JUDGMENT : Heard on admission and formulation of substantial question of law. 1. This second appeal is preferred under Section 100 of the C.P.C. by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 09.01.2013 passed by the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 84-A/2011, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-II, Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 268-A/2002 dated 28.04.2008 has been affirmed. 2. The facts of the present case are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction with respect to lands comprising survey No. 242 admeasuring 4.55 hectares; survey No. 244 admeasuring 0.78 hectares and survey No. 256 admeasuring 0.90 hectare which was originally recorded in the name of Ramcharan. Ramcharan and Bakhariya were real brothers. Ramcharan died issueless. Brijlal and Siyalal were real brothers. The plaintiffs are sons of Brijlal, whereas the defendants are sons of Siyalal. The suit property was given to the father of the plaintiffs namely, Brijlal as he was adopted by Ramcharan and the adoption deed was executed on 18.01.1962. The defendants started interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs; therefore, the suit seeking aforestated relief(s) was filed. 3. The defendants filed their written statement and denied the plaint averments. They categorically stated that Ramcharan died issueless, therefore, Brijlal and Siyalal had stayed with Ramcharan since their childhood and the suit property was jointly possessed by Ramcharan and Siyalal during the lifetime of Ramcharan. After the death of Ramcharan, Brijlal and Siyalal mutually partitioned the property and they were in possession of their respective shares. It is further stated that the father of the plaintiffs namely, Brijlal was working as Patwari and taking advantage of the old age of Ramcharan, the adoption deed was executed and on the basis of the forged adoption deed, the plaintiffs recorded their names in the revenue records, which was challenged by the defendants before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Saraipali and the order of mutation passed by the Tehsildar was set aside. 4. 4. The learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 28.04.2008 dismissed the suit and recorded a specific finding that adoption deed Ex.-P/3 does not contain the signature of the mother of Brijlal and there was no consent of the mother, therefore, the adoption was not in consonance with Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The learned trial Court further recorded a finding that at the time of adoption, the age of Brijlal was more than 15 years and he was a married person, therefore, in light of Section 10(iii) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the adoption was not valid. The learned trial Court also held that the plaintiffs could not prove custom to establish that a married person can be adopted. The first appeal was filed by the plaintiffs and the learned first appellate Court specifically held that the year of birth of Brijlal according to transfer certificate Ex.-D/1 is 1930, whereas the adoption deed was executed in the year 1962 and at the time of adoption, Brijlal was 42 years of age, therefore, adoption deed is not valid. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the learned Courts below committed an error of law in treating Ex.-P/3 as an adoption deed, whereas recitals of Ex.-P/.3 would show that it is an acknowledgement made by the father in relation to adoption. Brijlal (adopted son) has been living along with Ramcharan since his childhood, particularly soon after Brijlal's younger brother was born. They would further submit that according to Section 32(5) of the Indian Evidence Act, Ex.-P/3 is relevant. They would further argue that Brijlal was born on 09.01.1930, whereas his younger brother Siyalal was born on 01.07.1933 vide Ex.-D/1 and Ex.-D/2. In Ex.-D/1 the name of the father of Brijlal is mentioned as Ramcharan and he studied in the school from 01.04.1937 to 31.03.1941 thus, it is established that Brijlal was living with Ramcharan when he was aged about 6-7 years. They would also argue that the Courts below failed to consider the scope of Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act. They would further contend that Ex.-P/3 is a statement of fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found, is relevant when it relates to the existence of a relationship by (blood, marriage or adoption). They would also argue that the Courts below failed to consider the scope of Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act. They would further contend that Ex.-P/3 is a statement of fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found, is relevant when it relates to the existence of a relationship by (blood, marriage or adoption). They would also contend that earlier a suit was filed for permanent injunction, but subsequently, by way of amendment, relief was sought to declare the order passed by revenue authorities null and void. They would also submit that the biological father of Brijlal was Bakhariya. Ramcharan migrated from Bastar to Basna along with his adopted child namely, Brijlal and as acknowledgment, the adoption deed was executed on 18.01.1962. They would further submit that Brijlal inherited the suit property and revenue records were mutated by order dated 31.01.1963 vide Ex.-D/14. They would also submit that Ramcharan was issueless, therefore, according to the Hindu religion, Brijlal performed his funeral rites. They would further argue that Brijlal was adopted according to requirements of adoption under Ancient Hindu Law and the necessary requirements are as under:- A) Every male Hindu could adopt provided that he was competent to do so, i.e. he had to be of sound mind and should have attained the age of discretion. Such a person could be a minor but over the age of 15 years; B) Such a Hindu male could not have had a son, grandson, or great-grandson, natural or adopted living at the time of adoption; C) Father and mother were the only persons who could lawfully give a child in adoption, with the primary right being the father's; D) There was no restriction of age for adoption and a boy over the age of 18 could also be adopted; E) The person being adopted had to be a male; F) The adopted child should have been of the same caste as his adoptive father; G) A valid adoption implies free consent to the adoption by the person giving on adoption, the person receiving, and if the person being adopted is a major then of such person too. In other words, the adoption could not have been on the basis of misrepresentation, coercion, fraud, undue influence or mistake; and H) The most important ceremony was the physical act of giving and receiving, with the intent to transfer the boy from one family to another. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the appellants have placed reliance on the judgments passed by the High Court of Orissa in the matters of Grama Devati, Satabhauni Thakurani & Others vs. Ranga Bewa & Others, SA No. 291 of 1994 dated 18th December, 2017; Agani Bewa vs. Bhaskar Mallik, Vol.III (1961) OJD 196 and Balinki Padhano and another vs Gopakrishna Padhano and others, AIR 1964 Orissa 117. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 3/defendants No. 1 to 3 would oppose the submissions put forth by learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs. He would argue that the adoption deed was executed on 18.01.1962, therefore, the provisions of Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 would apply in its full force and the plaintiffs had to prove the adoption strictly in accordance with the law. He would further argue that the plaintiffs in their plaint have not pleaded that Brijlal was adopted by Ramcharan when he was 6-7 years old. He would further submit that learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs has set up the requirements to prove the adoption in old Hindu Law, but the requirements for adoption have neither been pleaded in the plaint nor proved. It is also argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove adoption made before the commencement of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. He would also argue that there is a concurrent finding of facts recorded by the learned Courts below, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 8. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have pleaded that the suit lands are situated at Village Samanlore, Patwari Circle No. 8, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund which were recorded in the name of Brijlal by virtue of the adoption deed dated 18.01.1962. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 8. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have pleaded that the suit lands are situated at Village Samanlore, Patwari Circle No. 8, Tehsil Basna, District Mahasamund which were recorded in the name of Brijlal by virtue of the adoption deed dated 18.01.1962. It is further pleaded that from 1962 to 1999 no objection was raised by the defendants and the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 31.08.2004 in favour of the defendants is null and void and thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Officer affirmed the order passed by the Tehsildar on 19.11.2004. The plaintiffs have nowhere stated when Brijlal was adopted by Ramcharan. The plaintiffs have not stated in their plaint that Ramcharan was a person of sound mind and age of Brijlal was more than 15 years. It is also not pleaded that the consent of the mother of Brijlal was obtained. The plaintiffs have not pleaded in plaint that any ceremony concerning giving and receiving the child was performed. 9. Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with persons who may be adopted and Section 11 of the Act deals with other conditions for a valid adoption. Both provisions are relevant, and are reproduced herein below:- “10. Persons who may be adopted.– No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:– (i) he or she is a Hindu; (ii) he or she has not already been adopted; (iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption: (iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption. 11. 11. Other conditions for a valid adoption.–In every adoption, the following conditions must be complied with:– (i) if the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son, son's son or son's, son's son (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption; (ii) if the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu daughter or son's daughter (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption; (iii) if the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted is a female, the adoptive father is at least twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted; (iv) the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted is a male, the adoptive mother is at least twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted; (v) the same child may not be adopted simultaneously by two or more persons; (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth [or in the case of an abandoned child or child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up] to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of datta homam shall not be essential to the validity of adoption.” 10. As the adoption deed was executed on 18.01.1962, therefore, the plaintiffs ought to have proved the adoption strictly in accordance with Sections 10 and 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Undisputedly, Brijlal, who was adopted by Ramcharan, was a married person and aged about 42 years at the time of adoption and the same is in contravention of Section 10(iii) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 11. The plaintiffs could not prove the custom or usage applicable to the parties, which permits persons who are married to be taken in adoption. No consent from the wife of Bakhariya (mother of Brijlal) was obtained and it is also not stated whether she was alive at the time of adoption or not. 12. 11. The plaintiffs could not prove the custom or usage applicable to the parties, which permits persons who are married to be taken in adoption. No consent from the wife of Bakhariya (mother of Brijlal) was obtained and it is also not stated whether she was alive at the time of adoption or not. 12. In the matter of Grama Devati (supra), the High Court of Orissa in paras- 9, 10 and 11 held as under:- “9. The apex court in the case of Kishori Lal v. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 , held that as an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. 10. It is not a case of ancient adoption. D.W.1 was a witness to the giving and taking ceremony, Defendant no.7 is the sister's of Muli. The deed acknowledging adoption vide Ext.A, reveals that when defendant no.7 was two years old, he was adopted. The day and date of adoption has not been mentioned, Ext.A was registered on 14.5.1954. Muli was 29 years when alleged adoption took place. As held by this Court in the case of Bauri Dei (supra), creation of documents is no substitute for the fact of giving and taking which must be proved independently de hors and document. Omission of the day or date of adoption is very vital and the deed of acknowledgment of adoption loses all its significances. 11. In Agani Bewa (supra), this Court held that where a deed is executed by a person stating that a valid adoption had already taken place, such an admission should be given its full weight, in the absence of evidence showing that the admission was untrue or was made by mistake or fraud or other vitiation circumstances and the fact of adoption as well as is validity must be taken to be established.” In the matter of Kishori Lal v. Mt. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 which has been relied upon by the High Court of Orissa, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that as an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. In para-10 it is held by the High Court that the creation of an adoption document is no substitute for the fact of giving and taking which must be proved independently dehors any document. In para-11 relying on the judgment passed in Agani Bewa (supra) it was observed that, where a deed was executed by a person stating that a valid adoption had already taken place, such admission should be given its full weight. Where there is an admission by a person who executed the adoption deed, such an admission should be given its full weight, but in the instant case though Ramcharan executed the adoption deed, he was not alive and in the entire deed, he has not stated date of adoption as to when Brijlal was adopted by him. Attesting witnesses of Ex.-P/3 are Nilamber, Dashrath and Durjan, but none of them has been examined. In the matter of Ballinki Padhano (supra), the adoption was of year 1905, the Hight Court of Orissa with respect to ancient adoptions held that the actual evidence of giving and taking may not be available and if there is sufficient evidence to show that for a long time the boy was treated as the adopted son at a time when there was no controversy, the burden will shift on the other side to show that the adoption did not take place. 13. In the present case, there is no eyewitness to prove actual giving and taking, neither there is pleading with regard to giving and taking or adoption nor has the same been proved by the plaintiffs by adducing sufficient evidence. 13. In the present case, there is no eyewitness to prove actual giving and taking, neither there is pleading with regard to giving and taking or adoption nor has the same been proved by the plaintiffs by adducing sufficient evidence. Even in the adoption deed, it is not mentioned when the adoption took place, who was present at the time of adoption, whether the consent of the father and mother of the child was obtained and what was the age of the child, therefore, judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs are of no help. 14. Now dealing with the judgments relied on by learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 3/defendants No. 1 to 3. 15. In the matter of Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By Lrs vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 555 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also held that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The relevant para- 6 is reproduced herein below:- “6. The question which falls for consideration is whether the respondents in their written statement have raised the necessary pleading that the license was irrevocable as contemplated by Section 60 (b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on record to support that plea. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should settle the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead the court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735 a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed : If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in very case. What the court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial and did they lead evidence about it ? What the court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is : did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial and did they lead evidence about it ? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the court cannot do injustice to another.” 16. In the matter of Daniraiji Vrajlalji, Junagadh vs. Vahuji Maharaj Shri Chandraprabha Widow of Deceased Maharaj Shri Purshottamlalji Raghunathlalji, Junagadh, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 612 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with an issue to prove the adoption made prior to commencement of the Act of 1956. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the validity of the adoption made before the commencement of the Act as also its effect will have to be examined and determined with reference to the law or the custom as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act and not in accordance with it. Para-14 is reproduced herein below:- “14. Section 30 is a saving clause in the Act and says: Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any adoption made before the commencement of this Act, and the validity and effect of any such adoption shall be determined as if this Act had not been passed. The second part of the section merely clarifies what is embodied in the first part. The provisions of the Act are not to affect any adoption made before its commencement. That is to say the validity of the adoption made before the commencement of the Act as also its effect will have to be examined and determined with reference to the law or the custom as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act and not in accordance with it. The expression “affect any adoption” necessarily means affect an adoption as to its “validity and effect”. The expression “affect any adoption” necessarily means affect an adoption as to its “validity and effect”. Neither of the expressions takes within its sweep any of the other incidents or characteristics of the law or the custom of adoption under which it was made. It is to be noticed that almost the entire field in relation to any adoption was covered in its validity and effect. Yet something remained outside it. The custom of revocability of adoption at the instance of either party in the Goda Datta form was one such matter. Under the Hindu Law even as it stood before coming into force of the Act. A valid adoption once made cannot be cancelled by the adoptive father or the other parties thereto, nor can the adopted son renounce his status as such and return to his family of birth. [vide Section 493 at page 550 of Mulla's Hindu Law (Fourteenth Edition)] Departure from this general law was permissible in very rare type of customs – Goda Datta being one such. The incident or characteristic of this custom which entitled either party to revoke the adoption was not a matter concerning the validity and the effect of adoption.” 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhimashya and Others vs. Janabi (Smt) Alias Janawwa, reported in (2006) 13 SCC 627 has described the requirements to prove adoption deed according to Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Paras-19 to 21 are relevant, are as under:- “19. This object is further amplified by certain observations of this Court. It has been held that an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wife and daughters of their rights, and transferring the properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations. (See Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai.) Through undeniably in most of the cases motive is religious the secular motive is also dominantly present. We are not concerned much with this controversy and as observed by Mayne it is unsafe to embark upon an enquiry in each case as to whether the motives for a particular adoption were religious or secular and an intermediate view is possible that while an adoption may be a proper act, inspired in may cases by religious motives, courts are concerned with an adoption, only as the exercise of a legal right by certain persons. 20. 20. The Privy Council's decision in Amarendra Mansigh case, AIR 1933 PC 155 has reiterated the well-established doctrine as to the religious efficacy of sonship, as the foundation of adoption. The emphasis has been on the absence of a male issue. An adoption may either be made by a man himself or by his widow on his behalf. The adoption is to the male and it is obvious that an unmarried woman cannot adopt. For the purpose of adoption is to ensure spiritual benefit for a man after his death by offering of oblations and rice and libations of water to the manes periodically. Woman having no spiritual need to be satisfied, was not allowed to adopt for herself. But in either case it is a condition precedent for a valid adoption that he should be without any male issue living at the time of adoption. 21. Under the old law, “male issue” was indicated and it was held that it was to be taken in the wide sense peculiar to the term in Hindu law to mean three direct descendants in the male line. (See Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage referred to above at p. 334.) Even if for the sake of argument in the instant case, it is accepted that a custom was prevalent authorising adoption in the presence of a male issue, yet it being contrary to the very concept of adoption cannot be said to have any force. Adoption is made to ensure spiritual benefit for a man after his death. Public policy is not defined in the Act. However, it connotes some matter which concerns the public good or the public interest. No straitjacket formula can be laid down to hold what is for the public good or for the public interest, or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest. What is public good must be in consonance with public conscience.” 18. Likewise, in the matter of M. Vanaja vs. M. Sarla Devi (Dead), reported in (2020) 5 SCC 307 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para-15 held as under:- “15. A plain reading of the above provisions would make it clear that compliance of the conditions in Chapter I of the 1956 Act is mandatory for an adoption to be treated as valid. A plain reading of the above provisions would make it clear that compliance of the conditions in Chapter I of the 1956 Act is mandatory for an adoption to be treated as valid. The two important conditions as mentioned in Sections 7 and 11 of the 1956 Act are the consent of the wife before a male Hindu adopts a child and proof of the ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. The appellant admitted in her evidence that she does not have the proof of the ceremony of giving and taking of her in adoption. Admittedly, there is no pleading in the plaint regarding the adoption being in accordance with the provisions of the Act. That apart, the respondent who is the adoptive mother has categorically stated in her evidence that the appellant was never adopted though she was merely brought up by her and her husband. Even the grandmother of the appellant who appeared before the Court as PW 3 deposed that the appellant who lost her parents in her childhood was given to the respondent and her husband to be brought up. PW 3 also stated in her evidence that the appellant was not adopted by the respondent and her husband. Therefore, the appellant had failed to prove that she had been adopted by the respondent and her husband Narasimhulu Naidu.” 19. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Moturu Nalini Kanth vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad (Dead, Through Lrs.), reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1488 from paras - 51 to 55 held as under:- “51. The actual 'giving and taking' of the child in adoption, being an essential requisite under Section 11 (vi) of the Act of 1956, we find that there is no convincing evidence of that 'act' also in the case on hand. Interestingly, there are no pictures of the actual 'giving and taking' of the child in adoption. In Exs. A2 and A3, the purohit (PW 7) is seen standing or sitting behind the others and the same cannot be taken to be during the ceremony of 'giving and taking', as he would have stood/sat in front of them, chanting mantras and incantations as per shastras. Ex. A4 is a group photograph. Further, there are no photographs of the datta homam, though PW 7 claimed that he had performed the same. Ex. A4 is a group photograph. Further, there are no photographs of the datta homam, though PW 7 claimed that he had performed the same. Even though it is no longer considered an essential ceremony, it is of significance when performed, and would have been captured for posterity by taking pictures. Strangely, though a professional photographer (PW 4) was stated to have been engaged for the purpose of taking pictures at the adoption ceremony, he took only three photographs and no more. This parsimony is not explained. Further, PW 1 producing and marking Ex. A8 receipt, supposedly issued by PW 4 to the temple, with no explanation as to how it came into her possession, also does not inspire confidence. 52. More importantly, the evidence of the purohit (PW 7), who is stated to have conducted the ceremonies, leads to a doubt as to the very adoption having taken place. The adoption ceremony is stated to have been performed at Sri Sri Raghunadha Swamy Temple at Bhapur in Berhampur but as per PW 7, Raghunadha Swamy Temple is not even in Bhapur but in Chandramanipeta and only Ramalingeswara Swamy and Mukteswara Swamy Temples are at Bhapur. Though, this discrepancy is sought to be explained at this stage, the fact remains that there was no re-examination of PW 7 at that time to clarify this telling aspect. 53. That apart, Ex. A9 Adoption Deed is scribed in English but it does not even contain a recital that the contents thereof were read over and explained in Telugu to the executant. No evidence has been let in for the Court to deduce that Venkubayamma was conversant with English language. Further, and more significantly, in the second page of Ex.A9 Adoption Deed, Venkubayamma's signature reads thus: “Moturu bayammma' and, thereafter, the word 'Venku” was interjected above. Underneath that signature, the signature 'Moturu Venkubayamma' is again affixed. It has come on record that Venkubayamma was in the habit of signing in English as well as in Telugu. If so, it is strange that she would not have signed her own name correctly on the second page and would have left out 'Venku' altogether. Further, the misspelling of 'bayamma' as 'Bayammma' is also strange and significant. 54. Ex. It has come on record that Venkubayamma was in the habit of signing in English as well as in Telugu. If so, it is strange that she would not have signed her own name correctly on the second page and would have left out 'Venku' altogether. Further, the misspelling of 'bayamma' as 'Bayammma' is also strange and significant. 54. Ex. A9 Adoption Deed records the age of Venkubayamma as 70 years and states that she was desirous of taking a male child in adoption as she had no male issues. The document also records that the adoptive child would perform the annual shraddha ceremonies and offering of Pinda and water, as her natural son, to her ancestors. Nalini Kanth was aged less than a year when this adoption deed was executed whereas the adoptive mother, going by the document itself, was aged 70 years. Being of that age, it is strange that Venkubayamma would have expected this toddler to perform her obsequies after her death and such other ceremonies for her and her ancestors. Further, it is difficult to believe that a woman of such advanced years would willingly take on the responsibility of caring for an infant at that age. 55. Last but not the least, Ex. A9 Adoption Deed mentions that the adoption took place at Sri Sri Raghunadha Swamy Temple but Ex.A10 Will records that Venkubayamma adopted the child with the consent of his parents in the presence of relations at the house of his parents at Chandramanipeta, Berhampur. Therefore, as per this document, the adoption took place, not at a temple, but at the house of the natural parents, i.e., PW 2's house. There is, thus, a contradiction between Ex. A9 Adoption Deed and Ex. A10 Will as to the place where the adoption took place. An attempt was made to discredit the scribe (PW 6) in this regard, but this disparity in the two documents which were drawn up within a short span of time speaks for itself.” 20. In the present case, the plaintiffs have not pleaded as to when Brijlal was adopted by Ramcharan. It is also not pleaded who was present at the time of adoption and whether consent was obtained or not from the mother of Brijlal. The plaintiffs further failed to plead the age of Brijlal at the time of adoption. In the present case, the plaintiffs have not pleaded as to when Brijlal was adopted by Ramcharan. It is also not pleaded who was present at the time of adoption and whether consent was obtained or not from the mother of Brijlal. The plaintiffs further failed to plead the age of Brijlal at the time of adoption. Document Ex.-P/3 was executed on 18.01.1962, therefore, obviously, the attesting witnesses were not available, but the plaintiffs ought to have proved the valid execution of the adoption deed strictly in accordance with the law by adducing clinching evidence. 21. PW-1 Goucharan has stated that on affidavit that 40 years ago Brijlal was adopted by Ramcharan and a deed was reduced into writing and after the death of Ramcharan, the suit properties were recorded in the name of Brijlal. In cross-examination, he stated that he could not get an opportunity to see Bakhariya, even though he did not know the name of the mother of Brijlal and Siyalal. In para-4, he admitted the fact that the effect of execution of the adoption deed was narrated to him by one Gajanand. He has nowhere stated that he did not recognize the signatures of witnesses and Ramcharan on the adoption deed. 22. PW-2 Khageshwar has also stated in the same fashion. 23. PW-3 Aasharam in cross-examination has stated that he does not know who the father of Brijlal is and how many brothers Brijlal has and he is not a resident of Village Temri where the suit property is situated. 24. PW-4 Raisingh in para-4 has stated that at the time of execution of the adoption deed, he was not in the company of Ramcharan at Saraipali and he is not aware of who was present at that time. He further deposed that the father and mother of Brijlal were alive at that time. 25. From the perusal of the pleadings made in the plaint by the plaintiffs, the evidence adduced by them and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Orissa, in the opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs could not prove due execution of adoption deed in accordance with the provisions of Old Hindu Law or the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and thus, the Courts below have not committed any error of law in dismissing the suit. 26. 26. Consequently, the second appeal sans substantial question of law and is dismissed. A decree be drawn accordingly. No cost(s).