JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 17.11.2022 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Circuit Bench at Ranchi, in O.A. No. 051/000852/2018, by which, the prayer made in the original application has been declined to be entertained by rejecting the delay condonation application on the ground that the tribunal has been approached after lapse of about 8 years. 2. Mr. Niranjan Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that a detailed reason was explained before the learned tribunal showing the reason said to be sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 3. The ground has been taken that the writ petitioner was appointed and subsequent to his appointment, he was terminated vide order dated 13.03.2013. 4. The petitioner, being aggrieved with the said order, has approached to the learned tribunal by filing original application being O.A. No. 175 of 2013(R) which was disposed of vide order dated 16.05.2014, by which, the order of termination passed against the writ petitioner was cancelled with a direction upon the respondent to allow him to continue as ‘Panjania’. 5. The writ petitioner has made representation in terms of the order dated 16.05.2014 for compliance of the order passed by the learned tribunal vide his representation dated 28.05.2014. 6. The respondents had reinstated the applicant in pursuance to the order dated 16.05.2014 by the order issued in this regard on 25.06.2014. But, after one year, the respondents had issued show cause notice to the applicant on 14.10.2014 asking the writ petitioner as to why, his appointment be not cancelled, which on review by the competent authority, has found to be irregular. 7. The ground has been taken by the respondents that the provisional selection of the writ petitioner was based upon the marks secured in matriculation examination, which he has submitted issued from the JAC of the Annual Secondary Examination of the year 2010, in which, the date of birth of the writ petitioner was shown to be ‘03.10.1990’ but the actual date of birth of the petitioner is ‘03.10.1972’ and hence, as per the writ petitioner, the allegation was leveled against the petitioner of suppression of the fact. 8. 8. The writ petitioner was asked to furnish reply within 30 days vide show cause notice dated 14.10.2014, which was duly been replied vide reply dated 10.11.2014, but, the respondents had again terminated the petitioner from service vide order dated 04.12.2014. 9. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has approached the JAC for correction of his date of birth in the year, 2010, but, no decision since was taken by the JAC, hence, a writ petition was filed before this Court being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019. However, during pendency of the writ petition, the JAC has issued the corrected date of birth certificate to the applicant in the month of Oct, 2020 which was the period of lock down. 10. The copy of the corrected date of birth examination registration slip, mark sheet, admit card, provisional certificate have been supplied to the applicant/petitioner in the month of Oct, 2020. 11. The writ petitioner, thereafter, has stated that on receipt of the corrected document from the JAC, the writ petitioner has submitted representation before the respondent concerned herein on 06.11.2020, 11.02.2021 and 28.02.2022 for his reinstatement in service but, no decision has been taken which prompted the writ petitioner to approach the tribunal and accordingly, the original application was filed along with the delay condonation application under the provision of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act read with Rule 8(4) of the CAT Procedure Rule, 1987 explaining the delay. 12. It has been contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that the learned tribunal has not appreciated the fact that whatever reason was there in not approaching the tribunal, was beyond his control, since, in absence of corrected date of birth which was to be issued by the JAC, no purpose would have been fulfilled, even if the applicant would have appeared before the learned tribunal. Further, the ground of writ petition which was pending for some period as also the imposition of lock down due to the Pandemic Covid-19 was also taken as a ground to condone the delay. 13. But, the learned tribunal has considered all these reasons as not convincing to condone the delay merely by taking the note of the fact that the delay is not of days or months but of about 8 years. 14. 13. But, the learned tribunal has considered all these reasons as not convincing to condone the delay merely by taking the note of the fact that the delay is not of days or months but of about 8 years. 14. The contention has been raised that the delay irrespective of the days or months or years, the same depends upon the sufficient cause which is required to be shown by the litigant concerned for its consideration. 15. The concerned court if comes to the conclusion that the cause which has been shown to condone the delay is sufficient then irrespective of the period of delay, the delay in filing the original application, is to be condoned. 16. But, the aforesaid parameter, since, has not been followed, hence, the order passed by the learned tribunal suffers from error due to the dismissal of original application on the ground of limitation, the very issue on merit of the case of the writ petitioner, has remained un-adjudicated by which the petitioner has suffered irreparable loss and injury, which cannot be cured in future but in all time to come. 17. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Addl. S.G.I. assisted by Mr. Ravi Prakash, learned counsel for the UOI-respondent has defended the order passed by the learned tribunal. 18. It has been contended by referring to the provision of Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, wherein, the period to file original application has been provided which is one year from the date of order. 19. However, the learned tribunal has also been conferred with the power under the aforesaid provision as under Section 21(2) that if the sufficient cause will be shown then the tribunal may condone the delay. 20. Herein, the learned tribunal, taking into consideration the fact that the delay is of 8 years and hence, if the delay condonation application has been rejected, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. 21. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned tribunal in the impugned order. 22. 21. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned tribunal in the impugned order. 22. This court, before considering the legality and propriety of the impugned order, needs to refer herein the consideration which is to be made in the matter of condonation of delay, as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar and Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2014) 11 SCC 351 . 23. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. vs. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 24. In P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 25. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 26. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962) 2 SCR 762 , has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 28. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.” 28. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 29. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj and Another vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough” inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [See Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 , Parimal vs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ] 10. In Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause.” 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. [Vide Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 and Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ] 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law” stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts - The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. [See Popat and Kotecha Property vs. SBI Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Rajender Singh vs. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 and Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 ] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 . 15. In P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 30. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive.” However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. vs. Bhutnath Banerjee and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin vs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal vs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 31. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 32. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive.” 33. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the judgment particularly in the case of Basawaraj and Another vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (supra), the sufficient cause has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as has been quoted and referred hereinabove and by virtue of the aforesaid, it has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that sufficient cause if available, the delay is to be condoned in the ends of justice. 34. In view of the aforesaid position of law and adverting to the grounds of condonation of delay and for the aforesaid purpose, the prayer has been made to condone the delay as in the Misc. 34. In view of the aforesaid position of law and adverting to the grounds of condonation of delay and for the aforesaid purpose, the prayer has been made to condone the delay as in the Misc. Application being M.A. No. 723 of 2022 which has been filed under Section 21 read with Rule 8(4) of the CAT Procedure Rule 1987 before the learned tribunal, requires to be referred herein-below: “That the instant M.A. is being filed by the applicant for condoning the delay of 2521 days in preferring Original Application (O.A.) against the termination order dated 04.12.2014 vide memo no. A-1/Panjamia-BO/2011 issued by the Sub-Divisional Inspector of Social Services, Jamtara.” 35. This Court is now to consider, whether, the ground as shown by the writ petitioner in the delay condonation application, can be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay. 36. The sufficient cause has been defined by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, whereby and whereunder, the sufficient cause will be said to be a cause which pertains to the reason which is beyond the control of the litigant concerned, as also the bona-fide of the concerned litigant is to be seen as to how much the litigant concerned is vigilant in pursuing the matter by approaching the Court within the reasonable time. 37. Such notion is based upon the principle that if the litigant is loathe and he is not vigilant about his right to approach the Court by approaching the Court within reasonable time, then if any excuse has been taken said to be sufficient ground, the same cannot be said to be sufficient ground. 38. Here, it is evident from the factual aspect that the date of birth contains some infirmity as in the certificate issued by the JAC, wherein, instead of date of birth 03.10.1972, it has been referred as ‘03.10.1990’. 39. The petitioner was appointed and terminated second time on 04.12.2014. The petitioner, thereafter, has made three representations before the JAC for correction in the date of birth. 40. The JAC, even though, the statutory creation when not any decision then the writ petitioner having no option but to approach this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019. 41. The petitioner, thereafter, has made three representations before the JAC for correction in the date of birth. 40. The JAC, even though, the statutory creation when not any decision then the writ petitioner having no option but to approach this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019. 41. The said writ petition was pending and in course of pendency, the JAC on its own, has brought to the notice by way of an affidavit about the fact that the necessary correction has been made in the date of birth of the writ petitioner. 42. The petitioner has also taken ground that after receipt of the corrected certificate from the Jharkhand Academic Council, the three representations have been filed before the contesting respondents for his reinstatement. 43. One of the representations has shown to be received in the office of the concerned respondent. But, the contention which has been raised by the petitioner that no decision has been taken in this regard either way and original application was filed before the tribunal being O.A. No. 852 of 2022 along with the delay condonation application filed under Section 21 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act read with Rule 8(4) of CAT Procedure Rule, 1987. 44. The question is required to be considered herein that: “as to whether these grounds can be said to be sufficient cause or cannot be said to be sufficient cause.” 45. The other ground has been taken that by the time when the certificate was issued there was imposition of lockdown due to Pandemic Covid-19. 46. It needs to refer herein the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, wherein, the Apex Court while considering the Covid-19 pandemic has passed general order to waive out the period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 said to be not considered for the purpose of counting the period of limitation, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under: “1. Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took suo motu cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be faced by the litigants across the country in filing petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central or State). By an order dated 23.03.2020 this Court extended the period of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. The order dated 23.03.2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement. The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to normalcy. Almost all the Courts and Tribunals are functioning either physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order dated 23.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should come to an end. 2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it appropriate to issue the following directions: 1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any, shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021. 2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. 3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe periods of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. 4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. 4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services, and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications, including for legal purposes, and educational and job-related requirements.” 47. This Court, in view of the aforesaid fact is to consider the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned tribunal as to how the said reason cannot be said to be convincing and cogent to condone the delay, the reference herein is required to be made of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basanti Prasad vs. Chairman, Bihar School Exam Board and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 791 , wherein, the factual aspect of the said case was that the appellant’s husband of the said case was terminated from service on the sole ground of conviction in the criminal case by the Judicial Magistrate. 48. The facts of the aforesaid case are that the appellant’s husband was assistant in the school and for tampering with marks-sheet of several candidates, appellant’s husband was charge-sheeted and convicted by judicial magistrate. The judgment of the conviction was challenged before Additional Sessions Judge. While the appeals were pending for consideration, the Bihar School Examination Committee, Patna, by its order dated 4-8-1992 terminated the services of the appellant's husband, on the ground of conviction by judicial magistrate. 49. Thereafter, the appellant's husband expired during the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions Court, Patna. With the permission of the court, the wife (appellant) had continued to prosecute the criminal appeal. The learned Sessions Judge, Patna has allowed the appeals and thereby has acquitted the appellant's husband and others. 50. After disposal of the criminal appeal, the appellant had approached the Bihar School Examination Committee by filing representations, inter alia representing, that, since her husband has been honourably acquitted by the Sessions Court in the criminal appeal filed by him against the order of conviction passed by the Judicial Magistrate, the appellant's husband is deemed to have remained in service till the date of retirement from service and, therefore, she is entitled for all the retiral benefits of her late husband. 51. 51. Since appellant’s representations were rejected by the Board (Committee), the appellant was constrained to file the writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Patna in CWJC No. 14536 of 2005, inter alia, seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Bihar School Examination Board to settle all the monetary and service benefits payable to her late husband. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant had filed IA No. 1256 of 2007, inter-alia, requesting the Court to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order passed by the Board (Committee) dated 4-8-1992, terminating the services of the appellant’s husband on the ground that he has been convicted in a criminal case. The High Court has rejected the writ petition primarily on the ground that since the appellant's husband had not questioned the order of termination dated 4-8-1992 while he was alive and at this belated stage the appellant cannot be permitted to question the order of termination of services passed by the Board (Committee). 52. Further, the letters patent appeal filed by the appellant was rejected by the High Court on 12.07.2007 on the ground that the appellant's husband had not questioned the order of termination passed by the Board (Committee) while he was alive. The same was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein it was observed that the dismissal was in view of the order of conviction passed by the Magistrate, till that order is set aside by a superior forum, the appellant's husband or the appellant could not have questioned the same till he was acquitted by the Sessions Court. Further, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the prayer of the appellant primarily on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the appellant in questioning the order of termination passed on 4-8-1992 in a petition filed in the year 2005. Therefore, Supreme Court held that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant. 53. Adverting to the facts of the case herein also the petitioner has tried to show the sufficient cause of making representation before the JAC and when his grievance was not fulfilled he has approached to the High Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019. 54. 53. Adverting to the facts of the case herein also the petitioner has tried to show the sufficient cause of making representation before the JAC and when his grievance was not fulfilled he has approached to the High Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019. 54. The writ petition when was pending, the JAC after realizing the fact that the necessary correct is to be made as per the grievance raised by the writ petitioner, which was the subject matter of the writ petition, has rectified the date of birth mentioned in the certificate and issued a fresh certificate. 55. The writ petitioner, thereafter, was withdrawn on the ground that the grievance which was the subject matter of the writ petition, is no more require adjudication. The corrected certificate was issued by the JAC in the month of October, 2020. 56. Further, by the time, when the certificate was issued by the JAC, there was imposition of lockdown, in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as quoted and referred hereinabove, the said period was to be waived for the purpose of consideration of issue of limitation. 57. It is, thus, evident that the reason has been shown by the petitioner in the delay condonation application with respect to taking sincere endeavour for seeking necessary correction from the competent authority, i.e. JAC. The certificate was issued by the JAC belatedly that is when the writ petitioner has preferred writ petition before this Court being W.P. (S) No. 5665 of 2019, which according to the considered view, was having not in the domain of the petitioner for early disposal. However, the JAC without adjudication, has rectified the date of birth mentioned in the certificate by issuing the fresh one, which was also not within the domain of the writ petitioner. By the time, when the certificate was issued, the Pandemic Covid-19 has spread. 58. This Court, considering the aforesaid reason is of the view that the said ground cannot be said to be sufficient. But, the learned Tribunal, instead of considering the aforesaid ground, has gone into the period but not gone into by assigning the reason, i.e., the reason shown is not sufficient. 59. 58. This Court, considering the aforesaid reason is of the view that the said ground cannot be said to be sufficient. But, the learned Tribunal, instead of considering the aforesaid ground, has gone into the period but not gone into by assigning the reason, i.e., the reason shown is not sufficient. 59. This Court, is conscious with the fact that the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is having the power of judicial review, as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 , for ready reference, relevant paragraph of the said judgment needs to be referred herein, which reads hereunder as: “99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 60. The law is well settled that the power of judicial review is to be exercised if there is any error apparent on the face of the order so assailed suffers from vice of the violation of statutory provision, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission and Others vs. Abdul Halim and Others, (2019) 18 SCC 39 , wherein, at paragraph-30 it has been held as under: “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna, AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 61. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 61. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the power of judicial review is to be exercised only in the case where the manifest error is there or there is jurisdictional error, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa, (1955) 1 SCR 250 , wherein, it has been held as under: “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” 62. This Court is of the considered view as per the discussion made hereinabove that it is a case where the learned tribunal has not considered the issue of sufficient cause and merely by coming to the reason that the reason which has been shown is not convincing and cogent to condone the delay as the delay is not of day or month but is of about 8 years. 63. The learned tribunal ought to have taken into consideration the reason of delay and not the period of delay. If the reason of delay is sufficiently explained then irrespective of the period of delay, the same is to be condoned. 64. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the impugned order needs to be interfered with. 65. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 17.11.2022 passed in O.A. No. 051/000852/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside. 66. In consequence thereof, the instant writ petition stands allowed. 67. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stands disposed of. 68. The matter is remanded before the learned tribunal to decide the issue on merit in accordance with law. 69. Needless to say that any observation made hereinabove, will not prejudice the case of the parties and the learned tribunal is to take decision independently to the order passed by this Court.