JUDGMENT : AJIT KUMAR, J. 1. Heard Sri K.R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of this petition, petitioner has questioned the order passed by the Director of Higher Education, Prayagraj dated 5th November, 2018, whereby, against one post of Junior Clerk, the selection of Krishna Yadav has been approved, whereas the selection of Arvind Kumar Singh on the another post of Junior Clerk and Sri Vineet Kumar Yadav on the post of Lab Assistant has been disapproved. 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the reasons assigned in the order is unsustainable as the particular ban imposed in the year 2012 on the appointments against class III and class IV positions of such institutions came to be lifted on 11th July, 2013. 4. It is submitted that merely because the ban has come to be lifted on 11th July, 2013, does not mean that the post which had fallen vacant after 11th July, 2013, the managements were denuded of their power to make selections and appointments. 5. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management of Mahatma Gandhi Shanti Smarak Degree College, Ghazipur and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others in Writ (A) No. 26271 of 2018 decided on 9th January, 2019. He submits that both the Government orders dated 11th July, 2013 and 15th March, 2012 were taken into consideration and the Court ultimately came to conclude that such approach of the authorities in taking as if there was still a ban in respect of the vacancy falling after 11th July, 2013 was incorrect. The Court in that case has set aside the order and Director was directed to pass order afresh in the light of the observations made in the judgment. 6. The Court in that case has set aside the order and Director was directed to pass order afresh in the light of the observations made in the judgment. 6. He further submits that it is after the lifting of the ban on 11th July, 2013 a conscious decision was taken by the authority in granting permission to the Committee of Management on 7th January, 2016 to proceed ahead with the selection of candidates upon the two posts of Junior Clerk and one post of Lab Assistant and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Committee of Management was not having the power or authority to make selection and appointment. 7. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel though sought to argue in support of the decision impugned in this case but could not dispute that a conscious decision had been taken to accord permission to fill up vacancy. He submits that in order to clear confusion on facts Director may be directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the judgment passed by this Court. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the record, what I find is that the permission to make selection upon the post in question (two posts of Junior Clerk and one post of Lab Assistant) was consciously taken by Joint Director of Higher Education for Director of Higher Education on 7th January, 2016 much after the ban was lifted. The authority was fully conscious about one post of Junior Clerk and one post of Lab Assistant that had fallen vacant after the ban got lifted, nonetheless the Director proceeded to disapprove the selection of one post of Junior Clerk and one post of Lab Assistant on the ground of ban. 9. I have gone through the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court and I find that in paragraph 5 of the judgment this very legal plea specifically taken by learned Standing Counsel was considered. Paragraph 5 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “5. Learned Standing Counsel has obtain instructions, according to which the State Government vide Government Order dated 11.7.2013 has lifted the ban only in respect of posts which had fallen vacant till 11.7.2013, and that the vacancy, in the present case, since has arisen after 11.7.2013, therefore, ban imposed earlier vide order dated 15.3.2012 would continue to remain invoked.” 10. Learned Standing Counsel has obtain instructions, according to which the State Government vide Government Order dated 11.7.2013 has lifted the ban only in respect of posts which had fallen vacant till 11.7.2013, and that the vacancy, in the present case, since has arisen after 11.7.2013, therefore, ban imposed earlier vide order dated 15.3.2012 would continue to remain invoked.” 10. Now after referring to both the Government orders in paragraph 6 & 7 of the judgment, learned Judge arrived at ratio in paragraph 9 that this view of lifting ban and make 11th July, 2013 as a cut off date, not to permit the selection and appointment upon the vacancy fallen thereafter was absolutely misplaced one. 11. It is held that the said Government order was general in nature and its applicability upon the institutions had stood lifted with the Government order dated 11th July, 2013. The Court concluded that lifting of ban was absolute ban and there was no rider whatsoever to draw an inference that the Government decided not to permit filling up the vacancies that were to fall vacant after 11th July, 2013. Paragraph 9 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “9. There is absolutely no justification for any such distinction to be drawn based upon the date specified i.e. 11.7.2013. Such a categorization/ classification can not be construed as a reasonable classification inasmuch as it would have no intelligible differentia or object which is sought to be achieved. The same Government Order dated 15.3.2012 was pressed as being the ground for denial of permission for filling up vacancies in Intermediate institution also. The Government Order on 15.3.2012, was also followed by subsequent Government Order dated 23.5.2013. After taking note of both the Government Orders, this Court in Vipin vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2013 (7) ADJ 274 , has been pleased to hold that ban would not be available for the purposes of denying institution to fill up the post itself. No specific provision has otherwise been shown to the Court under the applicable statutory scheme which could have been invoked for the purposes of issuance of Government Order dated 15.3.2012. The said Government Order, otherwise, is general in nature and its applicability upon the institutions of higher leaving stands lifted under the Government Order dated 11.7.2013. No specific provision has otherwise been shown to the Court under the applicable statutory scheme which could have been invoked for the purposes of issuance of Government Order dated 15.3.2012. The said Government Order, otherwise, is general in nature and its applicability upon the institutions of higher leaving stands lifted under the Government Order dated 11.7.2013. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Director of Education dated 4.9.2018 cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed.” 12. Again, I further find that against the judgment of the coordinate Bench of this Court cited above, the State of Uttar Pradesh unsuccessfully preferred a appeal being Special Appeal No. 198 of 2020 and other connected special appeals, in which Division Bench also considered all these aspects of the matter and finally affirmed the decision taken by learned Single Judge. Vide paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment of special appeal, the Court held thus: “12. It is otherwise an admitted fact that no ban on the appointment of teachers was imposed. If that is so then how an Institution can run without Class III and Class IV staff is another issue to be debated but we are deliberately not touching this issue as the order dated 15.03.2012 is not under Section 66A of the Act of 1973. 13. Taking aforesaid into consideration, we supply additional reasons to cause interference the order dated 04.09.2018. 14. In view of above, we don't find any reason to cause interference the judgment dated 09.01.2019 and accordingly direction given in the operative para of the judgment would be carried by the respondents within a month if it has not been carried till date.” 13. In view of the above legal proposition, I do not find any justification to sustain the order dated 5th November, 2018 insofar as it denies approval to the selection of one Arvind Kumar Singh and Vineet Kumar Yadav on the post of Junior Clerk and Lab Assistant respectively. 14. Besides the above, a ban on recruitment process is never absolute and has certain exception which order putting a ban itself may provide. Every ban is imposed for a certain period taking into consideration certain facts and circumstances. It cannot be for all time to come when recruitment process is governed by statutory rules. 14. Besides the above, a ban on recruitment process is never absolute and has certain exception which order putting a ban itself may provide. Every ban is imposed for a certain period taking into consideration certain facts and circumstances. It cannot be for all time to come when recruitment process is governed by statutory rules. An executive order to impose ban is also to be subject to certain conditions and for a certain period otherwise, the Act and statutory rules would get superseded by executive acts/ fiats at its whims. Once such a ban is lifted, it should, therefore, be taken to have been lifted absolutely. 15. The order dated 5th November, 2018, accordingly, to that extent is hereby quashed. 16. The writ petition is allowed. 17. The Director of Higher Education, U.P. Prayagraj is directed to accord necessary approval after verification of the records in the selection procedure place before him and if otherwise there is no legal impediment, within a period of two weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order.