ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition to quash the charge-sheets dated 08.12.2007, 24.11.2009, 10.06.2010 (Annexure P/9 to P/11), appellate order dated 05.11.2018, 05.11.2018 (Annexure P/1) by which the appeal filed by the petitioner against the punishment order of withholding of one increment without cumulative effect passed on 08.12.2007 has been rejected on the count that he has preferred an appeal after lapse of 11 years. The petitioner has also preferred writ petition against the appellate order dated 05.11.2018 (Annexure P/2) by which his appeal has been rejected on the count that he has preferred an appeal after lapse of 8 years of punishment order of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect has been passed on 24.11.2009. The petitioner has also preferred an appeal against the order dated 23.08.2010 by which punishment of one increment without cumulative effect has been rejected after lapse of 8 years of punishment order. The petitioner has also preferred writ petition against the order dated 22.01.2022 passed by Director General of Police by which his representation against the punishment order dated 08.12.2007, 24.11.2009 & 10.06.2010 has again been rejected vide impugned order. 2. The brief facts as reflected from record are that the petitioner was initially appointed on 09.11.2005 on the post of Constable. On 13/05/2007, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner alleging that he has violated sub-section (2) of clause-1 of Rule- 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and Clause-64 (3) of Police Regulation being absent unauthorizedly and subsequently respondent No. 5 vide order dated 08.12.2007 directed for withholding one increment with cumulative effect. Again, on 26.11.2009 another charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner directing him to reply within 10 days and thereafter departmental enquiry has been initiated wherein he was served with imposition of punishment of withholding one increment with cumulative effect. The petitioner was again served with chargesheet on 12.05.2009 and department enquiry was initiated against him wherein punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect was passed on 10.06.2010. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved with the imposition of punishment orders has preferred three different appeals before Director General of Police/respondent No. 4 on 22.02.2018, which were rejected on 05.11.2018 (Annexure P/1 to P/3) thereafter, he has preferred another representation on 11.08.2020, which has also been rejected on 22.01.2022 (Annexure P/4). 4. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved with the imposition of punishment orders has preferred three different appeals before Director General of Police/respondent No. 4 on 22.02.2018, which were rejected on 05.11.2018 (Annexure P/1 to P/3) thereafter, he has preferred another representation on 11.08.2020, which has also been rejected on 22.01.2022 (Annexure P/4). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that period from 2007 to 2010, the petitioner was suffering with Piles, Hepatitis B and Migraine and continued undergoing treatment with several doctors at Rajnandgaon and Raipur, due to which, he was not in a position to perform duty comfortably with good mental condition or sitting comfortably and because of the same, he had not worked properly and even he had to make himself absent from duty and not informed the authority about his absence and he was not in a position to communicate the immediate authority as the problem was beyond his control. Due to continuing ailments, he went on depression and gradually his condition became deteriorated and ultimately suffered with mental illness on account of which, he has to take leave which was the cause of his absent from duty. It has been further contended that after long treatment of about three years, ultimately he recovered from illness in year 2011 and since then he is discharging his duty with sincerity and has received several award of cash, prizes and praise. He would further submit that the impugned orders withholding of one increment of petitioner is completely bad in law and against the principles of natural justice and Police Regulations. He would further submit that the petitioner had submitted reply and representation to all the charge-sheets with medical papers but respondent No. 5 has not considered the same sympathetically and erroneously held guilty of misconduct ignoring the fact that the petitioner was actually sick. He would further submit that all the proceedings i.e. issuance of chargesheet, inquiry, show cause notice and impugned punishment have been passed during the period of petitioner's illness. Therefore, all action/decision taken by respondent authorities against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 5. He would further submit that Enquiry Officer and respondent No. 5 held that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence is willful. Therefore, all action/decision taken by respondent authorities against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 5. He would further submit that Enquiry Officer and respondent No. 5 held that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence is willful. He would further submit that the petitioner also submitted his explanation before the respondents stating that he was not willfully absent from his duty or neglected to perform his duties, which has not been considered by them. Hence the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 5 imposing punishment of withholding one increments which too continuously four times becomes vitiated and malafide, the same are unsustainable and deserve to be quashed by this Hon'ble Court. 6. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 254. 7. On the other hand, the State has submitted its reply mainly contending that the authorities have duly considered case of the petitioner and decided the same following the applicable statutory provisions in each stage. The appellate authorities have also considered the appeal following such applicable statutory provisions and the petitioner has failed to explain the delay before the appellate authority. He would further submit that this Court while exercising its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not sit as an appellate Court, re-appreciating the entire materials on record. It is also settled law that this Court would interfere in such matters only where the petitioner is able to point out any violation of any serious procedural irregularities and any prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of such irregularities. He would further submit that the police force is a discipline force, therefore, it becomes very necessary on the part of the authorities to deal with such more stringently and the reliance placed upon the police instruction by the petitioner could not be applicable in the case of the petitioner. 8. He would further submit that it is also settled law that this Court would interfere in such matter only where the petitioner is able to point out any violation of any serious procedural irregularities and any prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of such irregularities and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. 8. He would further submit that it is also settled law that this Court would interfere in such matter only where the petitioner is able to point out any violation of any serious procedural irregularities and any prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of such irregularities and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. The petitioner has also filed rejoinder to the reply submitted by the State mainly contending that the authorities are prejudice and spoiled the career of the petitioner and obstructed his promotion also and would pray for allowing the writ petition. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 11. From the above discussion, three points emerged for determination of this Court are:- (1) Whether the learned appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal vide impugned order dated 05.11.2018 (Annexure P/1 to P/3) as it has been filed after lapse of 8-9 years after imposition of punishment order on 08.12.2007, 24.11.2009, 21.08.2010 respectively. (2) Whether rejection of successive representation on 22.01.202 (Annexure P/4) can condone the delay in preferring the writ petition against the imposition of punishment way back in the year 2007 to 2010 (3) Whether this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere in quantum of punishment looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. Points No. 1 & 2 12. Since Points No. 1 & 2 are inter-connected, they are being decided jointly. 13. Record of the case would clearly demonstrate that the order of punishments were passed on 05.11.2007, 24.11.2009 & 23.08.2010 and being aggrieved with these orders, the petitioner has preferred appeal on 22.02.2018 (Annexure P/18). From perusal of Annexure P/18, it is quite vivid that there was no explanation for filing of the appeal at belated stage of eight years. The petitioner in his appeal memo has only prayed for quashing of the punishment order without any explanation for delay. It is not in dispute that the appellate authority appointed under the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rule has been empowered to condone the delay in preferring the appeal as per proviso to Rule 25 subject to satisfaction of the appellate authority that appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time. Thus, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to explain the delay. Thus, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to explain the delay. From bare perusal of the memo of appeal (Annexure P/18) it is crystal clear that there was no explanation of delay of 8 years. As such, the delay in preferring the appeal was fatal one and the appellate authority has rightly rejected the appeal on the count of delay and latches. The petitioner was served with the punishment of one increment without cumulative effect two times and one increment with cumulative effect on time way back in the year 2007 to 2010 and that period is already over. Thereafter filing of the appeal after lapse of 8-10 years rightly deserves to be rejected by the appellate authority. As such, he has not committed any illegality in rejecting the appeal as barred by limitation. 14. Record of the case would show that the petitioner’s appeal was rejected on 05.11.2018 and thereafter he has made successive representation which has been rejected on 22.01.2022 and thereafter he has filed the present writ petition on 24.02.2023 after lapse of about 4 years and 4 months after rejection of appeal on 05.11.2018. As such, also the present writ petition is barred by limitation and the subsequent rejection on 22.01.2022 cannot condone the delay. Hon’ble the Supreme Court very recently has considered the issue regarding filing of the writ petition at belated stage in case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley & others [Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024 (decided on 18.04.2024)] wherein it has been held at paragraph 9 to 13 at paragraphs 9 to 13 as under:- “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There ay be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261 ], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [ (1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969 ]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [ (1969) 1 SCC 110 ] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 ] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 ]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan and another, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invokeits extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [ (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ] . v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [ AIR 1967 SC 1450 ] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [ (1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329 ] . Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [ (1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitutionmakers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitutionmakers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 ] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litiganta litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 15. The petitioner has filed this petition on 24.02.2023 after rejection of representation on 22.01.2022 against the appellate order dated 05.11.2018 after lapse of four years and two months, as such it is belated one and also against the well settled position of law that successive representation cannot extend the limitation and condone the delay in preferring the writ petition. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Rajmati Singh reported in 2022 SCCOnline 1785 has held as under:- “20. Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the facts in this case, coupled with the legal principles cited above, we are satisfied that the claim of the respondent is stale, highly belated, time barred, and the same ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal or the High Court after a span of over three decades. 21. We reiterate that undue sympathy and a perceived liberal approach by a judicial forum can lead to significant adverse consequences. It not only gives rise to illegitimate expectations in the mind of fence sitting employees, but also leads to undue burdens on the public exchequer. Not only this, the indulgence shown by a Court solely on equitable considerations, dehors the law, breeds indiscipline in public services and incorrigible employees start looking for a dividend on the period of their absence or for dereliction of duty. While there is no evidence to suggest that the respondent deliberately absented herself from duty, the facts speak for themselves in that she failed to take any recourse provided under law for more than three decades. While there is no evidence to suggest that the respondent deliberately absented herself from duty, the facts speak for themselves in that she failed to take any recourse provided under law for more than three decades. We may say at the cost of repetition that the respondent had hardly served as an untrained teacher on temporary basis for a period of 2½ years and in terms of the impugned judgment of the High Court, she has been held entitled to get arrears of pay of more than 40 years, besides all the retiral benefits. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court ought not to have drawn adverse inferences against the appellants or put the entire onus on them to prove that the respondent was unjustifiably denied the resumption of duties. The approach of the High Court in this regard is completely erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of law. The impugned Judgment thus cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside.” 16. In view of above stated legal position and the facts of the case, it is quite vivid that the petitioner has preferred an appeal against the punishment order after 9-10 years which has been rejected on 05.11.2018 and thereafter he has filed representation which has been rejected on 22.01.2022, which cannot condone the delay. Thus, Points No. 1 & 2 deserve to be answered against the petitioner and it is held that the petition is barred by limitation and deserves to be dismissed on the count of delay and latches. Point No. 3 17. Record of the case would show that the petitioner was served with punishment of one increment without cumulative effect twice and withholding of one increment with cumulative effect once way back in the year 2007 to 2010 looking to the absentism of the petitioner. The petitioner is member of disciplined police force where the discipline is paramount consideration. The petitioner has shown total dis-subordination for remaining absent from duty and the respondents have imposed the punishment which is neither disproportionate to the misconduct of absentism committed by the petitioner nor shock from the conscious of the Court which warrants interference by this Court. The petitioner is member of disciplined police force where the discipline is paramount consideration. The petitioner has shown total dis-subordination for remaining absent from duty and the respondents have imposed the punishment which is neither disproportionate to the misconduct of absentism committed by the petitioner nor shock from the conscious of the Court which warrants interference by this Court. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that the High Court cannot exercise power of appellate authority by assessing the quantum of punishment imposed upon a Government servant as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Union of India Vs. Subrata Nath reported in 2022 SCCOnline SC 1617 has held as under:- “14. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere. 17. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Others v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569 a two Judge Bench of this Court referred to several precedents on the Doctrine of Proportionality of the order of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and held that : “21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved.” 18. Laying down the broad parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran13 held thus : “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 19. In Union of India and Others v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373 , a two Judge Bench of this Court made the following pertinent observations : “23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. 23. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. 23. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.” 24. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa and Others (supra) held that if the order of dismissal is based on findings that establish the prima facie guilt of great delinquency of the respondent, then the High Court cannot direct reconsideration of the punishment imposed. Once the gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the inquiry conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed rules and reasonable opportunity contemplated under the rules, has been afforded to the delinquent employee, then the punishment imposed is not open to judicial review by the Court. As long as there was some evidence to arrive at a conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority did, such an order becomes unassailable and the High Court ought to forebear from interfering. The above view has been expressed in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur. 21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to reconsider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.” 18. Applying the law laid down above to the instant case, I am of the view that Point No. 3 deserves to be answered against the petitioner and this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Disciplinary Authority wherein the charges levelled against the petitioner pertains to dereliction of duty. 19. Thus, the writ petition on the count of delay, successive representation cannot condone the delay and punishment is proportionate to the misconduct, deserves to be dismissed. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.