JUDGMENT 1. This Second appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code (for brevity, CPC) has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree dated 14.10.2016 passed by Court of Tenth Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 13/2015, by which, the Judgment and decree dated 5.11.2015 passed by 3rd Civil Judge, Class – 1, District Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 36-A/2014 has been set aside. 2. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that the original plaintiff Ramkishan Sharma (since dead) filed a civil suit seeking eviction against the defendants/respondents on the ground of sections 12(1)(a), (b), (f), (h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961 in respect to the shop shown as red oblique lines in plaint map situated in the building bearing municipal number 39/593 New number 57/593 surrounded by in the East: Joint House, West: Road Madhavganj, North: House Panchayati (Oswal), South: Shop of Deeptilal. 3. It was the case of plaintiff that father of defendant i.e. Vishandas S/o Khaturam was the tenant in the disputed shop @ Rs. 865/- per month. It is also pleaded that vide rent note dated 15.4.1979 father of plaintiff became tenant @ Rs. 225/- per month, thereafter, rate of rent was enhanced upto Rs. 865/- per month. 4. It was the case of plaintiff that defendant has paid rent upto 14.12.2007 thereafter despite of demand so also by way of registered notice dated 7.7.2008, 10.5.2009, and 11.5.2009 defendants did not pay rent. 5. It was also the case of plaintiff that defendant has inducted sub tenant ie. Satram Chhabada without the consent of plaintiff and Satram Chhabada is doing his cloth business. 6. It is also pleaded that plaintiff is going to retire from the service, hence, he has bonafide need as he will start business in the disputed shop along with shop adjoining to it, for which, he has no alternative accommodation in the town. 7. It is also pleaded that house is of 100 years old and is in delapidated condition hence plaintiff want to get it repaired and filed suit seeking eviction and arrears of rent. 8. The defendants filed written statement and denied the plaint allegations, and asserted that defendants are tenant @ Rs.600/- per month in the shop owned by Temple by way of amendment in para no. 8. The defendants filed written statement and denied the plaint allegations, and asserted that defendants are tenant @ Rs.600/- per month in the shop owned by Temple by way of amendment in para no. 2A of the written statement, it is asserted that owner of the disputed property is Bade Wale Hanuman ji, and the temple is of Government, but Government has not been impleaded as party. 9. By way of special plea it is asserted that the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act are not applicable and suit has been filed just to harass the defendants. 10. The plaintiff filed rejoinder to rebut the objection in regard to ownership of plaintiff, plaintiff pleaded that one part of disputed property got by grandfather through Patta dated 8.3.1894 and other part by sale deed dated 7.4.1923 and 9.2.1921 from Jagannath S/o Ishari, hence, plaintiff predecessor was owner of the property, and it was never belongs with temple, Mangilal grandfather of plaintiff executed will in his favour on 19.10.1967 on the basis of will plaintiff become exclusive owner of disputed property. 11. The defendants having been tenant and paid the rent to plaintiff, but denied title of plaintiff, hence plaintiff also amended his plaint in regard to ground under section 12(1) (c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961. 12. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court framed the issues and after recording evidence held that defendants are tenant of plaintiff @ Rs. 865/- per month. It is also held that despite demand defendants did not pay the arrears of rent but during pendency of suit deposited, and it is also held that plaintiff is entitled for alteration of shop for which plaintiff has need of shop, and also held that plaintiff has bonafide need for his own and also held that plaintiff is owner of the disputed property and decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 5.11.2015 on the ground of 12(1) (f) and (h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961. The decree of trial Court was challenged by the defendant No. 2 Pankaj Kumar Ahuja only. 13. The learned appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 14.10.2016 allowed appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of eviction, hence, being aggrieved by impugned judgment and decree instant appeal is being filed by the appellant/plaintiff. 14. The decree of trial Court was challenged by the defendant No. 2 Pankaj Kumar Ahuja only. 13. The learned appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 14.10.2016 allowed appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of eviction, hence, being aggrieved by impugned judgment and decree instant appeal is being filed by the appellant/plaintiff. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the respondent did not show any alternative accommodation which may be suitable for the plaintiff to satisfy his need nor shown said so called shops to be exclusive ownership of the plaintiff even the appellate Court has reversed the well reasoned judgment passed by trial Court, whereby, trial Court granted decree for eviction under section 12(1) (f) and (h) of MP Accommodation Control Act 1961. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that the disputed shop, having been constructed more than 100 years back and the plaintiff wants to rebuild it by making certain alteration for which the plaintiff specifically pleaded in his plaint and the same was not specifically denied by the defendant, even then the appellate Court is not justified in reversing the judgment passed by trial Court under section 12(1) (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that the appellate Court failed to understand the settled law that landlord is the best judge of his own need and the tenant cannot dictated or directed to satisfy the need of landlord and the choice of landlord must be honoured. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that the appellat’ Court even by passing long drawn judgment and also considering that the defendant even being tenant has raised objection in regard to ownership of plaintiff which certainly cause serious prejudice to the plaintiff even then has allowed the appeal ignoring the settled position of law that landlord is the best judge of his own need and his choice cannot be ignored. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that once on the basis oral and documentary evidence trial Court by giving cogent finding granted degree for eviction, the appellate Court should not interfere in the finding of fact, but appellate Court exceeding its power and without reversing and discussing the finding of trial Court has passed its own judgment which is totally unjustified. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that it is well settled that though the M.P. Accommodation control Act is provided to protect the unjustified eviction of tenant, but simultaneously it is also beneficial to the landlord and rights of landlord has not been curtailed under this act, hence, the owner/landlord cannot be denying to use his property as per his own choice so also make alteration and justifiable changes. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff further submits that provision under seçtion, 12(1) (h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act does not provide any requirement of prior permission from Municipal Corporation, hence, in absence of it, the decree for eviction under section 12(1) (h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act cannot be denied. 21. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court below and prayed for dismissal of the instant appeal being bereft of merit and substance. 22. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 23. This second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “(1) Whether the Appellate Court erred in reversing the findings of the trial Court given for eviction of decree under section 12 (1) (f) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ? (2) Whether the Appellate Court erred in reversing the finding in respect of section 12 (1) (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 while keeping the old house at par with dilapidated structure under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. (3) Whether the Appellate Court erred in denying the decree for eviction to the appellant despite satisfying the bonafide need for the purpose of business activities.” 24. To prove the ground of bonafide requirement for eviction under section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, the following ingredients need to be proved by the plaintiff :- “12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. To prove the ground of bonafide requirement for eviction under section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, the following ingredients need to be proved by the plaintiff :- “12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. -(1) xxxxxxxxxxx (a) to (e) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.” 25. The original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma (since dead) has examined himself as PW-1 as well as has examined PW/2-Narsingdas Sharma, PW/3-Shyam Sharma and PW/4 -Ashok Kumar Sharma to prove his case. 26. On the other hand, defendants examined DW/1- Pankaj Kumar Ahuja, DW/2- Ramchandra Ahuja and DW/3- Ramesh Chandra Sharma. 27. On the basis of pleadings adduced by plaintiff and defendants, learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court has given concurrent findings that plaintiff Ramkrishna Sharma has bonafide requirement of the disputed shop for opening his own business after retirement. The aforesaid findings in respect to the bonafide requirement of original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma is based on proper appreciation of evidence adduced by both the parties. 28. In second appeal concurrent findings based on oral as well as documentary evidence until found to be perverse cannot be reversed. On the basis of evidence of plaintiff and defendants learned Courts below have rightly held that original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma has bonafide requirement of the disputed shop for his own business. Now the question arises whether alternative accommodation for the aforesaid purpose is available to the plaintiff or not? 29. Perusal of the record reveals that on the point of availability of alternative accommodation, learned trial Court held that the plaintiff has no alternative accommodation for the purpose of opening his business. However, learned first appellate Court reversed the findings. The oral as well as documentary evidence reflect that another eviction case in respect to the shop adjacent to the disputed shop owned by the plaintiff had also been pending and the decree was passed in his favour. However, learned first appellate Court reversed the findings. The oral as well as documentary evidence reflect that another eviction case in respect to the shop adjacent to the disputed shop owned by the plaintiff had also been pending and the decree was passed in his favour. The same fact has been corroborated by Ex.-P-62, the judgement passed in second appeal. The original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma has in his Court evidence stated that he is having a building in Chitnis Ki Goth having three shops in it and his son and brothers were doing their businesses in these shops. PW/3- Shyam Sharma in his cross examination has also corroborated the fact that plaintiff is having three other shops. Thus the statement of DW/1- Pankaj Kumar Ahuja is found to be reliable that the original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma was having other shops apart from the disputed shop and he knowingly and malafidely did not file any details in respect to the shops owned by him. 30. In view of the above, learned trial Court wrongly disbelieved that the plaintiff has no alternative suitable accommodation for doing the business because as discussed above, the plaintiff and his witnesses admitted that apart from the disputed shop other shops are also available with the plaintiff. This is not the case where plaintiff has pleaded alternative accommodation available to him and first appellate Court has directed to choose particular shop, therefore, case law cited by the appellant namely Ramlal deceased through Lrs v. Ashok Kumar reported in 2014 (4) MPJR 34, Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali reported in AIR 2010 SC 2679 , R.C. Tamrekar v. Nidhi Lekha reported in AIR 2001 SC 3806 and Ragvendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery Company reported in AIR 2000 SC 534 do not help him. In this case, the landlord-plaintiff deliberately did not disclose availability of alternative accommodation to him. 31. In the case of Sri Kempaiah v. Lingaiah & Ors. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 718 , the apex Court distinguished the element of “requirement and desire” and held as under :-- “8. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his landlord was inisisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 718 , the apex Court distinguished the element of “requirement and desire” and held as under :-- “8. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his landlord was inisisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. It may have been a wish or desire of the appellant to occupy the leased premises but he failed to prove the reasonable bonafide requirement as contemplated under section 21(1)(h) of the Act. The word “require” used in clause (h) of sub-clause (1) of section 21 of the Act implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of the need. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire”. The ground mentioned in clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Act emphasizes to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord. The term “reasonable and bonafide requirement” are complementary and supplementary to each other in the context. Dealing with a similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court in Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 1 ] held that when the Legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that requirement must be really genuine from any reasonable standard. Where eviction is sought on the aforesaid ground, a duty is cast upon the Court to satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Even in a case where the tenant does not contest or dispute the claim of the landlord and the tenancy is governed by the Rent Control legislation, the Court is obliged to look into the claim independently and give a specific finding in that regard.” 32. In the case of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal reported in (2001) 5 SCC 705 , the apex Court has held that the criteria that the landlord has no other reasonable suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned is not available has to be fulfilled. 33. In the case of Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal reported in (2001) 5 SCC 705 , the apex Court has held that the criteria that the landlord has no other reasonable suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned is not available has to be fulfilled. 33. In view of the above discussion, learned first appellate Court has not erred in holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that he is not having suitable alternative accommodation to start his business. 34. In this case, the original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma died on 23.1.2022 during pendency of this appeal and his legal representatives have not sought any amendment in the plaint in respect to their bonafide requirement of the disputed shop. This is not the case of plaintiff that apart from him his son or other family members also need the disputed shop for business. 35. In the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders reported in 1975 Legal Eagle (SC) 125, the Apex Court held as under :-- “Order 7, Rule 7 Subsequent event Consideration of Subsequent event brought promptly to the notice of Court must be considered. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice subject, of course, to the absence of other dis entitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice.” 36. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice.” 36. In the case of Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad reported in 1981 Legal Eagle (SC) 282, the apex Court held as under :-- “Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred the appeal being a continuation of suit, landlord’s need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage.” The apex Court in the light of case of Venkateswarlu (supra), further observed “We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognizance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed.” 37. In the case of Baldev Krishan v. Satya Narain reported in (2013) 14 SCC 179 , the apex Court held as under :-- “12. In Sheshambal, the bonafide need that had been pleaded pertained only to the landlord and his wife. It will be relevant to record that the claim had been concurrently rejected by the Courts below, before when the landlord husband had passed away. The widow whose bona fide need had also been set up, unfortunately, also passed away during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. In those circumstances, it was held that the bonafide need, even assuming that it existed at the time of fling of the eviction action, had thereafter lapsed altogether on the death of the petitioning protagonists. The widow whose bona fide need had also been set up, unfortunately, also passed away during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. In those circumstances, it was held that the bonafide need, even assuming that it existed at the time of fling of the eviction action, had thereafter lapsed altogether on the death of the petitioning protagonists. It seems to us that it is arguable that the position may change had there been a favourable verdict during their lifetime. The premium should not be placed on the filing of appeals merely to defeat a favourable decision on the unfair speculation that the endemic delay in disposal of appeals may result in defeating a decree because of the death of the landlord.” 38. In view of the above settled principle of law while examining this case as discussed above, it is apparent that the suit was filed only for bonafide requirement of the original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma and his suit was decreed by learned trial Court, however, the judgment and decree of the trial Court has been set aside by the first appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 13/2015 by judgment and decree dated 14.10.2016. Thus, it is clear that when original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma died he was not having decree of eviction in his favour, therefore, the decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide need cannot be granted in favour of legal representative of original plaintiff – Ramkrishna Sharma (since dead) as they have not amended the plaint or came forward with a prayer that the disputed shop is required bonafidely for their businesses. In view of above, decree of eviction can not be granted on the ground of bonafide need. 39. The plaintiff has filed suit for eviction on the grounds of section 12(1)(h) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act also. As per statement of original plaintiff– Ramkrishna Sharma the disputed shop is situated is 150 years old and is in dilapidated condition. The Municipal Corporation has issued notice under section 310 of Municipal Corporation Act. However, the plaintiff failed to prove the said notice by filing original notice or by examining any witness from the Municipal Corporation. It is not in dispute that the said building is still in existence. 40. The Municipal Corporation has issued notice under section 310 of Municipal Corporation Act. However, the plaintiff failed to prove the said notice by filing original notice or by examining any witness from the Municipal Corporation. It is not in dispute that the said building is still in existence. 40. By filing I.A. No. 1255/2023, an application for urgent hearing, appellant filed a photo copy of the notice received from the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior dated 7.6.2022 alleging that the Municipal Corporation is threatening to demolish the said building. This fact also reveals that for almost 12 years, no notice was given by the Municipal Corporation neither any action has been taken under section 310 of Municipal Corporation Act, which reads thus :-- “310. Removal of buildings in dangerous state.--(1) If, in the opinion of the Commissioner, any building, wall, structure including under this expression any building, wall, parapet pavement, floor, steps, railings, door or window-frames or shutters or roof or other structure and anything affixed to or projecting from or resting on any building, wall, parapet or other structure, or any tree standing thereon, is in dangerous state, the Commissioner may by a notice in writing, require the occupier or owner thereof forthwith either to demolish or remove the building, wall, structure or any such tree or cause such repairs to be made thereto as he considers necessary for the public safety, and if the danger appears to him to be imminent, he may forthwith take such steps as may be required to avert such danger, including the forcible removal without notice from such building of all the occupiers thereof and their property. (2) Any expenses incurred by the Commissioner under sub section (1) shall be paid by the building, wall, structure, or anything affixed thereto. (3) Except with the permission in writing of the Commissioner no person shall without sufficient cause enter into or remain in any building from which the occupier and his property has been removed under sub-section (1).” 41. Under these circumstances, only on the basis of the photocopy of notice alleged to have sent by the Municipal Corporation it is not proved that the disputed shop is 150 years old and in a dilapidated condition because if the shop was in such a bad condition then the Municipal Corporation ought to have acted as per provision of section 310 of the Municipal Corporation Act. Therefore, learned first appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that disputed shop is situated is in a dilapidated condition. 42. In this case, the learned trial Court has failed to comply with the provisions of section 18 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, which reads thus :-- “18. Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry (1) In making any order on the grounds specified in clause (g) or clause (h) of sub- section (1) of section 12, the Court shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and, if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding, as the case may be. (2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof, as the case may be, within one month of the completion of such work. (3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation in accordance with subsection (2), the Court may, on an application made to it in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Court thinks fit.” 43. In view of the above discussion, the substantial questions of law are answered in negative. 44. Consequently. the instant appeal being bereft of merit and substance is hereby dismissed.