JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs:- “(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing respondent nos.1 and 2 to pay decreetal amount to the petitioner as per the order passed in Execution Application No.63 of 2014 (Old Execution Application NO.21 of 2004) dated 19.08.2015 by the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal. (B) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to direct respondent nos.1 and 2 to comply with the order passed by the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal in Execution Application No.63 of 2014 (Old Execution Application No.21 of 2004) dated 19.08.2015. (C) Be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.” 2. Brief facts of the present petition, in the nutshell, are as under:- 2.1 The petitioner was appointed as assistant teacher on 26.09.1978 in primary section of respondent no.1 – school after following due procedure and the educational – qualification of the petitioner is C.P.Ed. As the respondent – school was not paying the salary to the petitioner as per the government rules and regulations, she has filed Application No. 8 of 1995 before the then learned Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal and the Tribunal has passed final order on 16.03.1999 and directed the respondent – school to pay difference of salary on 22.05.1986 within three months and also directed the respondent – school to pay regular salary to the petitioner as per the government rules and regulations. That the Tribunal has also directed the respondent – school to give copy of service book of the petitioner to her and also to give details of provident fund and leave to the petitioner. As the said order passed by the Tribunal was not complied with, Execution Application No.21 of 2004 was filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal. During the hearing of the said application, the Tribunal has directed respondent no.4 herein that if the school was not complying with the conditions of recognition than respondent no.4 should start proceedings for cancelling recognition of the school. During the hearing of the said application, the Tribunal has directed respondent no.4 herein that if the school was not complying with the conditions of recognition than respondent no.4 should start proceedings for cancelling recognition of the school. Pursuant to the said order passed by the Tribunal, the department has started procedure and then on hearing the concerned teachers, cancelled recognition of the school and the school has without following procedure terminated the services of the petitioner by order dated 31.05.2005. That said order of termination came to be challenged by the petitioner by filing separate application being Application No.46 of 2005 before the then Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal and the said application was transferred to new Tribunal i.e. Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal and given number as Appeal No.311 of 2014. The said appeal, at present, is pending before the learned Tribunal. 2.2 That as the school has not complied with the order dated 16.03.1999 passed in Application No.8 of 1995, the petitioner has filed Application No.21 of 2014 before the Tribunal, which came to be transferred to the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal and given numbered as Execution Application No.63 of 2014. The said application was heard by the Tribunal and the Tribunal has passed an order on 19.08.2015 and directed respondent nos.1 and 2 to pay Rs.5,47,477/- within three months of passing the order by the Tribunal. though the order passed by the Tribunal has not been complied with by respondent nos.1 and 2 and, therefore, the petitioner has filed an application on 28.01.2016 and pointed out to the Tribunal that the Special Civil Application No.1386 of 2000 filed by respondent nos.1 and 2 challenging the order dated 16.03.1999 passed in Application No.8 of 1995 came to be dismissed by the High Court. That, the petitioner has also prayed to the Tribunal that as respondent nos.1 and 2 have not paid decreetal amount despite the order passed by the Tribunal, she may be given permission to file contempt petition before the High Court. In the said application, the Tribunal has passed an order on 15.02.2016 and given permission to the petitioner to file contempt petition before this Honourable Court as respondent nos.1 and 2 have failed to comply with the order passed by the learned Tribunal. In the said application, the Tribunal has passed an order on 15.02.2016 and given permission to the petitioner to file contempt petition before this Honourable Court as respondent nos.1 and 2 have failed to comply with the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 2.3 The original order was passed in Application No.8 of 1995 on 16.03.1999 and as the order was not complied with, an Execution Application was filed before the Tribunal. That as more than one year has been passed from the date of passing of the order dated 16.03.1999, the delay will come in the way of the petitioner for filing the contempt petition and, therefore, the petitioner approached before this Court by way of filing the present petition. 2.4 The action of the respondents in not complying with the order passed by the Tribunal in Application No.8 of 1995 dated 16.03.1999 and in Execution Application No.63 of 2014 (Old Execution Application No.21 of 2004) dated 19.08.2015 is unjust, illegal and arbitrary and, therefore, the present petition is filed. 3. Heard Mr.R. R. Vakil, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.Viral Shah, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3, Mr.Hasit Joshi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and Mr.Dharitri Pancholi, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondents No.5. 4. Mr.R. R. Vakil, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner appointed as assistant teacher in respondent – school since 26.09.1978 after proper selection process and her qualification is C.P.Ed and she was working in a primary section of the respondent – school. He has submitted that since the respondent – school has stopped in making payment of salary to the petitioner, she approached the Tribunal by way of preferring Application No.8 of 1995, which came to be allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 16.03.1999 and directed the management to pay difference of salary to the petitioner from 22.05.1986 within three months and also directed the school to pay regular salary to the petitioner as per the government rules and regulations. He has submitted that the Tribunal has directed the respondent – school to give copy of the service book of the petitioner and details of P.F. and leave to to her, however, such order was not complied with, the petitioner had preferred said execution application which was allowed. He has submitted that the Tribunal has directed the respondent – school to give copy of the service book of the petitioner and details of P.F. and leave to to her, however, such order was not complied with, the petitioner had preferred said execution application which was allowed. He has submitted that in view of procedural lapse, respondents No.4 and 5 have initiated proceedings against the school, however, the services of the petitioner was terminated and she preferred Application No.46 of 2005, which is at present pending before the learned Tribunal. He has submitted that the salary is due and payable upto 2005 till the date of termination of the petitioner is not yet to be paid and, therefore, seeking appropriate direction, she has preferred an application against respondents No.2 and 3, which came to be dismissed. He has submitted that despite the order passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner sought permission to file contempt petition before this Court, which came to be granted and though the order passed on 16.03.1999 which was not complied with, the petitioner preferred execution petition. He has submitted that as more than one year has been passed from the date of passing of the order dated 16.03.1999, the delay come in the way of the petitioner for filing the contempt petition and, therefore, she has preferred the present petition. He has submitted that the respondents has not complied with the orders and, therefore, she has urged before this Court to allow the present petition and to direct the respondents to pay decreetal amount to the petitioner which is due and payable to her. 5. Mr.Viral Shah, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3 has opposed the petition. While referring to the judgment and order dated 09.06.2016 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Misc. Civil Application No.1199 of 2016 more particularly the observation made in para-4, he has submitted that the present petition is not maintainable. The para-4 of the said judgment and order dated 09.06.2016 reads thus:- “4. In view of the following decisions, this petition need not be entertained as this is nothing but an attempt to execute the order in question, which appears to have been passed on 16.3.1999. (i) In case of Patel Hargovindbhai Hirabhai Vs. Jashvantbhai Manilal Dani and Ors, reported in 2002 (3) GLH 253 ; (ii) In case of R.N. Day and others Vs. (i) In case of Patel Hargovindbhai Hirabhai Vs. Jashvantbhai Manilal Dani and Ors, reported in 2002 (3) GLH 253 ; (ii) In case of R.N. Day and others Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and others, reported in (2000) 4 SCC 400 ; (iii) In case of Girishchandra R. Bhatt Vs. Dineshbhai N. Sanghvi Principal & Ors., reported in 1996 (1) GLH 523 ; (iv) In case of (The) Alahar Cooperative Credit Service Society Vs. Sham Lal, reported in 1995 (2) GLH 550; (v) In case of Kapildeo Prasad Sah & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 569; (vi) In case of Kanwar Singh Saini Vs. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307 ; The Court cannot continue the proceedings for assuring compliance with the order dated 16.3.1999 in contempt petition filed in the year 2016. The counsel submitted that the applicant being rendered remedy-less, is also of no avail to the applicant, as the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of substantive petition for appropriate compliance, is not brooked and has an impediment of delay and latches in a given case. Therefore, we are of the considered view that petition being misconceived, the contempt proceedings may not be entertained.” 5.1 Mr.Shah, learned counsel has submitted that the present petition is filed against the respondents out of which respondents No.2 and 4 are the private parties and, therefore, the petition would not lie before this Court. Mr.Shah, learned counsel has submitted that the remedy is available to the petitioner to approach before the appropriate authority for such grievance. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshina T. Vs. Abdul Azeez K. T. and others reported in (2019) 2 SCC 329 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 8, 9, 10, 17, 19 and 19 as under:- “8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and dismiss the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein out of which this appeal arises. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and dismiss the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein out of which this appeal arises. 9. In our considered opinion, the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the appellant before the High Court for grant of relief of restoration of the possession of the flat in question was not maintainable and the same ought to have been dismissed in limine as being not maintainable. In other words, the High Court ought to have declined to entertain the writ petition in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of Constitution for grant of reliefs claimed therein. 10. It is not in dispute that the reliefs for which the writ petition was filed by respondent No. 1 herein against the appellant pertained to possession of the flat. It is also not in dispute that one Civil Suit No. 807/2014 between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 in relation to the flat in question for grant of injunction was pending in the Court of Munsif at Kozhikode. It is also not in dispute that the appellant and the respondent No. 1 are private individuals and both are claiming their rights of ownership and possession over the flat in question on various factual grounds. 17. In our opinion, the High Court, therefore, while so directing exceeded its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. Indeed, the High Court in granting such relief, had virtually converted the writ petition into a civil suit and itself to a Civil Court. In our view, it was not permissible. 18. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, however, strenuously urged that the impugned order does not call for any interference because the High Court has proceeded to decide the writ petition on admitted facts. 19. In our view, it was not permissible. 18. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, however, strenuously urged that the impugned order does not call for any interference because the High Court has proceeded to decide the writ petition on admitted facts. 19. We do not agree with the submissions of learned counsel for respondent No.1 for the reasons that first there did exist a dispute between the appellant and respondent No. 1 as to who was in possession of the flat in question at the relevant time; Second, a dispute regarding possession of the said flat between the two private individuals could be decided only by the Civil Court in civil suit or by the Criminal Court in Section 145 Cr.P.C proceedings but not in the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 5.2 Mr.Shah, learned counsel has submitted that this Court may not exercise the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and entertained the present petition and in view of the aforesaid decisions, the present petition being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 6. Mr.Hasit Joshi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 has opposed the petition and has submitted that there is responsibility of the trust to pay the amount and respondent No.4 has only made correspondence. He has referred to and relied upon the affidavit-in-reply filed by Bina Nikhilkumar Dave, Administrative Officer, Primary Education Committee, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation, Jamnagar. The relevant paragraphs of the said affidavit-in-reply are as under:- “At the out set, I beg to draw attention of this Hon’ble Court to the fact that by way of the present petition, the petitioner is praying to direct the respondents no.1 and 2 to pay the decreetal amount to the petitioner as per the order passed in Execution Application No.63/2014 (Old Execution No.21 of 2004) dated 19.8.2015. Thus, the petitioner is seeking compliance of the order dated 19.8.2015 passed by the Tribunal and has not claimed any relief against the answering respondent. It is submitted that in Old Execution Application No.21/2014, the Gujarat Educational Establishments Services Tribunal, Ahmedabad has passed order dated 19.8.2015 wherein after deducting the amount of Rs.21,000.00, order is passed against the opponents No.1- 2 within three months whereas by order dated 15.2.2016 passed in New Execution Application No.63 of 2014, the petitioner is permitted to initiate the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is also submitted that looking to the order dated 31.5.2005 for relieving the petitioner from duty, as stated therein, the recognition of Shreyas Primary School has been cancelled by the District Education Officer, Jamnagar dated 1.4.2004. The present petition is concerning only the arrears of salary of Rs.5,47,000.00 and the answering respondents No.4 is party in the capacity of inspecting authority.” 6.1 Mr.Joshi, learned counsel has submitted that no any relief as sought for against respondent No.4 and the dispute is between the school management and the petitioner and the school has closed down the primary section and it is running secondary section in the premises. He has submitted that the Court may pass appropriate orders. 7. This Court has considered the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the material on record and the affidavit-in-reply and also considered the decisions cited at the Bar. It appears from the material that the petitioner was working as assistant teacher w.e.f. 26.09.1978 in primary section and though the respondent – school has stopped in making payment of salary to the petitioner, she had filed Application No.8 of 1995 before the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal. That on 16.03.1999, the Tribunal has allowed the application and directed the respondent – school to pay difference of salary within three months, however, the respondents have not paid any amount and, therefore, the petitioner has preferred Execution Application No.21 of 2004 before the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal which came to be allowed and such direction issued against the respondent – school management and in view of procedural lapse, respondents No.4 and 5 initiated the proceedings against the school management. It also appears from the record that the service of the petitioner came to be terminated by order dated 31.05.2005 and the same was challenged by the petitioner by filing Application No.46 of 2005 before the Tribunal, which is at present pending. In the backdrop of the facts, the school management has closed the primary section and now school management is running a secondary section. It is worthwhile to note that respondent No.4 has not taken any stringent action against respondents - trustees of the school management and they have merely silent and not made any correspondence and not cancelled the education trust. 8. It is worthwhile to note that respondent No.4 has not taken any stringent action against respondents - trustees of the school management and they have merely silent and not made any correspondence and not cancelled the education trust. 8. In view of the above aspects, this Court finds that the petitioner was appointed as teacher after due process in 1978 and after almost 22 years of service, the respondent – school has stopped paying salary to the petitioner and, therefore, she has approached the Tribunal by filing application, which was allowed. Despite of such order, since the respondents have not paid any amount, the petitioner again approached before the Tribunal by way of filing Execution Application which was also allowed, however, the respondents have not paid any amount which is due and payable to the petitioner. Now at this juncture, it is not lie in the mouth of respondents No.2 and 3 that it is a private dispute since the petitioner was not working in private organization, she is working as teacher in the school run by respondents No.2 and 3 and the dispute is not private dispute and, therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3 is not applicable to the facts of the present case and it is not come in the rescue of the respondent. Considering the fact that the Tribunal has passed the order way back in the year 1999 and, thereafter, the execution application is also allowed. It appears that till date the petitioner is not receiving her salary which is due and payable to her. Instead of paying the salary to the petitioner, the respondents have terminated the services of the petitioner and the said action is also challenged by the petitioner by way of filing application / petition which is at present pending for adjudication. 9. In view of the above and in light of the case, the present petition is allowed. Instead of paying the salary to the petitioner, the respondents have terminated the services of the petitioner and the said action is also challenged by the petitioner by way of filing application / petition which is at present pending for adjudication. 9. In view of the above and in light of the case, the present petition is allowed. The respondents No.2 and 3 are directed to deposit the difference of salary of the petitioner which is due and payable to her for an amount of Rs.5,47,477/- (Rupees Five Lakh forty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Seven Only) along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of her entitlement till the actual realization within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, failing which respondents No.4 and 5 are directed to take appropriate action under the Bombay Land Revenue Code to recover such amount in accordance with law as provided under the Gujarat Primary Education Act. Direct service is permitted. There shall be no order as to costs.