Khatim Reza, J. – This Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 06.10.2010 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, F.T.C. II, Nawada in Title Appeal No. 05 of 1999/02 of 2010 whereby the learned appellate court has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Munsif, Nawada, in Title Suit No. 306 of 1999 whereby, the learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. 2. In this appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been formulated for determination: – I. Whether in view of the averment of plaintiff in the plaint regarding settlement of 5 ½ dhurs (approximately one decimal) of land of plot no. 2690 from the ex-landlord after the cadastral survey and non-denial of this fact by the defendants in their written statement, the impugned judgments can be sustained without legal adjudication of this claim of the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence adduced in that regard? II. Whether when admittedly C.S. Plot no. 2690 has been recorded as Katchhari in Cadastral Survey Khatiyan as well as revisional survey Khatiyan, the ex-landlord/tenure holder could have the right to settle the suit land with the plaintiff? III. Whether the evidence on record as led by the plaintiff to corroborate the case of settlement of the suit land i.e. 5 ½ dhurs of plot no. 2690 are sufficient to uphold the said claim and whether in view of insufficiency of the evidence in this regard the impugned judgments can be held to be valid? 3. In order to gauge the matter in its correct perspective, it is necessary to briefly restate what the suit entails. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and further declaration that survey in the name of defendants-respondents with regard to the suit land was wrong and also for permanent injunction restraining defendant nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession as also from demolition of structure standing over the suit lands or from changing physical features of the suit land as well as sought relief for declaration that the revisional survey entry with respect to the suit land is wrong and is not binding on the plaintiff. 4. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession as also from demolition of structure standing over the suit lands or from changing physical features of the suit land as well as sought relief for declaration that the revisional survey entry with respect to the suit land is wrong and is not binding on the plaintiff. 4. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that, land of C.S. Plot No. 2691 area 4 decimal, Khata No. 341 was owned and possessed by Tunia Devi wife of Dhalo Kahar which was orally settled from ex-landlord on which there was a residential house. Her name was recorded in the Cadastral Survey in remarks column showing her possession. Most. Tunia Devi took settlement of 5 ½ dhurs of land of plot no. 2690 from the ex-landlord coupled with delivery of possession immediately after Cadastral Survey and remained in possession. Most. Tunia Devi sold 16 ½ decimal of lands to Jaldhari Kahar and put him in possession. Further, case of the plaintiff is that thereafter the said Jaldhari Kahar orally purchased 5 ½ dhurs land of C.S. Plot No. 2690 from Most. Tunia Devi in the year 1932 accompanied with delivery of possession. Jaldhari Kahar got constructed a house consisting of shops over amalgamated lands of plot no. 2691 and 2690 immediately after oral purchase of the aforesaid land. It is further case of the plaintiff that Jaldhari Kahar and his vendor prior to him had already perfected their title by law of adverse possession by remaining in peaceful possession over the house and lands openly continuously uninterruptedly to the knowledge of ex-landlord. The said Jaldhari Kahar sold the said lands consisting house, shops and other structure standing over plot no. 2691 and 2690 to Chando Devi, mother of plaintiff and defendant no. 3 by virtue of registered sale deed dated 18.09.1946 for a valuable consideration of Rs. 6000/- and delivered the possession to the said Chando Devi. Chando Devi used to live in the said house along with her husband and sons. It is submitted that Mathura Pd., husband of Chando Devi had a clinic in the said outer shop and structures facing towards east. The said Mathura Pd. was a Homeopath practitioner and he practised this profession till his death. On the death of Chando Devi, her two sons plaintiff and defendant no. It is submitted that Mathura Pd., husband of Chando Devi had a clinic in the said outer shop and structures facing towards east. The said Mathura Pd. was a Homeopath practitioner and he practised this profession till his death. On the death of Chando Devi, her two sons plaintiff and defendant no. 3 succeeded as legal heirs and came in possession thereof. Rent was being and is being paid and rent receipt is being granted before vesting and after vesting of the estate. It is also submitted that after purchase Mathura Pd. made certain addition and modification in the house and converted old latrine into septic latrine. 5. In the revisional survey, the lands of plot no. 2691 has been carved out as R.S. Plot No. 3860, but wrongly recorded in the name of Ramsaran Kahar under Khata No. 1266 showing an area of 02 decimals. The lands of plot no. 2690 area 5 ½ dhurs which corresponds to approximately one decimal has been carved out as R.S. Plot No. 3862/10747 but wrongly recorded under Khata No. 1706 in the name of State of Bihar. The entire land measuring 16 ½ dhurs of plot no. 2691 and 5 ½ dhurs of C.S. Plot No. 2690 over which there stand structures ought to have been recorded in the name of Chando Devi by carving out a separate revisional plot of amalgamated lands 22 dhurs corresponding to 4 decimals. The said Ramsaran Kahar never claimed the said land of R.S. Plot No. 3860 and as such he gave Bazidawa by executing a registered deed of Bazidawa dated 06.11.1987. Therefore the suit is confined to the portion of lands of R.S. plot no. 10747 measuring 5 ½ dhurs only the description of which is given in Schedule-A-I of the plaint. 6. The plaintiff further contended that they were in peaceful possession over the suit land for last 60 years. Recently the Karamchari and Anchal Adhikari has issued notice to the plaintiff for removing, demolishing the old wall of the structure standing over C.S. plot No. 2690/ R.S. Plot no. 10747. Hence, the plaintiff has been advised to file the suit for immediate and urgent relief without serving notice under Section 80 C.P.C. Leave was granted by the learned Munsif, Nawada on 16.10.1996. 7. 10747. Hence, the plaintiff has been advised to file the suit for immediate and urgent relief without serving notice under Section 80 C.P.C. Leave was granted by the learned Munsif, Nawada on 16.10.1996. 7. On summons, defendants appeared and filed their written statement denying the claim of the plaintiff with regard to title and possession of the plaintiff. They asserted that the suit property is the property of the State of Bihar and it has been rightly recorded in Khata of State of Bihar. Though plaintiff is in possession of the suit property but the possession is unauthorized and illegal and an encroachment proceeding started against the plaintiff. 8. Mr. Shashi Shekhar Dvivedi, learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that in the instant case the real dispute is with regard to C.S. Plot No. 2690, C.S. Khata No. 347, equivalent to R.S. Khata No. 1906, R.S. Plot No. 3862/10747, having an area of 5 ½ dhurs. The total area of the plot in C.S. is 26 decimals and the area is reduced to 14 decimals (Ext. 4 and Ext. 4 /A). 9. It is submitted that with regard to claims of the plaintiff, in rebuttal of all the paragraphs of plaint with respect to the plaintiff’s title and non-title of the State of Bihar, only one paragraph in written statement of defendant nos. 1 and 2 is relevant which is paragraph 10 which reads as under: – “10. That the averments made in the plaint which have not been specifically admitted should be admitted to have been denied by the defendant.” 10. It is contended that the relevant law in this respect is contained in Order VIII Rule 3, 4 and 5 CPC, which reads as follows: – 3. Denial to be specific. – It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. 4. Evasive denial. – Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. 4. Evasive denial. – Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstance, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. 5. Specific denial. – (1) Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability: Provided that the Court may in it discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. (2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved. (3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader. (4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 11. It is submitted that the next relevant provision is Order XII Rule 6 (1) CPC, reads as under: – “Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. 12. 12. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the provisions of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act have been considered by this court as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on several occasions. He relied upon a decision in the case of Punit Rai and Another vs. Md. Majid and Others reported in 1964 Patna 348 (DB) wherein it has held in paragraph 4 as under: – “So far as the first point, namely, that the plaintiff has not established its title to a portion of Plot No. 407 is concerned, it may be noted that the title of the plaintiff was not denied in the written statements filed by the appellants of the two appeals. The plaintiff clearly stated in paragraph-3 of the plaint that its own lands bearing Municipal Survey Plot Nos. 407, 408, 409 and 410 in Ward No. 26, Sheet No. 242, the area whereof is about 1 Bigha 5 kathas. The defendants 11 to 13 did not deny in their written statement the correctness of the averments made by the plaintiff referred to above. Defendants 14 and 15, however, in paragraph 7 of their written statement, with reference to the averments in the plaint about the ownership of the said plots only stated that they denied the allegations made in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint. This denial is no denial of averment in law. Order VIII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. There should, therefore, have been a specific denial of the title of the plaintiff with regard to the plots referred to above, and the Lower Appellate Court has rightly observed that the title of the plaintiff over these plots had not been denied in the pleadings. There being no denial of the title of the plaintiff with respect to these plots, it must be assumed that its title to these plots was admitted in the pleadings.” 13. There being no denial of the title of the plaintiff with respect to these plots, it must be assumed that its title to these plots was admitted in the pleadings.” 13. Further, reliance has been placed on the judgment in case of Balraj Taneja vs. Sunil Madan and Another reported in (1999) 8 SCC 396 , in which all possible aspects of Order VIII Rules 3 to 5 have been considered in paragraphs 8 to 12. Even the effect of non-filing of the written statement has been considered and it has been held that it will be deemed to be admission. 14. In another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gautam Sarup vs. Leela Jetly and Ors reported in (2008) 7 SCC 85 considered Order VIII as well as Order XII Rule 6 CPC read with Section 58 of the Evidence Act in paragraph 16, which reads as under: – “16. A thing admitted in view of Section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved. Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that even a vague or evasive denial may be treated to be an admission in which event the court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Relying on or on the basis thereof a suit, having regard to the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure may also be decreed on admission. It is one thing to say that without resiling from an admission, it would be permissible to explain under what circumstances the same had been made or it was made under a mistaken belief or to clarify one’s stand inter alia in regard to the extent or effect of such admission, but it is another thing to say that a person can be permitted to totally resile therefrom. The decisions of this Court unfortunately in this regard had not been uniform. We would notice a few of them.” 15. It is submitted that the title of the plaintiff should be considered in view of the oral evidences and documents of title having been produced which shows the story of settlement immediately after Cadastral Survey in favour of Tunni Devi. The registered sale deed dated 18.09.1946 (Ext. We would notice a few of them.” 15. It is submitted that the title of the plaintiff should be considered in view of the oral evidences and documents of title having been produced which shows the story of settlement immediately after Cadastral Survey in favour of Tunni Devi. The registered sale deed dated 18.09.1946 (Ext. 2) was executed by Jaldhari Singh and his brothers in favour of the plaintiff’s mother Chando Kunwar with respect to Plot No. 2690 and 2691 consisting a house, clearly mentioning therein the purchase of the disputed land from Tunni Devi, namely, Settlee of the disputed land from the ex-landlord. It is further contended that the revenue receipts were granted by the State authorities, namely, Ext. 1 series in the name of Chando Kunwar widow of Mathura Pd. regarding the disputed land of Jamabandi No. 410. This Jamabandi was created by the State of Bihar on the basis of Return submitted by the ex-landlord. Rent was not realized by the ex-landlord with respect to house property and therefore, there is no rent receipt of the ex-landlord. The receipts granted by the State, act as estoppel against the state and they cannot argue that it is valueless because it is issued without prejudice. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Sardamoni Debi vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1979 Patna 106 and in paragraph 24 this issue was considered and the court held that the grant of receipt by the State without prejudice does not mean that the state is not bound by them. 16. Learned senior counsel vehemently argued that the Cadastral Survey Khatiyan published in the year 1915, Plot no. 2690 was recorded as Katchhari Ka Sahan, area 26 decimals (Ext. 4.) whereas R.S. Khatiyan (Ext. 4/A) published in the year 1976, corresponding to R.S. plot no. 3862/10747 is recorded as Tehsil Katchhari, having an area of 14 decimals only. This clearly means that after Cadastral Survey 12 decimals of plot no. 2690 were settled by ex-landlord, inter alia, to the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. Admittedly, the State has not settled any part out of it. This fully corroborates the story of settlement as stated by the plaintiff. Both the courts below have put the onus of proving title on the plaintiff without considering the law on the point. 2690 were settled by ex-landlord, inter alia, to the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. Admittedly, the State has not settled any part out of it. This fully corroborates the story of settlement as stated by the plaintiff. Both the courts below have put the onus of proving title on the plaintiff without considering the law on the point. In paragraph 9 of the written statement filed by the State, the defendants have admitted the possession of the plaintiff and such possession is evident from the Khatiyan also. 17. Learned counsel placed upon provisions of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under: – “110. Burden of proof as to ownership. – When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner.” 18. In view of the aforesaid provision, the onus of proof of the lack of title of the plaintiff lies squarely on the defendant. The defendant could have proved that the disputed property vested with the State of Bihar. The Return has not been filed by the State which are proof of Jamabandi return. The Jamabandi of the suit land prepared by the State of Bihar in favour of the tenants, namely, tenants ledger and finally published register of the land prepared under Section 28 of the Bihar Land Reform Act (compensation Assessment- role) carries a presumption regarding certain land having vested in favour of the State of Bihar. This aspect of the provision of law have not been considered by the courts below. Only relying on the entry in Khatiyan, which is admittedly not a document of title, as has been held by this Court as well as Apex Court time and again, therefore, having failed to discharge the onus of proof on them with respect to the title, the Court was duty bound to hold and declare the title of the plaintiff over the suit properties. 19. Learned senior counsel submits that the title and possession of the plaintiff has been proved, the entry with respect to the suit property is illegal and wrong and is not binding on the plaintiff. 20. 19. Learned senior counsel submits that the title and possession of the plaintiff has been proved, the entry with respect to the suit property is illegal and wrong and is not binding on the plaintiff. 20. So far second substantial question of law is concerned, senior counsel for the appellant further submits that this question is redundant and appears to have been framed only because the appellate court has made out of a third case regarding ability of the landlord to settle Gair Mazarua Aam land, which the Katchhari is. There is no fundamental plea in the written statement and therefore, this question ought not to have been raised by the appellate court by making out a third case. 21. It is further submitted that the landlord before 1956 was the absolute owner of every inch of land within his Zamindari/tenure and he could settle any land at his will to any tenant; the only exception was with regard to the land over which some kind of customary right had accrued to the general public. 22. Reliance has been placed on the judgments reported in AIR (34) 1947 Patna 116, 1959 BLJR 310 as well as 1970 PLJR 7 , the tenor in all these cases are that Gair Mazarua Aam lands could be settled by the ex-landlord subject to the right of general public like customary right. 23. It is further submitted that Katchhari is not defined anywhere in the B.T. Act. Only two kinds of lands are there namely, Mazarua (cultivable) and Gair Majarua (non cultivable) and they have been classified according to the different uses for which they have been put now except where any embargo has been placed on the land lord over settlement of any kind of land. Katchhari only means a place where the land lord holds his office for his convenience and management of the estate and realization of revenue and maintenance of records. It could be built on any kind of land within the Zamindari of the landlord. He had the power to shift it, remove it, and demolish it or to do anything about it there is or was no legal embargo upon it. The State had never had any authority over these lands before the vesting of estate by the Act of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. He had the power to shift it, remove it, and demolish it or to do anything about it there is or was no legal embargo upon it. The State had never had any authority over these lands before the vesting of estate by the Act of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. By this Act, they got only such rights which the Maliks had including the power of settlement earlier held by Maliks. They do not contend nor they have ever contended since 1956 that on vesting of such lands, if any, the State has any right to settle a land which was Katcchari of the estate or any other kind of property held by the ex-landlord. 24. This question of law has not been considered by the courts below. 25. On the other hand Mr. U.S.S. Singh, Government Pleader no. 19 has submitted that learned trial court after perusing Cadestral Survey Khatiyan with regard to plot no. 2690 came to the finding that the said land was recorded in the Khatiyan as Katchhari (Ext. 4) and in the Revisional Survey Khatiyan (Ext. 4/a) the land is recorded as Tehsil Katchhari and held that as per Bihar Land Reform Act the cadestral survey plot no. 2690 corresponding to R.S. Plot no. 3863 / 10747 is also recorded in the name of Anabad Bihar Sarkar and the nature of the land has been shown as Tehsil Katchhari which has been vested in the State of Bihar and as such plot no. 2690 which was Katchhari was not subjected to settlement by the ex-landlord and the trial court has held that plaintiff has got no document of settlement of the suit land. Moreover, such land which is used for the purpose of Katchhari could not be settled in view of the provisions of Section 4(a) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The trial court further held that because the suit land has already been vested in the State of Bihar by operation of the Bihar Land Reform Act, so the revisional survey entry recorded in the name of Bihar Sarkar is correct. 26. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the learned appellate court after considering the matter held that revisional survey plot no. 2690 area 5 ½ dhurs which is recorded as Katchhari in C.S. Khata no. 26. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that the learned appellate court after considering the matter held that revisional survey plot no. 2690 area 5 ½ dhurs which is recorded as Katchhari in C.S. Khata no. 347, no question of passing title to Tuniya Devi or her subsequent vendor over plot no. 2690 exists. The Court below has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has got no document of settlement of the suit land, moreover, such land which is used as Katchhari could not be settled by the operation of the Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950. 27. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that both the courts below gave a concurrent finding of facts and the said finding does not require any interference by this court in second appeal. It is further submitted that from the perusal of evidence produced by the plaintiff, it does not appear that the Katchhari was not used by the landlord for the collection of rent. Reliance was placed on the judgment reported in AIR 1957 Pat 94 (Ram Kumari Devi vs. State of Bihar). 28. It is further submitted that both the courts have considered all aspect of the matter and rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. 29. Considering the rival submissions, materials on records as well as on perusal of the impugned judgment, it is pertinent to mention that Most. Tunia Devi took oral settlement from the ex-landlord with regard to 4 decimals pertaining to C.S. Khata No. 347, C.S. Plot No. 2691 by oral settlement on which there was residential house, her name was recorded in the Cadestral Survey in remarks column showing her possession. The said Cadestral Survey was finally published in the year 1915. The case of the plaintiff is that Most. Tunia Devi took settlement of 5 ½ dhurs lands of plot no. 2690 from the exlandlord coupled with delivery of possession immediately after cadastral survey and remained in possession. 30. Most. Tunia Devi sold 16 ½ decimals land to Jaldhari Kahar and put him possession. It is submitted that Jaldhari Kahar orally purchased 5 ½ dhurs land of C.S. Plot No. 2690 from Most. Tunia Devi in the year 1932 accompanied with delivery of possession. Plot nos. 2691 and 2690 amalgamated immediately after oral purchase of 5 ½ dhurs land of C.S. Plot no. 2690. It is submitted that Jaldhari Kahar orally purchased 5 ½ dhurs land of C.S. Plot No. 2690 from Most. Tunia Devi in the year 1932 accompanied with delivery of possession. Plot nos. 2691 and 2690 amalgamated immediately after oral purchase of 5 ½ dhurs land of C.S. Plot no. 2690. The said Jaldhari Kahar and his brother sold the lands consisting house and shops and other structures standing over Plot no. 2691 and 2690 to one Chando Devi (mother of the plaintiff and defendant no. 3) by virtue of registered sale deed dated 18.09.1946. Her name was mutated and on payment of rent receipts was granted by the State authorities (Ext. 1 series) and Jamabandi was created bearing Jamabandi No. 410. 31. It is admitted case of the parties that C.S. Plot No. 2690 has been recorded as Katchhari in Cadastral Survey Khatiyan as well as revisional survey Khatiyan. The total area of C.S. Plot is 26 decimals where as R.S. Khata No. 1906, R.S. Plot No. 3682/10747 having an area of 14 decimals only recorded as Tehseel Katchhari. It means after C.S. Khatiyan 12 decimals of Cadastral Survey Plot no. 2690 were not treated as part of the “Katchhari ka Sehan”. The defendant did not produce any document with regard to 12 decimals which was settled by the ex-landlord. 32. It is pleaded that 5 ½ dhurs (approximately 1 decimal) land of Tunia Devi is out of 12 decimals of C.S. plot no. 2690. The defendant is the custodian of all revenue records after vesting of Zamindari. Neither any document nor any evidence has been adduced by the defendants to prove that the said 5 ½ dhurs (approx 1 decimal) is not part of the 12 decimals. 33. So far sale deed of 1946 is concerned, as per the provision of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Collector has power to enquire whether any transfer was made after 01.01.1946 and if said transfer was made after 01.01.1946 whether the same was with object of defeating provision of the Act or causing loss to the estate or obtain higher compensation. In the present case, the sale deed was executed on 18.06.1946 but neither any annulment of the sale deed nor any enquiry was made by the Collector under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, neither the Jamabandi stood cancelled from the name of mother of the plaintiff namely Chando Devi nor any proceeding was ever initiated against the said Chando Devi. The said sale deed with regard to 16 ½ decimals of land of plot no. 2690 and 2691 was admitted and defendant, accepted the sale deed which is evident from the conduct of the defendant state while excluding 5 ½ dhurs of land (approx 1 decimal). 34. The provision of Section 4(a) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act provides that “Such estate or tenure including the interests of the proprietor or tenure-holder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure and used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars [mela] and ferries and all other sairati interests, as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether been worked or not, inclusive of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats) shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or other than the interests expresslly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.” 35. The defendant did not produce any order of cancellation of settlement or annulment of sale deed with regard to the suit land and there is no averment with regard to initiation of proceeding under Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950; the defendant has not produced any documents with regard to order of annulment of sale deed dated 18.09.1946 with regard to Plot No. 2691 and 2692 admeasuring 16½ decimals. The claim of the appellant-predecessor in interest regarding settlement of 5½ dhurs of C.S. Plot No. 2690 has not been denied by the defendant. The claim of the appellant-predecessor in interest regarding settlement of 5½ dhurs of C.S. Plot No. 2690 has not been denied by the defendant. The defendant-State of Bihar is the custodian of the revenue records despite that they did not file 'Return' which would clarify real issue in dispute. Moreover, on the basis of 'Return', the rent was fixed by the State authority in favour of the mother of the appellant. So far settlement in favour of Tunia Devi, who was settlee from the ex-tenure holder of suit land along with other land is concerned, in the cadestral survey, 26 decimals land of Plot No. 2690 has been shown as Katchhari. The said land reduced after submission of 'Return' filed by ex-tenure holder meaning thereby 12 decimals land of the said Katchhari land was settled by the ex-tenure holder which was accepted by the authority concerned. It is well settled that only building of the Katchhari of the ex-landlord which was primarily used for the purpose of collection of rent has been vested. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with in the case of Smt. Ram kumari Devi and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in AIR 1957 Pat 94 , the Court has held that: – “Under the terms of Section 4(a) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, a building or a part of it vests in the State only if it is primarily used for collection of rent. The use of the word 'primarily' by the legislature is very significant and makes it perfectly intelligible that though rents may have been collected by a proprietor in a building or a part of it casually, it cannot vest in the State as being a Kutchery unless it is established that it was primarily used for the purpose of collection of rent. It has, therefore, to be seen whether a case has been made out by the State on the materials on the record that the building in question was primarily used for collection of rent”. 36. The defendant has failed to prove that any building as a Katchhari was situated over the said disputed land i.e. 5 and ½ dhurs (approximately one decimal). The registered sale deed was executed on 18.09.1946 (Ext.-2) i.e. after 01.01.1946, the Collector had power under Section 4 (h) but no step was taken by the Collector. 36. The defendant has failed to prove that any building as a Katchhari was situated over the said disputed land i.e. 5 and ½ dhurs (approximately one decimal). The registered sale deed was executed on 18.09.1946 (Ext.-2) i.e. after 01.01.1946, the Collector had power under Section 4 (h) but no step was taken by the Collector. Non-consideration of registered sale deed amounts to perversity, reliance has been placed in case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur vs. Punjab State Electricity Board and Ors. reported in (2010) 13 SCC 216 . The sale deed with regard to Cadestral Khatiyan No. 347, Plot No. 2690 and 2691, mentions area 16 and ½ decimals. Both the courts have held that C.S. Plot No. 2691 is not in dispute. Only entry of Plot No. 2690 in the Survey Khatiyan is Katchhari and further assumed that the said 5 and ½ dhurs (approximately one decimal) is Katchhari without ascertaining that the said 5 and ½ dhurs is primarily used for collection of rent or not. This aspect of the matter has not been considered. The predecessor in interest was in possession of the suit land since 1930 and thereafter the suit property along with other land was sold to the appellant's mother. The State has not established that the said one decimal (5½ dhurs) land was primarily used for the purpose of collection of rent. 37. It appears from the Revisional Survey Khatiyan, the Katchhari land has been mentioned only 14 decimals out of 26 decimals measured in Cadestral Survey Khatiyan as Katchhari. Therefore, by the conduct of the State it is ample clear that it recognized ex-tenure holder settling of 12 decimals land of plot no. 2690 of C.S. Khatiyan in favour of other persons including the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff. In absence of any legal proceeding especially under Section 4(h) of the Act, the sale deed dated 18.09.1946 is legal and valid. 38. From the above discussions, it is manifest that the land, in question, was not primarily used for collection of rent within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Land Reforms Act and as such, it did not vest in the State and therefore, Plaintiff-appellant has title over the suit land. 39. In view of my above findings, the impugned judgments and decree are liable to be set aside and the suit be decreed. 40. 39. In view of my above findings, the impugned judgments and decree are liable to be set aside and the suit be decreed. 40. The substantial question of law formulated is therefore, answered in favour of the appellant. 41. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree dated 06.10.2010 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, F.T.C. II, Nawada in Title Appeal No. 05 of 1999/02 of 2010 as well as judgment and decree dated 23.02.1999 passed by the Munsif, Nawada in Title Suit No. 306/1999 are hereby set aside and Title Suit No. 306/1999 is decreed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 42. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed.