JUDGMENT : Ravindra Maithani, J. The challenge in this revision is made to the followings:- (i) Judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 passed in Criminal Case No. 22 of 2017, Ganendrapal Singh Parmar v. Dinesh Bhatt, by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Uttarkashi (“the case”). By it, the revisionist has been convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act”) and has been sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of two years with a fine of Rs. 13,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional simple imprisonment for a period of six months. (ii) Judgment and order dated 26.11.2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2018, Dinesh Bhatt v. Ganendrapal Singh Parmar and another, by the court of Sessions Judge, Uttarkashi. By it, the appeal has been dismissed and the conviction and sentence as recorded in the case affirmed. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. The case is based on a complaint made under Section 138 of the Act filed by Ganendrapal Singh Parmar (“the respondent”) against the revisionist. The respondent died during pendency of the revision. His son has been arrayed as the respondent no. 1/1. It is the case of the respondent that on 28.10.2016, he had advanced a loan of Rs. 12,50,000/- to the revisionist. The revisionist gave three cheques to the respondent of Rs. 5,00,000/-, Rs. 5,00,000/- and Rs. 2,50,000/- respectively. When the cheques were presented before the bank, they were dishonoured. A notice was issued to the revisionist by the respondent, but despite service of the notice, the revisionist did not pay the amount. Therefore, the complaint was filed. 4. After inquiry under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”), by an order dated 27.01.2017, the revisionist was summoned to answer the accusations under Section 138 of the Act. He was read over the accusations. The revisionist admitted that he had given blank cheques in the year 2012. The revisionist, at that stage, had stated that he had returned the loan amount but despite that the cheques were not returned to him and the respondent told it to the revisionist that the cheques are missing and he would locate them and then return them to the revisionist. Thereafter, false case has been lodged against the revisionist pertaining to the cheque amount. 5. The respondent adduced evidence in the case. Thereafter, false case has been lodged against the revisionist pertaining to the cheque amount. 5. The respondent adduced evidence in the case. He is the only witness in the case. Documents have also been filed by the respondent. 6. After evidence, the revisionist was examined under Section 313 of the Code. In answer to query No. 4, at that stage, the revisionist had stated that he had returned the amount pertaining to the cheques but the cheques were not returned to him. 7. After hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 passed in the case, the revisionist has been convicted under Section 138 of the Act and sentenced as stated hereinbefore, a judgment, which is confirmed in the appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the revisionist would submit that the respondent has failed to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt. He would also raise the following points in his submissions:- (i) It has not even been shown by the respondent as to why the amount was given in loan to the revisionist; there is no purpose assigned. It is argued that such a huge amount of Rs. 12,50,000/- may not be advanced by any parties unless there are genuine purpose. (ii) The respondent was not having financial capacity to advance such a huge loan to the revisionist. (iii) The respondent was not an income tax payee. (iv) There is no promissory note executed between the parties. (v) In para 11 of the judgment and order dated 08.08.2018 passed in the case, the court has doubted the prosecution case. But, still convicted the revisionist. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionist would submit that the revisionist may take all probable defences; the defences need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt; it may be proved by preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, it is argued that the judgment and order passed in the case as well as in the appeal is bad in the eyes of law. 10. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the principle of law as laid down in the case of Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 , wherein in para 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the principles of law as follows:- “25. 10. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the principle of law as laid down in the case of Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 , wherein in para 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the principles of law as follows:- “25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. 25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.” 11. Further, in para 26 of the judgment in the case of Basalingapa (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on the cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused….. ”. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent has shown that he had financial capacity to advance the loan; this is so stated by the respondent in his cross-examination and so discussed in para 11 of the judgment in appeal. ”. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the respondent has shown that he had financial capacity to advance the loan; this is so stated by the respondent in his cross-examination and so discussed in para 11 of the judgment in appeal. In addition to it, it is also argued that the revisionist has admitted to have taken Rs. 12,50,000/- as loan and, therefore, in such an eventuality, the question of financial capacity of the respondent has no importance. 13. It is a revision. The scope is quite restricted to the extent of examining the legality, correctness and propriety of an impugned judgment and order. In the revision, generally appreciation of evidence is not done, unless the finding is perverse i.e. against the weight of evidence or admissible evidence has been ignored or inadmissible evidence has been considered. 14. In the instant case, in the affidavit that has been filed by the respondent in his evidence, the respondent has reiterated the version of his complaint. According to it, Rs. 12,50,000/- was given by the respondent to the revisionist on 28.10.2016; the respondent gave three cheques to him, which when presented got dishonoured; despite notice having been served, the revisionist did not repay the loan. The cheques, the bank return memos and other documents have also been filed by the respondent. 15. The respondent as PW 1 has been cross-examined on 19.01.2018. It is quite an extensive cross-examination. 16. Before the cross-examination of the respondent is looked into, what is material is admission and statements that were made by the revisionist during trial. In his examination under Section 251 of the Code, when initially the accusations were read over to the revisionist, he has stated that he had returned the loan amount, but the cheques were not returned, which were given blank in the year 2012. This statement of the revisionist is an admission that the revisionist had taken loan from the respondent. In page 2 of his cross-examination, the respondent as PW 1 has stated as to how did he get Rs. 12,50,000/- so as to advance as a loan to the revisionist. In the cross-examination on behalf of the revisionist, suggestion was made to the respondent that the money, which was taken as a loan by the revisionist has been returned to him. 17. 12,50,000/- so as to advance as a loan to the revisionist. In the cross-examination on behalf of the revisionist, suggestion was made to the respondent that the money, which was taken as a loan by the revisionist has been returned to him. 17. There is another factor, which is important i.e. examination of the revisionist under Section 313 of the Code. Here also, the revisionist has admitted that he had repaid the amount pertaining to cheques, but despite that the cheques were not returned. It is another admission of the revisionist that he had taken loan from the respondent, in lieu whereof, he had given cheques. 18. Under the provisions of the Act, there are certain presumptions. Section 118 of the Act makes presumption with regard to consideration, date, time of acceptance, etc. It reads as follows:- “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.— Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:— (a) of consideration:— that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date:—that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance:—that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer:—that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of endorsements:—that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear then on; (f) as to stamp:— that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course:—that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.” 19. Section 139 of the Act also raises presumption in favour of the holder. It reads as follows:- “139. Section 139 of the Act also raises presumption in favour of the holder. It reads as follows:- “139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.” 20. Admittedly, in the instant case, the respondent is holder of a cheque. The respondent has been able to prove his case. In his cross-examination, nothing has been elicited, which may, in any manner, create any doubt in his version. In addition to it, as stated, at two occasions i.e. (i) when accusations were read over to the revisionist under Section 251 of the Code, the revisionist has admitted to have taken a loan, but according to him, he had repaid the same, however, the cheques were not returned and (ii) at the stage of examination under Section 313 of the Code, when questioned, the revisionist told that he had returned the money pertaining to the cheques but the cheques were not returned. 21. It is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the cheques were given by the revisionist. It is also proved that the cheques were given in discharge of liability of loan. 22. Now, it was the burden of the revisionist to prove as to how and when he repaid the loan and why should he pay the loan without taking the cheques back? The defence that has been taken by the revisionist could have been proved by him even by preponderance of probabilities, which he failed to do so. 23. Having considered the entirety of facts, this Court is of the view that there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the judgments and orders passed by the courts below so far as the conviction of the revisionist is concerned. The conviction of the revisionist under Section 138 of the Act is confirmed. 24. In so far as the sentence of the revisionist is concerned, no argument has been raised on behalf of the revisionist in this appeal. The revisionist has sentenced to two years of simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 13,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional simple imprisonment for a period of six months. 25. 24. In so far as the sentence of the revisionist is concerned, no argument has been raised on behalf of the revisionist in this appeal. The revisionist has sentenced to two years of simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 13,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional simple imprisonment for a period of six months. 25. Under Section 138 of the Act, maximum punishment that is provided is imprisonment for a term, which may be extended to two years or with fine which may be extended to twice the amount of cheque; or with both. 26. In the case of Somnath Sarkar v. Utpal Basu Mallick and another, (2013) 16 SCC 465 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court adverted to the concept of sentence in the case like the instant one. In paras 13, 14 and 15 of the judgment [authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur (as he then was)], it has been observed as follows:- “13. Having said that we have no hesitation in adding that the High Court may have indeed been justified in setting aside the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. We say so having regard to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in [Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 520 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1328] where this Court briefly examined the object sought to be achieved by the provisions of Section 138 and the purpose underlying the punishment provided therein. This Court has held that unlike other crimes, punishment in Section 138 cases is meant more to ensure payment of money rather than to seek retribution. The Court said : (SCC p. 670, para 17) “17. Unlike that for other forms of crime, the punishment here (insofar as the complainant is concerned) is not a means of seeking retribution, but is more a means to ensure payment of money. The complainant's interest lies primarily in recovering the money rather than seeing the drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of the cheque.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The complainant's interest lies primarily in recovering the money rather than seeing the drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of the cheque.” (emphasis supplied) 14. This Court also took note of the number of cases involving dishonour of cheques choking the criminal justice system of this country, especially at the level of the Magisterial Courts, and held that dishonour of cheque being a regulatory offence, aimed at ensuring the reliability of negotiable instruments, the provision for imprisonment extending up to two years was only intended to ensure quick recovery of the amount payable under the instrument. The following passages from the decision are in this regard apposite : (Damodar S. Prabhu case [Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 520 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1328] , SCC p. 666, paras 4-5) “4. … It is quite evident that the legislative intent was to provide a strong criminal remedy in order to deter the worryingly high incidence of dishonour of cheques. While the possibility of imprisonment up to two years provides a remedy of a punitive nature, the provision for imposing a ‘fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque’ serves a compensatory purpose. What must be remembered is that the dishonour of a cheque can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. The impact of this offence is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. 5. Invariably, the provision of a strong criminal remedy has encouraged the institution of a large number of cases that are relatable to the offence contemplated by Section 138 of the Act. So much so, that at present a disproportionately large number of cases involving the dishonour of cheques is choking our criminal justice system, especially at the level of Magistrates' Courts. As per the 213th Report of the Law Commission of India, more than 38 lakhs cheque bouncing cases were pending before various courts in the country as of October 2008. This is putting an unprecedented strain on our judicial system.” (emphasis supplied) 15. As per the 213th Report of the Law Commission of India, more than 38 lakhs cheque bouncing cases were pending before various courts in the country as of October 2008. This is putting an unprecedented strain on our judicial system.” (emphasis supplied) 15. We do not consider it necessary to examine or exhaustively enumerate situations in which courts may remain content with imposition of a fine without any sentence of imprisonment. There is considerable judicial authority for the proposition that the courts can reduce the period of imprisonment depending upon the nature of the transaction, the bona fides of the accused, the contumacy of his conduct, the period for which the prosecution goes on, the amount of the cheque involved, the social strata to which the parties belong, so on and so forth. Some of these factors may indeed make out a case where the court may impose only a sentence of fine upon the defaulting drawer of the cheque. There is for that purpose considerable discretion vested in the court concerned which can and ought to be exercised in appropriate cases for good and valid reasons. Suffice it to say that the High Court was competent on a plain reading of Section 138 to impose a sentence of fine only upon the appellant. Inasmuch as the High Court did so, it committed no jurisdictional error. In the absence of a challenge to the order passed by the High Court deleting the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant, we do not consider it necessary or proper to say anything further at this stage.” 27. In the instant case, the maximum sentence has been imposed. Having considered, the amount involved, the relationship between the parties and other attending factors, this Court is of the view that the sentence of imprisonment is on excessive side and the interest of justice would be served, if the sentence of the revisionist is reduced to three months. 28. The conviction of the revisionist under Section 138 of the Act is confirmed. 29. The revisionist shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 138 of the Act. The fine shall remain unaltered. 30. The impugned judgments and orders are modified to the extent as indicated above. 31. The criminal revision is partly allowed accordingly. 32. The conviction of the revisionist under Section 138 of the Act is confirmed. 29. The revisionist shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 138 of the Act. The fine shall remain unaltered. 30. The impugned judgments and orders are modified to the extent as indicated above. 31. The criminal revision is partly allowed accordingly. 32. Let a copy of this judgment along with the lower court record be forwarded to the court concerned.