JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner is questioning the legality and propriety of the order dated 08.02.2012 and 16.02.2012 passed in Case No.23-A/82/2008-09 whereby the Respondent Authorities have dropped the land acquisition proceedings initiated for acquisition of its land bearing Khasra No.153/3 admeasuring 0.34 hectare and, praying for compensation of its land which is being used by Respondent No.4 alongwith the interest. 2. From perusal of the record, it appears that initially a proceeding for acquisition of land in question bearing Khasra No. 153/3 admeasuring 0.34 hectare situated at village Dangania, Tahsil and District Raipur was initiated against the vendors of the petitioner, namely, Dilip Kumar & Others for the purpose of providing the same to the Chhattisgarh Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Housing Board’). The said proceeding was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 288-A/82/1989-90, wherein, it was observed that since the proceeding for vesting of the alleged land was under the consideration of The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, therefore, it was not acquired when the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 10.06.1991. It is to be seen here that after passing of the said award, a request was made by the Housing Board for possession of the land in question and on the basis of the order dated 02.06.1992 (Annexure R-4/1) passed by the Collector, Raipur, the possession of it was handed over on 05.06.1992 and since then, the Housing Board is enjoying the possession of it. It is to be noted here further that although the possession of the land in question was given to the Housing Board, but as it was not acquired vide award dated 10.06.1991, therefore, the right, title and interest of the vendors of the petitioner was not divested. The said land was subsequently directed to be released by the Commissioner, Raipur vide its order dated 16.08.1994 in Ceiling Appeal Case No. 140/A-90-C/1993-94 and, the land in question was thus not vested with the State Government. The right, title and interest of the alleged land was thereafter acquired by the petitioner from them under a registered deed of sale dated 22.06.2007 (submitted by the petitioner by way of covering memo dated 10.01.2024) and ostensible possession was delivered accordingly, but physical possession was remain with the Housing Board. 3. The right, title and interest of the alleged land was thereafter acquired by the petitioner from them under a registered deed of sale dated 22.06.2007 (submitted by the petitioner by way of covering memo dated 10.01.2024) and ostensible possession was delivered accordingly, but physical possession was remain with the Housing Board. 3. It appears further that at the request of the Housing Board, made on 22.12.2008, a land acquisition proceeding was initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1894’) for acquisition of the said land, i.e., Khasra No.153/3 admeasuring 0.34 hectare for the purposes of the construction of a Park (public purpose). The said proceeding was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 23-A/82/2008-09 and after following the procedure as provided under the Act, 1894, an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 10.05.2011 (Annexure P/4) determining the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.3,02,80,940/- (Three crore two lakhs eighty thousand nine hundred and forty rupees only) and was placed before the Collector, Raipur for its approval, who in turn, has approved the same vide its order dated 16.06.2011. It, however, appears that after its approval as such, the Commissioner, Raipur vide its order dated 25.07.2011 has raised certain objections and in pursuance thereof, the Land Acquisition Officer vide its order dated 03.08.2011 has clarified all the points as under:- 4. After clarifying the queries aforesaid, the Land Acquisition Officer has again submitted the said award, as passed on 10.05.2011, for its approval before the Collector, Raipur, who in turn, vide its order dated 08.08.2011 has recommended for its approval to the Commissioner, Raipur. However, the Commissioner, Raipur vide its order dated 12.08.2011 had directed the Land Acquisition Officer to ascertain the fact from the Housing Board as to whether the land in question still requires for the said purpose or not and, simultaneously directed to inspect the spot in order to know the use of the land in question. It is, however, to be noted here that once the queries, as sought by him was submitted, the said Authority may at the most disagree with it, but in no circumstance such a new direction should have been issued, as a short time of two days alone are left for the approval of the said award as required under Section 11-A of the Act, 1894. The act of the Commissioner is, therefore, cannot be appreciable and is hereby condemned. 5. Be that as it may, in pursuance to the aforesaid direction of the Commissioner, the Land Acquisition Officer vide its memo dated 19.08.2011 has asked the Housing Board as to whether the land in question is still required or not, who in turn, vide its letter dated 08.11.2011 (Annexure P/7) informed that since the ‘houses and road’ has already been constructed over the alleged land, therefore, a request was made for closing the said acquisition proceedings with a request for refund of his deposited amount of Rs.38,76,000/-. The Land Acquisition Officer after considering the said application, observed that since the notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 14.08.2009 and the alleged acquisition proceeding was to be completed within the period of two years, but, owing to the passing of said requisite period of two years, it could not be passed and, accordingly, the proposal was submitted before the Collector, Raipur, who, vide its order impugned dated 16.02.2012 has approved the same and the alleged acquisition proceeding was, accordingly, dropped/closed which has been impugned by way of this petition. 6. According to learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, since the award has already been approved by the Collector, Raipur vide its order dated 16.06.2011, therefore, the order impugned as passed closing the alleged acquisition proceeding is apparently unknown to the law and deserves to be quashed by placing reliance upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of “Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia and Another vs. Land Acquisition Officer and Another” reported in (2003) 5 SCC 83 . Further contention of him is that since the land in question owned by the petitioner was illegally taken over by the respondent- State Authorities while handing over to the Housing Board on 05.06.1992 without adopting the due process of law, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get the requisite compensation in lieu of illegal deprivation of it and, in support has placed his reliance upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matters of “Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others Through Power-Of-Attorney Holder vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others” reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 and “D.B. Basnett (Dead), Through Legal Representatives vs. Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and Another” reported in (2020) 4 SCC 572 , respectively. 7. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have supported the order impugned as passed by the authorities, while placing reliance upon the principles laid down in the matter of “State of U.P. and Others vs. Rajiv Gupta and Another” reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 . 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire papers annexed with the petition. 9. What is reflected from the facts and circumstances of the case that although the award dated 10.05.2011 has been approved by the Collector, Raipur, on 16.06.2011, but it was, however, the satisfaction of the said authority alone and cannot be held to be approved in view of the provisions prescribed under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, 1894 as it was not approved by the competent authority according to the said provision. The said proviso is relevant for the purpose reads as under:- “11. Enquiry and award by Collector. - [(1)] On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land [at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1)], and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of- (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him : Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorize in this behalf. Xxx xxx xxx xxx.” 10. Xxx xxx xxx xxx.” 10. The aforesaid proviso to Section 11 of the Act, 1894 was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the matter of “State of U.P. and Others (Supra) reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 and it has been held therein that if the award exceeds the limits prior approval of the State Government or authorised Officer is mandatory. The relevant observation made at para 6 reads as under:- “6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no award shall be made by the Collector under sub- section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf ". It is common knowledge that exercising the power under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make an award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by the appropriate Government in that behalf. If the award exceeds the limit, prior approval of the State Governments or authorised officer is mandatory. Any award made in violation thereof, renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer. No doubt, Mr Markandeya is right that the State had not produced before us rules or orders issued under the first proviso to Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer shall not make an award exceeding one crore of rupees without prior approval of the Commissioner, namely, Commissioner, Board of Revenue. But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is a condition precedent…………………..” 11. It is, however, to be seen at this juncture, the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia and Another (Supra) reported in (2003) 5 SCC 83 , as relied upon by Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, where a different view to that of the aforesaid principles was taken, though the said decision was not referred therein. The relevant observation made at para 9 reads as under:- “9.From the Scheme of the Act, it is seen that the power of inquiry under Section 11 vests with the Collector who has to issue notice to the interested persons and hear the interested persons in the said inquiry. He also has to determine the measurements of the land in question and on the basis of the material on record decide the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land and if need be, he can also apportion the said compensation amongst the interested persons. The nature of inquiry which statutorily requires the interested parties of being heard and taking a decision based on relevant factors by the Collector shows the inquiry contemplated under Section 11 is quasi-judicial in nature, and the said satisfaction as to the compensation payable should be based on the opinion of the Collector and not that of any other person. Section 11 under the Act has not provided an appeal to any other authority as against the opinion formed by the Collector in the process of inquiry conducted by him. What is provided under the proviso to Section 11(1) is that the proposed award made by the Collector must have the approval of the appropriate Government or such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in that behalf. In our opinion, this power of granting or not granting previous approval cannot be equated with an appellate power. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines 'approval' to mean an act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting to some act or thing done by another. In the context of an administrative act, the word 'approval' in our opinion, does not mean anything more than either confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting. It will be doing violence to the Scheme of the Act if we have to construe and accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the word approval found in the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act under the Scheme of the Act amounts to an appellate power. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that this is only an administrative power which limits the jurisdiction of the authority to apply its mind to see whether the proposed award is acceptable to the Government or not. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that this is only an administrative power which limits the jurisdiction of the authority to apply its mind to see whether the proposed award is acceptable to the Government or not. In that process for the purpose of forming an opinion to approve or not to approve the proposed award the Commissioner may satisfy himself as to the material relied upon by the Collector but he cannot reverse the finding as if he is an appellate authority for the purpose of remanding the matter to the Collector as can be done by an appellate authority; much less can the Commissioner exercising the said power of prior approval give directions to the statutory authority in what manner he should accept/appreciate the material on record in regard to the compensation payable. If such a power of issuing direction to the Collector by the Commissioner under the provision of law referred to hereinabove is to be accepted then it would mean that the Commissioner is empowered to exercise the said power to substitute his opinion to that of the Collector's opinion for the purpose of fixing the compensation, which in our view is opposed to the language of Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Act has not conferred an appellate jurisdiction on the Commissioner under Section 15(1) proviso of the Act. This conclusion of ours is further supported by the scheme of the Act and Section 15-A of the Act which is also introduced in the Act simultaneously with the proviso to Section 11(1) under Act 68 of 1984. By this amendment, we notice that the Act has given a power akin to the appellate power to the State Government to call for any records or proceedings of the Collector before any award is made, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any finding or order passed or as to the irregularity of such proceedings and to pass such other order or issue such direction in relation thereto as it may think fit. Therefore it is not as if the acquiring authority namely the appropriate Government even if aggrieved by the fixation of compensation by the Collector has no remedy. Therefore it is not as if the acquiring authority namely the appropriate Government even if aggrieved by the fixation of compensation by the Collector has no remedy. It can very well exercise the power under Section 15-A and pass such orders as it thinks fit, of course, after affording an opportunity to such person who is likely to be prejudicially affected by such order of the appropriate Government, therefore, it is clear that the statute when it intended to give appellate or revisional power against the finding of the Collector in the fixation of compensation it has provided such power separately in Section 15-A of the Act. Therefore, in our opinion, if the Commissioner while considering the proposed award of the Collector under the proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act to grant or not to grant approval thinks that the order of the Collector cannot be approved, he can at the most on the administrative side bring it to the notice of the appropriate Government to exercise its power under Section 15-A of the Act, but he cannot as in the present case on his own exercise the said power because that power under Section 15-A is confined to the appropriate Government only. Therefore we have to negative the argument of Mr. Joshi that it is open to the Commissioner while considering the grant of approval to exercise the power either found in Section 15-A of the Act or similar power exercising his jurisdiction under proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act.” 12. While passing the aforesaid observation, it was, noticed that a different view was taken in the matter of “State of Bihar vs. Prem Kumar Singh” reported in (1998) 2 SCC 573 , wherein, it has been held that the Officers authorised by the State Government by notification under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, 1894 for approval of the award could reduce the compensation fixed by the Collector which has been followed in the case of “State of Bihar and Others vs. D.N. Singh (Dead) by LRs and Others” reported in (1998) 2 SCC 572 . It was observed further that since in both the said matters, the Court has not considered the nature of power exercised by the Commissioner under proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act, 1894 nor the effect of Section 15-A of the Act, 1894 was considered therefore, for settling the issue in this regard, the matter was referred to the larger Bench. However, the said issue has not been settled as evidenced by the order passed in Civil Appeal No.2045/2003 in the matter of Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia and Another vs. Land Acquisition Officer and Another decided on 12.02.2004. 13. In view of the above circumstances and in view of the fact that the principles laid down in the matter of State of U.P. and Others (Supra) reported in (1994) 5 SCC 686 was not referred in the matter of Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia and Another (Supra) reported in (2003) 5 SCC 83 , the principles laid down in the earlier matter, i.e. State of U.P. and Others (Supra) would, therefore, required to be taken into consideration. As such, applying the principles laid down therein to the case in hand, the award dated 10.05.2011, though recommended by the Collector Raipur for its approval by the Commissioner vide its order dated 08.08.2011, but the same was, however, not found to be approved and instead, the Commissioner vide its order dated 12.08.2011 has directed the Land Acquisition Officer to ascertain the fact from the Housing Board as to whether the land in question still requires for its use or not with a further direction to inspect the spot in order to ascertain the use of the land in question and since, by the time, the requisite period of two years for passing of the award as required under Section 11-A of the Act, 1894 was over, therefore, the entire proceedings has, thus, lapsed by operation of law and, in view thereof, the order impugned closing the alleged acquisition proceedings does not call for any interference in this petition. The order impugned is, accordingly affirmed. 14. Before parting with the matter, it is to be noted that the land in question bearing Khasra No.153/3 admeasuring 0.34 hectare has been found in possession of the Housing Board since 05.06.1992 who has already utilised the same while constructing its houses and road, though, it was not acquired in the alleged land acquisition proceedings. 14. Before parting with the matter, it is to be noted that the land in question bearing Khasra No.153/3 admeasuring 0.34 hectare has been found in possession of the Housing Board since 05.06.1992 who has already utilised the same while constructing its houses and road, though, it was not acquired in the alleged land acquisition proceedings. It, thus, appears that the land in question owned by the petitioner was not acquired either in earlier acquisition proceeding when the award was passed on 10.06.1991 in Land Acquisition Case No.288-A/82/1989-90 or in the subsequent acquisition proceeding when it was dropped vide order impugned, yet the possession of it, as observed herein above, has been found with the Housing Board since 05.06.1992 as per the order dated 02.06.1992 passed by the Collector, Raipur. The possession of the land in question has, thus, been taken over even without adopting due process of law and handed over to the Housing Board, who enjoyed its possession illegally since 05.06.1992. The deprivation of the petitioner from its alleged land could, however, been made only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute, but in stretch of any imagination, the deprivation of the petitioner from its land cannot be made in such a fashion, as by virtue of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no one can be deprived of his property without adopting due process of law. 15. The aforesaid observation is fortified by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of “Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others Through Power-Of-Attorney Holder vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others” reported in (2013)1 SCC 353 , wherein under a similar circumstance, it was held at paragraphs 8, 10, 11 & 17 as under:- “8.The appellants were deprived of their immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the Right to Property seized to be a Fundamental Right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said word has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat, it has been held as follows: - (SCC p.627, para 48) "48.In other words, Article 300-A only limits the power of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There (is) no deprivation without (due) sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation." 10. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. 11. ……………………... The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development.” 16. Likewise, in the matter of D.B. Basnett (Dead), Through Legal Representatives vs. Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and Another reported in (2020) 4 SCC 572 it has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court at paragraphs 14,16 & 19 while referring to the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in various matters as under:- 14. We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed. 16. We find a detailed discussion about the law as it evolved and the rationale for the said purpose in Vidya Devi of which the relevant paragraphs read as under: (SCC pp.572-74, para 12) “12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property (The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors.), which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property (The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors.), which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2……………….Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article (K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka) 12.3.To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chennai, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p.634, para 6). “6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefore must be paid.” 12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: (SCC p.526, para 21) “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” 12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p.379, para 30) “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property." Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property." Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” 12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p.627, para 48) “48. In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” 12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.” 19. The result of the aforesaid would be that the respondents have failed to establish that they had acquired the land in accordance with law and paid due compensation. The appellant would, thus, be entitled to the possession of the land as also damages for illegal use and occupation of the same by the respondents, at least, for a period of three years prior to the notice having been served upon them. We are strengthened in our observations on account of the judgment of this Court in LAO v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy, where it was held that the owner can be entitled to damages for wrongful use and possession of land in respect of which no notification is issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, from the date of possession till the date such notification is finally published.” 17. In the instant matter, as observed herein above, although the proceeding was initiated for acquisition of the land in question at the instance of the Housing Board, but, it could not come to a logical end and, instead dropped by way of the order impugned. The petitioner is, thus, deprived from its alleged land by the State Authorities even without adopting due process of law. Therefore, considering the principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the above referred matters and having regard to the fact pertaining to dropping of the alleged acquisition proceedings, it will, thus, be the obligation upon the State Government to take proceedings for its restitution, i.e. restoration of possession of land in question as also the profits thereof and, I hope and expect that the State Government shall now take appropriate proceedings forthwith. 18. The petition is, accordingly, disposed off with the aforesaid observation. No order as to cost(s).