ORDER : 1. Since common questions of law and facts are involved in both cases, they are clubbed together, heard together and decided by this common order. 2. The petitioners are Presidents of Municipal Council, Mungeli, District - Mungeli and Nagar Panchayat Shivpur Charcha, District Korea. 3. The brief facts of WPC No. 2342 of 2024 are as under:- I. The petitioner was duly elected as a Councilor and later on, he was elected as President of Municipal Council Mungeli, District – Mungeli in the election held in the year 2020 amongst the Councilors. Surprisingly, respondent No. 1 vide order dated 14.03.2024 suspended the financial power of the petitioner and only the Chief Municipal Officer was authorized to sign the cheques. The petitioner in this petition has raised grounds regarding the authority of the State with respect to withdrawing the financial power. It is also pleaded that Sections 323 & 324 of the CG. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1961’) and CG. Municipal Accounts Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules, 1971’) do not permit the State Government to withdraw the financial power of the President, and thus it is pleaded that the power has been exercised arbitrarily by the authority. II. In turn, it is stated by the respondents that the financial power of the petitioner/President has been withdrawn according to provisions of Sections 323 & 324 of the Act, 1961 read with Rule – 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971. It is further stated in the reply that there were various complaints against the petitioner made by the contractors to the effect that deliberately cheques so presented by the Chief Municipal Officer were not signed by the petitioner. The work of drainage, drinking water connections, sewers and construction of roads was stopped by those contractors. The aforesaid complaints were made by the contractors on 05.12.2023. It is also stated in the reply that the Chief Municipal Officer, Mungeli took cognizance of the matter and after due enquiry, forwarded the letter to the State Government along with complaints and copies of the cheques, thereafter, the decision was taken by the State Government. 4. The brief facts of WPC No. 1695 of 2024 are as under:- I. The petitioner was elected as Councilor of Nagar Palika Parishad, Shivpur Charcha, District – Korea, and thereafter, she was elected as President in the year 2022. 4. The brief facts of WPC No. 1695 of 2024 are as under:- I. The petitioner was elected as Councilor of Nagar Palika Parishad, Shivpur Charcha, District – Korea, and thereafter, she was elected as President in the year 2022. Vide Order dated 14.03.2024 issued by respondent No. 1, the financial power of the petitioner was suspended in the exercise of the power conferred under Section 324 of the Act, 1961 read with Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971. It is pleaded in the Writ Petition that no opportunity of hearing was afforded. It is also stated that the provisions of Sections 323 & 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(ii) of the Rules, 1971 would attract. II. In reply, it is stated that various complaints were made against the petitioner by the Councilors of Nagar Palika, Shivpur Charcha to the effect that the petitioner misused her power. She issued various work orders without technical sanction and prior approval from the Nagar Palika to her near and dear. There were also allegations concerning financial irregularities. After receiving such complaints, an enquiry was conducted and the matter was forwarded to the State Government. The fact-finding enquiry was conducted and conclusions were recorded by the Chief Municipal Officer in its report as under:- Complaint No. 1 The new construction and beautification work of Chowk was done by the Chairman in Shubhash Nagar between Wards No. 4 and 5 without obtaining technical approval. Conclusion:- There is no document related to the above development work in the office, and thus the complaint has been found certified. Complaint No. 2 The petitioner without obtaining technical approval, installed rope lights on the main roadside and in various places in the area of Municipal Council. Conclusion:- There is no document related to the above development works in the Municipal Council office, and thus, the complaint has been found certified. Complaint No. 3 The petitioner misusing her position carried out illegal construction work through the contractor appointed by the Municipal Council on the land next to the Shivpur Charcha Helipad Ground on the roadside of the Railway area. Conclusion:- Notice was issued to the contractor and objection was also raised by the Railway Department, at present, the work is stopped and no payment has been made by the Municipal Council. Conclusion:- Notice was issued to the contractor and objection was also raised by the Railway Department, at present, the work is stopped and no payment has been made by the Municipal Council. Complaint No. 4 Complainant No. 4 stated about the sanction of work of beautification in front of her house at Ward No. 3 without obtaining technical approval from the Government. Conclusion:- There is no document related to the above development works in the Municipal Office. Therefore, the above complaints have been found certified. Complaint No. 5 The works like cleaning, construction work, supply work, distribution of work of municipal employees, water supply and electricity works are managed by her husband Mr. Bhupendra Yadav, who is a government employee in S.E.C.L. at Charcha. Conclusion:- It is recorded that according to the investigation report sent by the Collector, Korea, the allegation of interference in the functioning of the body by Mr. Bhupendra Yadav, the Chairman’s husband, was found to be true. 5. It is further pleaded in reply that the State Government taking into consideration the conclusions recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the allegations made against the petitioner, passed an order suspending the financial powers of the petitioner. 6. Mr. Amrito Das and Mr. Sanjay Pathak, learned counsels appearing for respective petitioners submitted that there is no provision under Sections 323 & 324 of the Act, 1961 to withdraw the financial power of the elected President. They further submitted that even Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971 does not deal with the suspension of the financial power of the President or any other authority. They also submitted that Section 323 of the Act, 1961 deals with the power to suspend the execution of orders, etc. of the Council. It provides that “the authority may by order in writing, suspend the execution of such resolution or order prohibit the doing of any such act.” It is contended that this Section does not empower any authority or the State Government to suspend the financial power of the President. 7. With regard to Section 324 of the Act, 1961:- They contended that this Section deals with extraordinary powers in case of emergency. 7. With regard to Section 324 of the Act, 1961:- They contended that this Section deals with extraordinary powers in case of emergency. It is argued that in an urgent situation, the Government or any Officer authorized by the State Government may direct or provide for the execution of any work, or doing of any act, which Council is empowered to execute which is in its or his opinion, necessary for the health or safety of the public. It is further argued that this Section also does not give any power to the State Government to suspend or withdraw the financial power of the President. 8. It is argued that the State Government or any Officer may appoint any person on reasonable remuneration to execute the pending work affecting the health and safety of the general public and such remuneration would be payable by the Councilor. It is also argued that Sections 323 and 324 of the Act, 1961 are entirely distinct and the scope and object of both Sections are entirely different. 9. They also argued that Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971 deals with the powers of the Chief Municipal Officer and the President concerning the signing of cheques. They further stated that according to amended provisions of Rule 90(2)(ii), the Chief Municipal Officer has the authority to sign a cheque if the amount is up to Rs. 50,000/- or below and when the amount exceeds Rs. 50,000/-, the cheques shall be signed by the Chief Municipal Officer and the President of the Council. 10. It is submitted that there is no provision with regard to the suspension or withdrawal of the financial power of the President. It is also argued that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before withdrawing the financial power and such an order has a civil consequence. In support of their arguments, they placed strong reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sahara India (firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I and another reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 . 11. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the respondents would oppose. They submitted that there were various allegations against the President of the Municipal Council, Mungeli with regard to not signing the cheques presented by the Chief Municipal Officer. 11. On the other hand, learned counsels appearing for the respondents would oppose. They submitted that there were various allegations against the President of the Municipal Council, Mungeli with regard to not signing the cheques presented by the Chief Municipal Officer. They further submitted that those cheques were counter-signed by the Chief Municipal Officer and were presented before the petitioner in the months of October and November and the petitioner refused to sign those cheques. They also submitted that various complaints were made by the contractors before the Chief Municipal Officer on the 5th of December, 2023 along with photographs of the payment register, and the allegations were that the cheques were counter-signed by the Chief Municipal Officer prior to 05.12.2023, but the petitioner/President refused to sign those cheques. It is further contended that after receiving complaints, the matter was referred to the State Government by the Chief Municipal Officer along with complaints and the State Government while exercising power under Section 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(ii) of the Rules, 1971 took the decision to suspend the financial power of the petitioner. It is also contended that the statement of an accountant was recorded, who categorically stated that though he approached the President many times, the petitioner refused to sign the cheques for one or the other reasons. They argued that due to non-payment of the bills raised by the contractors, work of construction of road, drainage, sewerage and water supply was stopped by the contractors, and to counter such emergent situation and to check the suffering of the general public of the Municipal Council, Mungeli and looking to the emergent situation which warranted immediate action, in the public interest, the decision has been taken by the State Government. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not been penalized; only his financial power has been withdrawn for a certain period, and it has no civil consequences. 12. With regard to the reply to WPC No. 1695 of 2024:- They submitted that there were various complaints made by the Councilors of Nagar Palika, Shivpur Charcha against the petitioner before the Collector. They further submitted that pursuant to the order passed by the Collector, an enquiry was conducted by the Chief Municipal Officer and in its report, the Chief Municipal Officer found most of the allegations certified. They further submitted that pursuant to the order passed by the Collector, an enquiry was conducted by the Chief Municipal Officer and in its report, the Chief Municipal Officer found most of the allegations certified. They also submitted that the note sheet is part of the return and it contains the abstract of the enquiry report submitted by the Chief Municipal Officer, where the authority concerned enquired into all allegations and recorded its conclusions. They further contended that the complaints made against the petitioner and its report were forwarded to the State Government, and thereafter, the State Government exercising power under Section 324 of the Act, 1961 read with Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971 passed the order against the President suspending the financial power. They also contended that both petitions deserve to be dismissed. 13. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the documents placed on the record. 14. The only question involved in both cases is whether the State Government has the authority to suspend the financial power of the President while exercising power under Section 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(ii) of the Rules, 1971. 15. It would be advantageous to go through the provisions of Sections 323 & 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971. The aforesaid provisions are reproduced herein-below for ready reference:- Section 323 - Power to suspend execution of orders, etc. 15. It would be advantageous to go through the provisions of Sections 323 & 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971. The aforesaid provisions are reproduced herein-below for ready reference:- Section 323 - Power to suspend execution of orders, etc. of Council (1) If, in the opinion of the [Substituted by C.G. Act No. 16 of 2011, w.e.f. 2-1-2012 for the words "Director Urban Planning and Development".] [Divisional Commissioner], the Collector, or any other officer authorised by the State Government, in this behalf, the execution of any order or resolution of a Council, or of any of its Committee or any other authority or officer subordinate thereto, or the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of the Council, is not in conformity with law or with the rules or bye-laws made thereunder and is detrimental to the interests of the Council or the public or is causing or likely to cause injury or annoyance to the public or any class or body of persons or is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, he may, by order in writing under his signature, suspend the execution of such resolution or order or prohibit the doing of any such act. (2) When any order under sub-section (1) is passed, the authority making the order, shall forthwith forward to the State Government and to the Council affected thereby a copy of the order with a statement of reasons for making it; and it shall, be in the discretion of the State Government to rescind the order, or to direct that it shall continue in force with or without modification, permanently or for such period as it thinks fit: Provided that the order shall not be revised, modified or confirmed by the State Government without giving the Council reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order. Section 324 - Extraordinary powers in case of emergency (1) In case of emergency the State Government or any officer, authorised by the State Government in this behalf may direct or provide for the execution of any work, or the doing of any act, which a Council is empowered to execute or do, and the immediate execution or doing of which is in its or his opinion, necessary for the health or safety of the public, and may direct that the expanse of executing the work or doing the act with a reasonable remuneration to the person appointed to execute or do it, shall be forthwith paid by the Council. (2) If the expenses and the remuneration are not so paid, the State Government or any officer authorised in this behalf may make an order directing any person, who for the time being has custody Of any moneys on behalf of the Council, to pay such expense and remuneration form such moneys as he may have in his hands or may, from time to time, receive, and such person shall be bound to obey such order. (3) Provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 323 shall, as far as may be, apply to any order made under this section. Rule 90 (2)(ii) - 90(2) The cheques shall be prepared by the Accountant, and shall be signed by - (One) the Chief Municipal Officer if the amount is rupees fifty thousand or below in the case of Municipal Council and rupees twenty-five thousand or below in the case of Nagar Panchayat; (Two) Jointly by the Chief Municipal Officer and the President of the council if the amount exceeds rupees fifty thousand in the case of Municipal Council and rupees twenty-five thousand in the case of Nagar Panchayta, in the absence of the President, the Vice President or in the absence of Vice President, any Councillor of the Council who are duly authorized by the Council for this purpose may sign the cheque. Copy of the resolution of the Council passed in this regard and the specimen signature of the Councillor shall be sent for record to the Bank by the Chief Municipal Officer.” 16. Copy of the resolution of the Council passed in this regard and the specimen signature of the Councillor shall be sent for record to the Bank by the Chief Municipal Officer.” 16. From a bare reading of Section 323 of the Act, 1961, it is apparent that the power has been conferred upon the Divisional Commissioner or Collector or any officer authorized by the State Government to suspend the execution of resolution or order or prohibit the doing of any act or doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done by or on behalf of the Council, if in his opinion, is not in conformity with law or with the rules or bye-laws made thereunder and the same is detrimental to the interest of the Council or the public or is causing or likely to cause injury. The power has been conferred with the State authorities to suspend the execution of orders or resolutions only. This Section does not empower any of the State authorities to suspend the financial power of the President or any other office bearer. 17. Now coming to Section 324 of the Act, 1961 which is extraordinary power in case of emergency. The first and foremost condition for the applicability of this Section is that there should be an emergent situation. But, the word ‘emergency’ has not been defined in the whole act. This Section empowers the State Government or any authorized officer for :- i. Execution of work; ii. Doing of any act for which the Council is empowered to execute; iii. The immediate execution of doing of act which is necessary for the health or safety of the public and further remuneration for execution of such act will be borne by the Council itself. 18. This Section again does not empower the State Government or any of the authorities of the State to suspend the financial power of the President or any office bearer of the Municipalities. 19. Now coming to Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971. The austere reading of Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971 would show that the cheques shall be prepared by the accountant and shall be signed by the Chief Municipal Officer if the amount is below Rs. 50,000/- and if the amount is more than Rs. 50,000/- the cheque so presented shall be signed by the Chief Municipal Officer and the President. 50,000/- and if the amount is more than Rs. 50,000/- the cheque so presented shall be signed by the Chief Municipal Officer and the President. There is no provision nor does this Rule empower any of the State authorities to suspend the financial power of the President. 20. It is not in dispute that there are various allegations against the petitioners in both cases. Allegedly, the petitioners acted in contravention to the provisions of the Act, 1961 and the Rules, 1971. 21. In WPC No. 1695 of 2024, an enquiry was also conducted and most of the allegations were found true by the Chief Municipal Officer. In the matter of the President of Mungeli, the President refused to sign the cheques which were already counter-signed by the Chief Municipal Officer and complaints were made by the contractors. Admittedly, no proceeding is contemplated or pending against the petitioners and based on the superficial enquiry, impugned orders have been passed by the State Government suspending the financial power of the petitioners. 22. In the matter of Sahara India (firm), Lucknow (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed and held as under:- “15. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1969 )2 SCC 262, the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 455 ,. 17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei & Ors. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 455 ,. 17. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei & Ors. AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated and it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Since then the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is invariably read into administrative actions involving civil consequences, unless the statute, conferring power, excludes its application by express language. 19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. 20. We may, however, hasten to add that no general rule of universal application can be laid down as to the applicability of the principle audi alteram partem, in addition to the language of the provision. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the said principle should be applied. The question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined. (See: Union of India Vs. Col. J.N. Sinha & Ors. (1970) 2 SCC 458 .” 23. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined. (See: Union of India Vs. Col. J.N. Sinha & Ors. (1970) 2 SCC 458 .” 23. From a bare reading of the above legal proposition, it is abundantly clear that the aim of the principle of natural justice is to ensure justice and prevent unfair outcomes. It ensures fairness against the actions of the Government and its functionaries or prevents arbitrary use of power. It applies to quasi-judicial, judicial and administrative decisions, especially those with civil consequences, to prevent injustice. 24. With regard to the principles of natural justice, it is evident from the orders impugned and the returns filed by the respondents that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners. It is no more res integra that if the action is being taken in the larger public interest there is no need to adhere to the principles of natural justice as held in the matter of All India Railway Recruitment Board vs. K. Shyam Kumar, (2010) 6 SCC 614 . 25. In view of the foregoing discussions, it can safely be held that the State Government is not authorized or empowered to pass the order of suspension of financial power of the President of Municipalities, while exercising power under Section 324 of the Act, 1961 and Rule 90(2)(ii) of the Rules, 1971, therefore, the orders so passed by respondent No. 1 are hereby quashed. 26. Accordingly, the instant petitions are hereby allowed. However, the authority concerned would be at liberty to take appropriate action strictly in accordance with the law, if so advised.