JUDGMENT : SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J. 1. This case is arising out of a consolidation proceedings. According to averment made in writ petition, original petitioners and original respondent Nos. 3 to 12 were descendants of a common ancestor namely, Madhu Nath. The pedigree which has not been in much dispute is part of writ petition being Annexure No. 1. 2. According to further averment, initially, land in dispute was recorded alone in the name of original petitioners and before settlement of 1324 fasli, name of Baldev alone was recorded in revenue records. Name of original respondents were never recorded before consolidation commenced. 3. There had been a prior litigation between the parties. A suit under section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 was filed by some of original respondents against original petitioners which was decree on 14.03.1967, therefore, names of respondents i.e. descendants of Beni Sevak and Rajmani were entered in revenue record, as co-tenure holders over Khatas in dispute. 4. The decree was challenged by way of filing an appeal at behest of original petitioners, which was allowed by an order dated 21.6.1968. A second appeal thereof, was filed by original contesting respondents before the Board of Revenue, and since consolidation proceedings commenced, therefore, second appeal was abated. It was further averred that name of respondents were recorded in pursuance of decree, which was later on set aside in appeal, therefore, their names were wrongly continued in revenue records. There is no dispute that land belongs to different Khatas situated in three different villages. 5. During consolidation proceedings, various objections were filed. The Consolidation Officer has consolidated all objections filed in respect of different khatas situated in three villages and by a common order dated 24.11.1972, held that original petitioners alone were tenure holders of land in dispute and it was directed that name of contesting respondents be expunged and be deleted from revenue records. 6. In aforesaid circumstances, the original contesting respondents filed an appeal. 6. In aforesaid circumstances, the original contesting respondents filed an appeal. The Settlement Officer Consolidation, Deoria, Sadar by order dated 27.12.1973 held that whole family except, branch of Ramswarup which had separated earlier (about 100 years ago) was joint till the year 1928, whereas case of original petitioners was that when branch of Ramswarup got separated, entire family got separated and thereafter each branch of family have acquired property on its own, manage it and not from nucleus of joint family. 7. Sri H.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Anup Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for petitioners has submitted that reliance placed by Appellate Authority on a judgment passed by this Court in a case of Achuta Nand Tewari and others and others vs. Chandrabali Nath Tewari and others, AIR (33) 1946 Allahabad 142 between same parties, wherein it was held that family remained joint and since they have contributed in a sale deed which was subject matter of above referred judgment, therefore property was from nucleus of joint family was erroneous as issue of jointness of family was not an issue in that case. According to petitioners, entire family got separated many years ago and though they have acquired property not from any nucleus of joint family as alleged by respondents. He referred following paragraph of aforesaid judgment: “Coming now to the two promissory notes executed on the 28th of February, 1927, by Jarbandhan and Ram Kishore, we find that they were discharged in the following manner. On the 26th of June, 1927, four promissory notes were executed by different members of this family in favour of different persons. The first was executed for a sum of Rs. 125 by Chandrabali in favour of Sumari Ahir, the second by Ram Kishore also for a sum of Rs. 125 in favour of Pranpati Hajjam, the third by Jarbandhan for a sum of Rs. 175 in favour of Budhu and the fourth by Raghunandan for a sum of Rs. 200 in favour of Sukhai Ahir. The total consideration of this debt was Rs. 625. As a result of these four promissory notes the two primissory notes of the 28th of February, 1927, by Jarbandhan and Ram Kishore were wiped off. Of the four promissory notes mentioned above, the two by Ram Kishore and Jarbandhan do not concern us in this appeal and may therefore be dismissed from consideration. 625. As a result of these four promissory notes the two primissory notes of the 28th of February, 1927, by Jarbandhan and Ram Kishore were wiped off. Of the four promissory notes mentioned above, the two by Ram Kishore and Jarbandhan do not concern us in this appeal and may therefore be dismissed from consideration. Of the remaining two, we shall first take up the one executed by Chandrabali for a sum of Rs. 125 in favour of Sumari Ahir. Instead of Chandrabali paying it off, Raghunandan renewed it by a promissory note of the 1st of April, 1930, which was further renewed on the 5th of March, 1933, and ultimately paid off on the 18th of June, 1934. The sum actually paid was Rs. 142. We now come to the last of the two other promissory notes executed by Jarbandhan in favour of Sukhai for a sum of Rs. 200. We again find Raghunandan and not Jarbandhan taking upon himself the liability for the discharge of the debt. The renewal of the above promissory note was made on the 5th of May, 1933, and it was finally paid off by him on the 21st of June, 1934. The sum actually paid was Rs.245. This completes the history of the promissory notes. It must also be mentioned that the family separated some time in 1928. The present claim has been brought by Raghunandan for contribution on the basis of the payment made by him on the 19th of October, 1931, in discharge of the promissory note executed by him for Rs. 70, the payment made on the 18th of June, 1934, in discharge of the promote executed on the 28th of February, 1927, for a sumpf Rs. 400 in favour of Tula Dhar, that of the 18th of June, 1934, in discharge of the promissory note of the 26th of June, 1927, executed by Chandrabali for a sum of Rs. 125 in favour of Sumari Ahir and finally the payment of the 21st of June, 1934, in discharge of the promissory note executed by Raghunandan in favour of Sukhai in lieu of the promissory note executed by Ram Kishore for a sum of Rs. 300 in favour of Tula Dhar on the 28th of February, 1927.” 8. The Appellate Authority has allowed the appeal and held that contesting respondents were co-sharers. 300 in favour of Tula Dhar on the 28th of February, 1927.” 8. The Appellate Authority has allowed the appeal and held that contesting respondents were co-sharers. The aforesaid referred orders were challenged by way of filing revision petitions, which were dismissed by a common order dated 02.01.1975. The relevant parts of the order passed by Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer Consolidation and Revision Authority are as follows: 9. As referred above, the land in dispute was situated in three villages. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer in favour of the contesting petitioners was set aside by the Appellate Authority and confirmed by the Revisional Authority, with an observation that family separated sometime in the year 1928 and not earlier as alleged by respondents. Petitioners have challenged the orders passed by Appellate and Revisional Authority by way of filing present writ petition. 10. Learned Senior counsel for petitioners referred averments mentioned in paragraph No. 11 of writ petition and submitted that not only branch of Ramswarup got separated before 1890 but entire family also got separated and thereafter every branch was taking care of their own property as well as acquired new properties also. He further submitted that according to doctrine of Hindu law when one branch separates, all other branches must be deemed to have been separated. 11. Learned Senior counsel for petitioners submitted that various documentary evidence were filed by petitioners to show that all branches were dealing with various properties severally in their own rights. A list thereof was on record in support of their submission that various branches of family have been having separate dealings either by way of sale and purchase in respect of various pieces of property. 12. Learned Senior counsel vehemently urged that there was no jointness of property as well as there was no proof that property in dispute was developed from any nucleus of joint family. He further submitted that respondents did not take any step in respect of land holdings in dispute since 1889 or earlier when they got separated and it could be considered to be a prove that they have no right, title or interest in the holdings. 13. He further submitted that respondents did not take any step in respect of land holdings in dispute since 1889 or earlier when they got separated and it could be considered to be a prove that they have no right, title or interest in the holdings. 13. Learned Senior counsel also pointed that original petitioners entered into a compromise under which contesting respondents were given very small piece of land in three villages to end all disputes but they have not been given any share in property at all nor was any share in property recognized by compromise. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that compromise had not been accepted and verified by all the respondents, therefore, it was only a dead letter and was wholly irrelevant. 14. Learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgments passed by Supreme Court in Babulal Badriprasad Varma Vs. Surat Municipal Corporation and others, (2008) 12 SCC 401 , Union of India and others Vs. N. Murugesan and others, (2022) 2 SCC 25 , Acre Polymers Private Limited Vs. Alphine Pharmaceuticals Private Limited and others, (2022) 2 SCC 221 . Relevant parts thereof are also reproduced hereinafter: Babulal Badriprasad Varma (supra): “43. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 16(2), 4th Edn. Para 907, it is stated: “The expression ‘waiver’ may, in law, bear different meanings. The primary meaning has been said to be the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. The primary meaning has been said to be the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. It may arise from a party making an election, for example whether or not to exercise a contractual right......Waiver may also be by virtue of equitable or promissory estoppel; unlike waiver arising from an election, no question arises of any particular knowledge on the part of the person making the representation, and the estoppel may be suspensory only… Where the waiver is not express, it may be implied from conduct which is inconsistent with the continuance of the right, without the need for writing or for consideration moving from, or detriment to, the party who benefits by the waiver, but mere acts of indulgence will not amount to waiver; nor may a party benefit from the waiver unless he has altered his position in reliance on it.” Union of India and others (supra): Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Acre Polymers Private Limited (supra): 16. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver applies when a party knows the material facts and is cognizant of the legal rights in that matter, and yet for some consideration consciously abandons the existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege. Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver applies when a party knows the material facts and is cognizant of the legal rights in that matter, and yet for some consideration consciously abandons the existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege. Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. The fact that the other side has acted on it, is sufficient consideration. 15. Per contra, Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for contesting respondents submitted that orders passed by Appellate Authority and confirmed by Revisional Authority does not warrant any interference of this Court under writ jurisdiction since that they were based on material and evidence on record. He also submitted that both authorities have rightly placed reliance on Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra) that except one branch of family which got separated before 1889, entire family remained joint till 1928 and properties in dispute were developed from money of joint family nucleus. 16. Learned counsel further submitted that there were documents to show that jointness of family remained in existence till 1928. Learned counsel have placed reliance on judgments passed by Supreme Court in Kailash Rai Vs. Jai Jai Ram and others, (1973) 1 SCC 527 as well as by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Kunj Bihari and others Vs. Ganga Sahai Pandey and others, 2013 (8) ADJ 97 . He also placed reliance on compromise that right of respondents were accepted by petitioners. 17. Heard counsel for parties and perused the record. 18. As per the pedigree being part of record is not under dispute that petitioners and contesting respondents are descendant to one common ancestor. It is also not in dispute that initially, there was a joint family and both parties remained part of it. The parties were also in agreement that one of the branch headed by Ramswarup, got separated about 100 years ago. The only dispute that remains was whether on separation of one branch of joint family, its jointness continued thereafter or not, though opposite parties have accepted that after 1928, jointness of family discontinued. 19. The parties were also in agreement that one of the branch headed by Ramswarup, got separated about 100 years ago. The only dispute that remains was whether on separation of one branch of joint family, its jointness continued thereafter or not, though opposite parties have accepted that after 1928, jointness of family discontinued. 19. Petitioners have placed heavy reliance on a proceeding between parties under Section 229 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 to the extent that it was on basis of names of respondents to be entered in revenue record for the first time, as the aforesaid suit filed by them was decreed and despite an appeal at behest of original petitioners were allowed, still names of respondents continued to be remained in revenue records and later on, since consolidation proceedings commenced, therefore, second appeal filed by respondents was abated. It is well settled that since proceedings were abated, therefore, it has no legal consequences. 20. Both authorities i.e. Revisional as well as Appellate Authority have placed reliance on Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra), a judgment passed by this Court in a second appeal, between parties arising out of a suit for contribution. Both authorities have held that aforesaid referred case was in regard to Bainama executed in the year 1927 and money utilized for that purpose was from the nucleus of joint family, therefore, it was held that property in dispute acquired in the year 1890 being much prior to it, ought to be held that it was developed and acquired from joint family nucleus i.e. family was jointness of family remained at least till 1927. 21. It was also held that a mortgage deed of year 1898 also referred name of all parties, therefore, family was not separated earlier to it. Both authorities have held that in 1890 the family was joint and every branch lived as a joint family. Both authorities have held that original petitioners have not able to prove that separation occurred and property in dispute was developed by their own money and not from nucleus of joint family. Both authorities have also followed the findings returned by this Court in Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra) to the extent above. 22. Both authorities have held that original petitioners have not able to prove that separation occurred and property in dispute was developed by their own money and not from nucleus of joint family. Both authorities have also followed the findings returned by this Court in Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra) to the extent above. 22. It was on petitioners to prove their claim that property in dispute was acquired by them and not from nucleus of joint family, however, there was nothing on record as to how property in dispute was acquired or developed whereas per contra there were various documents on record which indicate that since family was joint, therefore, it was deemed that property in dispute was acquired from nucleus of joint property as well as there are documents on record such as mortgage deeds executed at different time that parties remained as a joint family at least till 1927. 23. Petitioners had tried to dispute above referred documents, however, in absence of any contrary material document as well as considering findings arrived by two authorities, I am of considered opinion that such document could not be disputed and its legal consequence shall follow. In Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra) though jointness of property was not the issue involved still there was a reference that jointness of family remained at least till 1928 as well as that debt was originally taken by joint family and, therefore, the entire family was liable for debt i.e. all parties have to contribute for it. 24. The judgments placed by petitioners are on waiver i.e. relinquishment of a right, however, in the present case, theory of waiver is not applicable since the parties were litigating which is clearly evident from Achuta Nand Tewari and others (supra) whereas judgments relied upon by respondents in Kailash Rai (supra) and Kunj Bihari and others (supra) would be applicable in facts and circumstances of the case. Relevant paragraphs of Kunj Bihari and others (supra) are reproduced hereinafter: “34. Brothers may be presumed to be joint but conclusion of jointness with collaterals must be affirmatively proved. The presumption lies strongly in favour of father and son that they are living jointly unless proved otherwise. 35. This presumption, however, does not apply in respect of property. There is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, possess joint property. Brothers may be presumed to be joint but conclusion of jointness with collaterals must be affirmatively proved. The presumption lies strongly in favour of father and son that they are living jointly unless proved otherwise. 35. This presumption, however, does not apply in respect of property. There is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, possess joint property. As per Mitakshara law, the possession of property is not a necessary requisite for the constitution of a joint family, though where persons live together, joint in food and worship, it is difficult to conceive that they are possessing no property whatever, such as ordinary household articles which they would enjoy in common. 36. In Sher Singh v. Gamdoor Singh, 1997 (2) HLR 81 (SC), the Court said that once existence of a joint family is not in dispute, necessarily the property held by family assumed the character of a coparcenary property and every member of family would be entitled, by birth, to a share in coparcenary property, unless any one of the coparcener pleads, by separate pleadings and proves, that some of the properties or all the properties are his self-acquired properties and cannot be blended in coparcenary property. Merely because the family is joint, there is no presumption of joint property. A Hindu, even if he be joint may possess separate property. Such property belongs exclusively to him. Neither member of the coparcenary, nor his male issue, acquires any interest in it by birth. On his death (intestate), it passes by succession to his heirs and not by survivorship to the surviving coparcener. The existence of joint family does not raise presumption that it owns properties jointly. But once joint family nucleus is either proved or admitted so as to draw inference that such property could have been acquired out of joint family funds, the burden shifts to the party alleging self acquisition, to establish affirmatively, that such property was acquired without aid of joint family. Initial burden always lies upon the party asserting that any item of property is joint family property. 37. There may be a situation, where a property may be joint property without having been ancestral. Initial burden always lies upon the party asserting that any item of property is joint family property. 37. There may be a situation, where a property may be joint property without having been ancestral. Where the members of a joint family acquire property, by or with the assistance of joint funds, or by their joint labour, or in their joint business, or by a gift or, a grant made to them, as a joint family, such property is the coparcenary property of persons who have acquired it, whether it is an increment to ancestral property, or whether it has arisen without any nucleus of descended property. In other words, when members of a joint family, by their joint labour or in their joint business, acquire property, that property, in absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention, would be owned by them as joint family property and their male issues would necessarily acquire a right by birth in such property. Where the business is carried on and property is acquired jointly during subsistence of joint status, the presumption is that the property, so acquired, is joint family property, even if it was acquired without the aid of ancestral nucleus. This presumption may be rebutted by leading evidence indicative of acquirers' intention to own property as co-owners between themselves. Property acquired by joint labour without the aid of joint family property is the joint property of the acquirers. The issues of acquirers do not take any interest by birth. So long as a family remains an undivided family, two or more members of it, whether they be members of different branches or of the one and the same branch of family, can have no legal existence as a separate independent unit, but all the members of a branch, or of a sub-branch, can form a distinct and separate corporate unit within the larger corporate family and hold property as such. Such property will be joint family property of the members of the branch inter se, but will be separate property of that branch in relation to the larger family. Property acquired by members of different branches cannot partake the character of joint family property as the members will be in the position of co-sharers and the said property will devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship. Property acquired by members of different branches cannot partake the character of joint family property as the members will be in the position of co-sharers and the said property will devolve by inheritance and not by survivorship. A property, originally self-acquired, may become joint family property, if it has been voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock, with the intention of abandoning all separate claims upon it. 38. From the above discussion, it cannot be doubted that question No. 1 has to be answered partly in affirmative to the extent that vis-a-vis jointness of the family, there is a presumption in favour of jointness and burden lies upon the defendant to prove that the HUF has disrupted, particularly, when both the parties had not disputed this fact that family was a joint family, but with respect to its disruption, a time factor has been provided, meaning thereby once a joint family's existence from initial is not in dispute, the time when such jointness ceased would have to be proved, who asserts such disruption. LAC, however, has not placed burden upon the appellants in regard to the status of joint family but the relevant issues have been considered in the context of property which was claimed to be joint family property. As already discussed above, the “joint family” and “joint family property” are two different things. There lies a presumption in favour of former but not so in respect to later. LAC while placing burden upon appellants to prove that property in dispute was a joint family property, has not committed any error inasmuch jointness in respect of family status is one thing, but there is no such presumption in respect of property. With respect to joint Hindu family and the question as to on whom burden to prove would lie, I may refer certain decisions of Apex Court being law of the land, and binding on this Court. ” (Emphasis Supplied) 25. As discussed above, in the present case, from material available on record, the Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority have returned a legally sustainable finding that jointness of family remained in existence till 1928 despite one of branches was admittedly separated about 100 years ago. 26. The petitioners have failed to prove their claim that jointness of family extinguished when one branch of family got separated about 100 years ago. 26. The petitioners have failed to prove their claim that jointness of family extinguished when one branch of family got separated about 100 years ago. There were documents on record which suggests that jointness remained consistent. Members have contributed to clear debt as well as jointness of family also indicates from various mortgage deeds. These documents are not disputed and as discussed above, the finding returned by both authorities are not perverse and, therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere with impugned orders, accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.