JUDGMENT : 1. Appeal from Order No.194 of 2023 is filed by the original defendants and Appeal from Order No.207 of 2023 is filed by the plaintiffs of Trade Mark suit No.2 of 2017, against the order dated 4.8.2023 passed by the learned 4th Additional District Judge, Vadodara in Trade Mark Suit No.2 of 2017, by which the application filed by the original defendants under Order VII Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (`CPC’ for short) is allowed, however, liberty is granted to the original plaintiffs to amend the plaint by deleting the prayer of passing off action with respect to trade mark `Santushti’ of file a fresh suit for copyright infringement within fifteen days from the date of the order. 2. As the facts in both the appeals are same and the contentions raised by the parties are also almost same in reference to the provisions of CPC and also the provisions of Copyright Act and Trademarks Act, the appeals are heard together and decided by this common judgment. The parties are referred to in this judgment as the original plaintiffs and original defendants for the sake of convenience. 3. The brief facts which are stated in the plaint are such that the plaintiffs have started business of manufacturing juices, milk shakes, thick shakes, ice-cream, fresh fruit juices etc. The parties are referred to in this judgment as the original plaintiffs and original defendants for the sake of convenience. 3. The brief facts which are stated in the plaint are such that the plaintiffs have started business of manufacturing juices, milk shakes, thick shakes, ice-cream, fresh fruit juices etc. in the name of Santushti Shakes & More in Rajkot since the year 2009; that they have initially started business under banner Shantushti Shakes & More at P.Lal Chambers, Dr.Yagnik Road, Opp.Jagnath Police Chowki, Rajkot; that they had expanded their business in Vadodara at the address stated in Shop No.4, Ashoka Chamber, Opp.Sadar Bazar, Fatehgunj, Vadodara; that the plaintiff no.2 is a company created by plaintiff no.1 and the family members are the share holders of the said company; that under the same banner, a branch of Shantushi Shakes & More was opened in Vadodara in the year 2012 and also acquired registration of Copyright in the year 2014, whereas the trademark registration was still pending; that the defendant no.1 is their relative and old friend; that the defendant no.1 has continued the shop in Rajkot, which was established by the plaintiffs in the name of Santushti Shakes & More and was doing the business at the address mentioned in the suit; that the defendant no.2 had started a franchise in Rajkot in the name of Raj Marketing and is also doing the business of selling shakes, ice-creams and fast food etc.; that the plaintiffs filed the impugned suit being Trade Mark Suit No.2 of 2017 before the learned District Court, Vadodara against the appellants for declaration, permanent injunction and accounts of profit under Section 20 of the CPC, Section 134(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957. That the defendants filed application under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for return of the plaint below Exh.64, in which the impugned order is passed, which is challenged by both the plaintiffs and defendants by filing these appeals. 4. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Majmudar for the original plaintiffs has contended that the original plaintiffs have filed the suit with the following prayers in paragraph 22 of the plaint (translated version is as follows): “22. (a) Declare that Plaintiffs are the owner of Trademark, Label and Copy Right “SANTUSHTI” and defendants have no right to use the same. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Majmudar for the original plaintiffs has contended that the original plaintiffs have filed the suit with the following prayers in paragraph 22 of the plaint (translated version is as follows): “22. (a) Declare that Plaintiffs are the owner of Trademark, Label and Copy Right “SANTUSHTI” and defendants have no right to use the same. (b) Defendants and their licensees, agents, dealer, distributors and servants be permanently restrained from printing, publishing and using the Label and Trademark “SANTUSHTI” of plaintiffs and also to restrain them from making breach of their Copyright Label Certificate Registration No.A-108936-2014 of Artistic Work “SANTUSHTI” Shakes and More. (c) Defendants be directed to produce all the Stationery, Advertising Materials, Menu Card, Boards, Hoarding where “SANTUSHTI” label has been printed, before this Hon’ble Court and defendants be further directed to hand over all material to the plaintiff to destroy the same. (d) Defendants be ordered to produce accounts of profit before this Court from which they made business from “SANTUSHTI” Label and defendants be further directed to hand over the profit with an interest of 18% from the date of filing of the suit till its realization by deciding the amount of profit through Commission of Agent. (e) Defendants, their Agents, Dealers, Distributors and Servants be permanently restrained from using and passing off the Artwork and Trademark of plaintiff, namely “SANTUSHTI.” 4.2 The cause of action is stated in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the plaint. 4.3 By referring to the above, learned advocate Mr.Majmudar has submitted that prima facie the cause of action has arisen at Vadodara and the learned trial court has erred in believing that the suit is maintainable qua the provisions of Copyright Act and the suit under the provisions of the Trademark Act is not maintainable before the court at Vadodara and the suit is required to be filed at Rajkot, where the defendants are residing and carrying on business. He has submitted that the learned trial court has committed error in splitting the cause of action which is not permissible. He has further submitted that the learned trial court has committed error in observing that the suit is filed merely on apprehension and no actual act is done. He has submitted that the learned trial court has committed error in splitting the cause of action which is not permissible. He has further submitted that the learned trial court has committed error in observing that the suit is filed merely on apprehension and no actual act is done. He has submitted that the learned trial court has not properly considering the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of the CPC read with Order 2 Rule 3 of CPC. He has also submitted that the learned trial court has not properly considered Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of Trademarks Act in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He has further submitted that the learned trial court has wrongly relied on Section 20 of CPC for amending the plaint by deleting the prayer of passing off action, which findings of the learned trial court is highly erroneous and illegal and not in accordance with law. 4.4 Learned advocate for the original plaintiffs has relied on the following citations in support of his submissions: (1) Cadila Healthcare Limited V/s Uniza Healthcare LLP, 2021 reported in SCC Online Del 3330. (2) Pfizer Products Inc. V/s Rajesh Chopra, 2006 SCC Online Del 177. (3) Bristol Myers Squibb Company V/s V.C.Bhutada, 2013 SCC Online Del 4129. (4) Sejal Glass Ltd. V/s Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. Reported in (2018)11 SCC 780 . (5) Puma SE V/s D.K.Arora, reported in (2022) 6 HCC (Del) 653. (6) Chandra Kishore Chaurasia V/s R A Perfumery Works (P) Ltd. Reported in 2022 SCC Online Del 3529. (7) Sonal Kanodia V/s Shri Ram Gupta & Anr., in FAO (Comm) No.43 of 2023 dated 20.2.2023. (8) Carlsberg Breweries A/S V/s Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd. Reported in 2018 SCC Online Del.12912. 4.5 He, therefore, submitted that the Appeal From Order filed by the original plaintiffs is required to be allowed and the Appeal From Order filed by the original defendants is required to be dismissed. 5. (8) Carlsberg Breweries A/S V/s Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd. Reported in 2018 SCC Online Del.12912. 4.5 He, therefore, submitted that the Appeal From Order filed by the original plaintiffs is required to be allowed and the Appeal From Order filed by the original defendants is required to be dismissed. 5. Per contra, learned advocate Ms.Vidhi Bhatt for the original defendants has strongly opposed the submissions made at the bar by the original plaintiffs She has referred to the various pages of the paper book which is supplied in the compilation and has submitted that considering the fact that the learned trial court has not properly considered the various judgments and legal position and also pleadings of the parties as well as documentary evidence available on the record, the court has committed error in permitting the plaintiffs to maintain the suit regarding the provisions of the Copyright Act at Vadodara. She has further submitted that in the entire suit, the plaintiffs has not averred anything regarding how the cause of action can be arisen Vadodara. The plaintiffs have, in fact entered into various transactions with the original defendants prior to institution of the suit and the plaintiffs are aware that the defendants are also in the same business and doing business at Rajkot. Merely some assertion was made in paragraph 20 of the plaint of the suit by writing two lines that recently the plaintiffs have come to know that the defendants are trying to start business in Vadodara and the suit is filed on the basis of quiatimeaction, the Court has no jurisdiction. Further, this assertion is not supported by any other documentary evidence. On the contrary, cause of action, if any, has arisen before the court at Rajkot. The suit is permitted to be proceeded under the provisions of the Copyright Act, the order of the learned trial court qua that is erroneous, improper and also on the basis of erroneous consideration of the legal position and therefore when the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit, there is no question of granting any relief. 5.1 Learned advocate Ms.Bhatt has relied on the following citations in support of her submissions: (1) Dhoda House V/s S.K.Maingi reported in (2006) 9 SCC 41 . (2) Dabur India Limited V/s K.R.Industries reported in (2008) 10 SCC 595 . 5.1 Learned advocate Ms.Bhatt has relied on the following citations in support of her submissions: (1) Dhoda House V/s S.K.Maingi reported in (2006) 9 SCC 41 . (2) Dabur India Limited V/s K.R.Industries reported in (2008) 10 SCC 595 . (3) HSIL Limited V/s Imperial Ceramic and Another reported in 2018 SCC Online Del 7185. (4) Sayyed Ayaz Ali V/s Prakash G.Goyal and Others, reported in (2021)7 SCC 456 . (5) M/s Allied Blenders and Distillers Pvt.Ltd. V/s Prag Distillery Pvt.Ltd. Reported in 2017 SCC Online Del 6422. 5.2 In response to the judgment relied on by learned advocate Mr.Majmudar in the case of Carlsberg Breweries A/s (supra), she has submitted that the said judgment in fact is helpful to the case of the original defendants as the court has said that one composite suit can be filed by showing of two cause of actions one of infringement registered design of the plaintiffs and second of the defendants passing off the goods. Therefore, the suit which is maintained at Vadodara, without any cause of action being arisen and filed merely on apprehension is not maintainable. Therefore, the appeal from order of the original defendants is required to be allowed and the appeal from order filed by the original plaintiffs is required to be dismissed. 6. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar and also perused the material on record. From the bare perusal of the plaint as well as the submissions made in prayer clause, it transpires that the suit is filed by the plaintiffs who are doing business at Vadodara by using name of Santushti Shakes Pvt.Ltd. and the defendants are doing business at Rajkot in the name of M/s Santushti Shakes & More. It is the case of the plaintiffs in the plaint that they are doing business and registration of TM and also copyright of the Santushti is with the present plaintiffs and the defendants are using the said trademark of which the artwork is registered under the Copyright Act. The defendants are misusing the said trademark. Therefore, there is infringement of copyright and also passing off action is alleged in the plaint. The defendants are misusing the said trademark. Therefore, there is infringement of copyright and also passing off action is alleged in the plaint. It transpires that in the plaint it is stated that the defendants are meeting various persons at Ahmedabad, Surat and Rajkot and are trying to give franchise and also trying to give franchise at Vadodara by using mark Santushti and to start outlet. But these averments are made on the basis of the assumptions and apprehension that the defendants will start the business in Vadodara by giving franchise. If the contention of the plaintiffs is tested, then as per the say of the plaintiffs, the trial court has committed error by not entertaining the relief qua passing of trademark and the Court has come to the conclusion that such relief should be prayed before the Court of competent jurisdiction and therefore the suit is not entertained for this prayer. However, in the same breath, the court entertained the suit action under Copyright Act and, therefore, referring to Order 2 Rule 3 as well as Section 20 of CPC, splitting of action is not permissible. 7. To consider the submissions made by learned advocate for the plaintiffs that the Court cannot decide about such relief can be granted at the end of the suit or not but the Court has to consider only the nature of allegation and averments made in the plaint and whether the cause of action has arisen or not; that the court has, while deciding the application, erred in law by giving finding on the issue regarding the suit is not maintainable at Vadodara for the relief sought under the Trademark Act on the ground that Vadodara has no territorial jurisdiction, it is relevant to refer to Order II, Rule 3, Section 20 and Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of CPC, which read as under: Order II Rule 3 : (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.—A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action. 20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises.—Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. [Explanation].—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. Order VII Rule 10 and 10A : 10. Return of plaint.—(1) 4 [ Subject to the provisions of rule 10A, the plaint shall] at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted. [Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that a Court of appeal or revision may direct after setting aside the decree passed in a suit, the return of the plaint under this sub-rule.] (2) Procedure on returning plaint. —On returning a plaint, the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning it. [10A. —On returning a plaint, the Judge shall endorse thereon the date of its presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons for returning it. [10A. Power of Court to fix a date of appearance in the Court where plaint is to be filed after its return.—(1) Where, in any suit, after the defendant has appeared, the Court is of opinion that the plaint should be returned, it shall, before doing so, intimate its decision to the plaintiff.] (2) Where an intimation is given to the plaintiff under sub-rule (1), the plaintiff may make an application to the Court— (a) specifying the Court in which he proposes to present the plaint after its return, (b) praying that the Court may fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the said Court, and (c) requesting that the notice of the date so fixed may be given to him and to the defendant. (3) Where an application is made by the plaintiff under sub-rule (2), the Court shall, before returning the plaint and notwithstanding that the order for return of plaint was made by it on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit,— (a) fix a date for the appearance of the parties in the Court in which the plaint is proposed to be presented, and (b) give to the plaintiff and to the defendant notice of such date for appearance. (4) Where the notice of the date for appearance is given under sub-rule (3),— (a) it shall not be necessary for the Court in which the plaint is presented after its return, to serve the defendant with a summons for appearance in the suit, unless that Court, for reasons to be recorded, otherwise directs, and (b) the said notice shall be deemed to be a summons for the appearance of the defendant in the Court in which the plaint is presented on the date so fixed by the Court by which the plaint was returned. (5) Where the application made by the plaintiff under sub-rule (2) is allowed by the Court, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to appeal against the order returning the plaint.” Section 62 of the Copyrights Act and Section 134 of the Trademarks Act are also relevant for the consideration of the dispute in the present proceeding, which read as under: Section 62 of the Copyrights Act : Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this Chapter.- (1) Every suit or other civil proceedings arising under this Chapter in respect of the infringement of copyright in any work or the infringement of any other right conferred by this Act shall be instituted in the district court having jurisdiction. (2) For the purpose of sub-section(1), a “district court having jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, include a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.” Section 134 of the Trademarks Act: “134, Suit for infringement etc., to be instituted before District Court.- (1) No Suit- (a) for the infringement of a registered trademark; or (b) relating to any right in a registered trademark; or (c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trade mark, whether registered or unregistered. Shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. (2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding, or where there are more than one such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Explanation – For the purposes of sub-section (2), “person” includes the registered proprietor and the registered user.” 8. Learned advocate Mr.Majmudar has relied on paragraphs 67 and 69 of the judgment in the case of Carlsberg Breweries A/s (supra), which read as under: “67. In a passing off action filed by a plaintiff, the plaintiff has/claims ownership of a design because of shape, features, combination of colours, etc. of the goods of the plaintiff being used by plaintiff as a trademark, and that such user is so duly envisaged as legal as per the definitions of the expressions ‘mark’ and ‘trademark’ in Sections 2(1)(m) and (zb) of the Trade Marks Act and that the transaction of sale by the defendant of its articles containing the same shape or features or combination of colours etc. etc. results in the sale by the defendant of its goods being passed off as that of the plaintiff. 17. Therefore once the transaction of sale is the same transaction which will be in question in both the causes of action of infringement of a registered design and passing off, a substantial part of the bundles of facts of the two actions will be same as to whether or not the article being sold by the defendant of a particular design is or is not a fraudulent or obvious imitation (identical or deceptively similar) to the article of the plaintiff, therefore, there will clearly exist common set of facts with respect to the actions of passing off and the defence of the defendant of the defendant's goods/articles not being a fraudulent or obvious imitation by the defendant of the articles/goods of the plaintiff, resulting in arising of common questions of law and fact in the two actions of infringement of the registered design and passing off. 69. The reference is answered by holding that one composite suit can be filed by a plaintiff against one defendant by joining two causes of action, one of infringement of the registered design of the plaintiff and the second of the defendant passing off its goods as that of the plaintiff on account of the goods of the defendant being fraudulent or obvious imitation i.e identical or deceptively similar, to the goods of the plaintiff.” 9. Against that, learned advocate Ms.Bhatt has relied on the paragraphs 55, 67, 68 and 69 (paragraphs 67 and 69 are already reproduced hereinabove) of the same judgment in the case of Carlsberg Breweries A/s (supra), in which it is held as under: “55. While so holding that a composite suit can be filed only in that court which has territorial jurisdiction qua both the causes of action, the Supreme Court in Dabur India Ltd.'s case (supra) then went to the further aspect of a composite suit of that type where in the suit there exists one main cause of action and relief, and the second cause of action is such by which the relief prayed is only incidental to the main and first cause of action, andm qua this aspect, in para 25 in Dabur India Ltd.'s case (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that this aspect had not been decided in Dhodha House's case (supra). Supreme Court in Dabur India Ltd.'s case (supra) then proceeded to decide as to what is an incidental power to be exercised with respect to a suit in which the civil court has jurisdiction qua the main cause of action, and it was held that a court always has an incidental power to give necessary reliefs once the court otherwise has jurisdiction and the power to adjudicate the main cause of action, i.e. there can be filed a ‘composite suit’ for two causes of action where the second cause of action is essentially a right incidental to or supplemental to the main relief arising out of the main cause of action. This is stated by the Supreme Court in above quoted para 28 of the judgment in Dabur India Ltd.'s case (supra), and in this para it is further clarified that in certain cases besides an incidental power even supplemental power can be exercised. This is stated by the Supreme Court in above quoted para 28 of the judgment in Dabur India Ltd.'s case (supra), and in this para it is further clarified that in certain cases besides an incidental power even supplemental power can be exercised. Supreme Court however ultimately clarified and laid down the ratio in para 34 that though a composite suit can be filed with respect to main cause of action with relief arising therefrom, and also for an incidental relief for which the incidental power of the civil court is exercised by the court where the civil suit is filed, yet it has clearly been clarified that where the court hearing the civil suit has no territorial jurisdiction, partly or otherwise, a composite suit would not be entertained qua the second main cause of action for which the court has not territorial jurisdiction. It was accordingly concluded in terms of the last line of para 34 in the case of Dabur India Limited (supra) that two suits having different causes of action cannot be clubbed for being filed as a composite suit, and it is essentially this last line in para 34 in the judgment in the case of Dabur India Limited (supra) which has been relied by the majority opinion in the case of Mohan Lal (supra) to hold that there cannot be filed a composite suit having two causes of action of infringement and passing off. 68. On account of existence of common questions of law and fact between the two causes of action of infringement of a registered design and passing off, therefore to a considerable extent, the evidence of the two causes of action will be common. In such a situation to avoid multiplicity of proceedings there should take place joinder of the two causes of action of infringement of a registered design and passing off against the same defendant in one suit, otherwise multiplicity of proceedings will result in waste of time, money and energy of the parties and also of the courts.” 10. Considering the position of law, it clearly transpires that the composite suit is maintainable which can be filed only in a court which has territorial jurisdiction qua both the cause of action. Considering the position of law, it clearly transpires that the composite suit is maintainable which can be filed only in a court which has territorial jurisdiction qua both the cause of action. Learned trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that under the Vadodara court has no jurisdiction has not jurisdiction under the Trademarks Act, the Court has no jurisdiction. 11. The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Carlsberg Breweries A/s (supra), considering the case of Dabur India Limited (supra) that the issue which is squarely addressed by this Full Bench is as to whether there would arise common questions of facts and law in the two causes of action of infringement of registered design and passing off so that these two causes of action can be joined under Order II Rule 3 of CPC, and the Full Bench had come to the conclusion that one composite suit can be filed by a plaintiff against one defendant by joining two causes of action, one of infringement of the registered design of the plaintiff and the second of the defendant passing off its goods as of the plaintiff on account of the goods of the defendant being fraudulent or obvious imitation i.e. identical and deceptively similar, to the goods of the plaintiff. In the present case, mere assertion in paragraph 20 regarding some apprehension that the defendants in the suit will start the outlet by giving franchisee at Vadodara, it will not suffice to satisfy the requirement under Section 20 of CPC as well as Order II Rule 3 of the CPC. 12. I am of the opinion that the learned trial court has committed error to the extent in continuing with the proceeding under the Copyright Act and when the composite suit of the same cause of action under different statute can be proceeded as is held by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, referred to hereinabove, and other judgments which are cited at the bar. The territorial jurisdiction is with the court of Rajkot as defendants are doing business and carrying on business at Rajkot. The territorial jurisdiction is with the court of Rajkot as defendants are doing business and carrying on business at Rajkot. As per the averment, earlier transaction has also taken place at Rajkot which is borne out from the correspondence between the parties which is part of the record produced before the Court, therefore, I am of the view that the Vadodara Court is partly correct in holding that the jurisdiction is with the court under the Trademarks Act, but at the same breath learned trial Court could not have proceeded with the proceeding under the Copyright Act of the suit which is otherwise filed as a composite suit. Therefore, the court has failed to discharge its duty in law by not appreciating the correct legal position as indicated in above mentioned discussion and has committed error. 13. The scope of jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC is discussed in a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Future Sector Land Developers LLP and Another V/s Bagmane Developers Private Limited and Others reported in (2023) 5 SCC 368 , wherein it is held in paragraphs 11, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29 and 30 as under: “11. That takes us to the more contentious issue revolving around Order 7 Rule 10CPC. As we have seen earlier, the foundation on which an application under Order 7 Rule 10 was filed, was that the suit schedule property is situate within the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, Bengaluru and that though the reliefs claimed are substantially in respect of the immovable property, they are couched in a language, by clever drafting, to appear as though the reliefs relate to enforcement of rights in personam. Therefore, it is claimed that the plaint should be returned for presentation to the proper court. 21. It is seen from several portions of the plaint that the appellants have done a tightrope walking to take refuge under Section 20(c)CPC by carefully avoiding any relief that may apparently appear to relate to Section 16(d)CPC. But obviously the plaintiffs have not been successful in this tightrope walking, as we see quite a few falls/slips. For instance: 21.1. In Para 2 of the plaint, the appellants have referred to the properties in dispute as “suit property” and have categorically stated that, “the said properties are the subject matter of the present suit”. 21.2. But obviously the plaintiffs have not been successful in this tightrope walking, as we see quite a few falls/slips. For instance: 21.1. In Para 2 of the plaint, the appellants have referred to the properties in dispute as “suit property” and have categorically stated that, “the said properties are the subject matter of the present suit”. 21.2. In Para 4, the plaintiffs assert as follows, “…and it was further represented that, the said Society i.e. Defendant 137 has no right, title, share and interest in any portion of the suit properties…”. 21.3. In Para 38 of the plaint, the appellants have asserted that “ … as per the documents on record, it is crystal clear that the Bangalore Gorakshan Shala Society and also Bagmane Construction Pvt. Ltd. have no right, title and interest with respect to the suit properties…”. 22. Thus it is clear : (i) that suit concerns immovable properties which are not just described in the plaint schedule by way of empty formality but are clearly stated to be the subject-matter of the suit; and (ii) that the plaintiffs are actually questioning the right, title and interest of the contesting defendants to the suit scheduled properties 23. Therefore, the High Court, in our considered opinion was right in holding that the suit falls under the category of one, for the determination of any right to or interest in immovable property covered by Section 16(d). The contention that even if Section 16 applies, the suit would be saved by the proviso to Section 16, is completely misplaced. At least one of the reliefs which relates to possession, may not fall under the proviso to Section 16. 28. It is true that the trial court has granted leave to the appellants in terms of Order 2 Rule 2(3)CPC, to file a substantial suit for specific performance and possession at a later point of time. That does not mean that the rights of the defendants to seek the return of the plaint can be curtailed. 29. In view of the above, we hold that the order passed by the High Court in the civil revision application arising out of the applications under Order 7 Rule 10CPC does not call for any interference. That does not mean that the rights of the defendants to seek the return of the plaint can be curtailed. 29. In view of the above, we hold that the order passed by the High Court in the civil revision application arising out of the applications under Order 7 Rule 10CPC does not call for any interference. However, as we have stated earlier, one portion of the impugned order by which the other application under Order 7 Rule 11CPC stands allowed, perhaps by way of inadvertence, is liable to be set aside. 30. Therefore, the appeals are partly allowed, setting aside that portion of the impugned order where the application of Defendant 117 filed under Order 7 Rule 11CPC stands allowed. The other portion of the impugned order [Bagmane Developers (P) Ltd. v. Future Sector Land Developers LLP, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 254] allowing the applications of the defendants filed under Order 7 Rule 10 stands confirmed. It is open to the appellants to represent the plaint before the jurisdictional court at Bengaluru, within a period of four weeks.” 14. In view of the above, the reasons given by learned trial court in view of the above mentioned judgments are regarding the suit which is directed to be proceeded before the Vadodara court under the provisions of Copyright Act. 15. It will be fruitful to refer to the judgment in the case of (2014) 14 SCC 762 Paragon Rubber Industries V/s Pragathi Rubber Mills and Another, wherein it is held in paragraphs 13 to 19 as under: “13. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, the issues raised in the present proceedings are no longer res integra being covered by the ratio of judgments of this Court in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] and Dabur India [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ]. 14. In our opinion, the issues raised in the present proceedings are no longer res integra being covered by the ratio of judgments of this Court in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] and Dabur India [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ]. 14. It is not disputed before us that in the plaint itself it is pleaded as under: “Though the defendant's goods are not available in Kottayam, nor do the defendants carry on business and reside within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, yet this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit at Kottayam having regard to the provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act for the plaintiff carries on business and resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.” The aforesaid averments make it abundantly clear that even the plaintiff was aware that the court at Kottayam will have no jurisdiction under the 1958 Act, but tried to camouflage the same by confusing it and mixing it up or intermingling it with the relief contained under the 1957 Act. From the averments made in the plaint, it is apparent that the plaintiff had filed a composite suit. Such a suit would not be maintainable unless the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in relation to the entire cause of action and the entire relief. 15. We have noticed earlier that the issue is no longer res integra. The same issue has been examined in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ]. In para 43, this Court formulated the question for consideration which is as under: (SCC p. 53) “43. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether causes of action in terms of both the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act although may be different, would a suit be maintainable in a court only because it has the jurisdiction to entertain the same in terms of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act?” It was answered as follows: (Dhodha House case [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ], SCC pp. 53-54 & 56, paras 44 & 54) “44. A cause of action in a given case both under the 1957 Act as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping to some extent. 53-54 & 56, paras 44 & 54) “44. A cause of action in a given case both under the 1957 Act as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping to some extent. The territorial jurisdiction conferred upon the court in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indisputably shall apply to a suit or proceeding under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act provides for an additional forum. Such additional forum was provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not otherwise be in a position to file a suit at different places where his copyright was violated. Parliament while enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not choose to make a similar provision therein. Such an omission may be held to be a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The intention of Parliament in not providing for an additional forum in relation to the violation of the 1958 Act is, therefore, clear and explicit. Parliament while enacting the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provided for such an additional forum by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The court shall not, it is well settled, readily presume the existence of jurisdiction of a court which was not conferred by the statute. For the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction of a court in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the conditions precedent specified therein must be fulfilled, the requisites wherefor are that the plaintiff must actually and voluntarily reside to carry on business or personally work for gain. *** 54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court only because two causes of action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.” 16. Recourse to the additional forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues.” 16. This legal position has been reiterated in Dabur India [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ] as under: (SCC p. 607, para 34) “34. What then would be meant by a composite suit? A composite suit would not entitle a court to entertain a suit in respect whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise. Order 2 Rule 3 of the Code specifically states so and, thus, there is no reason as to why the same should be ignored. A composite suit within the provisions of the 1957 Act as considered in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ], therefore, would mean the suit which is founded on infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental power of the court is required to be invoked. A plaintiff may seek a remedy which can otherwise be granted by the court. It was that aspect of the matter which had not been considered in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] but it never meant that two suits having different causes of action can be clubbed together as a composite suit.” 17. We see no conflict in the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid two cases. In both the cases, it has been held that for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the court in a composite suit, both the causes of action must arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues. However, the jurisdiction cannot be conferred by joining two causes of action in the same suit when the court has jurisdiction to try the suit only in respect of one cause of action and not the other. In Dabur India [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ] the ratio in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] has been explained. In Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] the law was stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 56, paras 54-55) “54. In Dabur India [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ] the ratio in Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] has been explained. In Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] the law was stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 56, paras 54-55) “54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court only because two causes of action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues. 55. In this case we have not examined the question as to whether if a cause of action arises under the 1957 Act and the violation of the provisions of the Trade Marks Act is only incidental, a composite suit will lie or not, as such a question does not arise in this case.” 18. In our opinion, the aforesaid observation is self-explanatory and needs no further clarification. We also do not find any substance in the submission of Mr Dave that there is any conflict between the law laid down in Dabur [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ] and Exphar Sa [Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688 ]. In Dabur [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ] this Court distinguished the judgment Exphar Sa [Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688 ] in the following terms: (Dabur case [Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595 ], SCC pp. 606-07, paras 31-33) “31. Exphar Sa [Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688 ] cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. 606-07, paras 31-33) “31. Exphar Sa [Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688 ] cannot be said to have any application in the instant case. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether the jurisdiction of a court under sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act is wider than that of the court specified under the Code of Civil Procedure and thus a person instituting a suit having any claim on the ownership of the copyright which has been infringed, would not be a ground for holding that he would not come within the purview of sub-section (2) Section 62 of the 1957 Act, as he had been served with a ‘cease and desist’ notice, opining: (SCC p. 693, para 13) ‘13. It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for the introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62 was not to restrict the owners of the copyright to exercise their rights but to remove any impediment from their doing so. Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the District Court only to cases where the person instituting the suit or other proceeding, or where there are more than one such persons, any of them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or presently works for gain. It prescribes an additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and above the “normal” grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code.’ 32. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that Parliament having inserted sub-section (2) in Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the jurisdiction of the court thereunder would be wider than the one under Section 20 of the Code. The object and reasons for enactment of sub-section (2) of Section 62 would also appear from the report of the Committee, as has been noticed by this Court being a provision which has been specially designed to confer an extra benefit upon the authors who were not in a position to instate copyright infringement proceeding before the courts. It is in the aforementioned context the law laid down by this Court in para 13 of Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] must be understood. 33. It is in the aforementioned context the law laid down by this Court in para 13 of Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] must be understood. 33. If the impediment is sought to be removed by inserting an incidental provision, there cannot be any doubt the court could be entitled to pass an interim order, but the same by no stretch of imagination can be extended to a cause of action which is founded on separate set of facts as also rights and liabilities of a party under a different Act. In Dhodha House [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ] although Exphar Sa [Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688 ] was not noticed, the distinction would be apparent from the following: (Dhodha House case [Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 ], SCC p. 56, paras 50-51) ‘50. In this case, the Delhi High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction in terms of the 1957 Act. The primary ground upon which the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court was invoked was the violation of the 1958 Act, but in relation thereto, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act could not be invoked. 51. The plaintiff was not a resident of Delhi. It has not been able to establish that it carries on any business at Delhi. For our purpose, the question as to whether the defendant had been selling its produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant (sic). It is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff are available in the market of Delhi or they are sold in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi.’” 19. We are, however, of the opinion that the High Court has correctly held that the provision contained in Section 134 of the 1999 Act, would not come to the aid of the plaintiff. Although, the 1999 Act was enacted on 30-12-1999, it came into force on 15-9-2003 vide S.O. 1048(E), dated 15-9-2003, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section 3(ii), dated 15-9-2003. Since the suit in this case was filed on 19-3-2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act. Although, the 1999 Act was enacted on 30-12-1999, it came into force on 15-9-2003 vide S.O. 1048(E), dated 15-9-2003, published in the Gazette of India, Extra., Part II, Section 3(ii), dated 15-9-2003. Since the suit in this case was filed on 19-3-2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act. The 1958 Act does not contain a provision similar to the provision contained in Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act. Parliament being aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act still did not incorporate the same in the 1958 Act. Therefore, it cannot be read into the 1958 Act by implication. The High Court had correctly concluded that the suit of the plaintiff (appellant) was a composite one.” 16. Considering the various judgments which are cited at the bar more particularly, the full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court, I am of the view that the learned trial court has committed error in holding that as two causes of actions are joined in the suit, the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the action for infringement of copyright against defendants, however, in so far as passing off action is concerned, no territorial jurisdiction lies with this Court. When the present suit is a composite suit and therefore would not entitle a Court to entertain a suit in respect whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise, Order II Rule 3 of CPC specifically states so. The findings of the learned trial court regarding the jurisdiction to the extent to the relief claimed under the Trademarks Act are proper that it does not have any jurisdiction to try the suit. Therefore, in view of above discussion, in my opinion, the entire plaint is required to be returned to the plaintiff, to be produced before the competent Court having jurisdiction. 17. In view of the above, Appeal From Order No.194 of 2023 is allowed and the Appeal From Order No.207 of 2023 is dismissed. The learned trial Court is directed to return back the plaint to the plaintiff with necessary documents under the provisions of Order VII rule 10 of CPC to be produced before the appropriate court which is having territorial jurisdiction to try the suit under the provision of law. If such plaint is returned, the plaintiff is at liberty to file the plaint before the competent Court, within three weeks from the date of receipt of the plaint. If such plaint is returned, the plaintiff is at liberty to file the plaint before the competent Court, within three weeks from the date of receipt of the plaint. Civil Applications stand disposed of as no orders are required to be passed thereon.