JUDGMENT : MAUNA M. BHATT, J. 1. Dena Bank through his regional manager has filed this petition seeking following reliefs: “5(a) Your Lordships be pleased to issue a writ of Certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the like nature quashing and setting aside the award dated 29.06.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad in reference (I.T.C) No.26/2008 [Old reference (I.T.C.) No.8/1996 – Reference (C.G.I.T.A.) No.37/2004] at Annexure “A”. (b) During the pendency of admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, stay the operation, implementation and effect of the award dated 29.06.2010 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Reference (I.T.C.) No.26/2008 (Old Reference (I.T.C.) No.8/1996 – Reference (C.G.I.T.A.) No.37/2004] at Annexure “A”. (c) Such other and further relief/s as may be deemed just and proper in the facts of the case may be granted.” 2. It is case of the petitioner that award of the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 29.06.2010 in Reference (I.T.C.) No.26 of 2008 is erroneous since the Tribunal while passing the award has committed not only an error of law but also an error of jurisdiction by applying wrong standard of proof for evaluating the finding of Inquiry Officer and also by recording its own finding after re-appreciating the evidence on record of departmental enquiry, particularly, when the legality and validity of enquiry proceedings was admitted by the respondent – workman before the Industrial Tribunal. 3. Brief facts referred in the petition are as under: 3.1. At the relevant time, the respondent was working as Peon in Vijapur Branch (Mehsana Region) of the petitioner – Bank. Gujarat Finance – Vijapur, a customer of the petitioner – Bank was having an account with Vijapur Branch, who applied for new cheque book on 02.11.1987. The new cheque book containing cheque Nos. E 411501 to 411600 was issued on 04.11.1987. Before the cheque book was delivered to the customer, one cheque was stolen from it. The said cheque was stolen by respondent – workman who thereafter managed to open the account in the name of Shri Mahesbhai Ramabhai Patel with Mehsana District Central Co-operative Bank, Vijapur Branch. It was case of the petitioner – Bank that the said cheque was deposited having amount of Rs.40,000/- in favour of Shri Maheshbhai Patel. The complaint of stolen cheque was filed by customer before police. FIR was lodged against respondent-workman. It was case of the petitioner – Bank that the said cheque was deposited having amount of Rs.40,000/- in favour of Shri Maheshbhai Patel. The complaint of stolen cheque was filed by customer before police. FIR was lodged against respondent-workman. On account of above, the respondent was charge-sheeted for fraudulent withdrawal of Rs. 40,000/- from account of customer by forging the signature. Respondent – workman was arrested. It was case of the petitioner – Bank that during investigation before the police authority, the respondent admitted the offence, and therefore, the report of inquiry officer holding the charges as proved against the workman was proper. Pursuant thereto the respondent – workman by order dated 26.08.1991 was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was challenged by the workman before the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (I.T.C) No.26/2008 and the Industrial Tribunal by award dated 29.06.2010 held that dismissal of the workman was illegal. The Industrial Tribunal further directed reinstatement with continuity of service and also awarded 25% backwages. Against the award dated 29.06.2010, present petition is filed. 4. Heard Mr. Varun Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner – Bank and Mr. Jigar Dave, learned advocate for respondent – workman. 5. Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner – Bank submitted that the award of the Industrial Tribunal is erroneous on the following grounds: (i) The respondent – workman was dismissed from service on account of gross misconduct causing damage to the property of the petitioner. The misconduct of respondent had caused damage to the reputation of Bank. For misconduct, inquiry was initiated and after conducting inquiry, the inquiry officer gave his report holding the charges as proved. Against order of inquiry officer, an appeal was preferred, which was also rejected. (ii) Before the Industrial Tribunal, workman admitted the legality and validity of departmental inquiry. Therefore, only challenge available was in relation to the dis-proportionality of the punishment and perversity of findings. Without examining case of the workman on the aspect of perversity of findings and dis-proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the I.D. Act, the Tribunal erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record and, therefore, the award is erroneous. (iii) The Tribunal has erred by applying the standard of proof applicable in a criminal trial in departmental proceedings. Without examining case of the workman on the aspect of perversity of findings and dis-proportionality of punishment under Section 11A of the I.D. Act, the Tribunal erred in re-appreciating the evidence on record and, therefore, the award is erroneous. (iii) The Tribunal has erred by applying the standard of proof applicable in a criminal trial in departmental proceedings. In the departmental proceedings, the proof applicable would be preponderance of probabilities where strict proof of evidence is not required and, therefore, reappreciation of evidence particularly without there being any perversity in the order of penalty was not warranted. (iv) The Tribunal erred in holding that the findings of inquiry officer was based on only two management witnesses - Mr. Brahmbhatt and Mr. Thakar, thus no strong evidence was available on record. The Industrial Tribunal erred in not appreciating the documentary evidence on record. In the inquiry report, every aspect was considered and, therefore, the findings of Industrial Tribunal are erroneous. Once the legality and validity of the departmental proceedings were admitted, the Industrial Tribunal committed an error of jurisdiction by holding that the inquiry officer cannot be said to be neutral person as respondent was working as subordinate to the said inquiry officer. (v) The Industrial Tribunal had erred in relying upon the judgment of the trial Court dated 06.03.2007, where the respondent was acquitted because, consideration of evidences in relation to departmental proceedings and criminal trial are different. The standard of proof applicable in the criminal case would not be applicable in the departmental inquiry since both the proceedings are distinct and separate. Further, criminal proceeding was initiated pursuant to the complaint filed by third party whereas in the departmental proceedings, the charges were held to be proved. It was not the case of workman that malafide action or victimization was done in initiating the departmental proceedings. (vi) Referring to the inquiry report, learned advocate submitted that inquiry officer in the report had held that the confession of the respondent was voluntary. No document was produced to support the case that confession was by coercion. (vii) It was a case of loss of confidence and the petitioner – Bank engaged in financial dealings, the act of the respondent involving financial misappropriation could not be tolerated, particularly, when the misconduct was proved in the departmental proceedings. No document was produced to support the case that confession was by coercion. (vii) It was a case of loss of confidence and the petitioner – Bank engaged in financial dealings, the act of the respondent involving financial misappropriation could not be tolerated, particularly, when the misconduct was proved in the departmental proceedings. Learned advocate, therefore, submitted that the award of the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside. (viii) On the aspect of backwages, learned advocate submitted that no proof was produced by the workman for his unemployment during the interregnum period and therefore, grant of 25% backwages deserves to be quashed and set aside. (ix) In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions: (a) Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. M.Mani (2018) 1 SCC 285 (b) State Bank of India and Ors. vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212 (c) Osmanbhai Aba Pandya vs. Zonal Manager, Bank of Bardoa, North Gujarat Zone in Special Civil Application No. 2341 of 2015 dated 22.03.2018 (d) Sureshchandra S.Mehta vs. Diamines & Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. in special Civil Application No.11592 and 14091 of 1994 dated 04.08.2006 (e) Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. M.G.Vittal Rao (2012) 1 SCC 442 (f) Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (1996) 10 SCC 659 (g) U.P. State Brassware Corporation Ltd. vs. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 (x) In the alternative, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the Industrial Tribunal, ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence and to prove misconduct of the respondent before the Tribunal if the report of the Inquiry Officer was found improper or perverse. Instead, the Industrial Tribunal re-appreciated the evidence which is impermissible and therefore, the matter may be remanded to the Tribunal, permitting the petitioner to lead evidence and to prove the misconduct. In support, he relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. A.B.Zodge and Anr. AIR 1996 SC 1556 . 6. On the other hand, Mr. Jigar Dave, learned advocate for the respondent – workman submitted that award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 29.06.2010 is just and legal on the following grounds: (i) FIR, under the provisions of Indian Penal Code was registered on 09.12.1987 against the respondent by one customer. AIR 1996 SC 1556 . 6. On the other hand, Mr. Jigar Dave, learned advocate for the respondent – workman submitted that award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 29.06.2010 is just and legal on the following grounds: (i) FIR, under the provisions of Indian Penal Code was registered on 09.12.1987 against the respondent by one customer. Pursuant to which, departmental proceedings were initiated. The disciplinary authority framed charges accordingly and conducted inquiry, resulting into a report dated 15.04.1991. In the report, the inquiry officer had relied upon deposition of Branch Manager Shri J.B. Bhrambhatt and Mr. Navinbhai Thakar. Except these two officers of Bank, no other person was examined as witness. Therefore, the findings of the Industrial Tribunal that the inquiry was conducted in gross violation is appropriate. (ii) For the guilt admitted by respondent, learned advocate submitted that confession before police authority is a very weak piece of evidence and therefore sole reliance placed by the inquiry officer on the confession made by the workman before police, in presence of Branch Manager Shri J.B. Bhrambhatt and one Shri Navinbhai Thakar was of no consequence. He relied upon the decision of Roopsingh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors. reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 to submit that a person cannot be held guilty on basis of confession. The inquiry officer ought to have taken into consideration some other evidence which he failed and, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal had rightly held that the inquiry proceedings were perverse and without any basis. Similar is the situation with regard to recovery of amount from the account of workman-Shri Jivabhai S.Parmar and Shri Sureshbhai Nai. The recovery of amount is also a very weak piece of evidence and, therefore, sole reliance cannot be placed on the same. (iii) Undisputedly, before inquiry officer on all dates the workman remained present and upon completion of the proceedings on each day, he denied the charges levelled against him. However, he could not produce any witness or evidence in support of his innocence and that could not be the sole ground for holding the charges as proved. Learned advocate submitted that the powers of Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court are wide and in the proceedings pending before it, the Court can go into merits of the inquiry and legality and validity of the inquiry proceedings once the findings are challenged. Learned advocate submitted that the powers of Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court are wide and in the proceedings pending before it, the Court can go into merits of the inquiry and legality and validity of the inquiry proceedings once the findings are challenged. (iv) On the findings of the trial Court, learned advocate submitted that present is a case of honorable acquittal where the trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record, had held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused. In this case, no witness had turned hostile and even the investigating officer and the Manager of the Bank had not supported the case of prosecution. The report of the handwriting expert was not even recognized by the Criminal Court. Therefore, in this case, the last line of the trial court judgment is not to be considered but if the judgment is considered in entirety, here is a case where no evidence was placed on record by the prosecution. Most importantly, no FIR was filed by the Bank. Even the collusion between Shri Jivabhai Parmar and Shri Sureshbhai Nai could not be proved. In support of his submissions, learned advocate relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Ramlal vs. State of Rajasthan reported in Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023 arising out of SLP (C) No.33423 of 2018. (v) The respondent was appointed in a bank on temporary basis from 10.11.1975 to 13.02.1981. He was made permanent on 04.04.1981 and continued in service till his dismissal on 26.08.1991. The respondent reached the age of superannuation on 30.05.2017 despite that till date no gratuity and provident fund amount has been paid. Pension is also not paid. Therefore, there is a huge financial loss. This is a case where no evidence was available and therefore for workman’s 20 years of service, directions may be issued to give the benefits as expeditiously as possible. 7. Considered the submissions. Revisitation of following facts would be relevant. (i) Respondent –workman was charge-sheeted by a memorandum of charge dated 26.07.1986. (ii) Inquiry was initiated and after following due procedure, the inquiry officer by report dated 15.04.1991 held the charges as proved. In the inquiry report, reliance was placed on confession of workman before the police authority, the statement of Mr. J.B. Bramhbhatt, Branch Manager, Vijapur and a report dated 06.01.1988 of Mr. Navin. (ii) Inquiry was initiated and after following due procedure, the inquiry officer by report dated 15.04.1991 held the charges as proved. In the inquiry report, reliance was placed on confession of workman before the police authority, the statement of Mr. J.B. Bramhbhatt, Branch Manager, Vijapur and a report dated 06.01.1988 of Mr. Navin. M. Thakar, Regional Manager, Mehsana wherein Shri J.B.Bramhbhatt and Mr. Navin Thakar had stated that the workman had confessed in their presence before the police authority when he was brought to the Bank Branch. Further reliance was placed on copies of the cheque issued by workman from his Saving Account No.3089 in favour of Mr. Yogeshwar Shroff and Financier and its return memo submitted by the presenting officer through Ex-M-4, Ex-M-6, Ex-M-9 and Ex-M-16. The cheque was dishonored with remarks insufficient funds. The inquiry officer on above evidences held that the workman had intentionally and fraudulently misused bank money by using/encashing stolen cheque through Mehsana District Cooperative Bank Ltd., Vijapur. (iii) The second reliance placed was on the aspect that the workman was in a habit of creating debts and, therefore, it was presumed that the cheque was stolen by him. The I.O. relied upon name given by respondent, of one Shri Sureshbhai Nai, who was an outsider and it was stated in the report that in collusion with him, the amount was fraudulently withdrawn. The recovery of Rs.9,000/- from the employee and Rs.17,000/- from his associate Mr. Sureshbhai Nair was considered for holding the charges as proved. 7.1 Against the order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent preferred an appeal and the appellate authority also held the charges as proved. 7.2 Admittedly workman had not challenged the legality and validity of the inquiry procedure but the findings of the inquiry officer’s report were challenged. Since, the findings of the inquiry report were challenged, the Industrial Tribunal, in the opinion of this court had rightly gone in to the merits of the inquiry report. 7.3. It would be profitable to refer to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited vs. Shri P.P.Mundhe reported in (1975) 2 SCC 661 , wherein it is held as under: “22. 7.3. It would be profitable to refer to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited vs. Shri P.P.Mundhe reported in (1975) 2 SCC 661 , wherein it is held as under: “22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue.. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication.” Therefore, the submission of learned advocate for the petitioner that if the Tribunal was not in conformity with the findings of the Inquiry Report, it ought to have remanded the matter permitting the petitioner Bank to prove the charges before it, in the opinion of this Court does not merit acceptance. 7.4. On merits of the charges, as a matter of fact, issuance of cheque book to the concerned customer was not the work to be done by respondent – workman. It is duty of the Manager to issue complete cheque book to the concerned customer. Further, by placing reliance on the complaint filed by the complainant, charge-sheet was issued and inquiry was initiated. Heavy reliance was placed by inquiry officer and appellate authority on the confession of respondent before the police authority, however, police authority was not examined during the inquiry proceedings. Further, by placing reliance on the complaint filed by the complainant, charge-sheet was issued and inquiry was initiated. Heavy reliance was placed by inquiry officer and appellate authority on the confession of respondent before the police authority, however, police authority was not examined during the inquiry proceedings. Mere opening of an account in Mehsana District Bank, Vijapur in name of Mr. Maheshbhai Ramabhai Patel and thereafter recovery of an amount from the respondent’s Bank account would not be the ground to draw adverse inference against respondent – workman. 7.5. Further, the findings of inquiry officer that the stolen cheque was signed by respondent-workman appears to on presumption because, it was not supported by handwriting expert’s report. Two officers who deposed about confession by the respondent –workman, were the employees of the bank. Admittedly, the complainant did not remain present before the inquiry officer. The police authority had also not appeared before the inquiry officer. Therefore, inquiry officer dropped police officer and the complainant from the departmental proceedings and, therefore, reliance placed on these evidences, is found erroneous. 7.6. In the opinion of this court, therefore, here is not a case where erroneous or irrelevant evidences were considered or the evidence not on record were considered by the Industrial Tribunal. Undisputedly, before handing over the cheque book to the customer, verification was not done with regard to cheque book having total 100 cheques. During the inquiry proceedings before the inquiry officer, no evidence was led to establish that the cheque book was given to respondent – workman containing 100 pages and thereafter one cheque was missing therefrom. 7.7. The contention raised by learned advocate for the petitioner that in this case though inquiry was held to be appropriate, the Tribunal erred in going into the findings of the inquiry officer, in the opinion of this court would not be relevant because admittedly, the Tribunal held that the inquiry was conducted as per the extant procedure. With regard to findings, the Tribunal held that the evidence considered by the inquiry officer and confirmed by the appellate authority was not sufficient enough to establish the charges levelled against the respondent and, therefore, charges were held as not proved. Thus, there is no illegality as alleged. 8. Now let me consider the decisions relied upon by learned advocates for the respective parties. Thus, there is no illegality as alleged. 8. Now let me consider the decisions relied upon by learned advocates for the respective parties. (i) In the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. vs. M. Mani, (supra) relied upon by the petitioner- Bank, it is held that “……. there was no occasion for the Labour Court to examine this issue once the departmental inquiry was held legal and proper. The Labour court committed error in holding that since the appellant failed to lead any evidence to prove the charge, the order of respondent is liable to be set aside……” The above observations were made since the sole reliance was placed on the acquittal before the trial Court. In the above context, the Apex Court held that the Labour Court ought to have confined its inquiry to examine only one limited question as to whether the punishment given to the respondent was in any way disproportionate to the gravity of charge levelled against him and the Labour Court should have examined this aspect by taking recourse to the provisions of 11 A of the Act. Thus, this decision , in the opinion of this Court would not be applicable in facts of this case, particularly when sole reliance was not made on acquittal by trial court. (ii) In the case of State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (supra), the Court while discussing the scope of judicial review has held that Bank officer committing any misconduct for his personal ends and against the interest of bank and the depositors must be dealt with iron hands without any leniency. The said decision would not be applicable in the facts of the present case since the charges are not held to be proved. (iii) In the case of Osmanbhai Aba Pandya vs. Zonal Manager, Bank of Baroda, North Gujarat Zone (supra), this Court has held that there exists a specific difference between the criminal proceedings and the charges levelled against the officers for the purpose of domestic inquiry and, therefore, there cannot be any comparison. The domestic inquiry would proceed on the principles of preponderance of probability whereas the criminal prosecution is based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. The domestic inquiry would proceed on the principles of preponderance of probability whereas the criminal prosecution is based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is the settled principle of law however; in the opinion of this Court this is not the case where reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the findings of the criminal Trial. (iv) Similar principle is laid in the decision of this Court in the case of Sureshchandra S Mehta vs. Diamines & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) (v) In the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. M.G.Vittal Rao (supra), the Court held as under: “24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry.” In the very decision on the aspect of loss of confidence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “25. Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed.” (vi) In the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (supra), in relation to confession made before the police authority it is held as under: “11. In this sense, if the appellant's confession is relevant, the fact that it was made to the police or while in the custody of the police may not be of much consequence for the reason that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmental/disciplinary enquiries. In this sense, if the appellant's confession is relevant, the fact that it was made to the police or while in the custody of the police may not be of much consequence for the reason that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmental/disciplinary enquiries. In a departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be permissible for the authorities to prove that the appellant did make such a confession admission during the course of interrogation and it would be for the disciplinary authority to decide whether it is a voluntary confession/admission or not. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the statement was indeed voluntary and true, he may well be entitled to act upon the said statement. Here, the authorities say that they were satisfied about the truth of the appellant's confession. There is undoubtedly no other material. There is also the fact that the appellant has been acquitted by the designated court. We must say that the facts of this case did present us with a difficult choice. The fact, however, remains that the High Court has opined that there was enough material before the appropriate authority upon which it could come to a reasonable conclusion that it was not reasonable practicable to hold an enquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. Nothing has been brought to our notice to persuade us not to accept the said finding of the High Court. Even a copy of the counter filed by the respondents in the High Court is not placed before us. Once proviso (b) is held to have been validly invoked, the government servant concerned is left with no legitimate ground to impugn the action except perhaps to say that the facts said to have been found against him do not warrant the punishment actually awarded. So far as the present case is concerned, if one believes that the confession made by the appellant was voluntary and true, the punishment awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The appellant along with some other caused the death of the Superintendent of Police and a few other police officials. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a situation obtaining in Punjab during the years 1990-91. The appellant along with some other caused the death of the Superintendent of Police and a few other police officials. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a situation obtaining in Punjab during the years 1990-91. Moreover, the appellate authority has also agreed with the disciplinary authority that there were good grounds for coming to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and that the appellant was guilty of the crime confessed by him. There is no allegation of malafides levelled against the appellate authority. The disciplinary and the appellate authorities are the men on the spot and we have no reason to believe that their decision has not been arrived at fairly. The High Court is also satisfied with the reasons for which the disciplinary enquiry was dispensed with. In the face of all these circumstances, it is not possible for us to take a different view at this stage. It is not permissible for us to go into the question whether the confession made by the appellant is voluntary or not, once it has been accepted as voluntary by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority.” (vii) In the case of U.P.State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Uday Narain Pandey (supra), the Court held that in relation to backwages, learned advocate submitted that it is burden of the employee to establish that he was not gainfully employed and, therefore, the backwages awarded are erroneous. 9. On the aspect of decision relied upon by learned advocate for the respondent, (i) In the case of Roopsingh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors (supra), it is held as under: “14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.” (ii) In the case of Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is for the expression like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquittal” used in the judgment are not to be understood as magic incantations. Court of law will not be carried away by mere use of such terminology. The Court further held the use of such words is to be examined by going into the judgment in its entirety and not only by the expression used. The Court further held that when the charges were not just similar but identical, and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. The findings recorded by the trial Court needs to be considered. (iii) In the case of M/s. Puri Investments vs. M/s. Young Friends and Co. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.1609 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.6516/2019) dated 23.02.2022, the Court while referring to the scope of interference by the superior Courts on decision of fact-finding forum, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “10. (iii) In the case of M/s. Puri Investments vs. M/s. Young Friends and Co. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.1609 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.6516/2019) dated 23.02.2022, the Court while referring to the scope of interference by the superior Courts on decision of fact-finding forum, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “10. In the case before us, occupation of a portion of the subject-premises by the three doctors stands admitted. What has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that once the Tribunal had arrived at a finding on fact based on the principles of law, which have been enunciated by this Court, and reflected in the aforesaid passages quoted from the three authorities, the interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was unwarranted. To persuade us to sustain the High Court’s order, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has emphasized that full control over the premises was never ceded to the medical practitioners and the entry and exit to the premises in question remained under exclusive control of the respondent(s)- tenant. This is the main defence of the tenant. We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel and also gone through the decisions of the fact-finding fora and also that of the High Court. At this stage, we cannot revisit the factual aspects of the dispute. Nor can we re-appreciate evidence to assess the quality thereof, which has been considered by the two fact-finding fora. The view of the forum of first instance was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court was conscious of the restrictive nature of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the judgment under appeal, it has been recorded that it could not subject the decision of the appellate forum in a manner which would project as if it was sitting in appeal. It proceeded, on such observation being made, to opine that it was the duty of the supervisory Court to interdict if it was found that findings of the appellate forum were perverse. Three situations were spelt out in the judgment under appeal as to when a finding on facts or questions of law would be perverse. It proceeded, on such observation being made, to opine that it was the duty of the supervisory Court to interdict if it was found that findings of the appellate forum were perverse. Three situations were spelt out in the judgment under appeal as to when a finding on facts or questions of law would be perverse. These are:- (i) Erroneous on account of non-consideration of material evidence, or (ii) Being conclusions, which are contrary to the evidence, or (iii) Based on inferences that are impermissible in law. 11. We are in agreement with the High Court’s enunciation of the principles of law on scope of interference by the supervisory Court on decisions of the fact-finding forum. But having gone through the decisions of the two stages of fact- finding by the statutory fora, we are of the view that there was overstepping of this boundary by the supervisory Court. In its exercise of scrutinizing the evidence to find out if any of the three aforesaid conditions were breached, there was re-appreciation of evidence itself by the supervisory Court.” (iv) In the case of United Bank of India vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee reported in (2022) 13 SCC 329 , while considering the scope of judicial review in the misconduct alleged the Court has held as under: “19. Other decisions have ruled that being a proceeding before a domestic tribunal, strict rules of evidence, or adherence to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 are inessential. However, the procedure has to be fair and reasonable, and the charged employee has to be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself (ref:Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana a decision followed later in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh). In Moni Shankar v. Union of India this court outlined what judicial review entails in respect of orders made by disciplinary authorities: “17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidence, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere.” The Court further relying upon the decision in the case of Roopsingh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (supra) has held as under: “26. This court previously had an occasion to deal with a departmental proceeding that culminated in a penalty, where the enquiry was based on the confessional statements made to the police and no other material. The court, in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank held such evidence to be inadequate: “15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.” 28. As far as the other two charges go, the division bench correctly held that there was no evidence to show that the respondent had removed the documents, from the bank. Importantly, he was charged seven years after the alleged incident; by that time other managers had taken over the branch. As far as the other two charges go, the division bench correctly held that there was no evidence to show that the respondent had removed the documents, from the bank. Importantly, he was charged seven years after the alleged incident; by that time other managers had taken over the branch. As regards the last charge of transferring amounts through three demand drafts from the account of Sri Madan Mohan Saha to Joint S.S. Account of Sri Haradhan Bera on 28.06.94 was concerned, the enquiry officer noted that, “Sri Haradhan Bera in his evidence avoided the matter for some reasons best known to him.” In the absence of any other material, the finding that the amounts had been misappropriated by the respondent, who in connivance with Sri Madan Mohan Saha, and Sri Subhendu Kumar Das, ensured that the loan component was returned to the bank, cannot be said to have been established.” (v) In the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Anr. vs. Superintendent of Police and Anr., reported in (29015) 2 SCC 365, while considering the honourable acquittal by the trial Court, the Court has held as under: “22. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" was discussed by this Court in detail in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram, the relevant para from the said case reads as under :- "24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted." 10. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted." 10. Thus, from the judgments referred herein above, it is noticed that it is true that when the inquiry was proceeded in accordance with the extant rules and after following due principles of natural justice, the scope of interference in relation to the punishment awarded is minimal, when the findings of the inquiry proceedings have not been challenged. In this case, respondent-workman, had challenged the findings, and therefore the Industrial Tribunal upon appreciation of evidence on record had correctly held the charges as not proved and thus interfered with the penalty by quashing and setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, in the decision in the case of Roopsingh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (supra), it is held that the inquiry officer performs the duties of quasi-judicial officer and it is his duty to arrive at a finding after taking into consideration the material brought on record by the parties. In the present case, the sole reliance by the inquiry officer was based on the evidence produced by the police authority (investigating officer) during the criminal trial. No efforts were made by the inquiry officer to cross-examine the witness and to prove the correctness of the documents produced by the investigating agency. It cannot be ignored that in the departmental proceedings on every hearing the respondent – employee appeared and denied the charges despite that no witnesses were examined by the inquiry officer. 11. This Court is conscious of the fact that acquittal in a criminal trial is not the ground for holding the charges as not proved in the departmental proceedings since both operate in different sphere. The departmental proceedings are based on preponderance of probability whereas criminal proceedings require strict proof of evidence. However, in the present case, in the opinion of this Court, it is rightly held that the inquiry officer failed in proving the charges particularly when the entire set of evidence is identical to the evidence which was led before the trial Court. The departmental proceedings are based on preponderance of probability whereas criminal proceedings require strict proof of evidence. However, in the present case, in the opinion of this Court, it is rightly held that the inquiry officer failed in proving the charges particularly when the entire set of evidence is identical to the evidence which was led before the trial Court. Further, here is not the case where some irrelevant material or some extraneous evidence has been considered by the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court has rightly held that the inquiry officer failed in establishing that it was duty of the respondent – employee for issuance of cheque book to the customer, particularly, when the complainant did not come forward as witness. 12. Further as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Puri Investments vs. M/s. Young Friends and Co. & Ors.,(supra), when the inquiry officer arrived at a conclusion which is contrary to the evidence , the Industrial Tribunal was justified in reappreciating the evidence. 13. In one more decision in the case of United Bank of India vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee (surpa), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that when no evidence was available to prove the charges, findings of the inquiry officer can be interfered with. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the interference by the Industrial Tribunal is not based on some extraneous evidence other than what has placed on record. The Industrial Tribunal after examining the evidence on record has held that the consideration of evidence by the inquiry officer confirmed by the appellate authority is erroneous and passed a reasoned order. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, no error is found in the award of the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (I.T.C.) No.26/2008 dated 29.06.2010, with regard to the finding recorded for illegal termination and, therefore, the award of the Industrial Tribunal is confirmed on the aspect of reinstatement with continuity of service. 14. However, there is no denial to the fact that against the award of Labour Court, stay was granted by this Court against implementation and execution of the award, subject to payment of wages under section 17B of the Act. Therefore, respondent had not worked with the Bank from the date of his termination. 14. However, there is no denial to the fact that against the award of Labour Court, stay was granted by this Court against implementation and execution of the award, subject to payment of wages under section 17B of the Act. Therefore, respondent had not worked with the Bank from the date of his termination. The pendency of criminal prosecution cannot be denied and, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the respondent would not be entitled for 25% backwages as awarded by the Industrial Court. 15. In view of the above, the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 29.06.2010 is quashed and set aside only in respect of 25% backwages awarded. Rest of the award for reinstatement and continuity of service is hereby confirmed. Since, wages under section 17B of the Act was directed to be paid, the amount payable pursuant to order of this Court upholding reinstatement shall be adjusted accordingly by deducting section 17B wages paid. 16. The award of the Industrial Tribunal is hereby modified to the above extent. Petition is allowed to the above extent. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. Stay granted earlier stands vacated. No costs.