JUDGMENT : Anil Kumar Choudhary, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. This Writ Petition has been filed with the prayer for issue of appropriate writ(s), order(s), direction(s) for quashing and setting aside the order dated 28.05.2017 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma in Miscellaneous Revision No. 54 of 2013 whereby and where under, the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma has rejected the revision application and prayer has also been made to quash the order dated 14.06.2013 (a copy of which has been kept at Annexure -6 of this writ petition) passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma by which the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma has suspended the acceptance of rent and issuance of rent receipt to the petitioner till the time, decision is taken on the title of the land by the competent civil court as such order has been passed by L.R.D.C., Koderma without jurisdiction. 3. The brief fact of the case is that the petitioner which is the registered charitable institution, purchased the land in question vide registered sale deed dated 25.12.1957 and since then the petitioner has been in continuous possession of the subject land bearing plot no. 32, comprising 54 decimals of land situated at Village-Belatand, P.S.-Telaiya, Dist.-Koderma for the purpose of running gaushala known as Koderma Gaushala Samiti of which the Sub-Divisional Officer, Koderma is the ex-officio President. The name of the petitioner was entered in Register II and the petitioner has been regularly paying rent and taxes to the State Government and the municipal authority. After lapse of more than 50 years, i.e. in the year 2009, the respondent no.4 through his power of attorney filed Misc. Case No. 13/2009-10 before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma for cancellation of issuance of rent receipt in the name of the petitioner primarily on the ground that the registered sale deed dated 23.12.1957 was void ab initio as the vendor of the writ petitioner has no right to sell the subject land. The respondent no.3-Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma obtained an opinion from the Government Pleader and on the basis of the same allowed the petition of the respondent no. 4 though the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma has no such power to offset an entry in the revenue record on the basis of any shortcoming in the title of the petitioner. The respondent no.3-Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma obtained an opinion from the Government Pleader and on the basis of the same allowed the petition of the respondent no. 4 though the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma has no such power to offset an entry in the revenue record on the basis of any shortcoming in the title of the petitioner. The respondent no.3 passed the order merely on the basis of suspicion as the number of the mutation case has not been mentioned in the entry of the name of the writ petitioner mentioned in Register II. The power of attorney holder of the respondent no.4 who has instituted the said case being Chunni Devi and Jayant Kumar Tank are the relatives of the tenant of the writ petitioner namely Rajesh Jethua and Captain Anand who were evicted from the subject land in the year 2008. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no.3 has erred in exercising the power beyond the statutory limit by suspending the issuance of rent receipts to the petitioner even though being the revenue officer, the respondent no.3 cannot look into any dispute of title over any property. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the suspension of grant of rent receipt leads to curtailment of petitioner’s right for an indefinite period; that too without any authority therefor being vested with the respondent no.3. It is further contended by the petitioner that Section 19 of Bihar Tenants’s Holding (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973 stipulates that every entry in the continuous khaityan and tenant’s ledger registrar shall be an evidence of the matter referred to in such entry and shall be presumed to be corrected until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect in the proceedings stipulated therein and no such proceeding stipulated under Section 19 of the said Act of 1973 was ever initiated by any person under Chapter XII of the C.N.T. Act. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the law is well settled that mutation laws are governed by the possession of the subject land and does not affect, determine or alter the title of the said land in any manner. 5. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the law is well settled that mutation laws are governed by the possession of the subject land and does not affect, determine or alter the title of the said land in any manner. 5. In support of her contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph no.40 has reiterated that it is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar & Anr. reported in 2017 (3) JLJR SC 409 wherein it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph 6 and 7 that mere stating the facts and reproduction of passages from the court below and ultimately referring to certain exhibited documents in a cryptic manner, will not convert an unreasoned judgment to a reasoned one and submits that the impugned order passed by the respondent no.2-Deputy Commissioner, Koderma cannot be termed as a reasoned order; therefore on that account also, the said order is bad in law. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sudha Singh vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sudha Singh vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in MANU/JH/0818/2018 wherein, the coordinate Bench of this Court in the facts of the case observed that revisional authority on one hand was of the opinion that the dispute raised pertains to the title over the said land and thus directed the parties to move to the competent civil court and on the other hand has directed the circle officer to stay the issuance of rent receipt which is not tenable in the eyes of law and the said judgment of the coordinate Bench has been upheld by the Division Bench in LPA No. 383 of 2018 dated 26.11.2018. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Mishra vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in MANU/JH/0518/2006 wherein the coordinate Bench has held that jamabandi once created/opened by the competent authority in favour of a person who has been accepted as a tenant under the State by accepting rent for several decades, creates a valuable legal right in his favour and that valuable right cannot be taken away except through the procedure established by law. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Nand Kishor Dubey vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2017 (4) JLJR 645 wherein the coordinate Bench has reiterated the settled principle of law that revenue authority has no jurisdiction to decide the complicated legal dispute including adverse claim of the parties. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relies upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jitan Mahto & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2004 SCC OnLine Jhar 83, wherein the coordinate Bench has reiterated the settled principle of law that revenue authority have no jurisdiction to cancel the zamabandi running in the name of the raiyat/tenant and the remedy with the State authority or private respondent is to take recourse before the civil court of appropriate jurisdiction for a declaration of right, title and interest over the land in question. 11. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Attaul Haque reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Jhar 1814, wherein the Division Bench affirmed the observation made by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.2516 of 2017 wherein the learned Single Judge has observed that there must be an adjudication by appropriate civil court on title before the State can take a unilateral decision not to accept the rent from the occupier of the land whose land has been mutated pursuant to a registered sale deed. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Damri Ram Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. in W.P. (C) No. 5069 of 2008 dated 21.08.2017 wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court has observed that the onus cannot be fastened upon the person who has been in possession of a land since long. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the private respondent no. 5 filed Title Suit No. 49 of 2010 in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division)-III, Koderma for declaration of right, title and interest over 3.91 decimals out of the land which is subject matter of this writ petition and the suit was dismissed on contest vide judgment dated 27.02.2023. Hence, it is submitted that prayer as made in this writ petition be allowed. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the entries in the zamabandi is doubtful hence, the respondent has rightly passed such order. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent no.4 submits that the land in question is bakast malik land of Raja Ram Narain Singh and as the vendor of the petitioner has no right to transfer the same, the sale deed dated 25.12.1957 is void ab initio. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 5 submits that the respondent no. 5 has filed title appeal against the judgment passed by the Civil Court (Sr. Division)-III, Koderma in Title Suit No. 49 of 2010. 17. Learned counsel for the private respondents relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jagdeo Mahto vs. Commissioner North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh & Ors. 5 submits that the respondent no. 5 has filed title appeal against the judgment passed by the Civil Court (Sr. Division)-III, Koderma in Title Suit No. 49 of 2010. 17. Learned counsel for the private respondents relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jagdeo Mahto vs. Commissioner North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh & Ors. reported in [2009 (2) JCR 153 (Jhr)] and submits that therein the Division Bench has reiterated the settled principle of law that any order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and the Division Bench has further observed that jamabandi standing in the name of a particular person can be cancelled in appropriate cases such as when it is brought to the notice of the revenue authorities that the order for creating jamabandi has been passed by an authority who has no authority or jurisdiction at all or where the same is found to be based on the apparent error of record/facts or on law but of course, after giving prior notice and an opportunity of hearing to the concerned person whose interest would be adversely affected. 18. Learned counsel for the private respondents further relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Arjun Das reported in 2005 (1) JLJR 1 and submits that therein the Division Bench of this Court has reiterated the settled principle of law that in a mutation proceeding the circle officer is not supposed to determine the title and the proprietary right in immovable property for the reason that orders in mutation proceedings are not evidence that the successful applicant is in possession as sole legal owner in a proprietary sense to the exclusion of others but at the same time, the circle officer is not precluded from considering the evidence on the basis of which applicant is claiming possession and it has further being observed therein that the doctrine that possession follows title is well recognized and the same means that when the rightful owner is not in actual physical possession, he would in the eye of law be deemed to be in possession. The benefit of such presumption can accrue in favour of the rightful owner but not in favour of wrong doer. 19. The benefit of such presumption can accrue in favour of the rightful owner but not in favour of wrong doer. 19. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the private respondents that setting aside the order passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma will revive an illegal entry made in Register II in favour of the writ petitioner and in this respect, learned counsel for the private respondents relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Raj Kumar Soni vs. State of U.P. reported in (2007) 10 SCC 635 , paragraph nos.16, 17 and 18 of which reads as under:- “16. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. [ AIR 1966 SC 828 ] a Primary Health Centre was formerly inaugurated at a particular village subject to certain conditions. Since those conditions were not satisfied, the Panchayat Samithi resolved to shift it to another village. The Government, in exercise of its review jurisdiction, interfered with the resolution so passed by the Panchayat Samithi without providing any opportunity whatsoever to the Panchayat Samithi. The Government's order was challenged in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The A.P. High Court held the order passed by the Government on the review to be bad, but did not interfere on merits. The Supreme Court, while confirming the order of the High Court observed that: (AIR p. 837, para 17) “If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order—it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi.” The Supreme Court opined that the High Court was right in refusing to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1999) 6 SCC 237 : AIR 1999 SC 2583 ] this Court, relying upon Venkateswara Rao [ AIR 1966 SC 828 ] observed: (SCC p. 244, para 17) “The above case is a clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 18. In our view, on the admitted and indisputable facts set out above, any interference with the impugned order of the District Collector would result in restoration of orders passed earlier in favour of the appellants which are otherwise not in accordance with law. 20. Hence, it is submitted that this writ petition being without any merit be dismissed. 21. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials in the record, the undisputed fact remains that there is no provision of law which empowers the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma to suspend the collection of land revenue and being granted rent receipt to a person whose name appears in the Register II in the concerned circle office. Undisputedly, the name of the writ petitioner has been mentioned in Register II and still it exists. 22. It is a settled principle of law that the entries made in the revenue records are for fiscal purpose only and such entries neither create any title nor extinguishes any title. It is also a settled principle of law that revenue officers cannot adjudicate title of the parties. 23. Neither the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma nor Deputy Commissioner, Koderma has passed any order that if land revenue is not to be collected from the petitioner then from whom it has to be collected. For the purpose of revenue, possession plays a significant role. Here the petitioner claims to be in possession of the land. The title suit for right, title and interest over the portion of the land filed by the respondent no.5 against the petitioner has been dismissed, though appeal is still pending. 24. For the purpose of revenue, possession plays a significant role. Here the petitioner claims to be in possession of the land. The title suit for right, title and interest over the portion of the land filed by the respondent no.5 against the petitioner has been dismissed, though appeal is still pending. 24. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the order dated 28.05.2017 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma in Miscellaneous Revision No. 54 of 2013 and order dated 14.06.2013 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma by which the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma has been affirmed and by which the petitioner has been debarred from depositing the land revenue and being granted rent receipts thereof, even though undisputedly the name of the petitioner still runs in the concerned Register II more so after paying land revenue for about 50 years; is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the order dated 28.05.2017 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma in Miscellaneous Revision No. 54 of 2013 and the said order dated 14.06.2013 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Koderma are set aside. 25. The respondent nos.1 to 3 are directed to collect land revenue and grant land revenue receipt thereof to the writ petitioner in respect of the land in question till the name of the writ petitioner remains in the Register II. 26. It is made clear that parties, if any, aggrieved by the entry of the writ petitioner in the Register II are at liberty to approach the competent civil court to establish their title. 27. It is needless to mention that this Judgment passed in this writ petition has nowhere expressed any opinion regarding the title of any of the parties to the writ petition. 28. This writ petition is disposed of accordingly. 29. Parties to bear their own costs.