JUDGMENT : Ramesh Sinha, J. 1. This criminal appeal is preferred under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, the Cr.P.C.) against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2023 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari, in Sessions Trial No. 32/2020 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 22.08.2020, the appellant and her husband i.e. Goutam Kashyap (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) were present in the house and the appellant was busy in talking on mobile phone. The deceased tried to prevent her from talking on mobile phone on which a dispute arose. The appellant is alleged to have poured kerosene on the deceased and set him on fire. The deceased cried for help upon which the appellant poured water on him and fled from the place of incident. 3. Initially, a Dehatinalishi (Exhibit P/35) was recorded by the Police Assistance Centre, District Hospital, Dhamtari bearing Crime No. 0/2020 on 3.08.2020 at about 17:00 hours on the information given by the deceased himself. Thereafter, the First Information Report (for short, the FIR) (Exhibit P/28 and P/29) was lodged on 24.08.2020 at about 11:00 hours against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. Subsequently, during the course of treatment, the deceased died at District Hospital, Dhamtari on 27.08.2020, and on an intimation given by Ward Boy namely Tiger Sahu of District Hospital, Dhamtari, an unnumbered merg was registered by the Police Assistance Centre, Dhamtari, bearing No. 0/177/20 (Exhibit P/37) on the basis of which a numbered merg being 32/2020 (Exhibit P/32) was registered by the Police of Police Station, Nagri, District Dhamtari. As the deceased succumbed to the burn injuries at District Hospital, Dhamtari during the course of treatment, an offence under Section 302 of the IPC was added and after completion of the investigation, the police filed its charge sheet bearing No. 59/2020 on 07.11.2020 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagri, District Dhamtari for the offences under Section 302 and 307 of the IPC and the case was registered as Criminal Case No. 108/2020. However, the said case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Dhamtari, vide order dated 18.11.2020. 4. Accordingly, Sessions Trial No. 32/2020 was registered and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhamtari, framed charges on 19.01.2021 against the appellant/convict under Section 302 of the IPC. The convict/appellant abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. However, the said case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Dhamtari, vide order dated 18.11.2020. 4. Accordingly, Sessions Trial No. 32/2020 was registered and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhamtari, framed charges on 19.01.2021 against the appellant/convict under Section 302 of the IPC. The convict/appellant abjured the guilt and prayed for trial. 5. Amongst others, the prosecution has exhibited the following documents in support of its case: Crime Details Form (Exhibit P/1) Property Seizure Memo (Exhibit P/2 and P/3) Arrest/Court Surrender Memo (Exhibit P/4) Notice under Section 160 of Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/5) Spot Map (Exhibit P/6) Summons under Section 175 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/7) Dead Body Supurdnama (Exhibit P/8) Notice Under Section 160 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/9) Property Seizure Memo (Exhibit P/10) Statement of Uttam Kumar Kashyap (Exhibit P/11) Statement of Deepak Gonadane (Exhibit P/12) Notice Under Section 160 of Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/13) Statement of Ramgopal Sahu (Exhibit P/14) Notice Under Section 160 of Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/15) Statement of Gulab Sahu (Exhibit P/16) Statement of Neera Bai Kashyap (Exhibit P/17) Dying Declaration (Exhibit P/18) Statement of Kekayi Som U/s.164 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/19) Statement of Neera Bai U/s. 164 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/20) Police Intimation (Exhibit P/21) Application for Medical Examination of deceased Gautam Kashyap (Exhibit P/22) Indoor Ticket (Exhibit P/23) Memo for examination of seized articles and report (Exhibit P/24) Patient Referee Ticket (Exhibit P/25) Notice under Section 160 of Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/26) Application for postmortem and postmortem report (Exhibit P/27) First Information Report (Exhibit P/28 and P/29) Memo for providing bed head ticket of deceased (Exhibit P/30) Information of Arrest (Exhibit P/31) Numbered Merg Intimation (Exhibit P/32) Memo to CMO regarding providing bed head ticket of deceased (Exhibit P/33) Memo for providing spot map.(Exhibit P/34) Dehati Nalishi (Exhibit P/35) Police Information (Exhibit P/36) Unnumbered merg intimation (Exhibit P/37) Duty Certificate (Exhibit P/38) Memo seeking information about the victim whether he is fit to give a statement or not (Exhibit P/39) Memo to Sub Divisional Magistrate to record the dying declaration of Gautam Kashyap (Exhibit P/40) Statement of the deceased - Gautam Kashyap (Exhibit P/41) Notice under Section 160 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P/42) Memo to FSL for chemical examination of seized articles (Exhibit P/43 and P/44) Receipts and Exhibits (Exhibit P/45 and P/46). Memo to SHO submitting FSL report. (Exhibit P/47) Covering letter (Exhibit P/48) FSL report (Exhibit P/49) Memo to SHO submitting FSL report (Exhibit P/50) Covering letter for FSL report. Memo to SHO submitting FSL report. (Exhibit P/47) Covering letter (Exhibit P/48) FSL report (Exhibit P/49) Memo to SHO submitting FSL report (Exhibit P/50) Covering letter for FSL report. FSL report (Exhibit P/52). 6. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses, namely, Heeraram Kashyap (PW-1), Ku. Satyabhama Kashyap (PW-2), Arun Kumar Patel (PW-3), Narottam Kashyap (PW-4), Uttam Kashyap (PW-5), Smt. Pramila Kashyap (PW-6), Deepak Kumar Gondane (PW-7), Ram Gopal Sahu (PW-8), Gulab Sahu (PW-9), Smt. Neera Bai (PW-10), Smt. Phulesh Som (PW-11), Kekayi Som (PW-12), Dr. Laxmi Priya (PW-13), Shiv Kumar (PW-14), Jawahar Lal Sahu (PW-15), Dr. Vinod Kumar Pandey (PW-16), Nokul Singh Thakur (PW-17), C.L.Sahu (PW-18), Vinay Kumar Pammar (PW-19) and Dr. Monika Vardiyani (PW-20). 7. The statement of the convict/appellant was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C on 01.10.2022 and additional statement was recorded on 21.11.2022. She expressed her ignorance about most of the questions, however, some of them were denied as well. She stated that she was innocent and was falsely implicated. In support of her case, the convict/appellant had got the statement Ku. Satyabhama, Arun Kumar Patel, Narottam Kashyap, Uttam Kashyap and Smt. Phulesh Som @ Phuleshwari exhibited as Exhibit P/1 to Exhibit D/5, respectively. 8. On the date of incident i.e. on 22.08.2020, when the deceased was alive, he was taken to Community Health Centre, Nagri, District Dhamtari and on the next day he was referred to District Hospital, Dhamtari. Dr. Laxmipriya Sahu (PW-13) had conducted the MLC (Exhibit P/22) wherein she has reported that on 22.08.2020 the patient was brought at 8 p.m. and immediately referred at 9:00 p.m. but the patient left the hospital on the next day on 23.08.2020 at about 9:45 a.m. and at the time of admission, the patient had 40% burns. 9. During the course of treatment, the deceased died at District Hospital, Dhamtari and postmortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Vinod Kumar Pandey (PW-16) and the postmortem report is Exhibit P/27. In his deposition, he stated that on examination, he found that the deceased was a middle aged man, the body was cold and was lacking all signs of life. There were burn injuries on the face, neck, chest, stomach and back which were ante-mortem in nature with pink blisters. Burns were deep upto dermis and subcutaneous. However, the head and forehead was not burn. There were burn injuries on the face, neck, chest, stomach and back which were ante-mortem in nature with pink blisters. Burns were deep upto dermis and subcutaneous. However, the head and forehead was not burn. Both the eyes were closed, pupils dilated and rigor mortis was present on both his legs. On internal examination, he found that the lungs were congested, trachea and throat were filled with black carbon particles. He had opined that the cause of death was homicidal in nature because of asphyxia due to dry burns and the duration of death was within 48 hours of conducting the postmortem. 10. Nokul Singh Thakur (PW17) is the investigating officer who had registered the FIR bearing Crime No. 59/2020 for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. During the course of investigation, he had prepared spot map (Exhibit P/1), seized one mobile phone (Exhibit P/2), clothes worn by the deceased which was containing smell of kerosene, one old nylone mosquito net, one 5 liter capacity jerry can containing kerosene approx. 100 m.l. , one match box (Exhibit P/3). On the same day, he had arrested the appellant (Exhibit P/4) and given intimation to her father-in-law Hiraram Kashyap (Exhibit P/31). He had also given notice to Hiraram Kashyap, Ku. Satyabhama Kashyap and Arun Patel under Section 160 Cr.P.C. He had recorded the statement of Ku. Satyabhama Kashyap on 28.08.2020 and the statement of Narottam Kashyap and Uttam Kashyap on 11.09.2020. On 07.09.2020, he had sent a memo (Exhibit P/30) to the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Nagri for providing Bed Head Ticket and another memo (Exhibit P/33) to the Medical Officer, District Hospital, Dhamtari. During the course of investigation, he was transferred to some other Police Station and accordingly, he had handed over the case diary to the concerned Station House Officer. Thereafter, the matter was investigated by Mr. Vinay Kumar Pammar (PW-19). 11. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur in which the FSL, Raipur had given its report on 29.04.2022 (Exhibit P/52) stating that in the jerry can, partially burnt shirt, full pant of the deceased, and mosquito net, kerosene was found and the half shirt and underwear of the deceased and the match box, no kerosene was found. So far as the FSL report (Exhibit P/49) with regard to body parts of the deceased is concerned, no poison was found in it. 12. So far as the FSL report (Exhibit P/49) with regard to body parts of the deceased is concerned, no poison was found in it. 12. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who has committed the murder of her husband, convicted and sentenced her under Section 302 of the IPC, against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred. 13. Mr. Anil Gulati, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court has failed to consider the oral and documentary evidence in its true perspective. There are major omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses. Further, the present is a case which does not fall under the category of Section 302 of the IPC even if the entire prosecution case is accepted and it may fall under the exception of Section 300 sub section (1) of the IPC i.e. grave and sudden provocation as the appellant was continuously being harassed and ill treated by the deceased alleging that the appellant had illicit relationship with some other person. It is also the case of the prosecution that the appellant herself poured water on the deceased which goes to show that the appellant did not had the intention to kill her husband. All that happened was on account of sudden provocation and it cannot be said to be an act of murder. Even the dying declaration of the deceased is highly doubtful as when the deceased was in such a bad state of burnt condition, he was not fully conscious to understand and give his dying declaration. 14. On the other hand, Pawan Kesharwani, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent would support the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submit that learned trial Court, in view of categorical statement made by the deceased on 23.08.2-020 (Exhibit P/41) and the dying declaration (Exhibit P/18) on duly proved by the Executive Magistrate, Dhamtari and the statement of other prosecution witnesses and the materials available on record, was absolutely justified in bringing home the guilt of the appellant for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution had proved the offence committed by the appellant beyond reasonable doubt by leading cogent and clinching evidence, therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 15. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 16. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we have to examine the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution. 17. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased was homicidal in nature ? 18. When the deceased sustained burn injuries, he was brought to the Community Health Centre, Nagri where he was treated by Dr. Laxmi Priya Sahu (PW-13) who had given the initial treatment to the deceased and referred him to District Hospital, Dhamtari. The deceased was reported to have sustained 40% burn injuries and had prepared the MLC report (Exhibit P/22). After being referred to District Hospital, Dhamtari, the deceased was treated by Dr. Vibhor Nanda as is evident from the statement of Dr. Monika Vardiyani (PW-20). After the deceased succumbed to the injuries, Dr. Vinod Kumar Pandey (PW-16) had conducted the postmortem (Exhibit P/27) where in he has opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to dry burn injuries. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We hereby affirm the said finding. 19. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that the appellant is author of the crime? 20. The learned trial Court has taken note of the fact that there is no explanation offered by the appellant as to where she was at the time of incident, and on the contrary all the relatives of the deceased have stated that the appellant was at her home at the time of incident. Even when the deceased was taken to the hospital at Nagri and thereafter to District Hospital, Dhamtari, the appellant did not accompany her husband i.e. the deceased and such conduct of the appellant raises grave suspicion against her. 21. The motive for causing death of the deceased has been successfully proved by the prosecution. Even when the deceased was taken to the hospital at Nagri and thereafter to District Hospital, Dhamtari, the appellant did not accompany her husband i.e. the deceased and such conduct of the appellant raises grave suspicion against her. 21. The motive for causing death of the deceased has been successfully proved by the prosecution. The deceased suspected that the appellant and Gulab Sahu (PW-9) were having some illicit relationship and thus, the appellant and the deceased had bitter relationship. The deceased used to restrain the appellant from talking to Gulab Sahu over mobile phone. This fact has been stated by the deceased himself in his statement as well as in his dying declaration and many other witnesses have also made similar statements. Hiram Ram Kashyap (PW-1), who is the father of the deceased, Ku. Satyabhama Kashyap (PW-2), who is the niece of the deceased, Arun Kumar Patel (PW-3), Narottam Kashyap (PW-4), Uttam Sahu (PW-5), have made similar statements. Even Gulab Sahu (PW-9) has admitted that he used to talk with the appellant on mobile phone. 22. In the case in hand, there is a clear and umabiguous statement made to the police as well as dying declaration by the deceased before the Executive Magistrate which is sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of the offence. 23. In the matter of Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court held that while recording dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of maker, alertness of his/her mind and memory, evidentiary value, etc. have to be taken into account, laid down principles. Paras 14 to 22 are relevant for the purpose, which read as under :- “(A) Dying declaration 14. It is true that in the case on hand, conviction under Section 302 was based solely on the dying declaration made by Sonu @ Savita and recorded by Investigating Officer in the presence of a Doctor. Since we have already narrated the case of prosecution which led to three deaths, eliminating the second wife and the children of one Jaswant Singh, there is no need to traverse the same once again. This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 15. This Court in a series of decisions enumerated and analyzed that while recording the dying declaration, factors such as mental condition of the maker, alertness of mind and memory, evidentiary value etc. have to be taken into account. 15. In Munnu Raja and Another vs. The State of M.P, (1976) 3 SCC 104 , this Court held: (SCC pp. 106-07 para 6)" “6....It is well settled that though a dying declaration must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of the statement cannot be subject to cross- examination, there is neither a rule of law nor a rule of prudence which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated.…" It is true that in the same decision, it was held, since the Investigating Officers are naturally interested in the success of the investigation and the practice of the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying declaration during the course of an investigation ought not to have been encouraged. 16. In Paras Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126 , this Court held that lapse on the part of the Investigation Officer in not bringing the Magistrate to record the statement of the deceased should not be taken in favour of the accused. This Court further held that a statement of the deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can also be treated as dying declaration after the death of the injured and relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased was conscious and was in a fit state of health to make the statement. 17. The effect of dying declaration not recorded by the Magistrate was considered and reiterated in Balbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 . Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. Vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 12 SCC 283 . Para 23 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under: "23. However, in State of Karnataka v. Shariff, (2003) 2 SCC 473 , this Court categorically held that there was no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made before a Magistrate. This Court therein noted its earlier decision in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC 517 , wherein it was also held that the dying declaration need not be in the form of questions and answers. (See also Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 )." It is clear that merely because the dying declaration was not recorded by the Magistrate, by itself cannot be a ground to reject the whole prosecution case. It also clarified that where the declaration is wholly inconsistent or contradictory statements are made or if it appears from the records that the dying declaration is not reliable, a question may arise as to why the Magistrate was not called for, but ordinarily the same may not be insisted upon. This Court further held that the statement of the injured, in event of her death may also be treated as FIR. 18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng, (2007) 14 SCC 550 , the view in Balbir Singh case has been reiterated. The following conclusions are relevant which read as under: (Wakteng case, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15) "14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration, without any corroboration the same should not be suffering from any infirmity. 15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination. It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the assailant and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 19. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction." 19. In Bijoy Das vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 4 SCC 511 , this Court after quoting various earlier decisions, reiterated the same position. 20. In Muthu Kutty & Anr. Vs. State By Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 , the following discussion and the ultimate conclusion are relevant which read as under: (SCC p. 120, paras 14-15) "14. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 21. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence." 21. The same view has been reiterated by a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Panneerselvam vs. State of T.N., (2008) 17 SCC 190 and also the principles governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 . 22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that, (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eye-witness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 24. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.” 24. Dying declaration is the last statement that is made by a person as to the cause of his/her imminent death or the circumstances that had resulted in that situation, at a stage when the declarant is conscious of the fact that there are virtually nil chances of his/her survival. On an assumption that at such a critical stage, a person would be expected to speak the truth, Courts have attached great value to the veracity of such a statement. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of death, or as to any of the circumstances which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such a statement, oral or in writing made by the deceased victim to the witness, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. It is noteworthy that the said provision is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act that ‘hearsay evidence is inadmissible’ and only when such an evidence is direct and is validated through cross-examination, it is considered to be trustworthy. 25. Admittedly, there is no eye witness to the incident. However, the statement of the deceased (Exhibit P/41) was recorded by the police on 23.08.2020 wherein he has clearly stated that the appellant, being infuriated because of his objection being raised for talking to Gulab Sahu (PW-9), poured kerosene on him and set him ablaze. He further states that the appellant herself had poured water on him when he started screaming with pain. Further, during the course of treatment, the dying declaration (Exhibit P/18) was also recorded on the same day at about 6:40 p.m. in which he has made similar statement. The said dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Dhamtari. 26. He further states that the appellant herself had poured water on him when he started screaming with pain. Further, during the course of treatment, the dying declaration (Exhibit P/18) was also recorded on the same day at about 6:40 p.m. in which he has made similar statement. The said dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Dhamtari. 26. The Station House Officer, City Kotwali, Dhamtari had sent a memo (Exhibit P/39) on 23.08.2020 to the Medical Officer, District Hospital, Dhamtari to inform as to whether the deceased was in a condition when he could give his statement. Upon such memo, Dr. Monika Varidyani had made an endorsement that the patient was fit and conscious to give statement. The said fact goes to show that when the dying declaration (Exhibit P/18) was recorded, the deceased was in fit mental state, though he was physically in a bad state and was not able to even sign and hence, his thumb impression was taken. 27. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 28. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive loses its importance. Even otherwise, it only aids in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive loses its importance. Even otherwise, it only aids in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. In the present case, as per case of the prosecution, burning of the deceased by pouring kerosene by the accused/appellant shows that she intended to cause such injury as was sufficient to cause death to the deceased in the ordinary course of nature. 29. Therefore, from the statements of aforesaid prosecution witnesses coupled with the dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P/18) and also medical evidence showing that the death of deceased was not a natural death, but was caused by burning and its complications, otherwise than under normal circumstances, it would be proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant, who had intentionally caused the death of her husband/deceased by pouring kerosene on him, which was homicidal in nature and thereby committed the offence. 30. The prosecution has also been able to prove the circumstances of the case in the light of five golden principles to constitute the 'panchsheel' of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is not entitled to be acquitted of the charges. 31. A careful perusal of the aforesaid findings recorded by the trial Court would show that the prosecution has established that the death of deceased Gautam Kashyap was homicidal in nature; on the date of offence, the appellant and the deceased were staying in the same room; and it is the appellant who has murdered her husband by pouring petrol on him and burnt her. 32. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to endorse the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court convicting the appellant on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses and dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P/18). Therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 33. Therefore, conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC as well as the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 33. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 34. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. She shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 35. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the learned trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.