1)(a) of the Act of 2003 before the Special Court. During trial, the accused/Respondent has abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. The Complainant/Appellant-Department, in order to prove its case, has examined 4 witnesses and the accused/Respondent, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has stated that he has been falsely implicated and has not adduced any defence evidence. 4. During trial, the accused/Respondent has abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. The Complainant/Appellant-Department, in order to prove its case, has examined 4 witnesses and the accused/Respondent, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has stated that he has been falsely implicated and has not adduced any defence evidence. 4. After evaluating the evidence, the trial Court has acquitted the accused/Respondent and recorded its findings that the Complainant/ Appellant-Department has failed to prove as to whether the place where inspection was carried out was within the possession of the accused/Respondent where, the Electricity pump was used unauthorizedly by directly hooking the LT line. Hence, this special leave to Appeal has been preferred. 5. The Complainant/Appellant has also filed an application i.e. IA No. 01/2017 for condonation of delay of 280 days in filing the Petition and assigned reasons that owing to administrative procedure, the said delay occurred and a prayer has been made that as there is a loss of Rs.99,748/- to the Public Exchequer, therefore, the Appellant may not be non-suited on the ground of delay and latches. 6. With the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, the matter is heard on the ground of limitation as also on merits. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner fairly admits that under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. a special procedure has been envisaged for grant of special leave to Appeal from the order of acquittal and the Complainant is required to present such Appeal to the High Court and further, a rider under Sub-Section (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. stipulates that no application under Sub-Section (4) for grant of special leave to Appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after expiration of 6 months, where the Complainant is a public servant and 60 days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. He further fairly admits that this Petition has been filed beyond a period of 280 days but disputed the reasoning assigned by the trial Court that there is no evidence with respect to the possession of the person on whose land, the said direct hooking and theft of electricity was made on the date of inspection. 8. He further fairly admits that this Petition has been filed beyond a period of 280 days but disputed the reasoning assigned by the trial Court that there is no evidence with respect to the possession of the person on whose land, the said direct hooking and theft of electricity was made on the date of inspection. 8. On the contrary, learned Counsel for the accused/Respondent supports the impugned judgment and submits that the finding recorded by the Court below is well merited and does not call for any interference. She further submits that the Petition has been filed belatedly with a delay of 280 days having no proper explanation, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed. 9. Admittedly, the present case has been filed by the CSPDCL as a complaint case and under Section 151 of the Act of 2003, both modes either filing of the complaint case or filing of the charge sheet under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. has been provided. For the sake of brevity, section 151 of the Act of 2003 is reproduced hereunder: “151. Cognizance of offences: No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a complaint in writing made by Appropriate Government or Appropriate Commission or any of their officer authorized by them or a Chief Electrical Inspector or an Electrical Inspector or licensee or the generating company, as the case may be, for this purpose: Provided that the court may also take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act upon a report of a police officer filed under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Provided further that a special court constituted under section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.” 10. When a case has been instituted on complaint basis and order of acquittal has been passed against such case, the remedies are provided under Section 378 (4) & (5) Cr.P.C. which read as under: “(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under Sub-Section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.” 11. It is explicit that Sub-Section (5) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. is a “special law” of Limitation governing the Appeal of private prosecutors and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 restricts the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to application under Sub-Section (4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the special law prevails. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: 29. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 12. This seminal issue also came up for hearing before the Bombay High Court in the matter of Anjanabai Yeshwant Rao vs. Yeshwanatrao Daulatrao Dudhe, 1961 (1) Cri. 12. This seminal issue also came up for hearing before the Bombay High Court in the matter of Anjanabai Yeshwant Rao vs. Yeshwanatrao Daulatrao Dudhe, 1961 (1) Cri. L.J. 637 Full Bench, wherein, the following question was formulated: “Can the delay on the part of the applicant in making an application under S. 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal be condoned under the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act on proper case having been made out?” Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides as follows: “Any appeal or application or a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” In the above case, it was held that in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, as Section 417(3), a special law has been provided, therefore, invoking the power of Section 5 of the said Act, delay cannot be condoned and the following was observed at para-7, which reads thus: “7. I will now refer to the decisions of other High Courts, which have been brought to our notice. In Mohd. Ibrahim vs. Gopi Lal, AIR 1958 All. 691 , it was held that the words of Sub-Section (4) of S. 417, clearly show that the intention of the Legislature was that applications under Sub-Section (3) must be made within sixty days of the order of acquittal, that the High Court has no power to extend the period of limitation, and that the bar to the High Court's entertaining an application under Sub-Section (3) after the expiry of sixty days is absolute. This case was referred to in Municipal Board vs. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1959 All. 500 in which it was observed that this case may require further consideration. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view in Venkata Subbareddi vs. Papireddi, AIR 1957 A.P. 406 and In Re: P. Adeshamma, AIR 1958 A.P. 230 . This case was referred to in Municipal Board vs. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1959 All. 500 in which it was observed that this case may require further consideration. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken a contrary view in Venkata Subbareddi vs. Papireddi, AIR 1957 A.P. 406 and In Re: P. Adeshamma, AIR 1958 A.P. 230 . The same view has been taken by a single judge of the Madras High Court in Coimbalorc Municipality vs. Narayanan, AIR 1958 Mad. 416 . The basis of these decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts is that the Criminal Procedure Code is a general law and that consequently Sub-Section (2) of S. 29 does not exclude the application of S. 5 to applications for special leave under Sub-Section (3) of S. 417. But, as we have already pointed out, the provision contained in Sub-Section (4) of S. 417 is a special provision, which applies only to applications made by private parties for leave to appeal from orders of acquittal and is therefore a special law within the meaning of Sub-Section (2) of S. 29. With respect therefore, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Madras and the Andhra High Courts.” 13. In the matter of The Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal vs. Standard Paint Works (P) Ltd. and Others, 1971 (2) SCC 85 , while dealing with the question whether an Appeal after 60 days of acquittal is competent though no application for grant of special leave has been filed, the Court has dismissed the Appeal and the following observation was made at Para-12: “12. No application for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal was made within 60 days from that order of acquittal. The orders of acquittal were passed on April 4, 1968. The petitions of appeal were presented on July 1, 1968. The appeals were rightly not entertained by the High Court because first there was no application for grant of special leave under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, secondly, the appeals were incompetent without grant of special leave, and thirdly these were barred by limitation. An appeal under section 417(3) against acquittal is competent only when there is special leave granted by the High Court. An appeal under section 417(3) against acquittal is competent only when there is special leave granted by the High Court. On obtaining special leave the appeal is thereafter filed within thirty days of the grant of leave to escape the mischief of the period of limitation under Article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963.” 14. In the matter of State (Delhi Administration) vs. Dharampal, (2001) 10 SCC 372 , it has been held that a different procedure has been adopted against the judgment in a case of acquittal when a case has been filed by the State and private Complainant and as such, the law of Limitation is also different and when the State Government or Central Government has filed an Appeal against acquittal, in such cases, it would be open for them to file an Appeal and in case of any delay, to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but such course is not open for a private Complainant and the relevant Para of the said judgment i.e. Para-25 reads as under: “25. A comparison of Section 378 with the old Section 417 shows that whilst under the old section no application for leave to appeal had to be made by the State Government or the Central Government, now by virtue of Section 378(3) the State Government or the Central Government have to obtain leave of the High Court before their appeal could be entertained. Sub-Section (4) of Section 378 is identical to Sub-Section (3) of Section 417. Thus a complainant desirous of filing an appeal against acquittal must still obtain special leave. Thus, Section 378 makes a distinction between an appeal filed by the State Government or the Central Government, who only need to obtain “leave” and an appeal by a complainant who needs to obtain “special leave.” The limitation provided in Sub-Section (5) is only in respect of applications under Sub-Section (4) i.e. application for special leave to appeal by a complainant. A complainant may be either a public servant or a private party. If the complainant is a public servant then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 6 months. If the complainant is a private party then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 60 days. A complainant may be either a public servant or a private party. If the complainant is a public servant then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 6 months. If the complainant is a private party then the period of limitation for an application for special leave is 60 days. The periods of 6 months and/or 60 days do not apply to appeals by the State Government [under Sub-Section (1)] or the Central Government [under Sub-Section (2)]. Appeals by the State Government or the Central Government continue to be governed by Article 114(a) of the Limitation Act. In other words, those appeals must be filed within 90 days from the date of the order appealed from. Needless to state, if there is a delay in filing an appeal by the State Government or Central Government it would be open to them to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of such delay. That period can be extended if the court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of 90 days. The High Court was thus wrong in concluding that the appeals had to be filed within 60 days as provided in Section 378(5).” 15. In view of above, in the instant case, the judgment of acquittal has been passed on 05.12.2016 and special leave to Appeal has been filed on 13.12.2017 and this Petition has been filed beyond a period stipulated under Section 378 (5) Cr.P.C. and in view of the aforesaid legal proposition, for the Complainant, a separate limitation prescribed under Section 378 (5) Cr.P.C. applies, therefore, in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the special law prevails and the same does not provide any relaxation or enabling provision to condone the delay as stipulated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and no application under Sub-Section (4) for grant of special leave to Appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after expiration of 6 months, therefore, this Petition is not maintainable. Even otherwise, the statements which have been filed in the Petition and the reasoning assigned by the trial Court do not show that there is evidence as to in whose possession of land, the said inspection was carried out and during the said inspection, no such document or evidence has been collected and proved. 16. Resultantly, this Court is not inclined to grant Special leave to Appeal and the Petition being bereft of any merits, is accordingly dismissed.